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I 
ABSTRACT 
Contemporary analysis has generally accepted that amphibious warfare development in the 
United States and the United Kingdom was quite similar, if not almost identical, during the Cold 
War. So-called 'parallel courses' of similar development, which had emerged during the inter-
war years and continued to evolve during the Second World War, converged even further in the 
post-war era. This effectively culminated in national approaches (or systems) that most closely 
reflected the US Naval Service's (i.e., US Navy and Marine Corps) World War II model, which 
had been used with legendary success in the Pacific through 1945. 
However, a comparative study of American and British developments from 1945 to 1968 at the 
strategic, organisational/institutional and tactical/operational levels of analysis reveals that 
there were significant, if not fundamental, differences. These variances-which had, in fact, 
materialised during the inter-war years and were consolidated during World War II-continued 
to evolve along parallel but different courses of development. In essence, they were based on 
naval versus maritime strategies, single-service versus inter-service (or joint) 
organizations/institutions, and combined arms versus joint warfare concepts, techniques and 
doctrine. One could arguably summarise these developmental trends as being amphibious and 
expeditionary, respectively. 
Comparing these different courses of development is best accomplished by determining and 
analysing the similarly divergent evolutionary debates and changes that occurred within each 
subject country, specifically during the peacetime years when the most significant advances in 
concepts, tactics, techniques, and doctrine were made. Whilst these activities were particularly 
divisive in the late 1940s and 1950s (and even in the early 1960s), it was not until the mid-l960s 
that compromises were reached on both sides of the Atlantic, which made a convergence of 
amphibious/expeditionary warfare development apparent; but even this did not completely 
eliminate certain underlying national differences. 
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The term "amphibious operation" conjures up a myriad of famous battle scenes of which 
the 'sands of Iwo lima' and the 'beaches of Normandy' stand out as amongst the most epic. 
While the historical consensus maintains that these two operations represent very similar-if not 
almost identical-martial endeavours, closer scrutiny exposes a number of significant differences 
at the strategic, organisational/institutional and tactical/operational levels of analysis.! 
Underlying this apparent dichotomy is the fact that "amphibious warfare" per se is a 
relatively new domain of military science, having only been categorised as such in the mid-
twentieth century. Although the word 'amphibious' has been used to describe a 'Kind of 
Warfare' used to land troops on defended shores for nearly two-and-a-half centuries, the phrase 
"amphibious warfare" was not officially adopted in the military lexicon until after World War II, 
first by the Americans in 1946 and then by the British five years later as part of NATO 
standardization procedures.2 
BACKGROUND 
Whilst various forms of "amphibious warfare"-which generally consists of naval forces 
landing ground forces on hostile shores3-have been practised since ancient times,4 these types 
of operations have played a significant role throughout British and American history.5 From the 
I See, most recently, Lewis, Adrian R., Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory (Stroud: Tempus Publishing Ltd., 2004; first 
published 2001), Chapters 2 and 3. For more popular works, see Rottman, Gordon L., US World War II Amphibious 
Tactics: Army & Marine Corps, Pacific Theater, Elite 117; and US World War II Amphibious Tactics: Mediterranean 
& European Theaters, Elite 144 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2004; 2006). For an example of contemporary analysis, 
see [Thacker, Joel D.], 'The Development of Amphibious Tactics in the United States Navy (Preliminary)" 
manuscript, NL, NHHC, n.d. 
2 Ian Speller, 'The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defence Policy, 1945-64', Ph.D. dissertation, King's 
College, London, 1996,68. 
3 This later involved the use of air forces. 
4 See, for example, Vagts, Alfred, Landing Operations: Strategy, Psychology, Tactics, Politics, from Antiquity to 1945 
(Harrisburg, P A: Military Service Publishing Co., 1946; 2nd printing, 1952), Part 2: 'Ancient and Medieval 
Operations'; and Tucci, James M., 'Terra Marique: Amphibious Warfare in the Ancient World', Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2003. 
5 For an historical overview of early Anglo-American experience, see Vagts, Parts 3, 4 (201-452). For British 
experience, see 'Literature Review' for books by Creswell (Chapters I-VII), Fergusson (Chapter I), Foster (Chapter 
One), and Whitehouse (Chapters I-IV). For American experience, see books by Beaumont (Chapter I), Heinl (Chapters 
1-3), Millett (part One), Moskin (part I), Simmons (Chapters 1-7), and Whitehouse (Chapters III-IV), plus Ohls, Gary 
J., 'Roots of Tradition: Amphibious Warfare in the Early American Republic', Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Christian 
University, 5/08; Reed, Rowena, Combined Operations in the Civil War (Annapolis, MD: NIP, 1978); Millett, Allan 
R., and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New York, 
4 
seventeenth century onwards, the most significant of these enterprises were employed by both 
the British and, later, the Americans, in the form of so-called 'conjunct expeditions,.6 Simply put, 
the army and navy worked together, although most often with the latter supporting the former by 
transporting and disembarking troops and supplies ashore to conduct land campaigns (i.e., 
expeditions). Although the army also operated in support of the navy on occasion, the British and 
American institutionalisation of 'marines '-as purely naval infantry-in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, respectively, ensured that navies could be supported by small numbers of 
ground forces whenever required, although this support was inherently limited. This occasional 
(but also sometimes important) use of marines in amphibious landings notwithstanding, by the 
end of the nineteenth century, both the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) had 
generally pursued parallel and similar courses of what would most likely be referred to today as 
"expeditionary operations" (or "expeditionary warfare,,).7 
Due to varying strategic, organisational/institutional and tactical/operational changes that 
evolved during the first four decades of the twentieth century, these parallel and similar courses 
of development diverged into two parallel but different courses. In America, the US Naval 
Service,8 led by its Marine Corps-which had gained some amphibious experience from mostly 
smaller-scale, naval 'landing operations',9 embarked on a new course of 'navy-centered' 
amphibious development to counter the (naval) threat posed by Imperial Japan. 10 As such, by the 
start of World War II, what had materialised after nearly forty years of development was based 
on: an almost purely "naval" strategy, which had its theoretical roots in the Mahanian concept of 
NY: The Free Press, 1984); and Weigley, Russell F., The American Way of War: A History of United States Military 
Strategy and Policy (New York, NY: MacMillan, 1973). 
6 Thomas M. Molyneux, Conjunct Expeditions or Expeditions That Have Been Carried On Jointly by the Fleet and 
Army, with a Commentary on a Littoral War (London: printed for R & J Dodsley, 1759). 
7 See, for example, DN, HQ, USMC, MCDP 3, Expeditionary Operations (Washington, DC: DN, HQ, USMC, 
4/16/98), 1-2 - 1-6. 
8 The 'US Naval Service' is defined as the combination of the US Navy (USN) and the US Marine Corps (USMC) as 
organized within the Department of the Navy (DN). 
9 For historical examples, see Ellsworth, Harry A., (Capt., USMC), One Hundred Eighty Landings of United States 
Marines, 1800-1934: A Brief History in Two Parts, 2nd reprint (Washington, DC: H&MD, HQ, USMC, 1974; first 
published 1934; first reprinted 1964). 
10 For the US development of 'navy-centered amphibious forces' (as opposed to 'army-centered amphibious forces' 
and the British '''combined'' amphibious force'), see Potter, E. B. (CMDR, USNR), ed., The United States and World 
Sea Power (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955),576-587. 
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'Sea Power'; a "single-service" organisationaVinstitutional methodology, which involved the US 
Navy and Marine Corps acting as the Naval Service (within the Department of the Navy); and 
corresponding tacticaVoperational "combined arms" concepts, techniques, and doctrine, which 
were mirrored by a matching force structure in the form of the USMC's Fleet Marine Force 
(FMF).II 
During Wodd War II, these aspects combined to enable the seizure and defence of 
limited (island) objectives as part of a larger naval campaign, as was specifically demonstrated 
by the 'island hopping' campaign in the Central Pacific. What was most characteristic about 
these 'seizure' -type operations was that they centred on the attack in order to establish a 
beachhead ashore, which was at the same time the prerequisite and the ultimate objective for 
operational success. This was ultimately the result of the geographical setting in which they were 
employed, where the (island) objectives could be almost completely isolated by naval forces, 
thus precluding the reinforcement and/or resupply of the island defence. On the one hand, this 
meant that once a foothold or beachhead had been secured, the 'battle' had essentially been 
'won' as the attacker would eventually prevail by simple laws of attrition. On the other hand, 
however, this also meant that the defenders were frequently driven to employ a defence 'at the 
water's edge' in order to defeat any attempt at gaining said footholdlbeachhead, which inevitably 
resulted in a very determined (if not fanatical) defence but one that was largely static and 
immobile (due to the relatively small land mass sizes) as well as lacking heavy weapons and 
equipment (due to the soft beach and jungle-plus monsoon--conditions). Other related and 
distinguishing characteristics included tactical surprise, dawn/daylight landings, extensive pre-
bombardment by naval gunfire, close air support, and the use of amphibious tractors (,amtracs') 
to cross surrounding coral reefs. All of these features combined to earn these amphibious assaults 
the appropriate moniker of 'storm landings' .12 
11 Lewis, 66-70; and [Thacker], 4-16. See also MacGregor, David, 'Innovation in naval warfare in Britain and the 
United States between the fIrst and second world wars', Ph.D. dissertation, University of Rochester, 1989, Chapter IV. 
i2 Lewis, 71-76; [Thacker], 102-106; and Rottman, Elite 117. See also Alexander, Joseph R., (Col., USMC, Ret.), 
Storm Landings: Epic Amphibious Battles in the Central Pacific (Annapolis, MD: NIP, 1997). 
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Great Britain, as a small island nation with only limited resources, had historically been 
forced to rely on the combined power of her army and navy to wage war against her enemies 
overseas. With the evolution of modem warfare into three dimensions (i.e., land, sea, and air), 
this attention to what were known as 'combined operations '-which incorporated all forms of 
joint operations, including (amphibious) landings on hostile shores-only increased, although 
mostly only conceptually due to the lack of a consistent enemy and the resulting variance in 
strategic priorities amongst the Services. What resulted during the approximately same 
time frame prior to the Second World War, therefore, was based on: a "maritime" strategy, which 
had been theorised by Corbett as comprising the combined use of both the army and navy; an 
"inter-service" organisational/institutional methodology, albeit one which only involved the 
establishment of the Inter-Services Training and Development Centre (lSTDC) in 1938 to co-
ordinate the joint efforts of all three Services; and corresponding "joint warfare" operational 
concepts, techniques and doctrine, albeit ones which were only loosely accepted by the services, 
mainly in the form of 'combined operations' doctrine.13 
Nevertheless, during the Second World War, these aspects combined (or, more 
accurately, were forced to combine) to permit the seizure of effectively unlimited (continental) 
objectives as part of larger land campaigns, as was illustrated by the 'invasions' of North Africa 
and Europe during the Second World War. Also included in this class were the joint army-navy 
campaigns to invade and occupy the larger (continental-size) island land masses in the Southwest 
Pacific Area (SWP A), most notably New Guinea, Mindanao, Luzon, Borneo, and Leyte, which 
later influenced US Army views on expeditionary warfare (in contrast to the US Naval Service's 
amphibious practice).14 What was most distinguishing about these 'invasion' -type enterprises 
was that they not only depended on seizing a beachhead in the initial assault but also, and 
13 Lewis, 49-54. See also MacGregor, Chapter IV; and Massam, David R., 'British Maritime Strategy and Amphibious 
Capability, 1900-1940', Ph.D. dissertation, Oxford University (Bodleian), 1995, Chapters III, IV, VI, VII. 
14 These examples (and corresponding contrasts with the Central Pacific island/atoll objectives) were used in two 
lectures given byUS Army Brigadier General D. A. D. Ogden in 1949 and 1951. See Master Lesson Plan [Engineer 
Center and Fort Belvoir], 'Engineers in Tactical Operations', [2/18/49] (MHI Stacks: U261.0322; AHEC); and 
Adjutant General, DA, ltr to Distr., 'Lecture on "Amphibious Operations of Especial Interest to the Army" by 
Brigadier General D. A. D. Ogden', 2/19/51 (Library; NDU). 
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arguably more significantly, focused on establishing and consolidating a larger bridgehead from 
which land operations could be initiated. This was also the result of the geographical setting 
involved, where the much larger (continental-sized) objectives with their extensive coastlines 
could not be as completely isolated physically (whether by naval and/or air forces), thus allowing 
the coastal defenders to be reinforced and resupplied. On the one hand, this meant that, even 
though an initial footholdlbeachhead may have been gained, a much larger and expansive 
bridgehead was required to defeat any and all counter-attacks by enemy reinforcements (which 
also led to the occasional use of airborne troops by the invaders to penetrate deep inland). On the 
other hand, however, this also meant that the defences along the extensive coastlines were 
relatively weak (or even non-existent), which resulted in lightly opposed (or even unopposed) 
initial landings, although the available reinforcements and reserves were frequently of the heavier 
and more mobile variety (due to the conducive geography and superior transportation networks). 
Other related and distinguishing characteristics included strategic (or operational) surprise, pre-
dawn/night landings, land-based air support, limited pre-bombardment (by naval gunfire and 
strategic air), the early landing of heavy weapons and equipment (i.e., tanks, artillery, engineers, 
etc.), and massive logistical efforts and organisations. 15 
In effect, two different but still parallel types of warfare emerged between the United 
States and the United Kingdom between 1900 and 1945: amphibious and expeditionary, as 
presented below. 
SUMMARY OF NATIONAL DIFFERENCES 
Level of Analvsis United States United Kingdom 
Strategic "naval" "maritime" 
Organisational/Institutional "single service" "inter -service" 
T actical/ Operational "combined arms" 'j oint warfare" 
SUMMARY TERMS " amphibious" "expeditionary" 
15 Lewis, 55-66, Chapter 3; [Thacker], 99-102; Rottman, Elite 144; and Boose, Donald W., Jr., (Col., USA, Ret.), Over 
the Beach: US Army Amphibious Operations in the Korean War (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 
12/08),25-65. See also Ogden lectures. 
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SUMMARY, SCOPE AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Summary 
Building on these parallel but different courses, this thesis compares and contrasts 
American and British amphibious/expeditionary warfare development in the first two decades 
after World War II. Generally speaking, whilst each country underwent an initial period of 
consolidating what had emerged as distinct and different national approaches during World War 
II, a gradual convergence of these developmental courses appeared to take place. This was most 
visibly indicated by the promulgation of a 'sanitized version' of the United States' recently-
adopted joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations by NATO in 1968.16 However, as 
demonstrated by developments at primarily the organisational/institutional and 
tactical/operational levels, many underlying differences continued to remain. 
At the former level, the US Naval Service effectively retained-through bureaucratic 
infighting over service roles and missions (as well as independence )--overall responsibility for 
amphibious warfare development even though this position was repeatedly (albeit largely 
unsuccessfully) challenged by the other services, particularly by the Army. The British, whilst 
elevating their Royal Marine Commandos from the exclusive role of amphibious raiders to that 
of light amphibious infantry in the mid-1950s, amalgamated the overall responsibility for 
amphibious warfare policy and doctrinal development into a new 'Joint Warfare' organisation in 
the 1960s. At the tacticalloperationallevel, although the US armed forces had finally agreed to a 
joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations and whilst the US Army and, to a lesser extent, the Air 
Force, had both continued to develop their own amphibious doctrines, the practice of amphibious 
landings remained almost exclusively a naval domain, as demonstrated by the considerable 
expansion of naval amphibious capabilities and by the fact that the majority of such operations 
early in the Vietnam conflict were conducted exclusively by naval (amphibious) forces. In the 
UK, although the Royal Marine Commandos had been given a principal role in smaller-scale 
16 _, A TP-8, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, 1117168 (PI 946CF: Box 407; OAB, NHHC), IIa. 
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amphibious operations, these enterprises were ultimately integrated into broader "joint warfare" 
operations, in which the Commandos continued to playa central, but by no means exclusive, part 
(even as amphibious infantry). This resulted not only from the fact that the core 
'seaborne/airborne/land operations' concept was inherently joint but also because Britain's 
amphibious force structure had to rely on elements from all of the Services to conduct 
independent, self-sustaining amphibious landings. 
The convergence of these developmental trends as well as the continued existence of 
various underlying differences will be critically analysed by investigating the internal debates 
and developments that occurred within each subject country. As mentioned, in the United States, 
primary responsibility for amphibious warfare development was re-affirmed as being one of the 
primary functions of the Naval Service. The US Marines, having yet again faced the prospect of 
redundancy, were finally garnered legal recognition-and even protection-as amphibious 
assault specialists for their combat contributions in the Central Pacific. With this secured, the 
Marine Corps turned to the dual challenges of executing amphibious assaults in a nuclear geo-
strategic environment whilst also functioning as a conventional (but eventually nuclear-capable) 
'force-in-readiness'. Most significantly, the Corps advanced the concept of 'vertical 
envelopment' which centred on the use of helicopters launched from helicopter carrier ships to 
transport amphibious assault troops ashore in an air-lifted ship-to-shore movement. Not only did 
this avoid beach obstacles and defences, but it also allowed a forward-deployed, amphibious 
force to disperse as a passive defence against nuclear weapon attack. 
At the same time that these initiatives began, however, a growing debate emerged 
between the Naval Service and the Army. The latter, drawing on its own expeditionary 
experience in Europe and facing the increasing prospect of another continental enemy (were the 
Soviet Union to invade western Europe), began to question whether the former's version of naval 
'amphibious operations' or 'seizures' could be applied against a(n) (unlimited) continental foe. 
This debate was further complicated by the independence-minded Air Force, which disagreed 
10 
with the Naval Service's (and Anny's) insistence on unified command in amphibious operations 
as the latter specifically subsumed all air support forces under naval (or anny) command. As a 
result of these disagreements, the 'divergent views' of the Services became finnly entrenched 
during the 1950s, as illustrated by a failed attempt to fonnulate joint amphibious warfare doctrine 
and the concomitant promulgation of unilateral amphibious doctrine by each of the Services. 
Compromises eventually ensued, however, and what had originally been a single-service 
naval approach towards amphibious warfare appeared to expand to include the unique aspects of 
larger-scale 'joint amphibious operations' (or, more accurately, 'expeditionary operations'), 
which were employed to initiate (unlimited) land campaigns. Evidence of this shift appeared in 
the 1960s with the agreement-first between the NavylMarine Corps and the Anny, in 1962, and 
amongst these services and the Air Force in 1967-to promulgate official joint amphibious 
warfare doctrine, which had undergone various stages of inter-service negotiations for a number 
of years. This apparent progression toward 'joint warfare' was not completely validated in 
practice, however, as conventional amphibious operations conducted during the Vietnam conflict 
were perfonned almost exclusively by naval forces. 
In the United Kingdom, responsibility for 'combined operations' remained finnly vested 
in a pennanent, independent, and jointly-staffed agency after World War II, known as Combined 
Operations Headquarters (COHQ) but later renamed Amphibious Warfare Headquarters 
(A WHQ). Although early efforts were made to eliminate this entity, primarily by the Admiralty, 
fears of a reversion to the inter-war years when few concrete advances had been made in this 
field due to the specific lack of a pennanent Goint) system caused the British defence leadership 
to retain the COHQ organisation, although it had to be reduced in size due to financial 
constraints that affected the whole defence establishment. 
The reasons for retaining the COHQ seemed to be increasingly validated in the early post 
war years due to the rising threat of the Soviet Union. Although the COHQ establishment first 
focused primarily on the traditional large scale 'combined operations', it also turned its attention 
11 
to other fonns thereof, including 'raiding' and 'beach organisation' operations, in case of a 
potential return to the strategic situation similar to that of May, 1940. However, the realisation 
that more numerous and powerful nuclear weapons increasingly precluded the execution of 
large-scale, Nonnandy-type (expeditionary) "invasions" led to a distinct shift in strategy in the 
early 1950s. As a result, the British defence establishment-led by the Royal Navy-began to 
focus on how to deal with 'cold' and 'limited' war scenarios instead of a nuclear Third World 
War. What eventually emerged was a new requirement for standing, strategically-mobile 
intervention forces that could act as a deterrent and, more importantly, react quickly to limited 
contingencies from the Mediterranean to the Far East (i.e., 'East of Suez'), thereby precluding 
escalation into a wider-and potentially nuclear--conflict. Building on American conceptual 
experience, the fact that the Royal Marine Commandos had been elevated from their exclusive 
role as amphibious raiders to that of special light (amphibious) infantry, and their own limited 
(but operational) experience with the employment of helicopters as troop transports in Operation 
MUSKETEER (and later VANTAGE), the British pursued a new concept that involved the 
creation of joint (naval) task groups which centred on specially-converted 'Commando 
(helicopter) carriers' and special amphibious assault logistic shipping. These, in tum, were to be 
supported by conventional aircraft carriers. 
Although this seemed to reaffinn a shift towards a purely naval approach to amphibious 
warfare-similar to that of the United States-a few significant factors kept this change a limited 
one. The central reason stemmed from conceptual advances at the tactical/operational level 
which evolved from the joint 'seaborne/airborne/land operations' concept into the even broader 
notion of 'joint warfare'. This concept was based on the joint application of (limited) seaborne 
and airborne 'strategic mobility' assault capabilities to maximise British intervention potential, 
particularly east of Suez. This, in turn, caused a change at the higher organisational/institutional 
level where the 'combined operations' administration (fonnerly COHQ, now A WHQ) continued 
to exist, as did the specific responsibilities of the Chief of Combined Operations/Chief of 
12 
Amphibious Warfare (CCO/CA W) with regard to overall policy. Nevertheless, a new re-
organisation was undertaken, which resulted in the creation in 1962 of a 'permanent' Joint 
Warfare Committee (JWC) organisation as well as a corresponding Joint Warfare Establishment 
OWE). The entire A WHQ organisation was amalgamated into this new entity, which was 
ultimately responsible for the promulgation of amphibious operations doctrine, although under 
the broader rubric of 'joint warfare' doctrine. 
Finally, whilst the Royal Marine Commandos, as a light infantry formation, meshed well 
into this scheme, they still had to rely on supporting arms from the Army, including armour and 
artillery, plus air support from the Royal Air Force (and the Royal Navy). This, combined with 
the fact that the newest amphibious shipping was specifically designed and procured to transport 
Army heavy equipment and land it during amphibious operations, further reaffirmed that British 
amphibious concepts, doctrine and practice remained firmly rooted in a joint expeditionary 
approach. 
Scope 
This topic originated from an initial curiosity in the re-emergence of writings on strategy 
and doctrine that appeared after the end of the Cold War, particularly in America, that focused on 
such related issues as "joint operations/warfare", the operational level of war, warfare in the 
'littoral', and "expeditionary operations/warfare".17 Having first examined these issues within the 
context of the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, some fundamental 
questions emerged. These revolved around the inherent implication that these related issues-
which naturally included amphibious warfare-were something revolutionary or even novel, and 
therefore deserving of special attention. 
Regarding the significance of 'joint operations/warfare", one only has to tum to eminent 
strategist Colin S. Gray, amongst others, for a clear enunciation of its central importance in 
military history: 'War is a team enterprise. No matter how fashions in doctrine and military 
17 One of the most outstanding examples of this, at least from an American point of view, is exemplified by the 
appearance of the periodical Joint Forces Quarterly (JFQ), the first issue of which was published in 1992. 
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organization have evolved, the historical reality has been one of joint, if frequently ill-
combined-land-sea or sea-Iand--effort in the quest for strategic advantage' .18 In a similarly 
unambiguous way, Dr. Alfred Vagts, writing in 1952, makes a direct connection among 
(amphibious) landing operations, warfare in the littoral, and war in general. 
Geographically considered, wars may be classified according to the tendency to wage 
them on land, or on the sea, or on both, as either continental, naval or littoral (from litus-
shore). Littoral war as here understood is the war fought across the shore lines of the 
territories of one, or more participants. War is nearly always either littoral, or 
continental, so much so in fact that probably the majority of sea battles have been fought 
in sight of land ... [T]here can be no war only on the sea, or only in the air. All war is 
land based and war inherently demonstrates the strongest possible tendency towards 
landing operations. 19 
In view of the above observations and commentary, it is not surprising that much of the 
aforementioned post-Cold War analysis harkens back to the various Allied amphibious 
operations of World War II, which remains the historical apex of modem (i.e., twentieth century) 
joint, littoral and amphibious/expeditionary warfare practice.2o Similarly, it is also no surprise 
that post-Cold War analyses tend to focus on the few (but significant) amphibious/expeditionary 
operations that occurred during the post-World War II war era as they appear to be the primary 
sources of information by which further insight into these fields can readily be acquired?1 What 
is somewhat puzzling, however, is the lack of analysis of the peacetime years surrounding these 
particular post-war operations, particularly when a similar peacetime period such as the inter-war 
years has been so revealing?2 These peacetime intervals between 1945 and 1968 are exactly what 
18 Gray, Colin S., The Leverage of Sea Power (New York, NY/Toronto: The Free Press, 1992), 278. 
19 Vagts, 1. See also Beaumont, Roger A., Joint Military Operations: A Short History, Contributions in Military 
Studies, Number 139 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), 1, which cites Vagts' work amongst his references. 
20 See, for example, works by Beaumont, Boose, and Speller/Tuck, amongst others, as discussed below. 
21 These operations, prior to the Vietnam War, include CHROMITE (Inchon, 1950), MUSKETEER (Suez, 1956), 
BLUE BAT (Lebanon, 1958), VANTAGE (Kuwait, 1961), POWER PACK (Dominican Republic, 1965), and the 
planned invasion of Cuba (1962). 
22 See, for example, Atwater, William F., 'United States Army and Navy Development of Joint Landing Operations, 
1898-1942', Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1986; Clifford, Kenneth J., (Col., USMCR), Amphibious Waifare 
Development in Britain and Americafrom 1920-1940 (Laurens, NY: Edgewood, Inc., 1983); MacGregor, 
'Innovation', 1989; Massam, 'British', 1995; Millett, Allan R., 'Assault from the sea: The development of amphibious 
warfare between the wars - The American, British and Japanese experiences' in Murray, Williamson, and Allan R. 
Millett, (eds.), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1998; first 
published 1996), Chapter 2; Millett, Alan R., and Williamson Murray, (eds.), Military Effectiveness, Vol. II: The 
Interwar Period (Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1988), Chapters 3, 4,8; Moy, Timothy D., 'Hitting the beaches and 
bombing the cities: Doctrine and technology for two new militaries, 1920-1940', Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
California, Berkeley, 1992. See also Bittner, Donald F., 'Britannia's Sheathed Sword: The Royal Marines and 
Amphibious Warfare in the Interwar Years-A Passive Response', JMH, 55 (7/91),345-364; Clifford, Kenneth J., 
'Anglo-American Interwar Amphibious Doctrine, 1920-1940' in Reynolds, Clark G., and William J McAndrew (eds.), 
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this thesis sets out to examine and analyse, which should provide a valuable addition to (and fill a 
gap in) the existing literature. 
Literature Review 
Secondary sources that address post-World War II amphibious/expeditionary warfare 
development can generally be divided into two main categories. The first consists of topical 
histories related to or involving amphibious/expeditionary warfare and/or operations and includes 
navy, marine and joint operations/warfare histories. The second category entails works that focus 
specifically on amphibious/expeditionary warfare development and practice and consists of 
general historical surveys (part of which cover the early Cold War period) as well as specific 
post-Second World War analyses. 
Navy Histories 
For the Royal Navy (RN), most of the established literature exists III the form of 
popular-and frequently informative-survey histories that describe amphibious/expeditionary 
warfare generally and certain operations in particular. James Stokesbury, for instance, covers a 
very broad timeframe but therefore devotes only a single chapter (out of seventeen) to the post-
World War II era?3 Richard Humble uses more than two-thirds of his work to do SO,24 but does 
not examine amphibious matters very specifically. Both Cecil Hampshire25 and Desmond 
Wettern,26 devote their entire texts to the Cold War and offer a wealth of factual information. 
Covering the same Cold War timeframe but based predominantly on primary sources is Eric 
Grove's Vanguard to Trident,27 which has for some time been considered as the standard 
reference for the post-war Royal Navy. Considerable attention is paid to the evolution of 
1973 Seminar in Maritime and Regional Studies (Orono, ME: University of Maine Press, 1974),85-93; and 
MacGregor, David, 'The Use, Misuse, and Non-Use of History: The Royal Navy and the Operational Lessons of the 
First World War', JMH, 56:4 (10/92), 603-615. 
23 Stokesbury, James, Navy and Empire: A Short History of Four Centuries of British Sea Power and Its Influence 
Upon Our World (New York, NY: William Morrow and Co., 1983). 
24 Humble, Richard, The Rise and Fall of the British Navy (London: Queen Anne Press, 1986). 
25 Hampshire, A. Cecil, The Royal Navy Since 1945: Its Transition to the Nuclear Age (London: William Kimber & 
Co., 1975). 
26 Wettem, Desmond, The Decline of British Sea power (London: Jane's Publishing Co., Ltd., 1982). 
27 Grove, Eric J., Vanguard to Trident: British Naval Policy Since World War 11 (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 
1987). 
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amphibious capabilities as well as to policy-related developments, all of which provides an 
insightful perspective of the role of amphibious warfare within British post-war defence and 
naval policy. A slightly narrower assessment of the first decade of the Cold War-and one that 
covers US naval developments in parallel-is Norman Friedman's The Postwar Naval 
Revolution,28 which takes more of a thematic approach; an analysis of amphibious forces is 
deliberately excluded, however, because they ostensibly 'experienced their most dramatic 
development later' .29 Finally, mention should be made here of certain older historical 
assessments by Peter Gretton/o L. Martin,31 Stephen Roskill/2 and B. Schofield33 which, because 
they provide varying degrees of insight into the contemporary debate, are treated in this 
dissertation more so as (published) primary rather than secondary sources. A necessary inclusion 
in this latter group is William Crowe's doctoral dissertation, which covers the development of 
RN policy through 1963.34 
A very similar distribution of secondary works exists with regard to the post-war United 
States Navy (USN), a number of which were published in the early 1990s. Although Stephen 
Howarth's survey history35 only has four chapters that cover the 1945-1968 timeframe, more 
thorough and informative works that address the Cold War exclusively are those by Michael 
Isenberg,36 Robert Love, Jr./7 and, most recently, Lisle Rose,38 all of which provide valuable 
28 Friedman, Norman, The Postwar Naval Revolution (Annapolis, MD: NIP, 1986). 
29 Friedman, Naval Revolution, 6. 
30 Gretton, Peter, Maritime Strategy: A Study of British Defence Problems (London: Cassell, 1965). 
31 Martin, L. W., The Sea in Modem Strategy, Studies in International Security: 11 (Washington, DC, & New Yorlc, 
NY: Frederick A. Praeger for ISS, 1967). 
32 Roskill, S.W., (Capt., RN, Ret.), The Strategy of Sea Power: Its Development and Application (London: Collins, 
1962). 
33 Schofield, B. B., (V ADM, RN), British Sea Power: Naval Policy in the Twentieth Century (London: B. T. Batsford, 
Ltd., 1967). 
34 Crowe, William J., Jr., (Cmdr., USN), 'The Policy Roots of the Modem Royal Navy, 1946-1963', Ph.D. 
dissertation, Princeton University, 1965. 
35 Howarth, Stephen, To Shining Sea: A History of the United States Navy, 1775-1991 (New York: Random House, 
1991). 
36 Isenberg, Michael T., Shield of the Republic: The US Navy in an Era of Cold War and Violent Peace, Volume /, 
1945-1962 and Volume IL 1962-1992 (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1993). 
37 Love, Robert W., Jr., History of the US Navy, Volume Two, 1942-1991 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpol~ Bo~ks, 1992). 
38 Rose, Lisle A., Power at Sea, Volume 3: A Violent Peace, 1946-2006 (Columbia, MSlLondon: Umversity of 
Missouri Press, 2006). 
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contextual background. Probably the best secondary account is that by George Baer39 which, 
although covering a century's worth of US Navy history, does so by providing constructive 
strategic context as well as perceptive defence and naval policy analysis, similar to that of 
Grove's work on the RN. One last source that deserves recognition is another book by Norman 
Friedman40 which, whilst focusing on modem US amphibious shipping design and production, 
adds to the evolutionary analysis of underlying post-war naval policies. Finally, mention should 
be made here of an older historical survey of the USN, edited (and co-authored) by E. B. Potter41 
which, as with some British sources mentioned above, is treated here as more of a (published) 
primary than a secondary source (albeit mainly for definitional purposes). 
Marine Histories 
Generally speaking, marine histories, whilst addressing a number of naval aspects of 
amphibious/expeditionary operations-like their navy history counter-parts, tend to do so in 
relative isolation from any evolutionary trend. Beginning with the Royal Marines (RMs), there 
are three popular survey histories worth noting, a relatively recent work by Richard Brooks,42 an 
older account by James Moulton,43 and an engaging and insightful narrative by Julian 
Thompson.44 The slightly narrower subject of the Royal Marine Commandos is addressed by two 
other popular but basic works, one by former commando Robin Neillands45 and the other by John 
Parker.46 A much more comprehensive and instructive account-not to mention also an 
39 Baer, George, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The us Navy, 1890-1990 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1993). 
40 Friedman, Norman, US Amphibious Ships and Craft: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, MD: NIP, 2002). 
41 Potter, E. B. (CMDR, USNR), ed., The United States and World Sea Power (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1955). 
42 Brooks, Richard, The Royal Marines: 1664 to the Present (London: Constable & Robinson, Ltd., 2002). 
43 Moulton, James L. (Maj-Gen, RM, Ret.), The Royal Marines, rev. edn. (Eastney: The Royal Marines Museum, 
1981; first published by Leo Cooper Ltd., 1972). 
44 Thompson, Julian [Maj-Gen, RM, Ret.], The Royal Marines: From Sea Soldiers to A Special Force (London: Pan 
Books, 2001). 
45 Neillands, Robin, By Sea and Land: The Royal Marines Commandos - A History, 1942-1982 (London: George 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, Ltd., 1987). 
46 Parker, John, Commandos: The Inside Story of Britain's Most Elite Fighting Force (London: Headline Book 
Publishing, 2000). 
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'authorised history'-is presented by James Ladd,47 who addresses various but limited aspects of 
amphibious development. 
Regarding the United States Marine Corps (USMC), two popular survey histories, an 
older one by a former director of the Marine Corps History and Museums Division, Brigadier 
General Edwin H. Simmons,48 and an updated and very lengthy one by J. Robert Moskin,49 
supply some very good background information. By far the highest quality source, however, is 
Allan R. Millett's institutional history,50 the second edition of which appeared in 1991. Using a 
considerable amount of primary materials, this book provides some valuable historical context 
with regard to the role of the US Marines in American military history, particularly their parallel 
development as 'colonial infantry' and an 'amphibious assault force' during the pre-World War 
II period.51 Two additional works, published in 1962 and 1967, could perhaps be viewed as 
(published) primary sources. On the one hand is an authoritative and very detailed history by US 
Marine Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr.;52 on the other is an institutional 'snapshot' by another 
Marine Colonel, James Donovan,53 which provides an insightful contemporary perspective, 
including a brief discussion on the role of marines in joint operations. 
Joint OperationslW ar/are Histories 
The last sub-category of related topical histories consists of a few works that address 
amphibious/expeditionary operations (and/or warfare) through the holistic prism of 'joint 
operations/warfare". Foremost amongst these is a survey history written by Roger Beaumont,s4 
although only one chapter is devoted to the entire 1943-1991 period. Another more recent-but 
47 Ladd, James D., By Sea, By Land: The Royal Marines, 1919-1997, rev. edn. (London: HarperCollinsPublishers, 
1998; first edition published in 1980 as The Royal Marines, 1919-1980). 
48 Simmons, Edwin H. (Brig. Gen, USMC, Ret.), The United States Marines: The First Two Hundred Years, 1775-
1975 (New York, NY: Viking Press, 1976; first published 1974). 
49 Moskin, J. Robert, The US Marine Corps Story, 3d Revised Edn. (Boston, MA: Konecky & Konecky and Little 
Brown and Company,1992; first published 1977). 
50 Millett, Allan R., SEMPER FIDELIS: The History of the United States Marine Corps, rev. edn., The Macmillan 
Wars of the United States, Louis Morton, Gen. Ed. (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1991; first published 1980). 
51 See Part Two: 'Colonial Infantry, 1899-1941' and Part Three: 'Amphibious Assault Force, 1900-1945', respectively. 
52 Heinl, Robert D., Jr. (Col., USMC), Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962, 2nd edn. 
(Baltimore, MD: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1991; originally published 1962). 
53 Donovan, James A., Jr., (Col., USMC, Ret.), The United States Marine Corps, Praeger Library of US Government 
Departments and Agencies (New YorkILondon: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967). 
54 Cited above, 14. 
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not widely disseminated-publication, by Stuart Griffin,55 analyses a number of operational case 
studies, ranging from 'Gallipoli, 1915-16' to 'Sierra Leone, 1999-Present', although only one 
('Suez, 1956') falls within the timeframe under examination here. A similar but less analytical 
work, produced by the US Joint Chiefs of Staffs Joint History Office, 56 also has only one case 
study (i.e., the 1950 landing at Inchon) that falls between 1945 and 1968, with all of the 
remaining instances ( except one) involving operations from 1983 onward. One final and very 
pertinent study worth mentioning is one by Neville Brown57 that will be treated as more of a 
primary (published) source as it appeared back in 1963. This work examines almost every major 
post-war amphibious/expeditionary operation performed by both the US and the UK, specifically 
from the joint perspective of 'strategic mobility'. 
Historical Surveys 
The first sub-group of secondary works that focus specifically on 
amphibious/expeditionary operations consists of general historical surveys that also cover the 
early Cold War period. Of the more popular works, two are illustrated-type books by Barry 
Gregory58 and co-authors Norman Polmar and Peter Mersky,s9 while one is a 'classic' historical 
case-study survey by Simon Foster,60 although the only relevant operation it covers is the Inchon 
landing. A similarly limited historical survey is a 1996 study by retired US Marine Colonel Ted 
Gatchel,61 although it is unique in that it covers purely defensive aspects of amphibious 
operations. Two additional sources of varying quality are edited volumes. The older of these, 
edited by Merrill Bartlett,62 is a straightforward collection of previously published articles and 
55 Griffin, Stuart, Joint Operations: A Short History (UK: Training Specialist Services HQ, 2005). 
56 [OCJCS], Joint Military Operations Historical Collection (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 7/15/97). 
57 Brown, Neville, Strategic Mobility, Studies in International Security: 7 (London: Chatto & Windus for ISS, 1963). 
58 Gregory, Barry, Amphibious Operations (London/New York, NY/Sydney: Blandford Press, 1988). 
59 Polmar, Norman, and Peter B. Mersky, Amphibious Warfare: An Illustrated History (London/New Y orkiSydney: 
Blandford Press, 1988). 
60 Foster, Simon, Hit the Beach! The Drama of Amphibious Warfare (London: Cassell PLC, 1998; first published 
1995). 
61 Gatchel, Theodore E. (Col., USMC, Ret.), At the Water's Edge: Defending Against the Modern Amphibious Assault 
(Annapolis, MD: NIP, 1996). 
62 Bartlett, Merrill L. (Lt. Col., USMC, Ret.) (ed.), Assaultfrom the Sea: Essays on the History of Amphibious Warfare 
(Annapolis, MD: NIP, 1983). 
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essays. A much more recent work, edited by Tristan Lovering63 as an academic text for British 
military personnel, is an expansive volume of thoroughly researched (original) essays that 
provide fresh perspectives on a number of relevant Cold War era operations. One last group of 
sources consists of contemporary publications. General accounts by John Creswell64 and Arch 
Whitehouse65 are straightforward historical surveys, with the latter only barely addressing Cold 
War operations. Three more focus primarily on the Second World War, with Royal Air Force 
(RAF) Vice Marshal E. 1. Kingston McCloughry66 addressing certain command issues, and 
Bernard Fergusson67 and L. E. H. Maund68 (two central Second World War actors) providing 
detailed and insightful accounts of the Combined Operations organisation's performance during 
the war (and somewhat thereafter). 
AmphibiouslExpeditionary Analyses (post-World War II) 
The second sub-group of specifically amphibious/expeditionary-focused works consists 
of those that expressly examine the post-war development of amphibious/expeditionary warfare 
in the UK and the US, or both. Until very recently, there were only a few that covered 
developments by the US Naval Service (i.e., mostly the Marine Corps) exclusively. Whilst 
published in the 1970s and therefore perhaps a bit outdated, these works were extremely valuable 
because of their foundation on 'official' (primary) US Marine Corps and Navy documentation, 
some of which was difficult to locate and re-examine. Foremost amongst these is Kenneth 
Clifford's monograph Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States 
Marine Corps, 1900-1970,69 which describes the decade-by-decade development of the Marine 
Corps in the modem era and which focuses heavily various naval aspects of amphibious 
63 Lovering, Tristan T. A., (Lt. Cdr., RN), (ed.), Amphibious Assault: Manoeuvre from the Sea - Amphibious 
Operationsfrom the Last Century [London: Ministry of Defence, 2005]. 
64 Creswell, John (Capt., RN), Generals and Admirals: The Story of Amphibious Command (London: Longmans, 
Green & Co., 1952) 
65 Whitehouse, Arch, Amphibious Operations (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1963). 
66 Kingston McCloughry, E. J., (Vice-Marshal, RAF), The Direction of War: A Critique of the Political Direction and 
High Command in War (New York, NY: FrederickA. Praeger, Inc., 1955). 
67 Fergusson, Bernard, The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Operations (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
1961). 
68 Maund, L. E. H. (RAdm., RN, Ret.), Assaultfrom the Sea (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1949). 
69 Clifford, Kenneth J. (Lt. Col., USMCR), Progress and Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States 
Marine Corps 1900-1970 (Washington, DC: H&MD, HQ, USMC, 1973). 
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operations. This work is complemented by a similarly-researched two-volume Marines and 
Helicopter series, which covers the 1945-1962 and 1962-1973 periods, respectively.70 Due to the 
fact that the Marine Corps' amphibious development revolved around the helicopter, these 
accounts expand upon and deepen the core analysis provided by Clifford. Whilst all of these 
volumes are based chiefly on primary source evidence (and are therefore featured prominently 
when analysing American naval developments), the one drawback central to all three-at least 
with regard to examining American development as a whole-is that they tend to marginalise, if 
not ignore, the contributions of the other services. Having said that, the December 2008 release 
of Donald Boose's monograph, Over the Beach: US Army Amphibious Operations in the Korean 
War,71 represents a significant balance to an otherwise naval service-dominated field of research 
and analysis. Whilst extremely detailed and therefore quite illuminating it focuses almost 
exclusively on Korean War operations and does not address US Air Force (USAF) developments 
in any detail. On that note, the only secondary source relating to the Air Force's development of 
amphibious/expeditionary warfare is an extremely detailed but broad historical survey on 'basic 
thinking' in the USAF by Robert Futrell,n which includes some valuable information on the 
evolution of joint and air force amphibious doctrine, not to mention also joint doctrine in general. 
High-quality, secondary works that examine British amphibious/expeditionary warfare 
development specifically during the first two decades of the Cold War have been confined-for 
all intents and purposes-to a single author, Ian Speller. His work on the subject spans nearly 
fifteen years and has arguably gone through three evolutionary phases over time. The first phase 
is represented primarily by his 2001 book, The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defence 
Policy, 1945-1956,73 which is based on the first half of his 1996 Ph.D. dissertation.74 In it, Dr. 
70 Rawlins, Eugene W., (Lt. Col., USMC), and William J. Sambito, (Maj., USMC), Marines and Helicopters, 1946-
1962 (Washington, DC: H&MD, HQ, USMC, 1976); Fails, William R., (Lt. Col., USMC), Marines and Helicopters, 
1962-1973 (Washington, DC: H&MD, HQ, USMC, 1978). 
71 Boose, Donald W., Jr., (Col., USA, Ret.), Over the Beach: US Army Amphibious Operations in the Korean War (Ft. 
Leavenworth, KS: CSI Press, 12/08). 
72 Futrell, Robert F., Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 2 Vols. [1907-1984], 
2nd edn. (Maxwell AFB, AL: AUP, 12/89; first published 1971). 
73 Speller, Ian, The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defence Policy, 1945-1956 (BasingstokeiNew York, NY: 
Palgrave, 2001). A condensed but more nuanced assessment is provided in chapter form as 'The Role of Amphibious 
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Speller concludes that British development underwent a fundamental transformation from being 
an inter-service responsibility to a single-service one which, in tum, reflected the US 
arrangement at the time.75 Speller's second phase of analysis consists mainly of a few chapters in 
edited books which, whilst re-affIrming his initial conclusions in one case,76 increasingly outline 
the joint aspects of British development as they evolved during the post-1956 era,77 many of 
which had been introduced in the author's dissertation.78 By the time of Speller's latest work, 
which encompasses two articles written in 2006 and 2008/9 respectively, mention of the initial 
works' conclusions is conspicuously de-emphasised, if not absent altogether. There is, however, 
an increasing concentration on the joint aspects of amphibious operations, most notably in the 
fIeld of doctrine-which was largely missing in his 200 I book8°-not to mention also on the 
concept of 'expeditionary warfare' (although this is not specifIcally defIned). It is with most of 
these latter observations that this thesis is in agreement and, as such, will attempt to synthesise 
them into a comprehensive (but slightly revised) representation of the British approach toward-
and practice of-amphibious/expeditionary warfare between 1945 and 1968. 
Only three secondary sources have attempted to compare and contrast American and 
British developments explicitly as part of a wider examination to assess the evolution of post-war 
amphibious/expeditionary warfare. The fIrst of these is a relatively recent popular work by the 
aforementioned Ian Speller and Christopher Tuck, titled Amphibious Warfare: The Theory and 
Warfare in British Defence Policy, 1945-2000' in Till, Geoffrey, (ed.), SEAPOWER at the Millenium (phoenix 
MilVThrupp/Stroud: Sutton Publishing Ltd., 2001),84-94. 
74 Speller, Ian A., 'The Role of Amphibious Warfare in British Defence Policy, 1945-64', Ph.D. dissertation, King's 
College London, London, 1996. 
75 See, Role, Chapter 3, especially 98; 'Role', Chapter 3. 
76 Speller, Ian, 'Amphibious operations 1945-1998' in Harding, Richard (ed.), The Royal Navy, 1930-2000: Innovation 
and Defence (LondonlNew York, NY: Frank Cass, 2005), 213-245. 
77 See 'The Royal Navy, expeditionary operations and the End of Empire, 1956-75' in Kennedy, Greg, (ed.), British 
Naval Strategy East of Suez 1900-2000: Influences and Actions (LondonlNew York, NY: Frank Cass, 2005), 178-198, 
which originated as 'Amphibious Renaissance: The Royal Navy and the Royal Marines, 1956-66', IJNH, 1:1 (4/02), 
online at www.ijnhonlinc.orglarchives.html. 
78 Speller, 'Role', Chapters 6-8. 
79 See 'The Seaborne/Airborne Concept: Littoral Manoeuvre in the 1960s?', JSS, 29:1 (2.06),53-82; and 'Corbett, 
Liddell Hart and the "British Way in Warfare" in the 1960s', DS, 8:2 (6.08), 227-239. 
80 For this observation, see a book review by J. Sills O'Keefe in JMH, 67: 1 (1/03),292-293. 
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Practice of Amphibious Operations in the 20th Century,81 which presents a well-balanced and 
succinct overview of modem advances using twentieth century 'case studies', although only two 
(out of a total of fifteen) comprise operations between 1945 and 1968. A more detailed work is 
Sea Soldiers in the Cold War: Amphibious Warfare, 1945-1991, which is co-authored by two 
retired USMC officers, Joseph Alexander and Merrill Bartlett.82 While claiming to be 'an 
operational history of amphibious warfare in the Cold War, principally as defined by the two 
superpowers, their allies, and surrogates', only two ofa total of6l pages of text dealing with the 
post-war period through the Vietnam conflict addresses British developments and practice. This 
appears to result from a presumption that the British Royal Marines evolved into an amphibious 
assault formation just like their American counterparts, the US Marines. Furthermore, and 
perhaps due to their backgrounds, the authors tend to marginalise the contributions of other 
services with regard to amphibious/expeditionary warfare development. Indeed, this standpoint 
seems to be exemplified by the authors' interpretation of an oft-quoted statement by US Army 
General (and first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) Omar Bradley when, in 1949, he 
appeared to (mistakenly) proclaim the obsolescence oflarge-scale amphibious operations due to 
the advent of the atomic bomb, almost exactly one year prior to the famous amphibious landing 
at Inchon.83 What is not mentioned, however, not only by these particular co-authors but also by 
a few others who bring up Bradley'S statement, is that US Marine Corps Brigadier General Roy 
S. Geiger, in almost identical language, made the same pronouncement three years beforehand. 84 
81 Speller, Ian and Christopher Tuck, Amphibious Warfare: The Theory and Practice of Amphibious Operations in the 
2dh Century, Strategy and Tactics series (St. Paul, MN: MEl Publishing Co., 2001). 
82 Alexander, Joseph H., (Col., USMC, Ret.), and Bartlett, Merrill L., (Lt. CoL, USMC, Ret.), Sea Soldiers in the Cold 
War: Amphibious Waifare 1945-1991 (Annapolis, MD: NIP, 1995). 
83 AlexanderlBartlett, 1. 
84 See, for example, Heinl, Soldiers, 530, 536; Heinl, Victory at High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Campaign (philadelphia, 
PAINewYork, NY: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1968), 3; Isenberg, Shield, VoL I, 1945-1962, 157; Krulak, Victor H., (Lt. 
Gen., USMC, Ret.), First to Fight: An Inside View of the US Marine Corps (Annapolis, MD: NIP, 1984),71; Love, 
Volume 11,1942-1991,335; and Simmons, Marines, 180. Both Heinl (Soldiers) and Simmons are doubly misleading 
as they cite Geiger's quote but leave out the specific language that mirrors Bradley's. For an example of an accurate 
quotation of Geiger, see Till, Geoffrey, (with others), Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: 
St. Martin's Press, 1984; first published 1982), 199. For an interpretation of the true meaning of Bradley's statement 
(in an endnote), see Baer, 507-508, who also mentions Geiger's quote in a separate endnote (and cites Till for it), 507. 
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The last-and probably most significant-source is Michael Evans' Amphibious 
Operations: The Projection of Sea Power Ashore85 which, while only partially devoted to the 
early Cold War era, nevertheless identifies a few central themes that will be expanded upon in 
this thesis. One of them, which is specifically introduced in the 'Foreword' by Major-General 
Julian Thompson, RM, centres on debunking the popular myth that 'amphibious operations are 
the exclusive preserve of the Royal Marines, or indeed any other marines'. 86 As will be seen, this 
attitude reflects a distinctively British approach toward amphibious/expeditionary warfare (i.e., 
'combined operations') that is traditionally joint in nature. Although the text itself claims to be 
'essentially a British view', it outlines and examines a number of significant differences between 
British and American conceptions and practice that originated during the inter-war and World 
War II years and evolved afterwards. On the one hand, this involved recognising the central 
importance of such aspects as 'Strategy', 'Doctrine' and 'Organisation, Training and Equipment' 
in the American formulation of amphibious forces and doctrine during the inter-war years as well 
as the significance of the 'Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ)' establishment and the 
'Warfare is Joint' axiom in the British development and practice of 'combined operations' before 
and during the Second World War. 87 On the other hand, it entailed ascertaining British and 
American definitions of 'amphibious operations'. Although general similarities (as well as a few 
minor variances) are quite apparent, the author isolates and emphasises the source of a 
fundamental divergence, already mentioned above. 
The main difference ... concems this focus of an amphibious operation, the assault, 
which is at once the culmination of the maritime phase and the start of the land 
campaign. Although most amphibious forces use the term assault to describe the 
landing, it has degrees of emphasis in interpretation which are central to an 
understanding of the conduct of this form of warfare. 88 
Whilst the author then points out that the degree of opposition on the beach is an important 
element, he unfortunately does not follow up on his observations by providing a comprehensive 
85 Evans, Michael H. H., (Col., RM), Amphibious Operations: The Projection of Sea Power Ashore, Brassey's Sea 
Power: Naval Vessels, Weapons Systems and Technology Series, Volume 4 (London: Brassey's, 1990). 
86 Evans, xix. See also Thompson, Julian, (Maj-Gen., RM), 'The Royal Marines and Amphibious Operations in the 
Twentieth Century', RUSIJ, 145:4 (8.00),15. 
87 Evans, 22-28. 
88 Evans, 10. Emphasis added. 
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account of the most distinctively significant features between American and British approaches 
(not to mention also intra-national differences) and how they evolved over the course ofthe early 
Cold War period. It is this missing assessment that this dissertation aims to provide. 
STRUCTURE, SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
Structure 
In covering the 1945-1968 period, this dissertation builds on the structural framework of 
what has become a standard reference work for the pre-1945 era. Written by the aforementioned 
Kenneth Clifford (and based upon his master's thesis), Amphibious Warfare Development in 
Britain and America, 1920-194089 uses a chronological narrative to examine the 'parallel 
courses' of British and American development of amphibious/expeditionary warfare during 
sequential phases of the inter-war period and stretching into the World War II.9o 
This thesis follows a similarly-organised chronological structure, but beginning in 1945. 
The main body is divided into three sequential 'Parts', covering the 1945-1950, 1950-1957, and 
1957-1968 periods, respectively, which represent distinct phases in the evolution of American 
and British development. Each 'Part' consists of two chapters--one for each subject country-
plus an opening comparative summary. Each chapter, in turn, details and assesses the varying 
courses of development within each country. 
The chapters are further divided into three main sections-which represent the strategic, 
organisational/institutional, and tactical/operational levels of analysis-in order to simplify the 
overall comparative analysis. Along these lines, it should be pointed out that the organisation of 
the tactical/operational sub-sections are specifically arranged to reflect the divergent (but 
parallel) courses of internal debate taking place within America and Britain, respectively. To that 
end, American development is assessed by addressing 'naval' advances on the one hand, and 
'joint' developments-which include the individual contributions of the Army and Air Force-
89 See footnote 22. 
90 The phrase 'parallel courses' is borrowed from the title of Clifford's master's thesis, 'On Parallel Courses; An 
Analysis of British and American Amphibious (Combined) Operations, 1920-40', M.Phil. dissertation, King's College 
London, 1980. See also Clifford, 'Anglo-American', 85-93. 
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on the other. British development is generally examined through the 'joint' lens (i.e., that of 
traditional 'combined operations'), whilst taking into account the increasing role of the Royal 
Marines (commandos), but deliberately within the broader context of joint/combined operations 
(or 'expeditionary warfare'). 
Methodology 
Whilst this thesis uses the same chronological (and comparative) framework as 
employed in Clifford's book, it departs from what appears to be that author's central premise: 
that the so-called 'parallel courses' of 'amphibious (combined) operations' development in the 
US and the UK were more similar than different. This deduction is epitomised by one of 
Clifford's chief conclusions, that 'quite apart from one another, Britain and America, for 
different reasons, each developed an amphibious doctrine that fundamentally was identical to the 
other' .91 Not only was this not the case for the period before (and during) World War II-as 
American 'landing operations' doctrine was fundamentally naval in character whilst British 
'combined operations' doctrine was fundamentally jOint-but it is also not the case for the fIrst 
two decades of the post-war era for the exact same reason (amongst others), as will be seen in the 
body of this thesis. 
Along these lines, this dissertation will address two other thematic defIciencies that have 
been identifIed in analyses of the inter-war (and World War II) era, which could logically be 
applied to the immediate post-war era. The fIrst is revealed in Clifford's book and concerns the 
treatment of amphibious/expeditionary warfare development in America where, as that author 
claims, 'the development of amphibious doctrine was not an inter -service effort .... The Army and 
the Army Air Force did not contribute anything to development primarily because it was the task 
of the NavylMarine Corps acting as a single Service,.92 Whilst this assertion has been proven 
inaccurate for the pre-1945 period,93 the same could not be said for the post-war era, as 
91 Clifford, Amphibious, 250. See also vii for an almost matching statement. 
92 Clifford, Amphibious, 249. Emphasis added. 
93 See Atwater, 'Development'. See also Thornton, Gary J. E., (Cmdr., USN), 'The US Coast Guard and Army 
Amphibious Development', Military Studies Program paper, USA WC, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 3/23/87. 
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exemplified by the limited (if any) attention given to the US Army and Air Force in the 
secondary sources discussed above, including most of the naval and marine histories but 
especially the monographs by Clifford, Rawlins/Sambito and Fails, as well as the two works by 
Alexander/Bartlett and Evans. As also mentioned above, it was not until very recently that this 
shortcoming was largely offset by Boose's publication, although this analysis is confined mostly 
to the Korean War and almost exclusively to US Army developments. 
A second thematic deficiency that arguably transcends from the inter-war period can be 
identified from an analysis of pre-1941 British amphibious development by David Massam.94 
Noting that there had been a general 'failure to put the British achievement in context' during the 
inter-war years, Massam specifically blamed 'an over-emphasis on locating parallels with the 
United States Marine Corps, which misconception leads to an inaccurate picture of British 
approach and capability' .95 Although it is similarly tempting to draw such correlations between 
the American and British corps of marines during the early Cold War period,96 particularly as the 
latter had successfully monopolised the amphibious 'commando' role by 1947, such an approach 
can over-simplify what is a much more complex association between the USMC's Fleet Marine 
Force (FMF) and the Royal Marines Commandos. Whilst similar in a number of obvious 
respects, the two formations are arguably more notable for a few central 
amphibious/expeditionary differences (than their overall similarities). The most obvious-albeit 
perhaps a bit technical-of these, is the fact that the FMF was inherently a fully-integrated 
"combined arms" formation complete with its own infantry, armour, (light) artillery, combat 
engineers, and even air support. The Commandos, on the other hand, consisted predominantly of 
light infantry and therefore had to have supporting arms attached as needed, using mostly Army 
elements. Another more subtle, yet not insignificant, difference concerned the roles and functions 
94 Cited above, 14. 
95 Massaro, 'British', 1, 11; also 245. 
96 See, for example, AlexanderlBartlett. 
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of the Commandos which, as has been argued elsewhere,97 were more akin to specially-trained 
forces performing amphibious tasks (like their descendant counterparts, the US Army Rangers, in 
World War U98) rather than amphibiously-trained forces performing special tasks. Indeed, if there 
is a more apt comparison to be made between the Royal Marines and the US Marines, one could 
suggest that the post-war Commandos operated more so as the US Marines did as (expeditionary) 
'colonial infantry' between 1899 and 1941 instead of as a specialised 'amphibious assault force' 
between 1900 and 1945.99 
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
The current state of affairs with regard to defining the various terms associated with 
amphibious/expeditionary warfare has experienced a period of increasing ambiguity and 
confusion. This is because of the 'widespread', 'inconsistent' and often inter-changeable use of a 
number of similarly defined terms, including: 'amphibious operations/warfare', 'combined 
operations', 'joint operations/warfare', 'expeditionary operations/warfare', etc. lOO Indeed, a very 
recent work has gone so far as to assert that 'amphibious warfare is not undefined-it is defined 
badly'. Unfortunately, this same work-at the beginning of an otherwise very laudable effort to 
offer an extensive definitional discussion on the subject-goes on to conflate the terms 
'amphibious (or "combined" or "joint")', and also introduces such an awkward phrase as 'grand 
strategic amphibious warfare' .101 Similarly, a different work has argued that a definitional source 
of 'expeditionary operations' stems from the so-called 'small wars' that were fought by both the 
97 Hargreaves, Andrew L., 'An analysis of the rise, use, evolution, and value of Anglo-American commando and 
special forces formations, 1939-1945', Ph.D. dissertation, King's College London, 8.08. See also Steers, Howard J. T. 
(Capt., USAR), 'Raiding the Continent: The Origins of the British Special Service Forces', MMAS thesis, 
USAC&GSC, 6/6/80. 
98 See Haggerty, Jerome J., 'A History of the Ranger Battalions in World War II', Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham 
University, 1982; and, to a lesser extent, Hogan, David Wentweh, Jr., 'The Evolution of the Concept of the US Army's 
Rangers, 1942-1983', Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1986. 
99 See Literature Review for reference to Allan Millett's SEMPER FIDEL/S, which is organised into four distinct 
historical phases, including 'Colonial Infantry, 1899-1941', and 'Amphibious Assault Force, 1900-1945'. 
100 Till, Geoffrey, 'Amphibious Operations and the British' in Till, Geoffrey, Theo Farrell, and Mark J. Grove, 
Amphibious Operations, The Occasional, Number 31 (Camberly: SCSI, 11.97), 11. See also Galdorisi, George Y., 
'Expeditionary and Amphibious Warfare' in Sam J. Tangredi, (ed.), Globalization and Maritime Power (Washington, 
DC: NDU Press, 2002), 408. 
101 See Trim, D. J. B., and Mark C. Fissel, 'Amphibious Warfare, 1000-1700: Concepts and Contexts' in D. J. B. Trim 
and Mark C. Fissel, (eds.), AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE 1000-1700: Commerce, State Formation and European 
Expansion (Leiden/Boston, MA: Brill, 2006), Chapter One, especially 1,29-31. 
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British in the nineteenth century and the Americans in the twentieth. I02 Finally, it has not helped 
that current US Marine Corps doctrine has apparently just substituted the tenn 'expeditionary' 
for 'amphibious' in an apparent conceptual effort to revert back to a period when the Marines 
were employed as colonial infantry instead of amphibious assault specialists. lo3 
General Terms: "Amphibious" vs. "Expeditionary" 
Despite this situation, an attempt must still be made here to outline a few working 
definitions relevant to this subject matter, if only to provide some sort oftenninological basis for 
comparing (and contrasting) the 'parallel courses' of American and British development. This 
can be done by using recent doctrinal publications and analyses as many of the central and 
distinguishing features of amphibious/expeditionary operations are enduring and can therefore be 
easily identified. 
As already indicated, the basis of this thesis revolves around the ultimate relationship 
between amphibious and expeditionary. Beginning with the latter, which is the broader and more 
all-encompassing tenn, current US doctrine defines an 'expedition' simply as a 'military 
operation conducted by an armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign 
country,.I04 The most difficult (and therefore complicated) of these involve situations where an 
expedition is launched into a hostile or potentially hostile setting, in which case a so-called 
'forcible entry operation' must be used, which is defined as: 
a joint military operation conducted against armed opposition to gain entry into the 
territory of an adversary by seizing a lodgment as rapidly as possible .... A lodgment is a 
designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held, 
makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver 
space for subsequent operations (a lodgment may by an airhead, a beachhead, or a 
b · . h f) 105 com matIOn t ereo . 
102 Till, Geoffrey, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century, Cass Series: Naval Policy and History, Number 23 
(London: Frank Cass, 2004), Chapter Eight, especially 235-238. 
103 See CMC, MCDP 3, Expeditionary Operations (Washington, DC: DN, HQ, USMC, 4/16/98), especiall~ 1-2-
1-4; see also Farrell, Theo, 'United States Marine Corps Operations in Somalia: A Model for the Future' III 
TilllFarrelllGrove, 43-56. 
104 CJCS, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: OJCS, 
4/12/01; amended through 4/10),169. 
105 CJCS, JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations (Washington, DC: OJCS, 6/16/08). 
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As this definition implies, there are two elemental means by which such forcible entries can be 
conducted: by air and/or by sea. Accordingly, three 'primary forcible entry operations' are 
available to convey 'expeditions' into foreign settings under hostile or potentially hostile 
conditions: (1) the amphibious assault, (2) the airborne (i.e., parachute) assault, and (3) the air 
(i.e., fixed- and/or rotary-wing aircraft) assault.106 These endeavours can be said to fall into the 
realm of "expeditionary warfare" and, when employed-either separately or in any 
combination-to enable 'subsequent operations' ashore (i.e., campaigns), are usually conducted 
at the operational level of war. 
As the term "amphibious" stems from the Latin word amphibius and the Greek word 
amphibios, which both connote 'living a double life', a generic definition can be recounted as 
follows: 'living or able to live both on land and in water; belonging to both land and water' .107 
Due to this conceptual proximity to a water- or coast-line, when applied to military operations, 
the term "amphibious" can be said to concentrate--or culminate-at the tactical level of war. 
Consequently, and again using current US doctrine, an 'amphibious operation' can be 
defined as a 'military operation launched from the sea by an amphibious force (AF), embarked in 
ships or craft with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force ashore to accomplish the 
assigned mission,.108 The 'AF' is further defined as an 'amphibious task force (ATF) and a 
landing force (LF) together with other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for 
amphibious operations', with the former 'task force' consisting of a 'Navy task organization' and 
the latter 'landing force' consisting of a 'Marine Corps or Army task organization', 
respectively. 109 
106 CJCS, JP 3-18 (2008), 1-1, 1-6 - 1-7 (and ix). 
107 Stein, Jess, (ed.), The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged Edn. (New York, NY: 
Random House, 1966/7),50. 
108 CJCS, JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations (Washington, DC: OJCS, 8/10/09), 1-1 (and xi). See also CJCS, JP 1-?2, 
(4112/01),29; and CJCS, JP 3-02.1, Joint Doctrine for Landing Force Operations, 1111189. xx. An almost verbatim 
British definition can be found in Ministry of Defence (MOD), BR 1806, British Maritime Doctrine, 3rd edn. (London: 
The Stationery Office, 2004), 238, which, in turn, is taken from AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions 
(2003). 
109 CJCS, JP 3-02 (2009), 1-2 (and xi). 
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Generally speaking, amphibious operations consist of a number of phases, including 
'planning', 'embarkation', 'rehearsal', 'movement', and 'action', with the last phase being 
further divided into the five possible types of operation. 110 These consist of the' Assault', 'Raid', 
'Demonstration', 'Withdrawal', and 'Support to Other Operations'. III Of the three most relevant 
types of operation for this thesis-the assault, raid, and withdrawal-by far the most significant 
is the first, which is at once the most complex and difficult. To wit, '[t]he salient requirement of 
an amphibious assault is the necessity for swift, uninterrupted buildup of sufficient combat power 
ashore from an initial zero capability to full coordinated striking power as the attack progresses 
toward AF obj ectives,.112 It is this specific characteristic-essentially a tactical 'culminating 
point'-that has made amphibious assaults amongst the most complicated of all martial 
endeavours. Consequently, they require and deserve the most concerted attention. 
To that end, and in order to underscore the tactical aspects of these enterprises, it is 
worthwhile to formulate briefly a more comprehensive definition. This can be accomplished by 
slightly editing and modernising certain definitions that originated during the inter-war years 
when modem landing operations were first being conceptualised and codified into doctrine. As 
such, the following can be offered as a more accurate and comprehensive definition: 
An amphibious or landing operation is, in effect, a co-ordinated assault from the sea by 
integrated naval and military forces (possibly including airborne forces) using assault 
ships, craft and possibly (fixed- and/or rotary-wing) aircraft against organised or 
unorganised opposition, modified by initially substituting ships' gunfire for that of the 
landing forces' organic fire support (i.e. artillery and tanks), and frequently, carrier-
based aviation for land-based air units until the latter can be operated from shore. 113 
One final definitional observation can be made from current doctrine as it reveals an 
underlying dichotomy of amphibious assaults that has endured since the inter-war years and 
came into stark contrast-at least in the United States-during the immediate post-war decades. 
110 See CJCS, JP 3-02 (2009), Chapter 1 (especially 1-5 - 1-6), and Chapter III (especially III-I). See JP 3-02.1, xx, for 
use of term 'Assault' instead of 'Action' to delineate the final phase. 
III CJCS, JP 3-02 (2009), 1-2 - 1-3, III-59 - III-n. 
112 CJCS, JP 3-02 (2009), 1-2. 
113 This definition is paraphrased from the US Marine Corps' 1934 Tentative Manualfor Landing Operations (also 
known as Manual for Naval Overseas Operations), para. 1-34 (page 12). 
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This involves the two most important 'applications' or purposes for which amphibious operations 
are conducted, namely to: 
(1) Achieve operation or campaign objectives in one swift stroke by capitalizing on 
surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to strike directly at enemy 
critical vulnerabilities and decisive points in order to defeat strategic or operational 
centers of gravity (COGs). 
(2) Comprise the initial phase of a campaign or major operation where the objective is 
to establish a military lodgment to support subsequent phases. 114 
As will be seen, the subtle but significant difference between these two descriptions is a direct 
reflection of the fundamental variances that existed after the Second World War, not only 
between America and Britain in general but also, and more considerably, between the US Naval 
Service and the US Army (and, later, the US Air Force). 
Other Definitions 
As mentioned above, the parallel but different courses of American and British 
development that evolved during the first decades of the Cold War were respectively based on a 
few key parallel but different features across the spectrum of analysis. These included "naval" vs. 
"maritime" at the strategic level, "single service" vs. "inter-service" at the organisational level, 
and "combined arms" vs. "joint warfare" at the tactical/operational level. In order to help 
describe and assess the overall dichotomy between American and British developments, it is 
necessary to provide a brief explanation of each of these pairs of terms below. 
Strategic Level: "Naval" vs. "Maritime" 
As also mentioned previously, the terms "naval" and "maritime"-when applied to the 
strategic level-have theoretical bases. Common to both is the definition of 'strategy', which the 
famous war theoretician Baron de 10mini stated as being simply, 'the art of properly directing 
masses upon the theater of war, either for defense or for invasion' .115 The understanding of the 
term 'naval strategy', in turn, at least from an American perspective, stems from the writings of 
114 CJCS, JP 3-02 (2009), 1-1 (and xi). The three remaining applications included: '(3) Serve as a supporting operation 
in a campaign .... (4) Outflank an enemy. (5) Support military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, and 
humanitarian and civic assistance' (1-1 - 1-2). See also CJCS, JP 3-02 (2001), 1-2 (and x). Emphasis added. 
115 de Jomini, Baron [Antoine H.], (Capt. G.B. Mendell, USA, and Capt. W.P. Craighill, USA, translators), The Art of 
War, new edn. reprint (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, [1987]; first published in US in 1862; first published 1838), 
11. 
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US Navy Captain Alfred T. Mahan, who famously conceptualised the idea of 'Sea Power,.116 
'''Naval strategy"', he said (quoting a French author), "'has indeed for its end to found, support, 
and increase, as well in peace as in war, the sea power of a country;" .. .'. 117 In other words, the 
focus of this strategy was almost exclusively naval in character. 
Contrasting this is 'maritime strategy', a definition of which can be taken from Sir Julian 
Corbett. 'By maritime strategy' he stated, 'we mean the principles which govern a war in which 
the sea is a substantial factor .... The paramount concern of maritime strategy, then, is to 
determine the mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan of war' .118 Indeed, writing again 
a few years later, Corbett expounded on his definition by assessing the relationship between 
"naval" and "maritime" strategies, which would remain particularly relevant with regard to 
amphibious/expeditionary developments. 
Thus naval strategy, so long as it merely contemplates bringing the enemy's fleet to 
successful action and securing the command of the sea, may often miss its most potent 
line of energy, and operating as it were single-handed, it may fail to achieve a point in 
the war which combined or co-ordinated action would have given it.... Hence the 
importance of approaching the study of maritime warfare not from the point of view of 
what is usually understood by naval strategy, but from the wider standpoint of the 
functions of the fleet. 119 
As will be seen, it is exactly this difference in perspective that characterised the overall variance 
between American and British approaches to amphibious/expeditionary warfare. 
OrganisationaVInstitutional Level: "Single Service" vs. "Inter-service" 
Following on from the variances in strategic terminology outlined above are those that 
exist at the organisational/institutional level of analysis: "single service" vs. "inter-service" (i.e., 
'joint' /'combined'). The former, when related to naval strategy, simply refers to the US Navy 
and US Marine Corps-not to mention also the RN and RM-as being a part of a single Naval 
Service. As will be seen, although the USMC was technically a separate (fourth) service, it was 
116 Mahan, Alfred T., (Capt., USN), The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, 14th edn. (Boston, MA: 
Little, Brown, and Co., 1898; first published 1890). 
117 Mahan, Influence, 23. 
118 Corbett, Julian S., Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Classics of Sea Power, John B. Hattendorf and Wayne P. 
Hughes, Jr., series editors, (Annapolis, MD: NIP, 1988; first published 1911), 15-16. 
119 Corbett, Julian S., The Seven Years War: A Study in British Combined Strategy (London: The Folio Society, 2001; 
first published 1907 as England in the Seven Years' War), 5. 
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treated-both practically and literally, in certain key doctrinal publications-as part of the naval 
establishment, a perception that was only reinforced by the fact that the Marine Corps was an 
administrative entity within the Department of the Navy (DN). 
Opposing this is the confusion stemming from the frequent inter-changeability of the 
terms "inter-service", ')oint service" and "combined [service] operation". Whilst the former two 
are synonymous and refer simply to more than one service (of one country), the latter is a British 
expression that was officially used-as early as 1911-to describe all forms of joint operations 
conducted by the army, navy and (later the) air force. 120 In effect, the words 'combined' and 
'j oint' were considered to be synonymous-and sometimes are still treated as such today-
although in today's terminology 'combined' refers to more than one ally.l2I Overall, whilst often 
seen to be simply a difference in semantics, it will be seen that this variance is actually quite 
fundamental when relating to amphibious/expeditionary warfare. 
Tactical/Operational Level: "Combined Arms" vs. "Joint Warfare" 
The last pair of terms that require some description are at the tacticalloperationallevel of 
analysis, although they are closely related to--if not overlap-the variances at the 
organisationallinstitutional level discussed above. In today's military lexicon, "combined arms" 
can be derived from the current definition of 'combined arms team', which means '[t]he full 
integration and application of two or more arms or elements of one Military Service into an 
operation' . 122 Probably the most significant practitioner of this manner of combat is the US 
Marine Corps, simply because-alone amongst all of the military branches (American as well as 
British), particularly during the immediate post-war period-the Corps' Fleet Marine Force 
(FMF) had all of the required elements that comprised an inherent "combined arms" formation, 
120 See, for example, the 1911 and 1913 editions of the Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations (WO 
33/569, WO 33/644; NA), followed by the 1925 edition of the Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air 
Operations (AIR 10/1206; NA), and the 1931 and 1938 editions of the Manual of Combined Operations (DEFE 21708, 
DEFE 21709; NA). 
121 See CJCS, JP 1-02 (2001), 86, for the definition of 'combined operation': 'An operation conducted by forces of two 
or more Allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission'. 
122 CJCS, JP 1-02, 100. 
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including 'at least infantry ... , armor, reconnaissance ... , artillery, antitank weapons, air defense or 
antiaircraft forces, combat engineers ... , attack helicopters, and ground-attack aircraft' .123 
Generally similar in conception to "combined arms" is the phrase 'joint warfare", 
although it is not as readily or specifically defined in current American or British doctrine. 
However, a concerted effort by the British in the early 1960s-one that will be discussed in 
detail later-produced a working definition that can be offered here. 'Joint warfare', an official 
1962 British Chiefs of Staff (COS) document stated, was defined simply as: 'The employment of 
sea and/or air forces in concert with land forces' .124 Again, although conceptually similar, the 
most important difference to be noted here is that the resulting joint operations (i.e., formerly 
"combined operations") were never really performed by fully integrated forces or units (or even 
elements) of one service. This was significant with respect to British development, mainly due to 
the fact that the Royal Marines did not have the same supporting elements as inherent or organic 
parts of its Commando force structure, most notably with regard to artillery, armour, and air 
support. As such, their post-war role was arguably more akin to special forces operating 
amphibiously as opposed to amphibious forces performing special operations, although there was 
a notable shift from the former to the latter between 1945 and 1968. 
"Doctrine" 
Although the official promulgation of specialized amphibious/expeditionary warfare 
doctrine has been a relatively recent phenomenon, various forms of unoffiCial doctrine have 
arguably existed for centuries. 125 This fact notwithstanding, the concept of what doctrine is and 
why it is significant requires some explanation. Simply put, 'doctrine means "whatever is taught; 
123 House, Jonathan M., Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century, Modem War Studies, Theodore A. Wilson, 
General Ed. (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 4, which is the published fonn of Towards Combined 
Arms Warfare: A Survey of Tactics, Doctrine, and Organization in the 20th Century, Research Survey No.2 (Ft. 
Leavenworth, KS: CSI, USAC&GSC, 1984),2. 
124 COS (62) 426, 3.10.62 (DEFE 5/131; NA), 1. 
125 For one of the earliest examples, see Molyneux, Thomas M., Conjunct Expeditions or Expeditions That Have Been 
Carried On Jointly by the Fleet and Army, with a Commentary on a Littoral War (London: printed for R & J Dodsley, 
1759). 
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KIXG'S COLLEGE LO~DO~ UBI,tRY 
what is held, put forth as true and supported by a teacher, a school, or a sect; it is a general body 
of instructions" .. .'.126 More specifically, 
doctrine is those shared beliefs and principles that define the work of a profession. 
Principles are: (1) basic truths, laws, or assumptions; (2) rules or standards of behavior; 
(3) fixed or predetermined policies or modes of action. Professions are occupations and 
vocations requiring training and education in a specialized field-training and education 
in the doctrine of that profession. Doctrine is the codification of what a profession thinks 
(believes) and does (practices) whenever the profession's membership perform in the 
usual and normal (normative) way.127 
From the above, it can be gleaned that doctrine can apply to almost any organisation or 
group working toward a common goal, including such broad purposes as national security and 
defence. A country's armed services (or branches within a single service), for instance, are 
generally concerned with military doctrines, which 'are intended to be general guides to the 
application of mutually accepted principles, and thus furnish a practical basis for co-ordination 
under the extremely difficult conditions governing contact between hostile forces'. 128 
There are many things that influence military doctrine and are influenced by it, all of 
which demonstrate doctrine's central and enduring importance. Whilst those areas that influence 
military doctrine can include 'current policy, available resources, current strategy and campaigns, 
current doctrine, threats, history and lessons learned, strategic culture, fielded and/or emerging 
technology, geography and demographics, and types of government', military doctrine, in turn, 
can influence such aspects as 'tactics, techniques, procedures, local tactical directives, rules of 
engagement, training and education, organization and force structure, [force capability] analyses, 
programming, campaign planning, strategy, and policy' .129 
Of the many types of doctrines that fall under the broader rubric of military doctrine, this 
thesis is concerned mostly with tactical doctrine. Although still indirectly influenced by most, if 
not all, of the concepts listed above, tactical (and operational) doctrine is much more task-
specific and aims to provide designated forces (whether from one or more services) with 
126 Knox, Dudley W. (Lt. Cmdr., USN), 'The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare' in Text, Art of War Colloquium 
Publication (Carlisle Barracks, PA: USA War College, 11/83),50. 
127 Trirten, James J., 'Naval Perspectives for Military Doctrine Development', research paper, NDC, Norfolk, VA, 
9/94,1-2. 
128 Knox, 50. 
129 Trirten, 6, 12, 14. 
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guidelines for the execution of particular operations-such as amphibious/expeditionary 
operations-which, when normatively employed, increase the chances of success. Again, more 
specifically: 
Tactical doctrine organizes TTPs [Tactics, Techniques and Procedures ]-it is the "play 
book" from which tactics are chosen and ordered. ... Tactics is the selection and 
employment by the ... tactical commander of a particular employment and movement of 
forces from ... tactical doctrine "play books" .... Techniques are more specific instructions 
than are general tactics. They apply to [the] operation of individual systems and forces in 
particular functions .... Procedures, detailed instructions for [the] operation of equipment 
or units aimed at the operator, are often more rigid and directive than other levels of 
tactical guidance. 130 
To sum up, the relevance of (tactical) doctrine to this thesis stems from what it reveals, 
not only about the state of amphibious/expeditionary warfare development at any given time but 
also about the substance of that development. These revelations allow national changes and 
trends to be identified, categorised and analysed which, in turn, enables international 
developments to be assessed and compared. 
130 Tritten, 12-13. First instance of bold typeface added; others in original. 
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PART ONE: 1945-1950 
CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL APPROACHES 
The parallel but different courses of American and British amphibious/expeditionary 
warfare development that had emerged by the end of the Second W orId War were generally 
consolidated between 1945 and 1950. At the same time, however, debates surfaced in both the 
United States and the United Kingdom amongst the various services and related organisational 
entities that, whilst reflecting the different international differences, did not substantially alter 
them, at least not until after 1950. 
In the United States, the Naval Service appeared to secure almost exclusive legal 
responsibility for the development of 'amphibious operations' due to their legendary efforts at 
conducting 'seizures' during the island-hopping campaign in the Central Pacific. At the same 
time, the US Marine Corps embarked on a groundbreaking course to develop a new concept for 
amphibious assaults in an atomic environment. This centred on the use of helicopters to transport 
troops during the ship-to-shore phase of an amphibious operation (i.e., effectively, amphibious 
'vertical envelopment'). The US Army challenged this situation, mainly by drawing on its 
wartime expeditionary experience in the European and Southwest Pacific theatres, which 
ultimately involved so-called 'joint amphibious operations' that were very similar, if not almost 
identical, to British 'combined operations'. This challenge stemmed from the changed geo-
strategic situation where the pivotal threat to the US (and the 'west' in general) was increasingly 
emanating from yet another-and perhaps far greater-threat to continental Europe (if not also to 
all of 'Eurasia') by the Soviet Union and its satellite states. As a result, if a situation similar to 
1940 were to evolve where the US (and its allies) faced an occupied European continent, large-
scale, Normandy-type invasions would almost certainly be required. 
Facing the same threat but in closer proximity, the United Kingdom moved to 
consolidate its own, almost exclusive expeditionary experience during the war. This was 
accomplished primarily by retaining the existing Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) 
establishment and maintaining its corresponding 'combined operations' concepts, techniques and 
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doctrine. Not only did this encompass the large-scale amphibious 'invasions' as conducted in 
North Africa and Europe, but it also included 'raiding' and 'beach organisation' operations (with 
the latter entailing 'beach maintenance' efforts and 'withdrawals'). This overall consolidation 
occurred despite attempts by the Admiralty to have COHQ abolished, ostensibly so that the 
former could gain primary, if not also exclusive, responsibility for amphibious operations (as 
apparently was the case in the US). While these efforts failed, the Royal Marines were at least 
able to secure exclusive responsibility over the 'commando' (or amphibious raiding) role which, 
whilst an exclusive wartime role of the Army between 1940 and 1942, had a long tradition within 
the Royal Marines. 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-50 
OVERVIEW 
The immediate post-war period of amphibious/expeditionary warfare development in the 
United States has popularly been characterised as being one in which the Marine Corps-in the 
face of Army intransigence and apparent ignorance-consolidated its rightful place as the 
country's sole and true amphibious warfare specialist. 13l It did so not only by capitalising on its 
legendary success of the Central Pacific 'storm landings' of World War II, but also by 
conceptualising, in the late 1940s, the use of the helicopter (i.e., referred to as 'vertical 
envelopment') during the ship-to-shore movement of an amphibious assault. This was at a time 
when the US Army's (and the public's) attention was turned towards the ongoing occupational 
duties in both Germany and Japan, which were particularly taxing as a result of massive 
demobilisation efforts, and while the newly-independent US Air Force was pre-occupied with 
strategic (atomic) bombing. 
Building on new research, particularly Boose's recent publication on Army amphibious 
operations during the Korean War,132 this chapter will undertake a comprehensive examination of 
developments in the US as a whole in order to fully ascertain the extent of American national 
progress between 1945 and 1950. This review will involve assessments of both the 'navy-
centered' side (i.e., the US Naval Service) as well as joint developments, including purely 'army-
centered' ones. Whilst some functional differences will be more readily apparent at the 
organisationallinstitutional level, as they relate simply to single service (i.e., the US Naval 
Service) versus joint service (i.e., Army-Navy, plus Air Force) issues, the more complicated 
conceptual and doctrinal variances will be revealed at the tacticalloperationalleveL 
As a result of this examination, it will become apparent that, by 1950, the Army had 
mounted an open (if largely unsuccessful) challenge to the alleged exclusivity afforded the Naval 
Service with regard to amphibious/expeditionary developments. This ultimately involved the role 
131 For various examples, see Introduction, 15-18. 
132 See Introduction, 21. 
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of amphibious landings in relation to naval warfare on the one hand and land warfare on the 
other. On the naval side were 'amphibious operations', which basically centred on the seizure 
and defence of advanced naval and air bases as part of a naval campaign; on the land side were 
'j oint amphibious operations', which consisted primarily of large-scale invasions that required 
the resources of at least two services to initiate unlimited land campaigns. It was this latter 
approach, in tum, which reflected the British overall approach towards 'combined operations', 
essentially at all three levels of analysis. 
STRA TEGIC ASPECTS 
By the end of 1945, the United States had fought a 'two-ocean' war by defeating two 
separate and different enemies, as was reflected in the names of the respective theatres of 
operations: a largely continental enemy in the combined form of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy 
in the European Theatre of Operations (ETO); and a largely naval enemy in the form of Imperial 
Japan in the Pacific Ocean Area (POA).133 With the gradual evolution of America's erstwhile 
ally, the Soviet Union, into a superpower foe, it became evident that this new enemy was much 
more of a continental threat to Western Europe than a direct naval threat to the United States in 
the Pacific.134 As a result, this drew America's strategic attention towards Europe instead of the 
Pacific which, presuming that Russia would invade and occupy the entire European continent in 
any future war, meant that 'invasion' -type operations of the kind employed in the ETO during 
World War II would almost certainly be required. Indeed, this situation seemed to hearken back 
to that of the United Kingdom in 1939 (and 1940), something which that country seemed to be 
facing yet again. 
Defence Policy 
Generally speaking, the immediate post-war years (i.e., 1945 to 1950) can be described 
as the first phase of the Cold War, or a period of transition during which the Soviet Union 
133 See Morison, Samuel E., The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War 
(Boston, MAlToronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1963). See also King, Ernest J., (ADM, USN), US Navy at War, 1941-
1945: Official Reports to the Secretary of the Navy (Washington, DC: USN Department, 1946), 167. 
134 See Gaddis, John L., The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War (New Yode, NY IOxford: OUP, 
1987), Chapters 2-4. 
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evolved from a wartime 'great power' ally to a peacetime 'superpower' foe. As this stage has 
been widely studied and analysed, it does not bear recounting in detail here. 135 However, a few 
observations can and should be made about the evolution of US basic national security policy as 
they will provide first, the strategic context in which amphibious/expeditionary warfare 
development evolved and second, an indication of what kinds of such operations would be 
employed: amphibious or expeditionary, or both. 
By March, 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had firmly concluded that '[f]rom a 
military point of view, the consolidation and development of power of Russia is the greatest 
threat to the United States in the foreseeable future' .136 This, in tum, resulted in the approval by 
the President of NSC 20/4,137 which provided not only the underlying framework to the official 
'containment' strategy as briefly articulated by George Kennan in his 'X' article of July 1947,138 
but also the first specific insight into the potential need for amphibious/expeditionary operations 
in a future war that would pit the naval power of the United States (and presumably her allies) 
against the land power of the Soviet Union and her satellite states. NSC 20/4 specifically 
reiterated that 'Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia ... would be strategically and 
politically unacceptable to the United States,139 and guided the US to sign the North Atlantic 
Treaty in April, 1949, effectively committing the country to the defence of continental Europe in 
case of armed Soviet attack. This ensured that, presuming that Soviet conventional might would 
indeed follow through on its estimated offensive capabilities, the US and her allies would almost 
certainly have to employ large-scale, Normandy-type 'invasions' (or expeditionary operations)-
similar to those carried out in the ETO during World War II-to re-enter an occupied European 
continent. Finally, it also seemed possible that the US would have to resort to raiding operations, 
135 See, for example, Gaddis, John Lewis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American 
National Security Policy (OxfordiNew York, NY: OUP, 1982), Chapters 1 and 2. 
136 SWN-4096, 3/29/46, in FRUS, 1946, Vol. I, General; The United Nations (Washington, DC: GPO, 1972), 1165. 
137 NSC 20/4, 11123/48, in FRUS, 1948, Vol. I, General; The United Nations, Part 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1976), 
662-669. 
138 'X', 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', FA, XXV (7/47), 566-582. 
139 NSC 2014, 665. 
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as had been conducted by the British Commandos (and US Rangers at Dieppe) in the first few 
years of the last war. 
War Plans and US Navy Strategy 
War Plans 
As the post-war geo-strategic situation began to unfold, war plans were drafted, which 
essentially pitted America's naval/maritime and nuclear air strength against the 'land power' of 
the Soviet Union. On 2 March 1946, a paper by the Joint War Planning Committee (JWPC), 
titled 'Concept of Operations for Pincher', was circulated, which established 'a number of basic 
strategic assumptions that were to be the basis of all future plans for the next several years' .140 
The first assumption was that only the first few phases of any future war would or even could be 
covered in an operational plan, which meant that offensive operations specifically including 
amphibious/expeditionary ones were largely omitted. However, it was clear that no matter how 
the war started, it 'would become a total global conflict' similar to World War II. Second, Great 
Britain 'was America's most important ally' as it basically served as an advanced naval and air 
base. Third, as Western Europe was considered 'indefensible', British and American forces 
would have to 'withdraw to the British Isles and Italy'. Finally, the Middle East was viewed 'as 
the crucial strategic arena in World War III' as air attacks were planned 'from bases in the Cairo-
Suez area, and amphibious forces would attack Southern Russia via the Mediterranean and 
Persian Gulf .141 
One of the first of these war plans, Emergency War Plan (EWP) BROILER (which was 
first drafted in early 1948), followed most, if not all, of the aforementioned precepts. 142 A 
revised version of BROILER, Plan FROLIC, was drafted in March, 1948, and provided slightly 
more guidance on the possible employment of 'seizures' to take or occupy advanced bases along 
the periphery of the European continent including Iceland as well as 'the Azores and 
140 Ross, Steven T., American War Plans, 1945-1950 (New York, NYlLondon: Garland Publishing, 1988),28. 
141 Ross, 28-29. 
142 Ross, 61-70. 
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Casablanca. ,143 A subsequent update, Plan CRANKSHAFT, included the option of an 
amphibious campaign through the Persian Gulf with 'an amphibious assault on Bandar Abbas', 
the subsequent seizure of 'Qatif and Bahrain', and, finally, a 'major blow at the Kuwait-Basra 
area, thereby securing a beachhead at the head of the Persian Gulf.' Whilst another offensive 
approach involved the seizure of 'a base area in the Casablanca-Port Lyautey region of French 
Morocco', from which amphibious campaigns could be initiated 'into the Mediterranean, Spain, 
or northwest Europe', others focused on the 'reconquest of the Aegean' as well as advances 'into 
southern Russia via the Aegean and Black Seas' .144 
Beginning with HALFMOON in April 1948, another series of short-range, emergency 
war plans were drafted based on the assumptions outlined in the original PINCHER paper. By 
1949, HALFMOON had evolved into what was eventually labeled as plan TROJAN. 
Unfortunately, this plan as well as the related mobilisation plans, all suffered from serious 
logistical problems and budget constraints, which forced the JCS to abandon them altogether. 
By this time, however, both the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO had been formed, 
which allowed 'the JCS to reexamine [sic] the possibilities of defending Western Europe' .145 
In sum, whilst perhaps lacking detail, these war plans generally confirmed that the 
primary theatre of war was the European portion of the 'Eurasian' continent. This implied that 
any sort of attack against a coastline held by the Soviets would have to involve large-scale 
'invasions' or, in the British vernacular, so-called 'combined operations'. At the same time, 
however, there were quite a number of opportunities for the 'seizure' -type of endeavour to be 
employed, namely to seize advanced naval and air bases along the periphery of the 
European/Eurasian continent, including, for example, Iceland, the Azores, the Canary Islands, 
and even perhaps such islands as Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and Crete. As such, these options gave 
both the Naval Service as well as the Army (and Air Force) the geo-strategic rationale from 
which to base and fonnulate their own amphibious and expeditionary operations, respectively. 
143 Ross, 71-72. 
144 Ross, 86-89. 
145 Ross, 89-98. 
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US Naval Strategy and Forces 
The US Navy emerged from WWII without any competitor. It was supreme at sea in a 
victory that seemed so complete that some in America even questioned why the country still 
needed a Navy at all. 146 However, due to the emerging threat ofthe Soviet Union, particularly to 
Western Europe, it quickly became evident that the Naval Service would be required in the 
earliest phases of any future war, particularly with regard to warfare in the littoral. As a Marine 
Corps Board Report promulgated at the end of 1948 concluded: 'Due to the high improbability of 
a contending hostile surface fleet, it is felt that naval action will be characterized largely by 
surface and air escort, anti-submarine warfare, and the early seizure of advanced naval bases to 
insure complete control of vital sea areas' .147 In addition, whilst the geo-strategic situation and 
concomitant war plans tended to highlight the need for large-scale amphibious/expeditionary 
operations to liberate an occupied Europe (as had been done in World War II), they also 
indicated a similar requirement for the seizure and occupation of advanced air and naval bases on 
the periphery of the Eurasian land mass from which strategic air attacks and (eventually) land 
attacks could be launched. 148 Among the most important of these peripheral bases-as indicated 
in Naval Service war planning and training documents-were Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, 149 
Iceland,lSO the Azores, the Cairo-Suez area, the Port Lyautey-Casablanca area, and Sicily. 151 
Many of these types of objectives were similar to the ones that the Navy and Marine 
Corps had had to deal with in the Central Pacific during the Second World War. Nevertheless, 
there was some scepticism expressed at the time as to the ability of the FMF specifically and the 
Naval Service in general to handle the larger and more significant objectives (typical of the ETO 
146 See Baer, 275-276; and Palmer, Michael A., Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the First 
Postwar Decade, Contributions to Naval History, No.1 (Washington, DC: NBC, 1988), 1. 
147 MCB, Organization of the Fleet Marine Force - War and Peace, 12/1/48 (RG 127: GSF, Box 47; NARA), 3. 
Emphasis added. 
148 Palmer, Chapters 1,3. 
149 FMF, Pacific, Operation BRIGHTNESS, [10/47] (RG 127: RU&OC, Box 134; NARA). 
150 See MCS, Advance Base Problem VIIL STOVEPIPE, 1947; and MCS, Advanced Base Problem X MONARCH, 
Parts I-Ill, 1949. See also MCS, Advanced Base Problem IX MERMAID, 1948,2 Vols. (RG 127: RTE&M, Boxes 13, 
7;NARA). 
151 Op-30W8 Memorandum For Op-30, 6/25/48; DCNO (Ops) Memorandum For Admiral W.H.P. Blandy, USN, 
9/23/48; Op-30B Office Memorandum to Op-03, 10/26/48; and DCNO (Ops) Memorandum For Admiral W.H.P. 
Blandy, USN, 11110/48; (SPDR: Box 244; OAB, NHHC). 
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in World War II) that would ultimately include having to expel the Soviet Army from the 
E t · t 152 AM· C . . uropean con men. s one anne orps commentator-somewhat Iromcally-remarked, 
no matter how efficient or well trained, the Fleet Marine Force can never achieve the 
final decision against a first-class power. The force is too small. Under naval control it 
can seize naval objectives, it can establish beachheads, but the U.S. Army must deliver 
the knockout blow. Hence the Navy can deliver the Army to the enemies' shores, it can 
help devastate the enemies' homelands, but from here the Army must carry the brunt of 
the load. For only the Army can destroy the enemies' divisions and seize his 
homelands. 153 
ORGANISATIONAL/INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 
After World War II, it was realised that some form of defence re-organisation was 
necessary to manage and direct the defence establishment during peacetime. As such, a 
'unification' process, which had already begun during the war, proceeded in the immediate post-
war years and resulted in the approval of the National Security Act (NSA) of July, 1947. This 
created a National Military Establishment (NME) of three military Departments as well as a 
number of other agencies to help administer, direct and manage the vast defence establishment. 
While this went a long way toward centralising America's defence effort, it simultaneously 
allowed each of the military Departments considerable independence and self-sufficiency. This, 
however, led to disagreements arising with regard to the roles and missions of the various armed 
forces (or services), which ultimately required a separate agreement to be worked out amongst 
the Service Chiefs less than a year after the NSA was passed. Although this agreement, or so-
called 'Functions Paper', seemed to clarify most, if not all, of the issues specifically dealing with 
'amphibious operations', there was some apparent ambiguity that still existed relating to so-
called 'joint amphibious operations', which the Army attempted to exploit in order to gain 
primary developmental responsibility for what essentially amounted to expeditionary warfare. 
What was interesting about the latter agency's organisational concepts was how much they 
resembled the system that actually existed in the United Kingdom at the time, specifically in the 
form of the extended Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) establishment. 
152 Henderson, Frederick P., (Lt. Col., USMC), 'Concerning "Target Eurasia"', MCG, 32:3 (3/48), 12; and Spylanan, 
Nicholas J., The Geography of the Peace (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1944),49. 
153 Schanzle, R. F., (Capt., USMC), 'Sea Power - A New Testament', MCG, 33:9 (9/49), 15. 
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Army and Navy 'Philosophies' of War 
By the end of World War II, due to the massive scale in which the armed forces of the 
United States had been involved (and were now spread across the globe in occupational duties), 
the political and military leadership realised that a permanent, unified defence organisation was 
required to direct and manage the armed forces in the post-war world. This effort, however, did 
not bear fruit until mid-l 94 7 because of general differences of opinion in how this new defence 
establishment should be organised. These differences stemmed from the Navy's and the Army's 
development of modem (i.e., three dimensional) warfare over the past forty years, which 
culminated in their varying experiences in the Pacific Area of Operations (P AO) and the 
European Theatre of Operations (ETO), respectively, during World War II. 
What had effectively emerged were differing 'philosophies' of how each servIce 
employed military forces in the field to wage war. These were outlined and described in a Navy 
Department study, which had been instigated at the request of the Marine Corps in order to 
develop a 'basic military philosophy .... which can be adopted as the official Navy view' .154 This 
study, submitted to the Secretary of the Navy on 26 August 1946, explored 'the underlying 
differences between the Army and the Navy in the employment of military forces' .155 
Each Service's philosophy was outlined in detail and described the conceptual rationale 
for varying approaches towards the process of defence unification. Based on its experience with 
facing increasingly independent-minded aviators within its own ranks, the Army's concept of 
employing military forces in the field was summarised as follows: 
This concept, which has been referred to on occasion as the "tri -elemental concept" and 
may be likened to a "Type Organization", is founded on the central idea of a completely 
unified command with rigid subdivision of responsibility based on the three elements, 
land, water and air and a grouping of weapons and personnel into separate coordinate 
services wherein everything on land is the Army's, everything that floats belongs to the 
Navy and everything that flies is the province of the Air Force. This theory excludes the 
conception of seapower as we have come to understand it through the teachings of 
Mahan. It likewise equally rejects airpower and landpower as such and advocates a 
conjunct method of waging war employing the Army, Navy and Air Force, not as three 
154 Hurst, E. H. (Col., USMC), Memorandum for ADM Robbins, 'Importance of A Basic Military Philosophy to the 
Army's Unification Case', 8/2/46 (RG 127: RRMOP&O, Box 28, File 8, Part 2; NARA), 7. 
155 Radford, A. W. (V ADM, USN) and T. H. Robbins, Jr. (RADM, USN), Memorandum to the Secretary [ofthe 
Navy], 8/26/46 (RG 127: RRMOP&O, Box 28, File 8, Part 2; NARA), 1. 
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elemental powers each in itself capable of far reaching accomplishment, but as 
incomplete components of a conglomerate whole. 156 
Accordingly, the Anny's idea for post-war defence organisation therefore revolved around a 
Chief of Staff (complete with a supporting General Staff) directing essentially a single, highly-
centralised entity with 'Land', 'Sea' and' Air' components. From these three components, "Type 
Organizations" would be created 'requiring joint agreements for any battle and reorganization for 
each operation,.157 
Concomitantly, the Navy concept of warfare was also presented, which was based on 
having its own aviation as well as limited ground forces. 
[T]he underlying concept of the organization of naval forces is that of "Task 
Organization." [It] .. .involves an application of the principles which gave us predominant 
Seapower to the other two elements .... Such a concept holds that warfare knows three 
types of campaigns, land, naval, and air. At times two, or even all three, of these are 
coincident as to time and place of application or are related sequentially. When this 
relationship is close and immediate we have a joint form of operation; when there is no 
relationship they may be considered as separate campaigns. This requires that each major 
service be reasonably self-contained and constitute a balanced force. 158 
Accordingly, the Navy's idea for post-war defence organisation revolved around the JCS 
directing three separate entities that effectively operated as 'Landpower', 'Seapower' and 
'Airpower'. From these, 'Task Organizations' would be created that were 'capable of 
prosecuting campaigns on land, at sea or in the air over enemy territory, by the appropriate 
organization if expedient, or by joint operations if on a magnitude to require [them]' .159 
This over-arching principle of 'Seapower' was specifically seen by the Navy as 'a 
specialized professional mission, capable of being understood and executed only by the nation's 
professional experts in such matters: the Navy', 160 which thus caused it to oppose unification and 
joint organisation efforts throughout the Cold War. Indeed, by one account, this philosophy had 
actually morphed into "'a peculiar psychology ... , which frequently seemed to retire from the 
156 [USN], 'Basic Issue of the Unification Controversy - A Consistent Military Concept for Integrated Strategic and 
Tactical Use of Weapons and AImed Personnel in the Application of Three-Element Power in Modem Warfare', 
[8/46] (RG 127: RRMOP&O, Box 28, File 8, Part 2; NARA), 3. 
157 'Basic Issue', [Appendix 1]. 
158 'Basic Issue', 3-4. 
159 'Basic Issue', [Appendix 2]. 
160 Schwartz, Peter M. et aI., Drawing Lines in the Sea: The US Navy Confronts the Unified Command Plan (UCP), 
1946-99, CRM 99-3.09 (Alexandria, VA: CNA, 1/99), 68, 76-77. 
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realm of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the 
United States Navy the only true Church'" .161 
The National Security Act of 1947 and 1949 Amendment 
The different 'philosophies' of warfare were at the root of the opposing stances that the 
Services took in the unification debate. On the one hand was the Anny which, while accepting 
that a 'separate and coordinate air force ... was .. .inevitable', nevertheless promoted a highly 
centralised defence organisation with a 'single military budget controlled by the JCS' that would 
ensure 'adequate ground troops' and 'restrict the Marine Corps to functions that were strictly 
non-competitive with those of the Anny ground forces'. On the other hand was the Navy, which, 
while favouring a de-centralised defence organisation, kept as its 'priority ... combat effectiveness 
along with its perceived "indispensible prerequisite"-a strong Navy with the wartime functions 
of naval aviation and'the Marine Corps unimpaired' .162 
The National Security Act (NSA), of 1947, and subsequent 1949 amendments to it, were 
a compromise in which created a centralised defence executive organisation, first called the 
National Military Establishment (NME) but eventually becoming the Department of Defense 
(DOD). It allowed for each Service to retain a considerable degree of independence and self-
sufficiency, mainly in the form of balanced, combined arms force structures. 163 With respect to 
the broader 'philosophy' of 'seapower', this represented a landmark event in which the 
Department of the Navy (DN) retained its naval aviation arm as well as the Marine Corps. In 
fact, not only did the Act ensure the existence of the Marine Corps, but it also specifically 
defined the Corps' primary function as the country's amphibious landing forces, thus 
consolidating an evolution that had begun at the tum ofthe century. As the Act stated: 
161 Schwartz, 55. The quotation is from former Secretary of War, Henry Stimson. 
162 Keiser, Gordon W., The US Marine Corps and Defense Unification, 1944-47: The Politics of Survival (Washington, 
DC: NDU Press, 1982),40-47. See also Historical Division, Joint Secretariat (JCS), Organizational Development of 
the Joint Chieft of Staff, 1942-1989 (Washington, DC: DOD, 11189), Chapters II, III; and Hammond, Paul Y., 
Organizingfor Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century (princeton, NJ: PUP, 1961), 
Chapter 8. 
163 'The National Security Act of 1947-26 July 1947', in Cole, Alice C., et al. (eds.), The Department of Defense: 
Documents on Establishment and Organization, 1944-1978 (Washington, DC: OSD, Historical Office, 1978),35-50. 
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The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include land 
combat and service forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. The Marine 
Corps shall be organized, trained and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of 
combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the 
seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as 
may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine 
Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of 
amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed 
by landing forces. 164 
Ironically, the Act did not accord similar responsibilities to the Navy's amphibious forces which 
shared equal, if not more, responsibility with the Marine Corps as integrated partners in the naval 
service's amphibious warfare team. The role of the Marine Corps, as the Navy's combined arms 
landing forces, was thus ensured as part of the broader function of the naval service. This 
differed from the system in the United Kingdom, where the Combined Operations Headquarters 
organisation maintained responsibility for the development of so-called 'combined operations'. 
The 'Functions Paper' of 1948 
Prior to the NSA being approved, the three Service Chiefs had agreed that 'the proper 
method of setting forth the functions (now often termed as roles and missions) of the armed 
forces' was to have the President to issue an Executive Order at the same time that the NSA was 
signed into law. 165 As such, President Truman issued Executive Order 9877, Functions of the 
Armed Forces, on 26 July, 1947, by which he 'prescribe[d] the ... primary functions and 
responsibilities to the three armed services'. 166 After some concerns of the Services had been 
aired, the Service Chiefs agreed on a paper entitled 'Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff on 21 April 1948, otherwise known as the 'Functions Paper' .167 
In citing 'the basic policy embodied' in the NSA, the 'Functions Paper' first listed a 
number of 'Principles', 'Common Functions of the Armed Forces' and the 'Functions of the 
Chiefs of Staff. As one of the main aims of the creation of the DOD had been to integrate 'the 
Armed Forces into an efficient team of land, naval and air forces', the Paper directed that all 
doctrines and plans for 'joint operations and exercises shall be jointly prepared' by the three 
164 'The National Security Act', 42. 
165 'War-Navy Agreement-September 1946-16 January 1947' in Cole ... , 32-33. 
166 'Executive Order 9877-26 July 1947' in Cole ... , 267-270. 
167 'Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs ofStaff-3 February-21 April 1948' in Cole ... ,274-285. 
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Services. While the Services were also responsible for providing forces for all 'joint operations', 
the JCS were tasked to 'approve policies and doctrines for: ... [j]oint operations, including joint 
amphibious and airborne operations, and for joint training' .168 In effect, while this gave the JCS 
the ultimate authority in approving joint doctrine, it was up to the individual services to 
coordinate and draw up an agreed doctrine together. As discussed in the next chapters, however, 
not only did this decentralised and deliberative process not prevent each individual Service from 
promulgating its own amphibious warfare doctrine unilaterally but it also precluded much 
progress from being made with respect to the promulgation of official j oint amphibious warfare 
doctrine, at least until 1967 when such doctrine was finally approved by all the Services. 
The 'Functions Paper' also accorded each Service both 'Primary' and 'Collateral' 
functions. Most significantly, it reiterated the Navy's and Marine Corps' primary roles in the 
seizure of advanced bases and their corresponding responsibilities to organise, equip and train 
naval and landing forces, respectively, for 'amphibious operations'. However, only the Navy was 
accorded similar responsibilities with regard to developing 'doctrines and procedures for joint 
amphibious operations', a responsibility shared with the Army and the Air Force which were also 
to provide, equip and train their respective forces for such enterprises. While the Marine Corps 
was given 'primary interest in the development of those landing force tactics, technique, and 
equipment which are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps' (i.e., for 
'amphibious operations'), nothing was specifically mentioned about the latter's responsibilities 
with respect to 'joint amphibious operations' .169 
As the language above indicates, the Marine Corps' responsibility with regard to the 
development of amphibious landing force doctrines, tactics, technique and equipment did not 
seem to extend to 'joint amphibious operations'. Whilst not specifically defined in the main text, 
the term was referred to in the Glossary of Terms and Definitions of the 'Functions Paper' under 
the definition of an 'amphibious operation' which read as follows: 
168 'Functions', 274-285. 
169 'Functions', 280-283. Emphasis added. 
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Amphibious Operation-An attack launched from the sea by naval and landing forces 
embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile shore. An amphibious operation 
includes final preparation of the objective area for the landing and operations of naval, air 
and ground elements in over water movements, assault, and mutual support. An amphibious 
operation may precede a large-scale land operation in which case it becomes the amphibious 
phase of a joint amphibious operation. After the troops are landed and firmly established 
ashore the operation becomes a land operation. l7O 
By introducing the notion of an 'amphibious phase of a joint amphibious operation' and drawing 
a parallel between the latter and 'a large-scale land operation', the above description undermined 
what had appeared to be the fundamentally naval character of all 'amphibious operations', thus 
shifting the relationship of amphibious warfare between naval and land warfare more towards the 
latter. It was this particular emphasis that the Army would use to challenge the naval approach 
towards 'amphibious operations', not only in the late 1940s but more so in the 1950s. To 
paraphrase the language used in the National Security Act quoted in full above, whilst the Naval 
Service viewed 'amphibious operations' as (limited) land operations essential to the prosecution 
of a naval campaign, the Army perceived them as (limited) naval operations essential to the 
prosecution (or, more accurately, initiation) of a large-scale land campaign. 
TACTICAL ASPECTS 
Whilst developments at the strategic and institutional level generally led towards the 
increased centralisation of defence policy and organisation, developments at the tactical level, 
while apparently reinforcing the consolidation of a national approach toward amphibious 
warfare, actually revealed the beginnings of a significant divergence of opinion within the 
defence establishment. On the one hand was the Department of the Navy which, mainly through 
the efforts of the Marine Corps, forged ahead with its revolutionary helicopter assault concept, 
thus adding credence to its apparent primacy with regard to amphibious warfare development. 
On the other hand was the Army which, in an ongoing effort to increase the centralisation of the 
defence establishment even further (notably around the concept of 'land power' vice 'sea power' 
or 'air power'), began to mount a conceptual challenge to the Navy Department's primacy by 
differentiating between 'amphibious operations' and 'joint amphibious operation', between 
170 'Functions', 284. 
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'seizures' and 'invasions' and, ultimately, between amphibious and expeditionary warfare. As 
with its efforts to challenge the Navy Department from an organisational standpoint, the Army's 
ultimate objective at the tactical/operational level essentially resembled the 'combined 
operations' concept that had effectively been enshrined in the British COHQ system. 
Post-World War II Amphibious Warfare-State of the "Art" 
The US had garnered a vast array of amphibious experience in Wodd War II which 
essentially fell into two major categories. The first kind, which was primarily employed in the 
Central Pacific by the Naval Service (i.e., the US Navy and Marine Corps), consisted of small-
and medium-scale amphibious assaults or 'storm landings' to seize and defend island naval and 
air bases. The second type, which was typical of the enterprises conducted by the Army and 
Navy in the ETO (and SWPA), consisted of large-scale joint amphibious 'invasions' or 
expeditions that required the landing of a large joint expeditionary force or forces on a major 
(continental) land mass. 
US Navy Doctrine and Concepts 
As the Navy had been central in the execution of both types of amphibious operation, it 
was not surprising that it produced the first and most comprehensive set of operational doctrine. 
As part of a post-war process to revise all doctrinal, tactical and instructional manuals, a Tactical 
Publications Panel of combat-experienced officers was established within the Office of Chief of 
Naval Operations (OCNO). This panel produced drafts of basic publications which were 
circulated to commanders afloat and ashore for comments and critiques, with 'subsidiary 
publications ... prepared by forces afloat and the Marine Corps [that] were edited in the Navy 
Department for approval by the Chief of Naval Operations'. These publications were entitled 
'United States Fleets' (USF) manuals and generally represented 'the best service opinion and the 
best knowledge of naval warfare .. .in 1946,.171 
171 OCNO, ND, USF 1, Principles and Applications of Naval Waifare, United States Fleets, 1947,5/1/47 (WWIICF: 
USFPS, Box 269; OAB, NHHC), XI. 
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The basic volume covenng amphibious operations, USF 6, Amphibious Warfare 
Instructions, was promulgated on 20 August 1946.172 While defining an 'Amphibious Operation' 
as an 'overwater assault by armed forces, transported primarily by ships and craft, to effect a 
landing and seizure of an objective on a hostile shore', the manual also identified and defined the 
two major types: 
Amphibious Invasion-An amphibious operation which inaugurates a major overseas 
operation of unlimited objective, and subsequent amphibious landings in furtherance of that 
campaIgn. 
Amphibious Seizure-An amphibious operation of limited objective to seize and hold a 
hostile, or in some cases a friendly, land position, for a specific purpose or purposes. 173 
Taken together, these two definitions represented the majority of those amphibious operations 
that had been conducted in the two (or even three) maj or theatres during the war. The former 
represented those major invasions in the ETO (as well as certain ones in the Southwest Pacific 
Area) while the latter exemplified those 'storm landings' of the Central Pacific. 
Interestingly, the 'keystone' USF publication, USF 1, Principles and Applications of 
Naval Warfare, promulgated on 1 May 1947/74 actually expanded on the above types of 
enterprises, which testified to the breadth and complexity of amphibious warfare in general and, 
more particularly, foreshadowed some of the disagreement that would ensue between the Naval 
Service and the Army. While the term 'Amphibious Operations' was included in a chapter on 
offensive naval operations and defined similarly as in USF 6, USF 1 offered a broader 
methodology to categorise these enterprises, stating that the 'character and the magnitude of an 
amphibious operation are determined largely by the relative position of the target area to enemy 
centers of war-making power, and by the extent and vulnerability of pertinent enemy lines of 
.. h' h h ' 175 commUnICatIOn w IC cross t e sea . 
172 OCNO, ND, USF 6, Amphibious Warfare Instructions, United States Fleets, 1946,8/20/46 (PI946CF: USFPS, Box 
531; OAB, NHHC), XI. 
173 USF 6, 1-2 and 1-3. The two other types of operations were 'Amphibious Demonstration' and 'Amphibious 
Raid'. Underlining added. 
174 USF 1, III. 
175 USF 1,4-7. 
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Using this point of reference, it identified 'three general situations', the first, and most 
significant, being the one that would almost certainly be required in any future war against the 
Soviet Union once it had conquered continental Europe. This particular situation involved the 
[c]apture of a beachhead on an enemy continent, or homeland, within easy reach of his 
centers of war-making power and with lines of communication little, if at all, exposed to 
our attack. Such deployment of major land and air forces into continuous land contact 
with the enemy involves expansion of one or more comparatively limited beachheads into 
a major front, before the enemy can drive us back into the sea, or isolate and confine our 
effort. Such an operation always requires the early capture and development of one or 
more suitable and conveniently located ports and airdrome areas to insure an adequate 
build up. In such an operation, the speed with which we are able to build up our fighting 
strength on land, and its adequate logistics support, is an essential factor in the successful 
launching of the resulting land campaign. 176 
Included in this classification would have been such massive enterprises as the landings III 
Normandy and the planned invasion ofthe Japanese home islands. 
A second type of large-scale operation followed, which involved the capture 'of a 
beachhead on a continent, or a large group of islands, beyond immediate reach of enemy centers 
of war-making power'. While this type similarly involved consolidating one or more beachheads, 
it involved an enemy with 'limited additional strength to bear' as well as 'limited reinforcement' 
capabilities.177 This category would have included the maj ority of large-scale World War II 
operations including the landings in North Africa and on the Italian peninsula, the capture of very 
large islands such as Sicily, Okinawa, and various ones in the Southwest Pacific, as well as the 
incursion into southern France. 
The last type epitomised those assaults performed during the island-hopping campaign in 
the South and Central Pacific and was classified simply as capturing 'an atoll, or small island, so 
situated that the enemy has small possibility of reinforcement of his local defence forces and 
limited ability to exert pressure from outside by air or sea' .178 Notable examples would have been 
from the Pacific, such as Guada1canal, Tarawa, Saipan, Peleliu, and Iwo Jima. 
176 USF 1,4-7-4-8. 
177 USF 1,4-8. 
178 USF 1, 4-8. 
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Apparently focusing only on these last types of situations was USF 63, Amphibious 
Instroctions, Landing Forces, which was promulgated in March, 1947. 179 This manual was 
drafted by the Navy's landing forces, the Marine Corps, a fact revealed by the manual only 
offering three of the four types of operations listed in USF 6, notably 'Seizures', 
'Demonstrations' and 'Raids' .180 Missing were 'Invasions' or any other larger-scale types of 
operations offered in USF 1, which illustrated the Marines' experiences with-and probably 
preferences for-the relatively limited operations in the Central (and South) Pacific and therefore 
the narrower idea of amphibious warfare as a form of naval and not joint (or, perhaps, maritime) 
warfare. Furthermore, although the authors did mention large-scale landings, they made sure to 
separate amphibious operations-as distinctly naval affairs-from land operations, even if the 
former were employed to initiate the latter. 
Where the amphibious operation is preliminary to a large-scale land campaign or 
invasion, the seizure of the initial position or beachhead is the final joint incident of the 
amphibious operation. This will normally involve action by Joint Forces with over-all 
naval responsibility terminating when the Army forces are firmly established ashore .... 181 
This description would directly contradict that of a 'joint amphibious operation' that appeared 
with the release of the 'Functions Paper' in April of 1948, as discussed above, which stated that 
when an amphibious operation preceded a large-scale land campaign, it was merely the 
amphibious phase of a (larger) 'joint amphibious operation'. 
Atomic Weapons and Amphibious Warfare 
The doctrinal manuals also took into account, as much as they could, the newest 
developments in weapons and warfare to include their assessments and future predictions. As 
part of a ten-year forecast as to 'Trends in Future Naval Operations', USF 1 offered a number of 
sober yet balanced assessments about new weapons and war-fighting methods. On the one hand, 
whilst acknowledging the 'power and destructiveness' of nuclear weapons, as well as the 
potential of 'guided missiles and high speed aircraft', the manual warned against 'uninformed 
179 OCNO, ND, USF 63, Amphibious Instructions, Landing Forces, 1947,3/12/47 (PWWIICF: USFPS, Box 531; 
OAB,NHHC). 
180 USF 63, III. 
181 USF 63, 1-1. Emphasis added. 
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comment that all other weapons or forms of warfare are obsolete'. On the other hand, the 
manual, in specifically citing the success of strategic bombardment, carrier warfare and 
amphibious operations, also stated that the United States 'must not assume that all the tactics , 
dispositions and maneuvers developed from war experience in Wodd War II will remain valid in 
the next war' .182 This last pronouncement foreshadowed the attitude taken by the Marine Corps 
in their continuing pursuit of innovative tactics, techniques and equipment. 
The potential destructive effect of atomic bombs was also taken up in USF 6 which dealt 
more closely with these effects at the tactical level. This analysis was based on the evidence 
collected from Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as that from two nuclear tests conducted in July 
of 1946 on the Bikini atoll of the Marshall Islands in the central Pacific Ocean. The destructive 
results, while still extraordinary, were nevertheless not quite as devastating as originally 
believed.183 Some analysts did point out the potentially debilitating effects of radioactivity; the 
tests generally seemed to shift the focus of using atomic bombs from the tactical level to the 
strategic. The fact that there were very few of these weapons in existence throughout the late 
1940s-and none possessed by the USSR until late 1949-supported this shift as these extremely 
rare and costly weapons had to be reserved for employment against only the highest value 
targets, i.e., political and industrial centres. 184 This demonstrated, at least to some, that atomic 
bombs would not necessarily have an overwhelming destructive impact on certain aspects of 
conventional warfare, including amphibious warfare. 
The Naval Development of' Amphibious Operations' 
One of the witnesses to the Bikini tests, Marine Corps Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, 
was there specifically to ascertain the potential impact of atomic weapons on amphibious 
operations. In a letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), General Alexander A. 
182 USF 1, 11-3. 
183 See ,'Report of the President's Evaluation Commission on the First Bikini Test'; and _, 'Vice Admiral 
Blandy;;-Initial Report on Second Atomic Bomb', USNIP, 72:9 (9/46), 1238-1239, 1239-1240. See also -' 'The 
Atomic Bomb Tests', JRUSI, 91:564 (11/46),590-592. 
184 _, 'Operation Crossroads Findings', USNIP, 72:9 (9/46),1241; and Strope, Walmer E.,'The Navy and the Atomic 
Bomb', USNIP, 73:10 (10/47),1221-1227. 
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Vandegrift, General Geiger described what he felt the future held for the conduct of amphibious 
operations against an enemy with atomic weapons while quite possibly outlining the future 
attitude of the whole Marine Corps towards atomic weapons for the next generation: 'It is quite 
evident that a small number of atomic bombs could destroy an expeditionary force as now 
organized, embarked and landed. Such a force might not fare so badly on the high seas, if 
properly dispersed ... [but w]ith an enemy in possession of atomic bombs, I cannot visualize 
another landing such as was executed at Normandy or Okinawa' .185 As will be discussed below, 
this same assessment was made by Army General Omar N. Bradley in congressional testimony 
in October of 1949. Whilst Geiger's quotation is rarely cited by Marine Corps historians, the 
latter's statement has been frequently used as 'evidence' that the Army was generally ignorant of 
amphibious warfare and out of touch with modem developments. 186 
His negative prediction notwithstanding, General Geiger offered a more positive 
conclusion on the future of amphibious warfare as it then existed, which effectively 
foreshadowed the evolution of amphibious warfare development in the US for the next decade: 
'It is my opinion that future amphibious operations will be undertaken by much smaller 
expeditionary forces, which will be highly trained and lightly equipped, and transported by air or 
submarine, and movement accomplished with a greater degree of surprise and speed than has 
ever been heretofore visualized. Or that forces must be dispersed over a much wider front than 
used in past operations'. In the end, no matter what course needed to be pursued, General Geiger 
simply suggested that 'Marine Corps Headquarters ... use its most competent officers in finding a 
solution to develop the technique of conducting amphibious operations in the atomic age'. 187 
185 Quoted in Clifford, Progress, 71; and Till, Geoffrey, Modern Sea Power: An Introduction, Brassey's Sea Power: 
Naval Vessels, Weapons Systems and Technology Series, Volume 1 (London: Brassey's, 1987). Misleadingly quoted 
in Simmons, Marines, 180; and Heinl, Soldiers, 512. 
186 See, for example, Alexander/Bartlett, 1-2; and Heinl, Soldiers, 530, 536; Victory, 4-8. 
187 Clifford, Progress, 71. 
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The Marine Corps Special Board: A New Concept Formulated 
This recommendation was agreed to by the Commandant who formed a Special Board 
that presented its report in December of 1946.188 The 'Advance Report of Special Board, 
Commandant of the Marine Corps' consisted of three separate studies: 'Employment of 
Helicopters for Ship to Shore Movement', 'Damage Effects of the Explosion of An Atomic 
Bomb', and 'Special Equipment for Amphibious Operations'. Whilst the first paper, which used 
the second's data and analysis from the Japanese and Bikini atomic detonations, outlined the 
debilitating effects that 'an underwater atomic mine' or 'an air burst at about 650 feet altitude' 
would likely have had on the landing force at Iwo Jima (two Marine Divisions along a 3,500-
yard frontage), 189 the last paper basically presented the Special Board's conclusions and 
recommendations. Its summary is worth quoting at length as it outlined the central focus of the 
Marine Corps' (and Navy's) investigation of-and experimentation with-new amphibious 
warfare concepts, techniques, doctrine and equipment for the next quarter-century: 
The atomic bomb now prohibits the heavy concentrations of ships and landing craft 
heretofore used in amphibious operations. The answer lies in a wide dispersion of our 
attack force, a [rapid] concentration of our landing force by means other than small boats 
or amphibians and thereafter maintaining close contact with the enemy. 
Airborne operations by landplane transport, by parachute or by glider are not suitable 
for Marine Corps employment nor are they politically expedient. Submarine transport 
will be useful but to a limited extent. 
The development of a combination of large flying boats and helicopters will 
overcome the limitations of a purely airborne method, keep the enterprise a purely naval 
one, and permit its rapid exploitation and support from widely dispersed and more 
economical surface vessels. 190 
The report went on to emphasise the helicopter's central role in the initial assault-to attack 'a 
landing area from the flank or rear'-although the broader scheme of manoeuvre still involved 
conventional means used in the past war as they were 'more economic' to land heavier weapons 
and units such as tanks, field artillery and engineers, specifically 'by means of landing ships or 
cargo seaplanes sufficiently dispersed to avoid presenting a profitable target' .191 
188 Clifford, Progress, 72 
189 See [SB, CMC], 'Employment of Helicopters for Ship-to-Shore Movement', [12/46] (HAF 744, Box 41; AB, 
MCRC), 1-2; and [SB, CMC], 'Damage Effects of the Explosion of an Atomic Bomb', [12/46] (HAF 744, Box 41; 
AB,MCRC). 
190 [SB, CMC], 'Special Equipment for Amphibious Operations', [12/46] (HAF 744, Box 41; AB, MCRC), l. 
191 'Special Equipment', 7. 
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Parts II and III of the 'Special Equipment' paper were proposed four-year development 
programs for seaplanes and helicopters, respectively, for the years 1947 through 1950, whilst 
Parts IV and V included very brief analyses of the performance of the two types of machines in 
question. Of the three types of seaplanes that were readily available, only the Martin 'JRM' or 
'Mars', which could carry l33 fully-equipped troops, seemed to be in contention. 192 Of the nine 
types of helicopters that were analysed, two were considered seriously at the time: the single-
engine Sikorsky H03S-1 trainer-type model and the single-engine, twin-rotor (fore and aft 
folding-bladed) Piasecki XHRP-l, dubbed the 'flying banana', which could carry 6-8 troops plus 
a crew oftwo.193 
Helicopters, Exercises and Doctrine: A New Concept Tested 
As requested, reports outlining the military requirements for helicopters and seaplanes 
for amphibious operations were submitted to the CMC in March and October of 1947. 194 
Subsequent initiation of these helicopter and seaplane transport programs, under the direction of 
the Commandant, Marine Corps Schools (CMCS), was authorised by the CMC, although priority 
was given to the helicopter as seaplanes were initially seen as 'supplementary fast troop and 
cargo carriers' .195 In planning to establish a developmental helicopter unit for the Marine Corps, 
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) began including plans to this effect in June, 1947, and the 
CMC finally established Marine Helicopter Squadron One (HMX-l) on 1 December 1947.196 
HMX-l 's primary mission was to develop the tactics and techniques for the employment 
of helicopters in the ship-to-shore phase of the amphibious assault and evaluate a small 
helicopter to replace the Marine Corps' fixed-wing observation aircraft. It tested several concepts 
and equipment over the course of several exercises, mostly notably PACKARD II. Whilst the 
employment of the helicopters in the ship-to-shore movement proved feasible, unlike the 
192 'S ·al E· 4 8 peCI qUlpment', 1 -1 . 
193 'S . IE· 9 9 peCla qUlpment', 1 -2 . 
194 CMCS ltr Serial 001120 to CMC, 3/10/47 (HAF 744; AB, MCRC); and CG [MCS], ltr Serial 001170 to CMC, 
10/29/47 (HAF 743, Box 41; AB, MCRC). 
195 CMC, ltr Serial 008A35346 to CMCS, 12/19/46 (HAF 744, Box 41; AB, MCRC), 1. Emphasis added. 
196 Rawlins/Sambito, 19-20. 
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previously-articulated concept of helicopter operations which called for the initial assault to be 
made by helicopter-landed troops, the helicopter movement was actually preceded by a landing 
of conventional craft about two hours prior to the helicopters touching down. Despite this 
technical detail, the overall exercise-which also focused on logistics, air support, tanks, 
artillery, and naval gunfire-was a complete success. 197 As such, the underlying concept of 
employing helicopters to land assault infantry and other lighter elements ashore from carrier-type 
ships proved both feasible and practicable. 
Pursuant to the guidance outlined by the CMC in response to the requirements reports on 
helicopters, the CMCS set out to formulate a tentative helicopter doctrine for general use. 
Although rudimentary instructions had already been put together prior to the PACKARD II 
exercise in 'mimeograph instructional form', 198 an additional pamphlet, entitled 'The 
Employment of Helicopters in the Amphibious Attack', was specifically drawn up in preparation 
for the exercise 'to provide students with a working background for the problem and a general 
appreciation of the current concept of helicopter employment' .199 This pamphlet was revised 
after the training exercise and was ultimately released as PHIB-31, Employment of Helicopters 
(Tentative), 1948,200 which was the thirty-first in series of 'Amphibious Operations' instructional 
pamphlets, known as 'PHIBs', being prepared by the Marine Corps Schools. 
Like the other PHIBs in the series, PHIB-31 was less of an actual doctrinal publication 
and more of an instructional, background text which aimed to provide 'the basis for a body of 
doctrine governing helicopter landing operations' .201 Although the significance of the manual 
itself has sometimes been exaggerated, specifically with comparisons to the groundbreaking 
doctrine issued in 1934,202 it should be emphasised that this manual only addressed one specific 
aspect of the amphibious assault-the ship-to-shore movement-and that it involved only one 
197 MCS, Amphibious CPX {Operation PACKARD II}, Sections VI, VII; and Cmdr., AmphGp TWO, U.S. AtlFlt 
[CTF-86] Itr Serial No. 695 to Cmdr., AmphForce, U.S. AtlFlt, 6/12/48 (EF: Box 26; AB, MCRC); and Marine Corps 
Helicopter Squadron 1 (HMX-l), Operation PACKARD II (10-26 May 1948), n.d. (HAF 284, Box 13; AB, MCRC). 
198 Clifford, Progress, 77, and Rawlins/Sambito, 25. 
199 Amphibious CP){, II-lO. 
200 MCS, PHffi-31, Employment of Helicopters (Tentative), 1948 (Library; MCHC). 
201 PHffi-31, 1. 
202 See, for example, AlexanderlBartlett, 28. 
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piece of equipment, the HRP-l transport helicopter, which had yet to be operationally tested in 
order to assess its potential in amphibious operations. This was not remedied until the next year 
when another command post exercise, PACKARD III, involved the employment of eight HRP-l 
transport helicopters to simulate a 184-helicopter force lifting an RCT from six (simulated) 
escort carriers. Although only a total of 240 personnel and 14,000 pounds of equipment were 
lifted approximately 10 miles (six miles inland), the exercise was declared a complete success. 
Not only did these results seem to confirm those achieved in PACKARD II, but they also 'left no 
doubt to the future value of helicopters in amphibious assaults' .203 
The (Joint) Development of 'Joint Amphibious Operations' 
As discussed previously, an assertion about the future of amphibious warfare in the 
atomic age, made by Army General Omar N. Bradley during testimony at a House Armed 
Services Committee hearing on 19 October 1949, has often been cited as 'evidence' that the 
Army was (or continued to be) somewhat out of touch with or a step behind the practice of 
landing on hostile shores. A closer examination of his full remarks, however, reveals that his 
statement was not only technically accurate but also did not differ appreciably from the one made 
by Marine Corps General Roy Geiger less than three years before. In General Bradley's words, 
[u]ndoubtedly, without Navy support, any amphibious operation is impossible. However, 
by appraising the power of the atomic bomb, I am wondering whether we shall ever have 
another major scale amphibious operation. Frankly, the atomic bomb, properly delivered, 
almost precludes such a possibility. I know that I, personally, hope that I shall never be 
called upon to participate in another amphibious operation like the one in Normandy. 204 
This quote has been referred to by many historians who promptly cite the amphibious assault at 
Inchon on 15 September 1950 as proof that General Bradley was wrong in his claim.205 Such 
reasoning is misleading, however, mainly because the North Koreans had no atomic bombs to 
employ against the attacking force which therefore did not disprove General Bradley's statement. 
203 See Commander, AmphGp Two, Serial 0298 to Commander, AmphForce, US AtlFlt, 6/25/49; and Commander-in-
Chief, US AtlFlt, Serial 0731 to CNO, 9/20/49 (RG 127: RTE&M, Box 9; NARA II); and Rawlins/Sambito, Marines 
and Helicopters, 27. 
204 _, 'Department of the Army Views on Amphibious Operations Presented by Representatives of the DA Chief of 
Staff(G-3) and Army Field Forces at Conference with Staff and Faculty, C&GSC, Ft. Leavenworth, 10 April 1950', 
[4/10/50] (RG 127: RRDAWD, Box 1(4); NARA), 1. 
205 See footnote 186. 
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In fact, the amphibious landing was conducted in a completely conventional setting with few 
differences, if any, from certain operations performed during the Second World War. The main 
shortcoming in General Bradley's testimony, if any, was arguably the fact that he did not seem to 
offer any possible solutions to the problem, whereas General Geiger did. 
Early Joint and Army AmphibiouslExpeditionary Doctrine 
As will be seen below, one of the main concerns that would arise from early joint 
amphibious training and exercises involved the lack of viable joint amphibious operations 
doctrine. A few efforts in this area were made immediately following the war but with negative 
results. Amongst the first was a proposal for a new joint doctrinal manual in early 1946 although 
this was rejected by the Navy because of concerns that such a document would be too 
'voluminous' and that such a project was more suited for the Marine Corps Schools as it was 
allegedly 'the only institution to specialize in amphibious and lower echelon Joint Operations' .206 
The second also occurred the same year, when the Navy declined to endorse a doctrinal paper 
issued by a Joint Board at the Army and Navy Staff College, titled Joint Overseas Operations 
because it represented too much of an 'Army sponsored view' .207 
In fact, the only j oint manual that was applicable to amphibious operations at that time 
was the 1935 edition of Joint Action of the Army and the Navy (JAAN) which had last been 
updated with Change Number 20 in December of 1946.208 It addressed what had been referred to 
in the 1930s as 'Joint Overseas Expeditions', although its guidance was a bit ambiguous, if not 
contradictory, specifically with regard to command relationships.209 In addition, the manual left 
considerable leeway with regard to formulating and practicing each service's own functions/10 a 
situation compounded by the ambiguities and contradictions evident in the NSA and the 
'Functions Paper', as discussed above. 
206 See Op-30 Serial 35P30 to Op-34, 2/7/46 (SPDR: Series XIV, Box 198; OAB, NHHC), 1. 
207 [USNIUSMC], 'Chronology of Significant Developments in the Evolution of Amphibious Command and 
Organization Questions Since 1900, with Limited Reference Data', 7/2/56 (RG 127: RRDAWD, Box 3, File 9; 
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208 ND, FTP 155, Joint Action o/the Army and the Navy, 1935 (WWnCF: FTPPS, Box 108, OAB, NHHC), 5-6 
(Change No. 17,6/26/45). 
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The Anny's own landing operations doctrine, FM 31-5, Landing Operations on Hostile 
Shores, which was categorised under the 'special operations' series of US AnDy Field Manuals 
(FMs), had not yet undergone any sort of revision since last issued in 1944 and therefore could 
not clarify any of the above contentions.211 In addition, the Anny's capstone doctrine, FM 100-5, 
Field Service Regulations, Operations, the new edition of which had just been released in mid-
August of 1949, only had one section on 'Joint Amphibious Operations' .212 Whilst it did not 
incorporate any of the definitional language found in the 'Functions Paper' and only had one 
section devoted to the specific subject, the manual described these types of enterprises as having 
five different 'purposes' which seemed to imply that they were essential to the general 
prosecution of land warfare. 
Army Training and Joint (Amphibious) Exercises 
In recounting early US Anny amphibious training and exercises, it must be remembered 
that the Anny was considerably preoccupied in the first few years after the war with occupation 
duties, with nearly half of the service's approximately 550,000 men still serving overseas in mid-
1948?J3 Still, various smaller Anny units such as battalions and regiments did undergo some 
basic amphibious troop training?14 This ranged from rudimentary demonstrations and exercises 
for the cadets of the US Military Academy and the midshipmen of the US Naval Academy at the 
annual summer CAMID exercises beginning in 1946/15 to on-site training by the specially-
fonned Marine Corps' Troop Training Units (TTUs) prior to joint fleet exercises/16 and, finally, 
to a large-scale exercise conducted by the Sixth Anny in 1946, which was notable for the Anny's 
critique of the so-called 'Mid-Pacific doctrine' and practice that did not seem to cater enough to 
211 See WD, FM 31-5, Landing Operations on Hostile Shores (Washington, DC: US GPO, 11/44). 
212 DA, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations (Washington, DC: US GPO, 8/15/49), Chapter 11 ('Special 
Operations '), Section XII. 
213 DOD [OSD], Second Report of the Secretary of Defense and the Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Army, 
Secretary of the Navy, [and] Secretary of the Air Force, For the Fiscal Year 1949, [12/31/49] (Washington, DC: US 
GPO, 1950), 142. 
214 For an overview, see Boose, 65-68. 
215 US AtlFlt Serial_, Operation (ComPhibLant) Plan No. 2-48 (CAMID III), 4/23/48; and US AtlFlt, Serial 0286, 
Operation Order (ComPhibGru 2) No. A4-49, (CAMID IV), 7/1/49 (RG 127: RTE&M, Boxes 7,8; NARA). 
216 TTU, ATC, US AtlFlt, to Distr., 12/31/46 (EF: Box 32; AB, MCRC), 1-2; CG, TTU, US AtlFlt, ltr Serial No. 227-
49 to CG, US Army Forces, 2/24/49; Lt. Col. V.H. Krulak, USMC, ltr to Asst. CMCS, 3/8/49; and Col. S.G. Taxis, 
USMC, ltr to Asst. CMCS, 3/15/49 (EF: Box 33; AB, MCRC). 
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'continental operations'. 217 Only in the late-1940s did the Army begin participating in larger 
routine joint exercises from which a number of (somewhat disparate) conclusions materialised. 
These, in tum, lent increasing credence to the Army's own conceptualisation of 
amphibious/expeditionary warfare which primarily involved large-scale 'joint amphibious 
operations' like the 'invasions' undertaken during World War II. 
Whilst the Navy focused many of its early training efforts on a range of exercises 
including a number of cold weather tests (seeing that the Soviet Union coastline extended far into 
arctic and sub-arctic waters), the Army's primary concern centred on conventional, large-scale 
joint amphibious operations (otherwise known as 'joint overseas expeditions'), which involved 
such aspects as concepts, joint doctrine, fire and air support, and logistics. One of the most 
significant of these exercises, Operation SEMINOLE ,which involved the Army, Navy and Air 
Force, was held at the end of October 1947 in Panama City, Florida/18 specifically to 'develop 
the technique of loading and landing armored forces and heavy equipment', another primary 
concern of the Army in any large-scale continental operation.219 In keeping with the concept of 
what existing doctrine labelled as 'invasions', Operation SEMINOLE was actually the initiation 
of a subsequent ground offensive (code-named APACHE) in which a (simulated) infantry 
division was to carry out the 'landing and assault' phase while an actual armoured division (2d 
Armoured) would, by landing on 'D-day plus 1', contribute to the subsequent 'reinforcement and 
resupply' and 'consolidation' phases to prepare for the breakout and support of further land 
operations.22o 
The exercise was judged to be successful although a few poignant recommendations 
were made by the Commanding General, Fourth Army, which revealed the Army's focus on the 
latter-phase aspects of joint amphibious operations. Aside from a logical request for a 'study for 
217 Boose, 68. See also SIXTH ARMY, Report on Amphibious Training Program, [12/12/46] (MHI Stacks: 
U260.W47.U5; Library, AHEC). 
218 -' 'Exercise Seminole', USN1P, 74:1 (1/48), 103-4; and Fraser, Angus M. (Maj., USMC), 'Amphibious Armor', 
MeG, 32:3 (3/48),14-17. 
219 HQ, Fourth Army, Report on 1947 Amphibious Training Program (Exercise SEMINOLE), 8/6/48 (RG 127: 
RTE&M, Box 6; NARA), 4. 
220 Report, 5, and USF 6,1-4. 
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determining new methods of, and equipment for, landing heavy equipment', the other primary 
recommendation related to the requirement to produce j oint doctrine 'applicable to all three-
services' which had to address command relationships and 'the difference in organisation of a 
Marine Division and an Infantry Division of the Army since these differences vitally affect the 
planning and execution of amphibious operations' (mainly because of the heavier nature of the 
latter).221 
Operation MIKI, which was conducted in October of 1949 in Hawaii, was the largest 
joint amphibious exercise held since the end of the war.222 It involved a simulated invasion of the 
Hawaiian Islands by the 2nd Infantry Division using more than 43,000 personnel from all 
branches of the military as well as 100 naval vessels and more than 300 aircraft. 223 Although an 
overall success, there were many areas in which deficiencies emerged, particularly ones which 
had already been pointed out by SEMINOLE. Most significant-and a foreshadowing of 
controversies between the Army, Air Force, and the Navy/Marine Corps in the 1950s-was a 
specific critique of the status of joint amphibious/expeditionary development as opposed to naval 
amphibious development. As the exercise's presiding (Army) officer lamented, 
[a]mphibious technique and equipment are not keeping abreast of other developments in 
modern warfare. Equipment is obsolete. Techniques and doctrines, based on World War 
II experience, and designed for use against specific enemy island strongholds are not 
entirely applicable to warfare waged against a continental and modernly equipped enemy. 
New weapons necessitate revisions of strategy, tactics, techniques, procedures, 
'b'l' . d' 224 responsl 1 It1es, an eqUipment. ... 
The resulting recommendations focused primarily on clarifying obvious disagreements that the 
Army had with the naval service's limited conceptualisation of amphibious operations. As such, 
the most significant requests were for '[mJodem definitions of amphibious warfare', 'revisions of 
amphibious responsibilities', 'clarification of supporting roles', and 'clear delineation of. .. the 
221 Report, 9. 
222 --.J 'Oahu Maneuvers Completed', USNIP, 76:1 (1150),102-3. 
223 MC Headquarters (JSMIKl-3 354.2/61) to CIS, US Army and CNO, Final Report on Joint Army-Navy Exercise 
MIKI (FY 1950),1950 (RG 127: RTE&M, Box 12; NARA), Section I. 
224 Final Report, 3--4; and Commander, Naval Forces Western TF (COMPHIBPAC), Serial 0931 to MC, Joint 
Exercise MIIG, Report of Joint Exercise MIKI (pACFLT EX 49F), 12/10/49 (RG 127: RTE&M, Box 12; NARA), 
A-28/29. 
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Anned Forces to be equipped and trained for the paramount purpose of making the land 
attack' .225 
Two more specific issues were raised, the first concerning joint doctrine and training. 
Whilst the need for joint doctrine was again indicated by the Anny, it was recommended that the 
current doctrine (i.e., USFs 6, 63, and 66) be approved by all the services for immediate use.226 A 
specific shortcoming with these naval manuals and the personnel using them as instruction 
guidelines concerned the fact that differences between Marine Corps and Anny divisions were 
not taken into account, thus leading to a lack of unifonn indoctrination and training. 227 
The second issue focused on establishing the beachhead and logistics. Although mention 
was made of efforts to use 'airborne' means to land assault forces and that they should be further 
studied, more attention was paid to the conventional shore party which had been deployed 
according to USF 63.z28 Whilst successfully deployed, there was nevertheless some critique that 
not enough was being done towards developing 'improved techniques of unloading from ships to 
landing craft and from landing craft to the beach' which, in tum, resulted in calls for '[ s ]peeding 
up the ship-to-shore movement', developing larger, 'very high speed landing craft' as well as 
'faster and more durable amphibious vehicles' .229 
A third joint exercise, PORTREX, which was held in February of 1950 in the area 
surrounding Puerto Rico, centred on the landing of the 3d Infantry Division (reduced strength) 
whilst also involving an air-dropped BLT of the 82nd Airborne Division.230 Central to this 
endeavour was the first large-scale execution of new dispersal techniques in which the 'basic 
concept of the entire ship-to-shore movement was to provide dispersal of ships and boat waves 
225 Final Report, 4-1-4-2. 
226 Final Report, 4-8-4-10, and 4-20. 
227 See Headquarters, UG, Exercise MIKI, Operation Plan JS MIKl 03,9/1149,2; and Commander, TF 131, and CG, 
2d ID, Itr to MC Joint Exercise MIlG, 11125/49,2-3,23. (RG127: RTE&M, Boxes 12, 13; NARA) 
228 Final Report, 3-16, 4-17. 
229 Headquarters, UG, ... , 3; and Robert E. Fojt, (Col., USMC), et aI., Memorandumfor the Director, Division of Plans 
and Policies, Sub}: Observer's Report of Joint Operation MIKl, n.d. (RG 127: RTE&M, Box 13; NARA), 13-14. 
230 _, 'Amphibious and Arctic Maneuvers', USNIP, 76:3 (3/50), 338-339. See also Headquarters, AnDy UG, 
PORTREX, 'Submission of Report on Joint Puerto Rican Exercise, FY 1950, Portrex', 4110/50 (EF: Box 33; AB, 
MCRC), 1-1 - 1-2, II-I. 
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and at the same time meet the troop schedule and scheme of maneuver'. 231 Whilst considered 
'essentially feasible and practicable', 'of paramount importance', and 'worthy of continued test 
and experimentation', this technique also raised another issue that stemmed from a critical 
appraisal of the 'Mid-Pacific' naval approach towards 'amphibious operations' (i.e., amphibious 
warfare). 
Inevitably, the question arises as to the validity of our present practice oflanding in small 
personnel boats and craft designed specifically for conditions that were encountered in 
the South and Central Pacific during World War II. In this landing, wherein wind and 
water conditions were such as to very nearly preclude the landing in L VT and LCVP, it is 
believed that the same operation could have been carried out employing larger personnel 
and cargo carriers such as LSM and LSD, with a greater assurance of success against 
unfavorable weather but risking the chance ofloss oflarge units by enemy action. 232 
In furtherance of this suggestion and as part of a general agreement to continue to pursue 
continued experimentation in this technique, the report not only recommended a program to 
develop larger landing craft but it also recommended that 'a concurrent program of amphibious 
ship design to enable transports to lift, and quickly and easily launch such craft' be carried out,233 
advice that would gradually be realised in the 1950s. 
Army Development of 'Joint Amphibious Operations' 
Following on from a relatively weak doctrinal foundation but having gradually reignited 
its interest in and experience with large-scale joint amphibious landings through participation in 
a number of key exercises, the Army was eventually able to develop its own concept of 
amphibious/expeditionary operations. Although there was no real co-ordinated effort to do so, a 
number of different informational resources had become available by the end of 1949, including 
senior staff-level research and lectures, conclusions presented by special panels and instructor 
conferences, and the reports and recommendations resulting from the aforementioned 
exercises.234 Accordingly, a comprehensive report, entitled 'Department of Army Views on 
231 Commander, Naval forces INVASION (CTF 102) and Commander Joint Assault Force INVASION (CTF 104) 
(Commander, AF, US AtlFlt), Serial 0142 to Commander JTF INVASION (CG, V Corps), 4/13/50 (RG 428: ROCNO, 
Box 325; NARA), III(D)(5)-2. 
232 Serial 0142, III(D)(5)-4; and 'Submission of Report', 1II-13. 
233 Serial 0142, III (D)(5)-7. 
234 See Boose, 75-79. 
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Amphibious Operations', was drawn up in early 1950 and presented to the staff at the Army's 
Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, on 10 April. 235 
The report began by referring to the now familiar testimony given by General Bradley in 
October, 1949. It also included testimony by Army General Lawton Collins who, while agreeing 
with Bradley's seminal point concerning the threat of atomic weapons, re-emphasised the main 
concern of conventional j oint amphibious operations, which separated the broader Army concept 
from the narrower naval methodology: 'Now, we feel that the business of getting ashore in an 
amphibious operation is only the start of the thing. You can almost always get ashore ... but the 
operation doesn't end there. There is a tremendous logistical problem that follows .... Then you 
have to break out ofthe rather limited beachhead if you expect to get anywhere' .236 
Building on this fundamental detail, the report quickly presented a summary statement of 
the Army's position which suggested the foundations of a solution to executing large-scale, joint 
amphibious/expeditionary operations when attacking an enemy armed with nuclear weapons. 
In general, large-scale amphibious operations in a future war appear to be outmoded by 
the atomic bomb. While large concentrations of forces may no longer be practicable, our 
offensive capabilities can be retained and improved by employing dispersion and 
developing great tactical mobility and logistical flexibility. To fully exploit these military 
advantages, the Army should be capable of conducting amphibious operations (probably 
of Corps size), either in series with other small-scale amphibious operations or in 
conjunction with airborne operations.237 
Having thus rationalised a possible answer to conducting larger-scale (joint) amphibious 
operations in the face of atomic weapons, which it had apparently never abandoned, the Army 
looked to refine its concept of amphibious landings in relation to that championed by the naval 
service.238 
In order to do so, the report first set about challenging the US Naval Service's primacy 
with regard to amphibious warfare development as had apparently been accorded by the NSA 
and the 'Functions Paper'. The central claim was that no service had been granted such exclusive 
235 Cited above (,Army Views'), 63. 
236 'Army Views', 1-2. 
237 'Army Views', 2. 
238 See, for example, Pratt, Fletcher, 'Beachheads of World War III', MeG, 32:8 (8/48), 20-25; Stuart, Arthur 1. (Lt. 
Col., USMC), 'Mechanization of the Amphibious Attack [Part I]', MeG, 33:7 (7/49), 34-39; and 'Mechanization of 
the Amphibious Attack [Part II]', MeG, 33:8 (8/49), 26-31. 
69 
responsibility, particularly for 'joint amphibious operations' and a simple reVIew of the 
applicable language in these official documents technically confirmed this to be the case. In 
short, whilst the Marine Corps was responsible for providing naval 'landing forces' for (naval) 
'amphibious operations', the Army could still provide Army forces for 'joint amphibious 
. , 239 
operatIOns . 
The report next addressed joint training, which it claimed was overwhelmingly naval in 
character due to the fact that the Marine Corps TTUs were staffed primarily with naval personnel 
and only used USF manuals. In recounting the Army's earlier proposal to establish a 'Joint 
Training Center' (with the CNO as executive agent) in an attempt to institute a truly joint 
approach to amphibious operations, the report reiterated that the Naval Service's training system 
only trained other (Army) units using a single service (i.e., naval) rather than a joint approach.240 
Again, this discrepancy was exacerbated by the fact that USF 63 did not even officially include 
'invasions,.241 Furthermore, none of the USF publications had ever been approved by the other 
services, even as intermediate manuals as had been repeatedly recommended. The only 
governmental body that had indicated any sort of approval of the Joint Training Center scheme 
was a House Armed Services Committee on Unification and Strategy, which had sought to 
establish such centres for 'all areas of greatest inter-Service controversy', most particularly for 
'air matters, amphibious warfare, ground support-aviation, [and] airborne troops' .242 As a matter 
of fact, it should be noted that these 'Joint Training Center' concepts very closely resembled the 
Combined Operations Centre (COC) establishment that had evolved in the UK by that time under 
the direction and guidance of the jointly-staffed Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ). 
239 'Functions', in Cole.", 280-282. 
240 'Army Views', 4, 
241 USF 1 and USF 6 were basic manuals and not specifically geared toward landing forces. In addition, USF 63 and 
USF 47, Manual a/Training Exercises, Amphibious Force, 1946,6/10/46, were specifically concerned with naval 
amphibious forces. 
242 'Army Views', 5, 
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The Anny's main reasoning from the entire report was ultimately to redefine the concept 
of and approach towards what the Naval Service universally referred to as 'amphibious 
operations', which the Army thought was insufficient. 
The Navy's concept of amphibious operations is believed to be limited to the seizure 
type of operation as defined and standardized by the USF texts. The Army does not 
question the soundness of the doctrines, procedures, and techniques contained in the USF 
texts as they pertain to operations of the island seizure type. However, the Army does not 
consider this type of operation as inclusive of all amphibious operations.243 
From this basis, the Army began outlining its own definition of amphibious operations (or 
expeditionary warfare), which seemed to be more all-encompassing in general, but was instead 
much more closely related to land warfare specifically. Whilst still acknowledging an initial 
dependence on 'water-borne means for transport' and 'initial tactical and logistical support' in 
situations where amphibious landings were involved, the report literally characterised them as 
being 'types of land combat operations in which amphibious techniques may be employed'. 244 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, by the end of the 1940s, the Anny had effectively begun to diverge from the pre-
dominantly accepted view that amphibious operations were smaller -scale, limited or finite (land) 
operations in support of a larger naval campaign. Indeed, it had tried to reverse this relationship 
by claiming that 'joint amphibious operations' essentially involved limited naval operations 
employed as the initial ( or supportive) phase of a larger land campaign. From this perspective, 
the most difficult and challenging part of the whole enterprise therefore revolved around what 
would be identified as a the 'consolidation' phase, rather than the 'assault' phase, of these 
endeavours, the latter of which being the central feature of naval 'amphibious operations'. 
Through its limited but still significant experience with j oint amphibious exercises and 
its re-examination of the Naval Service's conceptualisation of 'amphibious operations', the Army 
had established the foundations for a dispute-soon to be joined by the Air Force--over the 
country's course of amphibious/expeditionary warfare development. Ironically, this same 
243 'Army Views', 6-7. Underlining in original; emphasis added. 
244 'Army Views', 5-6. Emphasis added. 
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dichotomy of concepts and procedure marked the broader evolution of developmental courses 
between the US and the UK with the pre-dominantly (and officially) accepted approach of the 
latter resembling the US Army's joint expeditionary methodology. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1945-50 
OVERVIEW 
The British course of amphibious/expeditionary warfare development during World War 
II, which was based almost exclusively on its expeditionary experience in the ETO, was 
generally consolidated in the immediate years prior to the Korean War. Although largely driven 
by the evolving strategic threat to the European continent by the Soviet Union and her satellites, 
which threatened a repeat of the situation of 1940, this consolidation occurred primarily at the 
organisationaVinstitutional and tacticaVoperationallevels of analysis. 245 
At the former level, the Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) organisation was 
retained as a permanent, independent, inter-Service entity that was responsible for all types of 
'combined operations'. The main reason for doing so was to preclude a return to the 
unproductive circumstances of the inter-war years, when no such entity existed to even address 
combined operations issues. These were almost always of lower priority to the other Services as 
they diverted already scarce resources away from traditional strategic priorities. This was 
particularly true for the Admiralty which, whilst naturally having to devote the most resources of 
any of the Services, could least afford to give them up. As a result, it made a number of efforts to 
abolish COHQ altogether, which continued into the 1950s. 
As mentioned, the retention of the Combined Operations establishment also meant that 
all types of 'combined operations' would continue to be addressed at the tactical level. As 
specifically outlined in the Chief of Combined Operations' (CCO's) directives, these ranged 
from 'raiding' to 'beach organisation' -type operations, which included the 'maintenance' of 
expeditionary forces over beaches as well as their potential 'withdrawal' using similar means. 
Both of these variants seemed very probable in any future conflict were the Soviet Union to 
invade and eventually occupy all of continental Europe. Still the most prominent type of 
enterprise, however, was the so-called 'invasion' which, although theoretically facing 
245 See Speller, Role, Chapter 2; and 'Role', Chapter Two. 
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obsolescence in the face of atomic weapons, was nevertheless expected, studied, and 
conceptualised. As a matter of fact, this last exercise was best illustrated by the appearance of a 
new Manual o/Combined Operations, which was promulgated in early 1950. 
STRATEGIC ASPECTS 
Defence Policy and Strategy 
Britain's geo-strategic position during the first few years after the war (i.e., 1945-1950) 
gradually evolved into an integral part of the 'maritime' power bloc led by the United States 
which faced the 'continental' power bloc led by the Soviet Union and its 'satellite' states in 
Eastern Europe. Whilst Great Britain generally faced the same threats as did the United States, 
the danger to the UK was magnified by Britain's imperial overstretch (itself exacerbated by rapid 
demobilisation), its severe economic problems, and, probably most significantly, its geographic 
proximity to the European continent and the Soviet Union itself. As such, the British generally 
expected to find themselves on the immediate defensive in any future conflict with the 
communist bloc. This was similar to the situation that it faced during the first years of the Second 
World War, which implied that the full gamut of 'combined operations' would again be required, 
including 'raiding', 'beach maintenance' -type operations, and eventually so-called 'invasions'. 
While the UK had already assessed that the Soviet Union was a potential threat as early 
as 1944/46 the country only began to flesh out the parameters of its defence policy in 1946 
which, although more general than the plans outlined early on by the Americans, effectively 
served as immutable principles of Great Britain's security for a generation. These so-called 'three 
pillars' of British defence were outlined in January 1947 which, in tum, were based on two 
'principles of defence': '(a) the defence of the Commonwealth's resources with which to fight a 
major war until an offensive with allies could be developed and (b) the holding of bases for the 
246 Reynolds, David, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century (London/New York, 
NY: Longman, 1991), 155. 
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offensive' ?47 The first 'pillar' focused on the defence ofthe UK, mainly from sea and air threats, 
and its development as an offensive base; the second was the protection of sea communications, 
primarily in the North Atlantic and approaches to the British Isles, but also throughout the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East; the last included maintaining a 'firm hold' on the Middle 
East itself, due to its geo-strategic value (Egypt in particular) and especially its oil resources?48 
Another strategic review paper promulgated in November of 1947 reiterated the 'three 
pillars'. It also outlined the general wartime roles of the armed forces which, with the possible 
exception of the 'development of an offensive air force', were almost exclusively defensive in 
nature. Nevertheless, in keeping with the defensive/offensive sequence of how a future war 
would be fought, 'combined operations' were mentioned only briefly. While there was no 
apparent need for 'major combined operations, in the form of assault landing[s] by sea or air, in 
the early stages of war', '[m]inor landing[s] in furtherance of land campaign[s] already 
undertaken might ... be required, and large-scale combined operations might be required at a later 
stage'. For this reason, 'the art of combined operations' needed to be kept 'alive in peace', 
mainly through 'research, experiment and development in the technique required' ?49 
Strategic War Plans 
The combination of these last statements, which acknowledged the eventual employment 
of ( offensive) combined operations, and the overall defensive nature of the aforementioned 
assessments, were summarily reflected in the early post-war British war plans that were 
promulgated in the face of the overwhelming strength of the Soviets' conventional (land) forces 
on the European (or, more accurately, 'Eurasian') continent. 'Until 1948, the basic British war 
plan in the event of a Red Army offensive was to evacuate British troops from the continent, 
assuming a 1940-5 scenario of retreat to the island prior to eventual recapture of the continent 
247 COS (47) 5 (0),23.1.47 (DEFE 5/5 NA), 1-3; and 'The Three Pillars Strategy' in Ritchie Ovendale, (ed.), British 
Defence Policy Since 1945, Documents in Contemporary History (ManchesterlN ew York, NY: Manchester University 
Press, 1994),36-37. 
248 COS (47) 5 (0),3-4; and COS (47) 79 (0) (Revise), 21.4.47 (DEFE 5/79; NA); and 'Importance of Palestine with 
the evacuation of Egypt' , 'The Chiefs of Staff and withdrawal from Palestine', and' Agreement with the Americans 
over the Middle East' in Ovendale, 38-41. 
249 COS (47) 227 (0) (2nd Revise), 19.11.47 (DEFE 5/6; NA), 1-7. 
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with American help' .250 Indeed, while higher-level relations between the US and the UK had 
apparently been ebbing and flowing between 1946 and 1948, 'joint Anglo-American planning 
took place with the result that an emergency war plan was agreed in October 1948'. This plan, 
named DOUBLEQUICK (later SPEEDWAY) by the British and FLEETWOOD (later TROJAN) 
by the Americans, focused on securing the Middle East 'as an air base' as well as 'recapturing 
Middle East oil (a matter of particular concern to the United States)'. Exactly one year later, a 
new joint plan had been drafted, called OFFTACKLE by the Americans and GALLOPER by the 
British, which 'shifted' more focus onto North Africa.251 
It should be pointed out that, like the exclusively American war plans, these joint plans 
appeared to deal with the war during its opening (or defensive) phase only (again, with the 
exception of a strategic air offensive with atomic bombs). As such, the large-scale combined 
operations that had been mentioned in strategic policy papers as possibly occurring later on in the 
war were barely discussed. In fact, plans such as GALLOPER left the primary responsibility to 
the Americans to mount 'a re-entry operation into Western Europe from the south'. Still, by the 
time that NATO planning had begun in earnest, the British had called for 'offensive operations 
against the enemy's fleet, shipping, ports and land resources ... ' ,252 the latter two of which would 
require a smaller-scale type of combined (amphibious) operation, namely, the raid. 
ORGANISATIONAL/INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 
Defence Re-organisation: The Ministry of Defence 
In the immediate post-war period, Great Britain did not go through the same radical re-
organisation of its higher defence establishment as did the United States. Instead, after initial 
overtures had been made during the war,253 a government-proposed plan, published in October 
1946, did call for a general consolidation of 'the advances which had been made in recent years 
250 Reynolds, Britannia, 195-6; and Eric Grove and Geoffrey Till, 'Anglo-American Maritime Strategy in the Era of 
Massive Retaliation, 1945-60' in Hattendorf, John B., and Jordan, Robert S., (eds.), Maritime Strategy and the Balance 
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under the compulsion of war or of the threat of war' ?54 Although an amalgamation of 'the three 
Services completely ... under a single Minister of the Crown' was not 'wholly' discarded as a 
concept to be eventually used sometime in the future, it was nevertheless considered 'a step 
which could not and should not be taken here and now' ?55 Still, the new plan outlined the official 
establishment of a 'new post of Minister of Defence, with a Ministry', with this Minister's 
functions, whilst focusing on the 'apportionment...of available resources between the three 
Services in accordance with the strategic policy laid down by the Defence Committee', also 
included the 'administration of inter-Service organisations, such as Combined Operations 
H d rt ,256 ea qua ers .... 
With the passage of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) Act, 'which came into force on 1 st 
January, 1947', the 'essential features of the new system' began to come into effect.257 This 
included the aforementioned 'Ministry', although its administrative takeover of COHQ did not 
occur until 1 April 1948. From this point, two items are notable about this defence re-
organisation, which had a direct effect on the development of amphibious/expeditionary warfare 
in the UK. The first concerned the fact that the Chief of Combined Operations (CCO), the head 
of COHQ, retained direct access to the Chiefs of Staff in an advisory capacity on most matters 
associated with 'combined operations', including policy, doctrine and training. Second, whilst 
'the other [COHQ] establishments ... at home and overseas-training, instructional, and 
experimental-[ were] paid for by the Service Departments', financing for COHQ itself was 
taken over by the new Ministry of Defence, thus ensuring a high degree of independence from 
the Services as well as a certain degree of permanence?58 
As a result of these changes, by 1950 COHQ had effectively garnered legal recognition 
(and protection) similar to that accorded the US Naval Service. In addition, the study and, to a 
lesser extent, practice of combined operations seemed to have been permanently secured through 
254 Great Britain, Cmd. 6923, Central Organisation for Defence (London: HMSO, 10.46). 
255 Cmd. 6923, 5. 
256 Cmd. 6923, 7-8. 
257 [Great Britain], Treasury, Central Organisationfor Defence (London: HMSO, 6.50), 8. 
258 [Great Britain], Treasury, 18. 
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the retention of a jointly-staffed COHQ organisation within the British defence establishment 
that was independent of the three Services and responsible directly to the Minister of Defence. 
This process had not been straightforward or easy, however, as evidenced not only by the general 
financial restrictions resulting from the poor British economy but also by the active resistance of 
the Admiralty, as discussed below. 
The Evolution of the Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) Establishment 
By 1944, the British Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) establishment had 
evolved from its inception in 1940 under Lt. Gen. A. G. B. Bourne, RM, as 'Commander of 
Raiding Operations' (and 'Advisor to the Chiefs of Staff on Combined Operations'), to its early 
days up to 1941 under Admiral Roger Keyes, RN, as Advisor on Combined Operations (ACO), 
to one of its highpoints under Lord Louis Mountbatten, as Chief of Combined Operations (CCO), 
up to 1943. However, as it seemed to be increasingly overshadowed by the COSSAC 
organisation that was preparing for the invasion of France, COHQ came under increasing 
scrutiny as D-day approached?59 
This drive was led by the Admiralty in early May, when the First Sea Lord (FSL) 
formally proposed 'that the Royal Marine Corps should assume greater responsibilities ... for the 
assault phase of Combined Operations'. 260 The 'modelling of the Royal Marines exactly on the 
lines of the US Marine Corps' was not being suggested but the FSL nevertheless argued that it 
was high time that the Marines be given 'a definite and statutory responsibility for the provision, 
training and technical development of all special assault forces' in the future. This view was 
apparently supported by the CCO, whose attached memorandum agreed in principle that the 
Royal Marines should provide the 'special units peculiar to seaborne assaults', such as the 
'Commandos, Beach Groups, COPPs, etc.,/61 although the CCO reversed course a bit when he 
elaborated on his previous position subsequent to the Admiralty's memorandum.262 Whilst 
259 This subject area for the period 1945-50 has also been addressed by Speller; see Role, 46-60; and 'Role', 47-68. 
260 COS (44) 414 (0), 11.5.44 (CAB 80/44; DEFE 2/1262, folio 1; NA), 1. 
261 COS (44) 414 (0), Annex (dated 29.2.44). 
262 COS (44) 433 (0), 16.5.44 (DEFE 2/1262, folio 2; NA). 
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generally agreemg that the Royal Marines should have more responsibility with regard to 
providing 'Units required for special amphibious tasks necessary for the assault phase of a 
combined operation', the CCO was now more adamant about retaining some sort of 'organisation 
which has strong Inter-Service representation, a constitutional position ... , and ... representation 
when necessary on the Chiefs of Staff level'. His main reasoning behind this approach appeared 
to be based on the mistakes of the inter-war years, which he foresaw as being repeated during the 
post-war era. 
There will be a natural tendency for all three Services to look inward towards their own 
interests and organisation; and restrictions of finance and manpower will tend to make it 
difficult for three Services voluntarily to carry out measures which, though necessary 
from the point of view of future combined operations, will often conflict with purely 
Service interests. 263 
As will be seen, it was this exactly line of interpretation that ultimately ensured that COHQ 
would remain intact for nearly two decades after the war. 
The COS discussed the aforementioned memoranda on 18 May and on the next day 
approved the Terms of Reference for an 'Ad Hoc Sub-Committee' that was to be formed under 
the chairmanship of Air Marshal N. H. Bottomley, Deputy Chief of the Air Staff?64 According to 
the brief 'Terms', the main purpose of this Committee was as follows: 'To consider future Inter-
Service responsibility for amphibious warfare with particular reference to the employment of 
Royal Marines; it being recognised that the retention of a Combined Service element on the lines 
of that already existing in COHQ will be essential to any future amphibious waifare 
organisation' .265 
On 29 June, less than a month after the largest amphibious assault in history had been 
launched, the so-called 'Committee on Inter-Service Responsibility for Amphibious Warfare', or 
'RAW Committee', issued its report.266 The report's main conclusions were generally divisible 
into two categories: administrative (or organisational) and operational. With regard to the former 
263 COS (44) 433 (0), 1-2. h 
264 See _, 'Extract from COS (44) 161 st Mtg d. 18.5.44'; COS (44) 94, 19.5.44; and -' 'Extract from COS (44) 164t 
Meeting dated 19.5.44', 19.5.44 (DEFE 2/1262, folios 5-7; NA). 
265 COS (44) 94,1. Quoted by Speller in Role, 47-48; 'Role', 48. 
266 COS (44) 116,29.6.44 (CAB 80/44; DEFE 2/1262, folio 9; NA). 
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aspect, the Committee outlined the basis of the rationale for retaining COHQ, which was 
essentially a permanent, independent and joint organisation. 
Preparation for amphibious warfare must become part of our permanent defence system. 
We cannot afford to rely on improvisation in the event of war.... Responsibility for 
amphibious warfare policy and in particular for training and technique should be vested 
in a Central Organisation, independent of the three Service Ministries but inter-Service in 
character. COHQ, as now organised, has both these characteristics and ... should be 
retained permanently on broadly the present lines as the central organisation for this 
267 purpose .... 
A number of arguments were used to support the conclusions regarding the retention of 
the COHQ establishment in particular. The underlying reason for retaining the independence of 
the 'Central Organisation' was 'because amphibious warfare, whilst involving all three Services, 
is the exclusive province of no one of them'. As a result, the report argued, if no such 
independent organisation existed, 'under pressure of economies, or for other reasons, insufficient 
attention will be given to the problems of amphibious warfare, and once again we may find 
ourselves insufficiently equipped to meet an emergency' .268 The main benefit of an inter-Service 
organisation was that 'each Service had its own contribution to make to the problem', which 
came in three ways: providing Service-specific knowledge, ensuring co-operation 'between the 
Central authority and the Service Ministries', and disseminating 'knowledge of Combined 
Operations ... throughout the Services' .z69 
With regard to the operational parameters of the organisation/establishment, the report's 
central conclusion was that the 'three Services will have to provide the assault forces in time of 
war' and that, as a result, a 'standing specialist assault force is undesirable and not required'. At 
the same time, the report also outlined the main 'function of the Central Organisation', which 
was 'to assist the three Services to maintain their readiness for amphibious warfare, and ... to 
provide the machinery for combined training' .270 Indeed, the Committee had given specific 
consideration to the creation of 'a Specialist Corps on the lines of the US Marines'. Its main 
267 COS (44) 116, paras. 39(a), (b); (para. 3(a), (b) in cover letter). 
268 COS (44) 116, para. 9. This also involved a recommendation for continued 'financial independence' (paragraph 
14). 
269 COS (44) 116, para. 10. 
270 COS (44) 116, para. 39(f); (para. 3(f) in cover letter). 
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disadvantage, however, revolved around the simple fact that 'it does not fit into the framework of 
the operations which must be undertaken primarily by the army supported by air forces', as had 
been done in the recent war. Not only would such a force 'become redundant' after the assault 
phase, but it was also believed that it was simply unaffordable to maintain a sizeable enough 
'specialist force' in the first place.271 
The report also considered an 'Alternate Scheme for [a] Specialist Force', which centred 
on 'a permanent amphibious Brigade to be found by the Royal Marines'. Such a force might not 
only 'ensure greater continuity' and provide for 'more intensified training' but it would 'also 
ensure the availability of a striking force to deal with emergency situations short of war' .272 
However, the Committee ultimately rejected such a scheme for four reasons, which are notable 
not only because they shed light on comparisons with the American system and the US Marines, 
but also because most of them turned out to be accurate forecasts of future developments. The 
first was similar to the redundancy critique mentioned above, which simply noted that the 
'assault force must be ready to treat the assault phase merely as a preliminary to fighting a land 
battle' .273 The second resembled the reasoning behind why responsibility for amphibious 
development had to be independent, specifically by recognising that this 'alternative scheme 
might unintentionally produce the result that the Services would regard [the permanent 
amphibious force's] existence as absolving them from their obligation to maintain their own 
efficiency in this sphere'. Related to this was the third explanation, which centred on the report's 
recommendation 'for the permanent maintenance of an SS Group including Commandos'. 274 Not 
only would the latter 'make Divisional amphibious exercises realistic' but they would also 
'provide a small but highly mobile force for Imperial defence'. Lastly, no matter what the case, 
the Committee ultimately doubted 'whether landings will have to be made against a strongly 
defended coast' anyway, which allowed for the 'use [of] the nearest available Army formation' 
271 S ) CO (44 116, para. 23. 
272 COS (44) 116, para. 28. 
273 Quoted in Speller, Role, 49; 'Role', 49. 
274 'SS' stands for 'Special Service'. 
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as essentially a strategically mobile reserve force. 275 As will be seen, whilst there were certainly a 
few unforeseen instances where a 'permanent amphibious Brigade' of Royal Marines would have 
been extremely useful, the overall line of thinking expressed by the Committee seemed not only 
to be quite insightful for having been reached in 1944, but also quite flexible in that the 
recommended scheme eventually still permitted the establishment of what was essentially a 
hybrid (or joint) version of this 'amphibious force' by the 1960s. 
This flexible foundation, in fact, stemmed from the Committee's conclusions and 
recommendations relating to the so-called 'operational' aspects, as mentioned above. Following 
along from having the Services 'provide the assault forces', the report noted that 
'[e]ffective combined training in peace can only be assured if there are available certain 
specialist units under the control of the ceo and a permanent Naval assault force under 
Admiralty control but available to ceo during the training season .... On this basis, one 
Army division could be trained annually'. 276 
Whilst this obviously involved all three Services, the Committee deliberately expanded on the 
responsibility of the Royal Marines, noting specifically that they 'should find the greater part of 
the specialists to be maintained under CCO' s control'.zn Of the five 'requirements' that were 
recommended to be maintained 'in peace in addition to the Central Organisation', the two 
largest-the 'Special Service Group (consisting of Commandos and Small Operations Group)' 
and 'Beach Group Components'-were to be staffed mostly by Royal Marines. A total of 900 
Marines were recommended for 'Two Commandos' whilst 2,723 Marines were suggested for the 
'Beach Group Organisation', which consisted ofa 'Beach Sub-Area and two Beach Groups '.278 
The conclusions of the RAW Committee's report were debated by the COS in July,279 
after which the Admiralty submitted a paper with its disagreements. Whilst generally agreeing 
with the specific conclusions reached concerning the Royal Marines, the Admiralty generally 
believed 'that the present system is not the best that it is possible to evolve, and do not agree that 
it should be perpetuated in its present form', although it simultaneously announced that no 
275 COS (44) 116, para 28(a-d). 
276 COS (44) 116, para. 39(g); (para. 3(g) in cover letter). Emphasis added. 
277 COS (44) 116, para. 39(h); (para. 3(h) in cover letter). See also paras. 33-34. 
278 COS (44) 116, Appendices C & D. 
279 _, 'Extract from COS (44) 226 Mtg dated 7.7.44' (DEFE 2/1262, folio 10; NA). 
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changes were required at that time. 280 This was followed up by a paper by the CCO, who 
reiterated some of his initial fears that had been characteristic of the inter-war years, primarily by 
doubting that 'an Inter-Service Committee ... would be able to watch the interests of amphibious 
preparations as impartially as an independent organisation'. Whilst taking pains not to impugn 
the Services' 'past assistance and co-operation', the CCO nevertheless concluded that 'it would 
be demanding a Utopian degree of impartiality if we adopted a system which, if it is to work, 
relies on the voluntary acceptance of considerable sacrifices and inconveniences by an individual 
Service for the good of a combined technique'. 281 
The Chiefs of Staff ultimately approved the conclusions of the so-called 'RAW 
Committee' and passed them on to the Prime Minister in a summary letter on 31 August 1944?82 
This contained a revised directive for the CCO, also approved by the COS, which empowered 
him to coordinate amphibious warfare doctrine development and peacetime practice (i.e., 
training).283 With this approval, the British were set to maintain a combined operations 
establishment in the post-war era that was inherently joint, not only in headquarters and training 
establishment staffing but also in actual force structure. Although the COHQ establishment was 
repeatedly put under pressure by the Admiralty, once in 1947284 and again in 1950,285 the latter as 
a result of another organisational examination by the so-called 'Long Committee' /86 the 
underlying rationale for its independence, joint organisation and broad function were repeatedly 
re-affirmed, at least into early 1950.287 
As a matter of fact, not only was the 'central organisation' retained intact but so too was 
the training and establishment that had evolved by then. This included the jointly-staffed School 
280 COS (44) 132,22.7.44 (CAB 80/44; DEFE 2/1262, folio 11; NA), 1-2. 
281 COS (44) 133, 24.7.44 (CAB 80/44; DEFE 2/1262, folio 12; NA), 1-2. Quoted by Speller in Role, 53; 'Role', 52. 
282 COS (44) 157,31.8.44 (CAB 80/44; DEFE 2/846, Docket CR 3289/44; DEFE 2/1262, folio 18; NA). See also COS 
(44) 167, 1.9.44 (CAB 80/45; DEFE 2/846, Docket CR 3289/44; NA). 
283 COS (44) 168,2.9.44 (DEFE 21710; NA). 
284 COS (47) 55 (0), 14.3.47 (DEFE 2/1647, folio lO; NA). 
285 See COS (47) 55 (0), 14.3.47 (DEFE 2/1647, folio lO; NA); _, 'Extract from COS (49) 182 Mtg. dated 8 Dec 
1949' (DEFE 211441, folio 22; NA); and COS (50) 87, 9.3.50 (DEFE 21710; DEFE 5/20; NA). 
286 COS (49) 336,11.10.49 (DEFE 21710; DEFE 5/17; DEFE 2/1441, folio 8; DEFE 7/2280, folio 2; NA). 
287 See COS (49) 353, 21.10.49 (DEFE 21710; DEFE 5/l7; DEFE 2/1441, folio lO; NA); COS (49) 366, 29.10.49 
(DEFE 217lO; DEFE 2/1441, folio 13; NA); and _, 'Extract from COS (50) 47 Mtg of22 March 1950' (DEFE 
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of Combined Operations (SCO), a similarly-structured Combined Signal School (CSS), and the 
Combined Operations Experimental Establishment (COXE).288 By 1949, these components, 
which had all been moved to Fremington, North Devon, and now included a Combined 
Operations Bombardment Battery (COBB), were re-christened as the Combined Operations 
Centre (COC).289 It should be noted that an Amphibious School, Royal Marines (ASRM) had 
also been formed (in 1948). Consisting of three 'wings' (Minor Landing Craft, Beach, and Small 
Raids) that had consolidated a number of skeleton specialist units, such as the Landing Craft 
Obstacle Clearance Unit (LCOCU) and the Landing Craft Recovery Unit (LCRU), this school 
focused on landing craft operations and training as opposed to amphibious warfare per se, and 
therefore remained fundamentally separate from the COe. 290 
Overall, this inter-service approach was very different from the American system that 
was dominated by the Department of the Navy. However, like the US Army, which had just 
begun to make limited inroads into this apparent monopoly with respect to the larger-scale 
amphibious warfare operations, the Royal Marines had also started to establish their claim, 
although by staking out responsibilities for smaller-scale amphibious warfare enterprises, or 
raids. 
TACTICAL ASPECTS OF 'COMBINED OPERATIONS' 
During World War II, American amphibious warfare operations fell into two general 
categories, the result of having to fight in two (if not three) theatres. The first involved small- and 
medium-scale amphibious assaults by naval (amphibious) forces to seize heavily-defended 
islands for use as naval and/or air bases (i.e., as limited objectives) as part of a larger naval 
campaign in the Pacific Ocean. The second consisted mainly of large-scale amphibious 
expeditions by joint army, navy and air (including airborne) forces to invade major land masses 
288 See various correspondence (DEFE 2/1315, Docket No. CR 251/45, Folios 16,34,37,40,45,46; NA); COS (45) 
299,24.11.45 (CAB 80/51; NA); and additional correspondence (DEFE 2/1316, Docket No. CO 251145 (pt. II), Folios 
77, 104, 112, 115; NA). 
289 COC, 'Combined Operations Centre - Organisation and General Staff Standing Orders', 5.49 (DEFE 2/1708, 
Docket No. CO 1613/50, Folio 4; NA). 
290 See various correspondence (DEFE 2/1619, Docket No. CO 793/48, Folios 4,5,6/8; Docket CO 793/18, folios lA, 
13A, 19,28; NA); and CAFO 295,29.10.48 (DEFE 2/1619, Docket CO 793/18, folio 31; NA). 
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as the initiatory phase of a larger (unlimited) land campaign, primarily on the African and 
European continents. 
As discussed above, British amphibious/expeditionary warfare development between 
1945 and 1950 was generally based on the latter type of endeavour. At the same time, 
considerable attention was also directed towards other forms of 'combined operations', most 
notably raiding, beginning seriously in 1947. There was also an effort begun to examine and 
prepare for 'beach maintenance' -type operations, such as re-supplying or withdrawing armies 
over beaches and even re-supplying the homeland using amphibious methods,291 although these 
were more fully developed in the early and mid-1950s. 
As the post-war strategic situation unfolded in the late 1940s, it became increasingly 
apparent that, in case of a future war against the Soviets in Europe, the chances were high that 
the same set of strategic circumstances would evolve on the outbreak of a future war as they had 
at the beginning of World War II. Similarly, whilst this scenario seemed to require an eventual 
expeditionary invasion similar to that of Operation NEPTUNE, it also appeared to necessitate the 
employment of amphibious raids against a hostile continental shoreline. As a result, this subject 
gradually gained attention in COHQ with the Royal Marine Commandos beginning to take centre 
stage in this regard. 
Combined Operations' Doctrine (and Concepts) at the End of World War II 
Unlike the Americans, who waited to collate the war's 'lessons learned' into completely 
new doctrinal publications after the war, the British began to produce revised (and new) editions 
of their existing Combined Operations Pamphlets (COPs) in preparation for the war in the 
Pacific. These publications had been promulgated 'specifically to deal with the responsibilities of 
all three Services in such operations' and to augment the 1938 Manual of Combined 
Operations.292 The capstone volume, COP No.1, Combined Operations (General), was printed 
291 See, for example, Speller, Role, 87-88; 'Role', 88. 
292 COHQ, COP No.1, General, 9.42 (DEFE 2/724; NA), 1. 
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in May 1945 and replaced the 1942 edition.293 While not containing an official definition per se, 
this manual provided a general description of a 'combined operation', which reflected the 
evolution of the expeditionary nature of the concepts and doctrine under development since the 
inter-war years (and even earlier), and as promulgated in the 1938 Manual of Combined 
Operations as well as in the 1942 edition of COP No. 1.294 
A Combined Operation seeks to establish forces on enemy territory by a sea-borne 
expedition protected and supported by naval and air forces. It may be made in 
conjunction with an airborne assault .... In operations of this kind the military formations 
carrying out the assault landing act as a covering force for the landing of the main body 
of the expedition. 295 
What differentiated this edition from its 1942 predecessor, however, was the identification of 
'two main types' of 'amphibious assaults'-' short-range' and 'long-range'-with the primary 
variances being that the former relied on land-based air support while the latter relied on carrier-
based air support. In the latter scenario, the force was also more self-contained and self-
supported, particularly from a logistics standpoint?96 
With this differentiation, COP No.1 referred to a new manual, COP No. 21, Conduct of 
a Long Range Assault in the Far East, which was essentially a secondary capstone manual to a 
new series being specifically promulgated for long-range combined (amphibious) operations.297 
As this Pamphlet stated, these 'special publications' were produced to identify and describe the 
specific characteristics of the Pacific theatre-such as 'terrain and hydrography' and 'weather 
and climate '-which were different from those in Europe and would therefore require different 
techniques and equipment to be used, such as the LVT, LCVP and LVT(A).298 
Although raids were only briefly recognized in the 1945 edition of COP No.1, COP No. 
21 referenced two additional publications which covered this type of endeavour.299 These were 
COP No. 26, Commandos in the Field, and COP No. 28, Small-Scale Amphibious Raids, which 
293 The publication of COP No.1 was approved on 6.4.45. See _, 'Minutes of the 26th Mtg. of the Executive .. .4th 
April 1945', 6.4.45 (DEFE 2/1183, Docket CR 712/45; NA). See also COHQ (CCO), COP No.1, Combined 
Operations (General), 5.45 (DEFE 2/725; NA). 
294 -' Manual oJCombined Operations, 1938 (DEFE 21709; NA), 17; COP No.1, 9.42 (DEFE 2/724; NA), 6. 
295 COP No. 1,5.45,11. 
296 CO P No.1, 5.4:5, 12-13. 
297 COHQ (CCO), COP No. 21, Conduct oJ A Long Range Assault in the Far East, 5.45 (DEFE 2/725; NA). 
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had been promulgated in March and May 1945, respectively. 300 The former, however, was almost 
exclusively concerned with how commandos were employed in major assaults. Due to their light 
weaponry, the Commandos sought surprise and agility over firepower, preferred operating in 
darkness and on the flanks, and were specially trained not only to negotiate difficult obstacles 
(i.e., rocky beaches and cliffs) but also to handle minor landing craft. As such, their prime 
objectives included attacking isolated defensive positions (including flanks), infiltrating rapidly 
inland from the beachhead, making independent subsidiary assaults with or after the main 
assault, and creating diversions?Ol Not much more detail was provided in COP No. 28 as it only 
provided a very general definition of a raid, referring to it as 'a temporary lodgment on the 
enemy coast by parties landed and withdrawn by sea' .302 
Future Warfare, Atomic Weapons and Combined Operations 
Future Warfare and 'Combined Operations' 
Like their investigations into post-war defence (re-)organisation, the British also began 
to examine future warfare-including combined operations-prior to the cessation of hostilities, 
even in Europe. As early as November of 1944, only a few months after Operation NEPTUNE, 
the COS directed the Joint Technical Warfare Committee (TWC) 'to carry out an investigation 
into the future potentialities of weapons of war. .. ,/03 an effort for which Sir Henry Tizard was 
selected to head?04 
The Tizard Committee's first report was issued on 16 June 1945, exactly one month 
prior to the experimental detonation of the first atomic bomb in America. 305 Although it could 
therefore only theorise abstractly about the future potential of 'the release of atomic energy', one 
of its conclusions seemed to reaffirm the continuing importance of expeditionary warfare, 
300 COHQ (CCO), COP No. 26, Commandos in the Field, 3.45; and COHQ (CCO), COP No. 28, Small Scale 
Amphibious Raids, 5.45 (DEFE 2/725; NA). 
301 CO P No. 26, 3-10. 
302 COP No. 28, 5. 
303 TWC (44) 68, 8.11.44 (DEFE 2/1251, Docket 366-47 (Pt. I), Folio 1; NA). 
304 ,'Extract from TWC (44) 24th Mtg. dated 14 Nov 44' (DEFE 2/1251, Docket 366-47, Pt. I, Folio 2; NA). 
305 COS (45) 402 (0),16.6.45 (DEFE 2/1251, Docket 366-47, Pt. I, Folio 31; NA). 
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although the ambiguous use of the term 'combined operations', at least in this particular case, 
made it unclear whether simple joint air/sea or amphibious operations were being emphasised. 
It will be seen that there are great changes ahead. These may be assumed by some to 
support the extreme view that the supreme importance of the Navy is giving way to that 
of the Air. We wish to record our view that though this may happen in the distant future, 
it will not be in our life-time. The need is no longer to concentrate mainly on the defeat of 
surface forces by surface forces, but primarily to counter the threat from the air and from 
under the water. Most thought should therefore be given to the defeat of the air and 
submarine menace and to participation in combined operations. The Navy alone is no 
longer our sure defence and the scientific development that we foresee forces us to the 
conclusion that air and sea war are indivisible. 306 
Atomic Weapons and 'Combined Operations' 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, initial reaction (or over-reaction) to the atomic bomb was almost 
immediate. On the one hand were negative comments that came directly from various sources 
within the COHQ establishment. These ranged from a call to 'put all of our present ideas and all 
our papers on the future of ships, etc. that we are now writing, into the waste paper basket,307 to 
an even more despondent claim that '[a]ll modem methods of warfare will be obsolete in a few 
years and that there will be no point in large fleets, bombers or large armies'. 308 On the other 
hand were questions, ironically from some of the same sources, about the potential of using 
atomic weapons in an offensive capacity in combined operations. One such inquiry concerned 
using the atomic bomb by 'dropping it at an appropriate distance out to sea so that the resulting 
disturbance in the water will have the indirect effect of a tidal wave, swamping the opponents['] 
defences and thus aiding the subsequent amphibious assault'. 309 Subsequent questions included 
how long areas affected by atomic bombs would remain impassable and whether or not atomic 
mines could be used to defend against seaborne landings?lO These were quickly put into a paper 
submitted to the TWC for further analysis.31l 
306 COS (45) 402 (0),3-15. 
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Generally speaking, the TWC eventually came to conclude that the future did not look 
quite so bleak with respect to the possible employment of atomic weapons in future wars.312 This 
was not the case initially as a preliminary report issued on 24 October 1945 stated that 
'[i]nvasions by sea would not be possible' if atomic bombs were used in a future war.313 In 
another report released the following January, the TWC seemed to have resigned itself to the fact 
that atomic bombs would most likely be employed in a future war. 314 This, in turn, convinced the 
joint committee to recommend specific counter-measures, most notably the general use of 
'dispersion', although it also emphasised the apparent limitations of atomic weapon use in any 
circumstance in a future war, mainly due to their limited number and, therefore, their extremely 
high value.315 
Whilst this stance ~eemed to mirror the American view regarding the vulnerability of 
concentrated naval and ground forces to atomic weapons, there was a slightly unique aspect of 
concern for the British that stemmed from the specific amphibious nature of conducting large-
scale 'combined operations' on a continental coast. 
Base areas as we know them at present, with large depots and installations dependent for 
their operation on low grade troops and frequently on 'coolie' labour, are exceptionally 
vulnerable to attack by atomic bombs. In particular an invading Army cannot in future be 
allowed to depend for its supply on two or three large ports. Our strategic conception as 
to the mounting and subsequent maintenance of any military campaign will require 
revision in light of these factors in the future. 316 
While this vulnerability was most apparent once beachheads had been seized and port bases 
captured overseas in order to maintain expeditionary armies and air forces, it would increasingly 
become an issue with regard to the mounting of these endeavours from home ports. Indeed, this 
ultimately translated into a potential threat to the survival of the country itself as the British Isles 
were dependent upon sea lines of communications and, by extension, the ports of call that 
anchored them. These realisations led to an increase in developing certain aspects related to 
312 ACNS(W) ltr to Distr., 15.8.45 (ADM 1117259: Docket Adm 132/45 or TSD 368/45; NA). 
313 TWC (45) 38, 24.10.45 (DEFE 211251, Docket 366-47, Pt. I, Folio 51; NA). 
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315 TWC (46) 3 (Revised), 11. 
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amphibious warfare concerned with the establishment of the beachhead, specifically the transport 
of supplies over beaches (instead ofportS).317 
Tizard's final revised report was released in July 1946.318 One of its main conclusions 
was that the same conditions were necessary for 'successful amphibious operations or 
independent airborne operations', which revolved around 'air and sea superiority sufficient to 
ensure continuity of supply and build-up'. While the report continued by recognising the primacy 
of air power in future war, especially with atomic weapons, it also reiterated the vulnerability of 
bases, stating that the 'with the existence of but a few atomic bombs it is clear that the main 
bases, at least in the United Kingdom, for the use of both naval and merchant shipping can no 
longer be regarded as secure'. With such an ominous conclusion, offensive combined operations 
seemed to have been by-passed almost completely.319 
In sum, the report failed to arrive at any specific assessment of future combined 
operations, which was quite ironic on two counts. Most apparent was the inherent requirement 
for offensive combined expeditionary operations to re-enter the European continent eventually in 
the offensive stage of a long war. Less obvious, but perhaps more immediately significant, was 
the need for other types of 'beach organisation' -type enterprises, including the re-supply of 
expeditionary armies over beaches (and through ports eventually), the conduct of combined 
operations 'in reverse' (i.e., 'withdrawals') to evacuate armies from hostile shores, and even the 
emergency re-supply of Great Britain itself in cases where home ports were damaged or 
destroyed in an atomic attack. 
The Early Post-War 'Study' and Practice of 'Combined Operations' 
Although serious investigation into the potential effects of atomic weapons had been 
made with regard to warfare in general and combined (amphibious) operations in particular, the 
impact of the resulting conclusions did not seem to be as significant as those that had affected 
American amphibious warfare development, specifically with regard to the US Marine Corps' 
317 TWC (46) 3 (Revised), 11. 
318 TWC (46) 15 (Revised), 1.7.46 (DEFE 2/1251, Docket 366-47, Pt. II, Folio 99; NA), 1-6. 
319 TWC (46) 15 (Revised), 13. 
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conception of amphibious 'vertical envelopment'. Instead, the British began the post-war era by 
focusing primarily on their wartime experience with large-scale amphibious landings, which 
carried over after the war. This was done primarily through such theoretical investigations as 
'The Study' as well as 'command post' -type exercises as SPEARHEAD,32o which were 
undertaken mostly because of the lack of manpower and funds necessary to conduct operational 
tests and exercises. 
Development of 'The Study' (and Doctrine) 
As the (re-)evaluation of the Technical Warfare Committee's report continued through 
1945, the CCO began to fonnulate a plan to perfonn an investigation specifically concentrated 
on combined operations. In early February 1946, COHQ finally outlined what would become 
known as the 'Study of the Conduct of Future Combined Operations', or simply, 'The Study'. 
This was to be 'a detailed examination of the technique for a combined operation after studying 
the methods and equipment used by all nations during the recent war' with the ultimate object 
being for the CCO 'to make proposals to the Chiefs of Staff on the future conduct of combined 
operations and the equipment required for them,.321 It was to be divided into two parts, a short 
tenn (of five years-to 1951) and a long tenn (of ten years-to 1956) and was 'to cover both 
those combined operations which depend broadly upon surprise and those which depend broadly 
upon bombardment' (as well as short- and long-range enterprises), which acknowledged that the 
European and Pacific wartime techniques were different enough to require separate analyses. 
Other assumptions included going up against first-class defences, the availability of airborne 
divisions, and sufficient flexibility so that any number of divisions could pass through the 
landing beach,322 although the landing force was subsequently limited to 'one Corps of not more 
than four divisions, assaulting with two Divisions up, with the usual additional troops' .323 
320 These areas are also covered by Speller, primarily in Role, 66-69, and 'Role', 59-61. 
321 Secretary, AWC (COHQ) ltr to Distr., 7.2.46 (DEFE 2/1727: Docket No. CR 66/46, Folio 3; NA), 1. 
322 Secretary, AWC (COHQ) Itr, 1-2. 
323 [Secretary, A WC (COHQ) Itr to Distr.], 21.3.46 (DEFE 2/1727, Docket No. CR 66/46, Folio 16; NA), 1-2. 
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Over the course of the next several months, 'The Study' experienced a number of delays 
d h dd·· f . 324 ue to tea Itlon 0 vanous reports, analyses, and raw data. Contrary to the understanding 
that this project had been completed in 1946,325 COHQ Executive meetings held in mid-1947 
indicated that the analysis was still being drafted more than a year after its original inception. By 
that time, twelve final draft 'chapters' had been approved with three still 'under revision'. More 
significantly, the purpose of 'The Study' had been reaffirmed: 'to define the doctrine of 
Combined Operations for the immediate future' and to 'be the basis on which Combined 
Operations publications and handbooks should be written' .326 
Additional chapters as well as revisions were approved in September and October of 
1947.327 A 'Main Study, 1947' was also mentioned in March, 1948, albeit without any detail. At 
the same time, a future doctrinal publication, the Manual of Combined Operations, was outlined 
as having six Parts. In addition, a new series of Combined Operations Handbooks (COHBs) were 
to replace the COPs of World War II. While these were to range from a 'Planning' sub-series 
(Nos. la to Id) to a single volume on 'Intelligence' (No. 12a), they also included sub-series on 
'Naval Units' (Nos. 3a to 3f), 'Army Formations' (Nos. 4a to 4e), 'Air Forces' (No.8), and 
'Commando and Raid Technique' (Nos. lOa to 10e)?28 Unfortunately, it was estimated that it 
would take another six years to complete the process of replacing all of the outdated COPs with 
COHBS.329 Before then, a capstone doctrinal volume would be produced that summarised British 
amphibious and expeditionary warfare thinking, although it would not be promulgated until 
March 1950 (see below). 
324 _, 'Minutes ofa Special Mtg. of the Executive ... 17/4/46', 25.4.46; and -' 'Minutes of the 21 st Mtg of the 
Executive ... 31 st May, 1946', n.d. (DEFE 2/1724, Dockets CR 576/46 and CR 753/46; NA). See also Secretary, AWC 
(COHQ) ltr to Distr., 17.7.46; Secretary, AWC (COHQ) ltr to Distr., 24.7.46; CCO ltr to U-SS (WO), 18.10.46; 
Secretary, A WC, Brief for CCO, 28.11.46 (DEFE 2/1727, Docket No. CR 66/46, Folios 44, 48, 67, 77; NA). 
325 See Speller, 'Role', 60. 
326 _, 'Minutes of the 14th Mtg ofthe Executive ... 19th June, 1947', n.d. (DEFE 2/1443, Docket CO 8(14)/47), folio 1; 
NA), 2-3. The original intention, as spelled out in September of 1946, was 'that the tactics and technique propounded 
in the Main Study ... be accepted as doctrine ... '. See _, 'Extract of the Minutes of AWC(46)31 Meeting of the 
Amphibious Warfare Committee ... 18 September 1946', n.d. (DEFE 2/1727, Docket No. CR 66/46, Folio 62A; NA). 
327 _, 'Minutes ofthe 22nd Mtg ... 18th September, 1947', n.d.; and -' 'Minutes of the 23rd Mtg. of the 
Executive ... 1Oth October, 1947', n.d. (DEFE 2/1444, Docket CO 8(22)/47), folio 1; Docket CO 8(23)/47, folio 1; NA). 
328 [COHQ], 'Acquaint No. 128, Combined Operations Publications', 19.3.48 (DEFE 2: Docket CO 477/47, Folio 41; 
NA),1-4. 
329 DCO(P) ltr to Chief of Staff, 29.4.48 (DEFE 2/1536, Docket CO 477/47, Folio 44; NA). 
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Exercise SPEARHEAD 
While conceptual developments were proceeding apace, the same could not be said for 
practical developments, at least with regard to training and exercises. The first major post-war 
combined (i.e., joint) exercise, which was strictly an 'administrative' (or 'command post') one, 
was conducted by the War Office in May of 1946 called EVOLUTION. As its primary purpose 
centred on studying 'offensive land operations' , the exercise's only element that was 
amphibious-related involved an 'opposed crossing of a major river obstacle such as the Rhine' .330 
Plans for a combined 'Overseas Expedition' exercise were announced in August 1946 
for War Office Exercise SPEARHEAD to be held in May of 1947.331 Although the initial 
strategic scenario was to involve all three Services mounting a j oint enterprise from the UK in an 
attack on Italy,332 it was changed to a two-corps operation with one corps being transported from 
the United Kingdom and the other being mounted from North Africa. As a 'script' for the 
exercise described, 'the setting [was] largely based on the actual progress of the last war during 
the period 1939/42' and '[m]uch of the data required for planning [was] in fact based on the 
action which took place at SALERNO in 1943,.333 The landing forces required amounted to two 
corps for the 'Assault and Follow-up' consisting of three infantry divisions, one armoured 
division, one airborne division and a Commando Brigade (i.e., four commandos). An additional 
two corps were required for the subsequent 'Build-Up' phase consisting of four infantry 
divisions and one airborne division.334 Specific weight was placed on the 'Airborne Troops', 
which were to be used for the seizure of an airfield, although a quick link-up with the other 
forces was essential. Similarly, 'Commandos' were to be used to capture small islands leading to 
the objective so that the convoy would remain safe from raiding forays. Finally, tracked 
330 DMT(WO) ltr to CCO, 30.4.46 (DEFE 2/1740, Docket No. CR 648/46, Folio 1; NA), 1. 
331 VCIGS note to DCIGS, 16.8.46. See also DMT ltr to Distr., 14.1.47; and CIGS ltr to CINC India, 29.1.47 (WO 
216/202, Docket CIGS BM No. 26/1241, Folios 1, lA, 14A; NA). 
332 CIGS ltr to Tizard, 31.1.47 (WO 216/202, Docket CIGS BM No. 26/1241, Folio 15A; NA), 1. 
333 -' 'Script for Item One - Introduction to the Exercise', 5.47,1; and _, 'Script for Item Three - Opening 
Narrative', [5.47] (WO 216/202; NA). 
334 _, 'Script for Item Six - The Army Outline Plan, April 1949', [5.47] (WO 216/202; NA), 1-4. 
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amphibian columns were to be landed 'very early' to link up with the airborne troops and 
penetrate inland as rapidly as possible.335 
This obvious emphasis on the large-scale, European-style, "joint amphibious 
operation"-with all of its corresponding characteristics-was reinforced when another 'script' 
stated explicitly why the Pacific technique of conducting 'amphibious operations' during the 
Second World War was insufficient. 
It will become clear, as we proceed, that we do not consider that the PACIFIC technique, 
that is, prolonged and continuous bombardment of the area selected for the landing over a 
period of days prior to the assault with the complete sacrifice of surprise, is acceptable in 
European conditions against a first class power with facilities for building up superior 
forces on shore if given time and unmistakeable indications of the point of attack. We 
have reached the conclusion that, under such conditions, it will be necessary to break 
down a long range invasion project into a series of short range operations so that the 
ultimate assault can be made with the maximum degree of tactical surprise and with the 
full support ofland based air forces. 336 
Such an approach notwithstanding, it is interesting to note that for the purposes of the 
exercise-in which Gennany was again the enemy-atomic weapons were assumed to be 
available and that Gennany would likely have dropped two or three devices on the UK with 
serious 'but not catastrophic' results?37 These weapons, due to their limited existence, would 
only be used strategically and therefore played no role in the simulated invasion. This even held 
true for the 'sea passage' phase of the operation which would still revert to a 'close convoy' 
system so as to offer the most protection against what was considered to be the gravest threat-
submarines, although 'a dispersed cruising disposition must be available for adoption in the event 
of Intelligence suggesting that the threat from atom attack is greater than that from subs'. This 
also applied to the ship-to-shore and establishment ofthe beachhead during the assault landing.338 
In addition, the actual effects of withstanding an atomic attack were studied in a separate 
analysis.339 Three situations were identified, including an attack on a convoy at sea, an attack on 
a convoy at anchor, and an attack on the actual landing craft during the ship-to-shore movement. 
335 'Item Six', 5-6. 
336 'Item One', 2. 
337 _, 'Script for Item Two - Future Weapons and the Effect oftheir Introduction Into Exercise Spearhead', [5.47] 
(WO 216/202; NA), 1. 
338 'Item Two', 2. 
339 'Estimated Effects of An Atomic Bomb Attack on a Combined Operation Landing', [1947] (ADM 1120373; 
NA~Annexure Six (Relating to Appendix XA of the Appreciation). 
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For the first two scenarios, an underwater burst was assumed, which would have resulted in 
significant (but apparently only limited) damage. For the third scenario, the report described a 
surface blast (at an optimal distance of 3,500 yards offshore) against a divisional attack frontage 
of 15 landing ships and 300 landing craft: 'An attack with one bomb ... sinks the boats carrying 
approximately one battalion and attached troops; the boats carrying a second battalion would be 
damaged, all on board receiving a lethal dose of radio activity as well as heavy immediate 
casualties. The boats carrying two other battalions would have casualties in varying degree'. 
With a conclusion that simply stated that 'three well placed bombs would ... wipe out the whole 
divisional landing operation' /40 the prediction that large-scale amphibious operations were most 
likely obsolescent in the face of nuclear weapons seemed to have preceded US General Omar 
Bradley's much criticised statement by more than two years. 
A special report that was put together by the Amphibious Warfare Committee (later 
Assault Warfare Committee) within COHQ outlined the various issues addressed by 
SPEARHEAD, how they related to current combined operations doctrine and practice, and what 
action was being taken by COHQ in relation to each.341 While a variety of subjects were covered 
in detail, only a few bear mentioning as they represented the most significant characteristics of 
British combined ( amphibious) operations, not only inherently but also relative to those 
characteristics adopted by the Americans, some of which were different (i.e., as compared to the 
US Naval Service) and some of which were similar (i.e., as compared to the US Army and, to a 
lesser extent, Air Force). 
Amongst the most important concerned command relationships, which did not comport 
to the command system championed by the US Naval Service. Simply put, the British called for 
a supreme commander 'on the highest level' with 'three Service Commanders-in-Chief. .. .located 
together during the assault and ... jointly responsible for the operation on the "trinity" system' .342 
340 ,'Estimated Effects', 1. 
341 [AWC], 'Relation of Spear bead Final Report to Combined Operations Headquarters Policy', [1947] (DEFE 2/1608, 
Docket No. CO 762-47, Folio 1; NA). 
342 'Relation', 2. 
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As will be seen later, this seemed to conform most closely to the US Air Force's command 
arrangements during so-called 'joint amphibious operations' (or expeditionary operations). 
Next was the 'Assault Technique' which, whilst notably lacking in any examination of 
naval gunfire and close air support (both of which bore heavy emphasis by the US Naval 
Service), included an analysis on the employment of airborne forces, which were considered to 
be 'valuable for pinning down enemy reserves remote from the assault area'. Indeed, not only 
would the employment of larger numbers of airlifted troops 'reduce the dangerous concentration 
of shipping in the assault area', it was even suggested that 'the whole assault should have been 
carried out by airborne troops ... [although] the practical implications of this proposal were not 
discussed' .343 
In conclusion, a determination was made that development of joint army/navy (i.e., land-
sea) and air force/army (i.e., air-land) operations was 'at present quite different' and specifically 
'a matter of high policy outside the scope of this paper'. Nevertheless, it was 'for consideration 
whether liaison is sufficiently close between the two organisations, who are each engaged on 
separate halves of the same problem' .344 Although the lack of action on this item ultimately still 
left COHQ responsible for the former type of joint operation (and the Air-Land Warfare 
Committee responsible for the latter type), the statement revealed the lack of an over-arching co-
ordinating authority below the level of the Chiefs of Staff Committee that was responsible for 
ensuring that close liaison was maintained or even existed between these two vital entities. 
Indeed, as will be seen later, just such a coordinating authority-the Joint Warfare Committee 
(with its corresponding Joint Warfare Establishment)-would eventually be established in 1962 
by essentially amalgamating COHQ and the aforementioned Air-Land Warfare Committee, 
which seemed to represent a bit of a triumph for an evolutionary process that had begun during 
the inter-war years and arguably came 'full-circle'. 
343 'Relation', 13. 
344 'R I t' '13 e a lOn, . 
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As the Americans were just beginning to conceptualise the use of helicopters (and 
seaplanes) seriously, mention should be made here of the apparent lack of analysis on the same 
subjects by the British.345 The British, in fact, began investigating using a 'large seaplane for the 
introduction or withdrawal of raiding forces in the Far East' as early as April of 1945,346 although 
no requirement was foreseen at that time.347 In addition, in June of that year, a report on the 
'Study of the Potential Application of the Helicopter to Various Army Roles' was released which 
traced the evolution of British helicopter experimentation, which had ceased in 1940 but had then 
resumed in 1943 with the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force conducting trials with 40 US-made 
Sikorski R4s between 1944 and 1945.348 
Although this report was supported within COHQ349 and had prompted the ceo to call 
for the need for three types of helicopters-not including a troop carrier-initially/50 any 
permanent helicopter development program was already facing serious challenges, most notably 
by the termination of the American 'Lend-Lease' program which made it impossible to maintain 
the American-made helicopters already in use in the UK. As a result, only the light helicopter 
was to be developed initially in the short term by the Royal Air Force.351 The Royal Navy 
concluded that it did not have any requirement for helicopters since they doubted whether the 
helicopters would even be economical in a combined operation.352 
Despite these setbacks, COHQ proceeded to investigate the potential employment of 
helicopters in combined operations, although nothing was published until April of 1948 with 
little (conceptual) progress seemingly having been made. 353 Not only did severe financial 
constraints continue to retard equipment development and procurement in general but the role of 
345 There was actually one mention of possibly using helicopters 'as a supplement to the ferry service' in one of the 
SPEARHEAD Exercise reports. See [AWe], 'Relation', 14. 
346 ~ 'Minutes of the 28th Mtg. of the Executive . .. 1804045',2004045 (DEFE 2/1183, Docket CR 871145; NA). 
347 ~ 'Minutes of the 29th Mtg. of the Executive ... 25AA5', 2704045 (DEFE 211183, Docket CR 958/45; NA). 
348 Director of Air, WO, ltr to Distr., 22.6045; Director of Air, WO, ltr to Distr., 11.9045; DCO (Air) ltr to Distr., 
2.11.45; and_, 'A Note on Helicopters', n.d. (DEFE 2/1697, Docket CR 1479/45, folios 1,2,6; NA). 
349 _, '61 st Mtg of the Executive', 8.11.45' (DEFE 2/1299, Docket CR 2902/45; NA). 
350 CCO Ltr to Secretary of the Admiralty, U-SS, WO, and U-SS, Air Ministry, 8.11045 (DEFE 2/1697, Docket CR 
1479/45, folio 7; NA). 
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CR 1479/45, folios 8, 9; NA). 
352 Secretary of the Admiralty ltr to CCO, 14.5.46 (DEFE 2/1697, Docket CR 1479/45, folio 10; NA). 
353 DCO(P) ltr to Executive, 904048 (DEFE 2/1697, Docket No. CO 855/48, folio 3; NA). 
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the helicopter itself was also restricted to cargo carrying and communications (as part of a 
ferrying service) rather than tactical troop carrying in an assault. The report nevertheless foresaw 
a three-ton capacity, multi-rotor helicopter as being the future load carrying transport which, 
when properly fitted with the appropriate winches and slings (and the cargoes palletised 
accordingly), would offer a rapid method of carrying cargoes directly from ship to shore. The 
problem of transporting enough of these flying machines to the assault area was to be alleviated 
through the use of either an aircraft carrier or a different ship specially converted for this 
purpose.354 In the end, however, the COHQ Executive did not find this concept attractive, 
claiming instead that 'such an operation could not be regarded as a feasible proposition within 
the foreseeable future' .355 
New 'Combined Operations' Concepts and the Royal Marines 
Small Scale Raiding and Unorthodox Operations 
Whilst British attention to post-war 'combined operations' focused primarily on the 
development of large-scale 'invasion' -type expeditionary operations between 1945 and 1950, 
interest in raiding resurfaced during that period due to the similar geo-strategic situation that 
Great Britain faced in the case of a third world war with the Soviet Union. Preliminary papers 
and correspondence produced by COHQ initiated an examination of the 'Division of 
Responsibility for Small Scale Raiding' as early as February 1947. A number of issues were 
presented, beginning with the definition of a raid, which encompassed 'any independent 
operation into enemy-held territory carried out by a party of uniformed troops not more than 30 
strong' .356 
After receiving some feedback on his various proposals, the ceo called for an Inter-
Service meeting to be held in June to discuss the division of responsibility for what was now 
354 DCO(P) ltr to Executive, 1-2. 
355 _, 'Minutes of the 13th Mtg of the Executive ... 22nd April, 1948', n.d. (DEFE 2: Piece 1609, Docket No. 768/1/48, 
folio 13; NA). Quoted by Speller in Role, 167; 'Role', 107. 
356 A WC, ltr to Distr., 6.2.47; COHQ ltr to Secretary of the Admiralty, U-SS, WO, and U-SS, Air Ministry, 12.3.47 
(DEFE 2/1449, Docket No. CO 27/47, Folios 2,5; NA); and COHQ, 'The Division of Responsibility for Small Scale 
Raiding Within the Combined Operations Command (including Commando Group)', 5.2.47; [COHQ], 'Proposals for 
Combined Operations Small Scale Raiding Policy [Draft]', [3.47] (DEFE 2/2088, Docket No. 27A147, Folio 2, and 
Docket No. CO 27B/47, Folio 1; NA). 
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being termed 'Unorthodox Operations', which included both 'Raids' and 'Clandestine 
Operations'. Amongst the myriad of proposals to be considered, the most important involved the 
establishment of a permanent inter-service committee that would maintain the necessary close 
liaison amongst the Services (and COHQ), which had been lacking during the recent war. The 
CCO was to be chairman while one member each was to come from the Admiralty, the War 
Office, the Air Ministry, Special Operations and COHQ.357 
The CCO's inter-service meeting was held on 27 June 1947 at COHQ where the CCO's 
suggestions were generally agreed, including the creation of 'a permanent Inter-Service 
Committee' along the same lines as the inter-service meeting itself with the permanent addition 
of a Royal Marine. The main function of this Committee was to 'formulate a joint policy on all 
matters relating to raiding and clandestine operations', to 'investigate and make 
recommendations through COHQ to the Chiefs of Staff Committee' on matters relating to this 
policy, and to 'appoint special sub-committees as ... necessary' .358 
The main thrust of these items were summarised by the CCO in a document that was 
produced for the Chiefs of Staff in August, requesting approval for the establishment of the 
permanent Inter-Service Committee on Raiding Operations (ISCRO).359 For various reasons, it 
was not approved until April of 1948.360 The CCO informed the three Services of this in Ma/61 
and the first meeting of the ISCRO was finally held on 16 June. Eight types of raids were 
confirmed, ranging from simple 'offensive' and 'deceptive' raids, to 'operating a concealed 
Advanced Base' and the 'transportation of "clandestine operators" and their stores'. The 
Committee's participants also agreed to establish three sub-committees, one to address the 
357 Commander, Commando Group, ltr to CCO, 29.4.47; and Cmdt. (SCO), ltr to CCO, 14.5.47 (DEFE 212088, Docket 
No. CO 27B/47, Folios 4,5; NA); and-, 'Extract ofthe Minutes of AWSC(47) 14th Mtg ... 30 May 1947', n.d.; CCO 
Itr to Secretary of the Admiralty, U-SS, WO, and U-SS, Air Ministry, 6.6.47 (DEFE 2/1449, Docket No. CO 27/47, 
Folios 13, 17; NA). 
358 _, 'Minutes of the Meeting ... 27th June 1947 ... ', [1.7.47] (DEFE 2/1449, Docket No. CO 27/47, Folio 29; NA). 
359 COS (47) 93, 7.8.47 (DEFE 5/2; NA); and COHQ ltr to Secretary, COS Committee, 1.7.47 (DEFE 2/1449, Docket 
No. CO 27/47, Folio 37; NA). 
360 _, 'Extract from COS (48) 47th Mtg of2.4.48', n.d. (DEFE 2/2089, Docket No. CO(O) 27/47, folio lC; NA). 
361 COCOS ltr to Under Secretary of the Admiralty, U-SS, WO, and U-SS, Air Ministry, 26.5.48 (DEFE 212089, 
Docket No. CO(O) 27/47, folio 1; NA). 
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division of more detailed responsibilities for raiding in general, another to examme 
responsibilities for 'technique and training', and the last to address equipment development.362 
Whilst these sub-committees began to meet and address their respective issues with 
regard to raiding/63 the newly renamed Chief of Combined Operations Staff (COCOS) 
forwarded a summary document to the Commandant of the SCO on 27 July 1948, which detailed 
the changed policy situation that had evolved within the new strategic context. It stated that 
although the British study of combined operations since World War II had almost exclusively 
revolved around the large-scale, Normandy-type of enterprise, it was now recognised that such 
operations were not likely in the first two years of a future war. Therefore, other variations had to 
be investigated, specifically corresponding to the 'period' of war during which each was 
expected. Of the three sequential 'periods' listed-'peace or pre-war', 'strategic defensive', and 
'offensive'--COHQ was focusing more on the second (instead of the third), not only because of 
the limited resources available, which effectively precluded any large-scale operations from 
being undertaken at the outset, but also because the UK would have to rely heavily on the US 
anyways-as it had during the recent war-particularly for specialised assault shipping. The 
types of operation that were expected during the 'strategic-defensive' phase included the seizure 
of a limited objective, the clearance of a small bridgehead, a rapid re-embarkation, raids, 
emergency maintenance over beaches, and specialised amphibious operations such as riverine 
warfare. 364 
Follow up reports to the first ISCRO meeting were considered in the subsequent months 
and on 30 November 1948 the COCOS summarised the various findings and made 
recommendations to the three Services.365 This paper and another one produced by COCOS for 
362 -' 'Minutes of the 1st Mtg of the Inter-Service Committee on Raiding Operations ... 16th June, 1948', n.d. (DEFE 
2/2089, Docket No. COCO) 27/47, folio 10; NA). 
363 COCOS ltr to Secretary of the Admiralty, U-SS, WO (DMO), U-SS, WO, U-SS, Air Ministry, and CGRM, 10.8.47 
(DEFE 2/2089, Docket No. COCO) 27/47, folio 20; NA). 
364 COCOS note to Cmdt., SCO, 27.7.48 (DEFE 211676, Docket No. CO 1039/48, Folio 22; NA). 
365 SO (plans) [and MX (RASC)], 15.11.48; -' 'Extract of the Minutes of33rd Mtg of the Executive ... 16 November 
1948', n.d.; and -' 'Extract of the Minutes of the 34th Mtg of the Executive ... 23 November 1948', n.d.; COHQ ltr to 
Secretary of the Admiralty, U-SS, War Office (DMO), U-SS, War Office (SD6), U-SS, Air Ministry (DCAS), and 
CGRM, 30.11.48; (DEFE 2/2089, Docket No. COCO) 27/47, Folios 31,32,34,36; NA). 
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CGRM, which detailed the 'Formation of a Small Raids Unit', were considered at the second 
meeting of raiding Committee, held on 5 January 1949.366 While the need to raise a fourth 
Commando (in the UK) and establish a Small Raids Unit (SRU) were agreed to in principle, it 
was noted that due to 'shortages in manpower' only a 'nucleus' of such a Unit could be formed. 
In addition, the Committee agreed to produce an updated draft of the 'Raiding' paper for 
submission to the Chiefs of Staff although this did not take place until 5 April. 367 
Raiding and the Royal Marines 
Prior to this, the COS had met in early January to discuss a memorandum by the 
Admiralty on the roles of Royal Marines in peace and war, which seemed to parallel the 
requirements being outlined by the Raiding Committee. The memorandum argued that, as the 
strategic reserve for the Royal Navy in peacetime, the Royal Marines had two main functions: 1) 
keeping alive the Commando technique, while providing a trained nucleus for wartime 
expansion; and 2) providing highly mobile and lightly equipped troops for Imperial policing 
duties. In war, the Royal Marines were to conduct all forms of raiding, perform special tasks in 
large-scale combined ( amphibious) operations, seize ports, and operate as regular infantry if 
necessary.368 In actual fact, it is doubtful whether any of the Commandos could have functioned 
in the amphibious raiding role. Ever since their re-deployment from Hong Kong in 1947, none of 
them had received any amphibious training. This was magnified by the fact that the three 
Commandos that made up the Commando Brigade were deployed in three separate locations at 
the end of 1948: HQ was in Malta with 45 Commando; 40 Commando was in Cyprus; and 42 
Commando was in Egypt. Although it was maintained that the 'brigade could take its part in this 
[raiding] role provided that the necessary landing craft were made available and there was 
366 COHQ ltr to CGRM, 6.12.48 (DEFE 212089, Docket No. CO(O) 27/47, Folio 38; NA); _, 'Minutes of the Second 
Meeting of the Inter-Service Raiding Committee ... 5th January 1949', 17.1.49 (DEFE 2/2090, Docket No. CO(O) 
27/49, Folio 9; NA). 
367 COS (49) 119,5.4.49 (DEFE 212090, Docket No. CO(O) 27/49, folio 22; NA). 
368 COS (48) 203, 11.12.48 (DEFE 5/9; NA). 
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sufficient time for rehearsals', it was also noted that '[s]upporting arms and services would also 
be required' .369 
By the time the 'Seaborne Raiding' paper was finally considered by the COS in April, 
the overall military manpower shortage was so 'acute' that 'it would not be possible ... to find the 
personnel required even for a small nucleus' of the SRU. As such, the Committee, in considering 
the general requirement for raiding operations, decided to ask the Joint Planning Staff to 
'determine the extent and nature of this requirement on a world wide basis', specifically what 
'would be needed in peacetime to meet this raiding commitment and the priority which should be 
accorded to the preparations' .370 
The vast scale of this undertaking ensured that it was not until January of 1950 that the 
JPS had produced a 'final' draft report, including a revised directive for the COCOS, that was 
submissable to the COS Committee.371 Whilst generally broadening COCOS' directive, and 
therefore COHQ's responsibilities with regard to raiding, the report also took into account a 
number of recommendations from the War Office. Although these revisions were incorporated 
into another 'final' report quickly enough to be approved by the Chiefs of Staff and the Minister 
of Defence by February,372 another revised Directive to COCOS, not approved by the COS until 
April, forced yet another draft revision.373 The revised 'Raiding Operations' report was finally 
considered by the COS on 19 June 1950 and approved, although not without resolving the 
dilemma of having the Royal Marine Commando Brigade earmarked for land operations in case 
of a new war while also allocated to perform amphibious raiding in the Mediterranean should 
war break out. 374 
369 DCO(T) ltr to COCOS, 24.1.49 (DEFE 2/1572, Docket No. CO 646/49, folio 1; NA). 
370 _, 'Extract of the Minutes of53rd Mtg of the COS(49), dated 8.4.49', n.d. (DEFE 2/1572, Docket No. CO 646/49, 
folio 24; NA). 
371 JP (49) 158 Final, 4.1.50 (DEFE 2/1442, Docket No. COCO) 7/50(A), folio 1; NA). 
372 COS (50) 39, 1.2.50 (DEFE 5/19; NA). 
373 _, 'Extract of the Minutes of the 5ih Mtg of the COS Ctee, dated 5 April 1950', n.d. (DEFE 2/1442, Docket No. 
COCO) 7/50(A), folio 17; NA). 
374 -' 'Extract from COS (50) 92nd Mtg dated 19 June 1950', n.d. (DEFE 212091, Docket No. COCO) 27/50, Folio 26; 
NA). 
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The report's analysis, which was on a 'world-wide basis', summarised the strategic 
situation 'in the short tenn' (i.e., first few months) of a future war against the Russians as 
basically having lost all most, if not all of continental Europe, including Scandinavia, Sicily, 
Sardinia, Crete and Cyprus, but excluding the Spanish-Portuguese peninsula. In addition, most of 
the Middle East would have been lost, including 'Turkey, northern Syria, Iraq and Persia, 
and ... even ... as far as Israel'. As a result, 'any unorthodox warfare, such as raiding operations, 
which will tend to dissipate their forces in wasteful defensive tasks should be exploited from the 
outbreak of war' .375 
The conclusions reached were essentially evolutionary as they represented the 
culmination of development that had begun in 1947 when raiding was first deemed as a probable 
requirement. From an organisational standpoint, it was recommended that COCOS remain 
generally responsible, in peacetime, for 'Raids by Sea' and all 'Raids' involving a withdrawal by 
sea, with the War Office gaining primary responsibility for 'Raids by Land' and 'Raids by Air' 
(in conjunction with the Air Ministry). In addition, the Inter-Service Committee on Raiding 
Operations, with COCOS still as Chainnan, should continue to ensure co-operation among the 
three Services, co-ordinate staff requirements and maintain liaison with other authorities. 376 
From an operational perspective, the report recommended that various types of units be 
maintained at operational readiness in peacetime. Aside from Royal Engineer (RE) and Special 
Air Service (SAS) units, these also included the Royal Marine Commando Brigade (i.e., three 
Commandos) in the Middle East; '[c]ertain men trained in the Small Raids Wing of the 
Amphibious School [RM] in the United Kingdom'; and the maintenance of required landing craft 
and ships in reserve, which also would have required Royal Marines. Upon mobilisation, in 
addition to one regiment of SAS, two additional Commando Brigades were also required, one at 
D + 3 months and another at D + 6 months in the UK 'for use in Western Europe' .377 In sum, 
375 COS (50) 222, 29.6.50 (DEFE 2/2091, Docket No. COCO) 27/50, Folio 32; NA). This actually contains JP (50) 50 
(Final), 14.6.50 (DEFE 2/2091, Docket No. COCO) 27/50, Folio 22; NA), 1-2. 
376 COS (50) 222, 2-4. 
377 COS (50) 222, 5. 
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whilst COCOS continued to maintain responsibility for co-ordinating all studies of-and 
preparations for-raiding on a joint basis, the Royal Marine Commandos had gained centre stage 
with regard to executing raids from the sea. 
Doctrine and the Manual of Combined Operations, 1950 
Raiding Doctrine 
As the conceptualisation and practice of raiding-including small scale raids by 
'parties '-emerged to balance the pre-eminence of large-scale operations, the parallel 
development of raiding doctrine proceeded apace, if a bit delayed. By January of 1949, work on 
one of the aforementioned COHB 'Series', No. 10, which was to consist of four volumes, had 
already begun, although there seemed to be some confusion as to which volumes COHQ and the 
Royal Marines were responsible, thus resulting in only sporadic progress at first. 378 Another 
complication was that the 'world-wide' analysis for raiding requirements was not officially 
approved until 1950, as detailed above. Once that happened, COCOS requested that the Royal 
Marines be responsible for the preparation of a new COHB to be titled The Organisation, 
Training and Employment of Commandos. This was to supersede a number of Second World 
War-era (COPs), namely No. 24 (Cliff Assaults, 1945), No. 26 (Commandos in the Field, 1945), 
and No. 27 (Hardening of Commando Troops for War).379 This task was quickly accepted380 and 
the new Handbook, now labelled Amphibious Warfare Handbook (A WHB) No. lOa, was 
published in 1951.381 A complementary Handbook, No. lOb, Amphibious Raids, was produced 
that same year although it was most likely written by COHQ.382 
378 DCO(P) memo to Distr., 17.1.49; GSOl1(pol) memo to Distr., 14.4.49; DCO(I) memo to Distr., 26.7.49 (DEFE 
211572, Docket No. CO 580-49, Folios 1, 5, 7; NA). 
379 COCOS ltr to CGRM, 28.2.50 (DEFE 2/1537, Docket CO 477/50, Folio 29; NA). 
380 CGRM, ltr to COCOS, 15.3.50 (DEFE 2/1537, Docket CO 477/50, Folio 36; NA); DCO(P) Itr to Distr., 21.4.50 
(DEFE 2/1573, Docket No. CO 580/50, Folio 1; NA). 
381 A WHQ (CAW & Cmdt-Gen, RM), A WHB No. lOa, The Organisation, Employment and Training of Commandos, 
1951 (DEFE 2/1770; NA). 
382 A WHQ (CAW), A WHB No. lOb, Amphibious Raids, 1951 (DEFE 2/1771; NA). 
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The Manual of Combined Operations, 1950 
Overshadowing the publication of Handbooks lOa and lOb, however, was the release of 
the capstone Manual a/Combined Operations in March, 1950.383 As mentioned, this volume had 
been a work long in progress, considering that a revised draft of the 1938 edition had been 
produced by the end of the war, albeit with 'a considerable amount of revision and re-
writing ... necessary'. It was not until mid-1948 that work on the Manual had restarted.384 A first 
draft of the Manual was finally circulated in March of 1949 and a second one followed the next 
month.385 At the same time, a number of unresolved points were brought up by a source within 
COHQ that needed to be addressed to complete the Manual, which mostly revolved around 
terminology. Aside from rather simple changes such as 'exploitation' instead of 'follow-up 
stage', which was more in compliance with American terminology, the School of Combined 
Operations (SCO) had recommended the substitution of 'amphibious operations' for 'combined 
operations', apparently again in a move towards more compliance with the US.386 The latter issue 
was addressed at an Executive meeting on 5 May with the COHQ ultimately deciding not to 
change British terminology, mainly because it was thought that the American term 'amphibious' 
represented a much narrower definition than 'combined operation' .387 As a matter of fact, a very 
similar viewpoint had been taken by the US Army toward the US Naval Service's narrow 
conception of 'amphibious operations' as compared to their broader encompassment of so-called 
'j oint amphibious operations'. 
Having gathered general agreement amongst the Service Ministries, a final draft was 
made ready for fmal COS approval by September 1949, although it was not officially 
383 DCO(P) ltr to Distr., 21.4.50,3. 
384 DCO(P) ltr to Distr., 23.6.48 (DEFE 2/1671, Folio 1; NA). 
385 _, 'Minutes of the Meeting ... 2nd March, 1949 ... ', n.d. (DEFE 2/1537, Docket CO 477/50, Folio 2; NA); and 
DCO(P) ltr to Executive, 8.4.49 (DEFE 2/1672, Folio 4; NA). 
386 DCO(P) ltr to Executive, 3-4. . 
387 _, 'Minutes of the 10th Mtg of the Executive ... 5th May, 1949', n.d. (DEFE 2/1610, Docket No. CO 768/1/49, foho 
10; NA), 2-3; and_, 'Extract of the Minutes of the 10th Meeting of the Executive ... 5th May 1949', n.d. (DEFE 2/1672, 
Folio 7; NA), 2. 
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promulgated until March 1950.388 As with similar manuals produced during the inter-war years, 
this one also emphasised the joint nature of its focus by stating that it was 'intended as an 
introduction and guide to the basic principles of all types of Combined Operations for 
commanders, staff and other officers of the Navy, Army and RAF'. 389 Its definition also did not 
differ appreciably from those offered in past doctrine, including the COPs. 
A Combined Operation is defined as one involving the integration of sea and land forces 
with associated air support; and also of sea, land and air forces when an airborne assault 
is an integral part of such an operation. The type of Combined Operation depends on the 
aim to be attained, the resources available and the local conditions, but the operation is, in 
itself, only the means to an end.390 
Two characteristics were notable for their variance with US naval doctrine. The first concerned 
the fundamentally inter-service (or joint) nature of a 'combined operation', which was unlike the 
essentially single service nature of the US Naval Service's 'amphibious operation'. The second 
concerned the emphasis that the whole enterprise was just a 'means to an end', whereas the 
emphasis on the' amphibious operation' was that it was a separate and distinct naval operation. 
Along these lines, the Manual was careful to point out the various differences with 
American doctrine. Whilst it asserted that British and American doctrine did 'not differ in any 
important principle', a number of underlying differences were revealed including that American 
doctrine had been derived specifically from 'the Pacific "island war", where special problems 
were successfully met and solved by the development of special methods'. On the other hand, the 
British 'operational procedure and doctrine were developed primarily to meet European and 
Mediterranean conditions, and perhaps have a bias in that direction'. Although this may have 
resulted in a 'divergence on points of detail and tactical procedure' the Manual still maintained 
that the perception that the British and the Americans had their own 'technique' was merely a 
'false impression' .391 This claim notwithstanding, the Manual was careful to re-emphasise that, 
when solutions to difficult situations were required, it was 'important to remember that most of 
388 DCO(P) Itr to Distr., 6.9.49 (DEFE 2/1672, Folio 16; NA). See also DCO(P) Itr to Distr., 21.4.50 (DEFE 2/1573, 
Docket No. CO 580/50, 3. 
389 COHQ (COCOS), c. B. 3181, The Manual of Combined Operations, 1950, [3].50 (ADM 239/233; NA), 1. 
Emphasis added. 
390 C 
. B. 3181, 2. 
391 C. B. 3181, 4. 
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the problems which seriously affect Combined Operations will be common to all operations of 
war in the future, and it will therefore be a matter of adapting a common solution to the special 
needs of a Combined Operation, than attempting to fmd a "specialist" solution for this kind of 
. ,392 
enterpnse. 
The Manual then proceeded to assess the current status of the relationship between 
'airborne' and 'seaborne' operations as they had been so closely associated with the large-scale, 
'invasion' - (or expeditionary-) type operations conducted during the Second World War in the 
ETO. 
It is to be expected that airborne operations will continue to take an increasingly 
important share in the attainment of the aim of a Combined Operation, which is usually 
the establishment of our forces on a hostile shore. The complete replacement of seaborne 
by airborne expeditions is not, however, yet within sight, and this manual is concerned 
mainly with the seaborne method. The airborne operation is therefore treated as a 
subsidiary to the seaborne assault, but the fact should not be lost sight of that on occasion 
in the future these roles may be reversed. 393 
Although the Manual simply references 'LandfAir Warfare Pamphlet No.4 "Airborne and 
Airtransported Operations'" for further information, the above quote is important because it 
foreshadows the continued use of airborne operations in conjunction with seaborne ones, not 
only in actual operations like Operation MUSKETEER in 1956 and Operation VANTAGE in 
1961, but also in theory as illustrated by the eventual adoption of the 'seaborne/airborne/land 
operations' concept in the early 1960s. 
Two basic types of operation were then outlined and described: a 'large scale assault' 
and a 'small scale assault'. The descriptions provided for each were very similar to those 
developed over the past years. The former 'might form the prelude to the final offensive stage in 
a long war. The strategic aim would therefore be to capture an advanced base from which to 
mount important operations by naval and air forces, or to establish land and air forces on a main 
land-mass held by the enemy, in order to engage him in decisive battle'. The latter was simply on 
a 'limited aim and scale .. .in the early stages of war, or during any strategic/defensive period'. 
392 C 
. B. 3181, 2. 
393 C. B. 3181,3. 
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Included as possibilities were the 'seizure of small strategic objectives' and 'raids' (as well as 
'estuary or river warfare'), although care was taken to point out that these endeavours 'can be 
successful only against relatively light opposition'. One final 'corollary of such limited 
operations may be the opposed re-embarkation', otherwise known as an amphibious 
'withdrawal' .394 
Although chapters on 'Raids' and 'Estuary and River Warfare' were included in the 
Manual, there was nothing groundbreaking about this publication, undoubtedly because of the 
limiting caveats introduced at the start. From an evolutionary point of view, indeed, the 1950 
Manual resembled USF 6, which was also a general compilation of lessons learned from World 
War II. This situation was not wholly lost on the COHQ leadership who, in summarising the 
progress made since the end of the war, outlined the future direction and emphasis of British 
amphibious/expeditionary warfare development that would eventually dominate the next decade 
although would not be fully realised until the 1960s. 
The doctrine of Combined Operations as taught up to now has been based on the lessons 
of the 1939-45 war and has envisaged a landing in the face of well organised enemy 
defences. It is intended to maintain and develop this technique, but since present policy 
visualises and stresses the small scale operation against limited opposition in the early 
stages of the next war, study is now being principally directed to the best use of our 
existing resources in this type of operation. During the course of the next few months it 
is hoped to produce a provisional doctrine specially applicable to the small scale assault 
versus light opposition, employing very limited numbers and quantities of specialised 
vessels or equipment and taking account of the present lack of headquarters ships (LSH), 
rocket support vessels, and amphibians. This study will also include the employment of 
the small Beach Group designed to land a Brigade Group and handle up to 600 tons a 
day by the most economical means. 395 
CONCLUSION 
The above quote quite literally confirmed that the course of British 
amphibious/expeditionary development in the immediate post-World War II years was based on 
the Services' expeditionary experiences in the ETO between 1943 and 1945. This was especially 
reflected at the organizationaVinstitutional level of analysis through the retention of the jointly-
staffed but independent COHQ establishment. It was also evident at the tacticaVoperationallevel, 
394 C. B. 3181,7. 
395 DCO(P) Itr to Distr., 20.6.50, (DEFE 2/1514, Docket No. CO 580B/50, folio 3; NA), 1. 
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not only with respect to the promulgation of joint doctrine but also with regard to the Chief of 
Combined Operations' directives, which encompassed all types of 'combined operations'. Whilst 
this contrasted with the US Naval Service's consolidation of its Second World War amphibious 
experience--at the same two levels of analysis-it is worth noting a similarity that would 
continue to evolve in the 1950s. This was between the course of overall British development on 
the one hand and that of the US Army on the other, with the latter having also drawn on its 
extensive expeditionary World War II experience, not only in Europe but also in the Southwest 
Pacific. 
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PART TWO: 1950-1957 
AMERICAN AND BRITISH DEBATE .. .AND BRITISH 
COMPROMISE? 
The trend of inter-national consolidation between 1945 and 1950 did not continue with 
the same deliberateness during the 1950 to 1957 time frame, which seemed to indicate that a 
slight convergence of developmental courses had occurred. This resulted from the deepening and 
widening of the internal debates that had surfaced within each country in the late 1940s, 
particularly in the United States. 
In the US, the Department of the Navy (i.e., US Navy and Marine Corps) forged ahead 
with its innovative 'future concept of amphibious operations', which expanded on the 
groundbreaking concept introduced in the late 1940s, mostly through further conceptualisation 
and testing. At the same time, the initial debate between the Naval Service and the Army 
expanded to include the nascent Air Force. As a result, disagreements amongst the services 
threatened to become permanently entrenched, as specifically demonstrated by a failed attempt to 
formulate joint amphibious warfare doctrine between 1951 and 1955. During this process, the 
services outlined a set of 'divergent views' on amphibious operations which, in turn, appeared to 
revolve around the dichotomy between so-called 'amphibious operations' and 'joint amphibious 
operations'. The former reflected the Naval Service's amphibious wartime experience of seizing 
island bases while the latter reflected the other two services' expeditionary experience of 
invading continental land masses which, again, more closely resembled overall British 
experience with 'combined operations'. Finally, the Army and the Air Force each continued to 
develop its own expeditionary capabilities. Whilst this was most conspicuously demonstrated by 
the promulgation of single service amphibious operations doctrines, it also included a notable 
amount of Goint) exercising, as well as the procurement of certain amphibious equipment, 
particularly by the Army. 
In the United Kingdom, the Amphibious Warfare Headquarters (A WHQ-formerly 
COHQ) establishment proceeded to address the broad scope of responsibilities for 'combined 
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operations' that it had been assigned after the war. These ultimately ranged from 'raiding', which 
continued to be pursued on a joint basis but with the Royal Marine Commandos acting in the 
lead functional role, to 'beach organisation' -type ventures that included 'maintenance', 
'withdrawal' and 're-supply' operations, to joint amphibious/airborne assaults against limited 
opposition, as was effected against Port Said during the Suez Crisis of 1956. However, as a result 
of an ongoing 'defence review' process that took into account the shifting geo-strategic situation 
as well as continually limited defence expenditures, the A WHQ establishment experienced a 
partial consolidation as well as a significant institutional downsizing. 
At the same time, the RM Commandos moved into a central role with regard to 
amphibious warfare practice, essentially as seaborne light infantry. Although the Commandos 
were successfully employed in this role during the joint seaborne/airborne attack on Suez in 
1956, much of the early and mid-1950s was spent conducting various 'cold war' tasks. As such, 
any sense of acquiring exclusive responsibility over amphibious development as a whole was 
conspicuously undercut by the continued existence of A WHQ itself and the fact that this joint 
entity continued to retain primacy over the formulation of overall Goint) amphibious policy, 
concepts and doctrine. Furthermore, existing differences between the Commandos and their 
apparent counterparts in America, the US Marine Corps' Fleet Marine Force (FMF) units-
notwithstanding the huge disparities in overall numbers-tended to undermine direct 
comparisons as true 'standing' (i.e., permanently organised and afloat) amphibious forces, which 
the latter effectively were. 
III 
CHAPTER THREE: THE UNITED STATES, 1950-1957 
OVERVIEW 
As during the first few years immediately following World War II, 
amphibious/expeditionary developments in the US between 1950 and 1957 have generally been 
depicted as being predominated by naval developments, meaning those achieved by the US Navy 
and Marine Corps. The focus of this history revolves around the successful development and 
testing of the so-called 'future concept of amphibious operations', which centred on the 
employment of troop transport helicopters from specialised amphibious shipping to conduct 
amphibious assaults in both atomic and non-atomic conditions. However, and as discussed in 
Chapter 1, some very recent scholarship focusing on US Army amphibious operations during the 
Korean War has emerged to provide an initial balance to this prevailing naval interpretation. 396 
Building on these two strands of research, amongst others, this chapter aims to develop 
further a comprehensive account of American amphibious/expeditionary warfare development as 
a whole, whilst also offering new observations on certain issues that remain open to further 
interpretation, not only from a national perspective, but also ultimately from an international one. 
For example, although the 'future concept' was clearly important insofar as it expanded on the 
original groundbreaking theory promulgated in the late 1940s, the practical requirements 
involved in fully implementing this concept were, in fact, quite limiting. As a result, this 
effectively precluded the concept itself from being as fully realised as generally perceived. 397 
This was because only the assault elements of a Marine Division (which itself had to be 
considerably lightened to become fully air-transportable) could be transported ashore by the 
helicopters that existed at the time. Heavier elements such as tanks, artillery, and engineering 
equipment, which were essential in any seriously opposed amphibious assault, therefore had to 
be landed using conventional waterborne means. As the doctrinal publication that announced this 
396 See Chapter 1, 62-72; and discussion of Boose's work in Introduction, 21. 
397 It can be noted here that the concept, as outlined in the 1950s, still has effectively not yet been realized-even 
today-in that an 'all helicopter assault' concept has not been successfully implemented. 
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new concept at the end of 1955 itself admitted, the 'surface assault across the beach by 
conventional means ... constitut[ es] the main effort'. 398 On the one hand, this undermined the 
original idea, which was to minimise the effects of atomic bombs being employed defensively 
against a concentrated amphibious assault; on the other hand, it did not help distinguish the 
developments of the Naval Service from the Army which, as discussed previously, had openly 
challenged the apparent exclusivity of naval responsibility for amphibious warfare. 
Second, just as it had been for the inter-war years (until successfully corrected), the 
contributions of the other services to amphibious/expeditionary development during this 
time frame has tended to be downplayed, if not marginalised, in the secondary literature. This 
remained the case for US Army contributions until very recently when, as previously discussed, a 
maj or gap was filled that, whilst focusing heavily on Korean War Army amphibious operations, 
included some valuable details on related Army developments up through the Vietnam conflict 
and even afterwards.399 Not only did this work help introduce the parameters of the emerging 
joint (national) debate that was becoming entrenched amongst the US armed services by the mid-
1950s, but it also continued to outline the US Army's specific conceptualisation of so-called 
'joint amphibious operations', which evolved into the 1960s. Many of these latter traits, in turn, 
appeared to resemble the overall British approach toward traditional 'combined operations', a 
concept that was also at the root of a continuing divergent debate in the UK. 
STRATEGIC ASPECTS 
The geo-strategic situation that evolved between 1950 and 1957 was one in which the 
Cold War-between the maritime alliance led by the United States, now formally under the 
rubric of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the continental bloc of the 
'satellite' states led by the Soviet Union (eventually under the rubric of the so-called 'Warsaw 
Pact')-became entrenched on a truly global scale. It was during this period that the underlying 
398 HQ, USMC, LFB Number 17, ConceptojFutureAmphibious Operations, 12/l3/55 (HAF 453, Box 21A, Archives Branch, 
USMC Research Center, Quantico, VA), 3-4. 
399 See Boose, 327-349. 
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policy of 'containment', which had been introduced in the late 1940s, effectively became not 
only 'militarised' but also 'nuclearised'.40o 
Defence Policy 
Largely as a result of the invasion of South Korea by communist North Korea on 25 June 
1950, US President Harry S. Truman formally approved one of the most seminal documents of 
the Cold War, known colloquially as 'NSC 68', on 30 September.401 Originally submitted in mid-
April,402 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security' effectively 'laid out the 
rationale for US strategy during much of the cold war'. 403 
Concluding that the 'fundamental design' of the Soviet leadership was world 
domination, NSC 68 also stated that 'Soviet efforts [were] now directed toward the domination 
of the Eurasian land mass' .404 From a purely military point of view, this ultimate objective 
seemed increasingly plausible considering the USSR's overwhelming superiority in conventional 
forces facing the European continent, which had been repeatedly assessed.405 NSC 68 estimated 
that an attack launched against NATO would most likely overrun all of 'Western Europe, with 
the possible exception of the Iberian and Scandinavian Peninsulas; ... drive toward the oil-bearing 
areas of the Near and Middle East; and ... consolidate Communist gains in the Far East'. From an 
amphibious/expeditionary warfare point of view, due to the ability of the Soviets to employ 
atomic weapons, it also seemed possible for them 'to prevent any allied "Normandy" type 
invasion operations intended to force a reentry into the continent of Europe'. Indeed, it was 
estimated that the USSR had 10-20 atomic bombs in mid-1950 and would have 200 by mid-
1954.406 
400 See, for example, Gaddis, Strategies, Chapters 4-6. 
401 NSC 68/2, 9/30/50, in FRUS, 1950, Vol. I, National Security Policy, 400. 
402 See NSC 68,4/14/50, in FRUS, 1950, Vol. I, 234-292. The actual date of the report is 4/7/50. 
403 May, Ernest R., (ed.), American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 (Boston, MAINew York, NY: Bedford 
Books ofSt. Martin's Press, 1993), vii. 
404 May, 26-27. 
405 See Ross, 138, 147. See also NSC 100, 1111151; and NSC 114/1, 8/8/51, inFRUS, 1951, Vol. I, National Security 
Policy, 7-18,127-157. 
406 May, 38-39. See also Rosenberg, David A., 'The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 
1945-1960', IS, 7:4 (Spring 1983),3-71. 
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As a result of this negative assessment, NSC 68 declared that 'the long-range allied 
military objective in Western Europe must envisage an increased military strength in that area 
sufficient possibly to deter the Soviet Union from a major war or, in any event, to delay 
materially the overrunning of Western Europe and, if feasible, to hold a bridgehead on the 
continent against Soviet Union offensives,.407 From a strategic perspective, this primarily aimed 
to contain the Soviet Union through strengthening and creating alliances along the periphery of 
Soviet and communist control. In Europe, NATO was strengthened, first by the activation of a 
central, US-led military command in Belgium on 1 April 1951 and then by the admission of three 
states that directly bordered the Soviet sphere of influence: Greece and Turkey in 1952; and West 
Germany in 1955. (The latter's accession, in turn, prompted the establishment of the 'Warsaw 
Pact' in May of 1955.) In the Pacific, subsequent to the signing of the Sino-Soviet pact in 
February of 1950, a number of collective security pacts were made by the United States, which 
aimed to encircle the Eurasian continent geographically. These included the following: the bi-
lateral 'Philippine Treaty' (August 1951); the 'ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States) 
Treaty' (September 1951); the bi-Iateral 'Japanese Treaty' (September 1951); the bi-Iateral 
'Republic of Korea (South Korea) Treaty' (October 1953); the 'Southeast Asia Treaty' 
(September 1954); and the bi-Iateral 'Republic of China (Taiwan) Treaty' (December 1954).408 
Strategic War Plans 
As a result of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, American war planners 
generally adopted a collective security foundation to plan for potential global conflicts in the 
1950-1957 timeframe. Although short-, medium- and long-term plans increasingly sought to 
establish a firm line of defence on the European continent while remaining on the strategic 
defensive in the Far East, almost all of them contained scenarios in which amphibious landings 
operations of both the 'seizure' and 'invasion' type were expected. As in the late 1940s, the 
former were needed to capture air and naval bases on the periphery of the Eurasian continent 
407 May (ed.), American, 39. 
408 _, 'Western Security System', MR, 34:2 (5/54), 62; _, 'Southeast Asia Treaty Nations', MR, 34:9 (12/54), 69; and 
'Figure l' in _, 'Readiness for the Little War', MR, 37:1 (4/57), 15. 
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from which atomic air strikes and invasions could be mounted, whilst the latter were necessary to 
execute large-scale land campaigns to liberate occupied territories and ultimately defeat (if not 
also occupy) the Soviet Union itself. 
The first 'emergency war plan' that reflected this nascent defence alignment was code-
named OFFT ACKLE.409 It provided an analysis of the first two years of a war beginning in 1949 
and was designed for a situation that was very similar to 1940 in which the European continent 
as well as much of the Middle East and Far East would be occupied by the USSR within three 
months. The Western allies would immediately retaliate, however, by launching an atomic 
counter-attack by air whilst also securing lines of communication in the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean, which involved occupying or seizing a number of advanced air and naval bases, 
including possibly 'Sicily, Southern Italy or Sardinia, andlor Corsica' during a massive 
manpower mobilisation. Soviet-occupied territories would then face a two-pronged 'reinvasion' 
from North Africa and the British Isles similar to endeavours mounted in World War II. Despite 
being deemed militarily 'infeasible' in certain respects, OFF TACKLE was still approved by the 
JCS in December 1949, again in January 1950, and 'retained as the basic emergency war plan 
until mid-1951' .410 
Prior to OFFTACKLE even being detailed, the first long-range war plan was already 
being outlined. This plan, code-named DROPSHOT, assumed a dramatic increase in defence 
spending, which was deemed necessary to counter the Soviet's overwhelming conventional 
strength.411 The plan's 'overall strategic concept' essentially involved 'conducting a strategic 
offensive in Western Eurasia and a strategic defensive in the Far East'. From an 
amphibious/expeditionary warfare perspective, implementing this strategy would require two 
successive phases, the first of which involved securing and controlling' essential strategic areas' 
and 'bases'. This, in tum, called for 'seizure' -type amphibious operations to accomplish, almost 
409 Palmer, Origins, 63. 
410 Ross, 111-118. 
411 See Brown, Anthony C., (ed.), DROPSHOT- The United States Plan/or War with the Soviet Union in 1957 (New 
York, NY: The Dial Press/James Wade, 1978). See also Ross, 119-132. 
116 
all of which mirrored the amphibious landings that were dominated by the Naval Service in the 
Central Pacific during World War II.412 
The other area of DROPSHOT's strategic concept concerned the 'launch [of] 
coordinated offensive operations of all arms against the USSR' which, whilst dominated by 
'invasion'-type enterprises, would also involve 'seizures' in certain circumstances. Similar to the 
events that occurred in the Second World War, DROPSHOT presented three general offensive 
options that involved one or more of the following options: 'amphibious and airborne landings 
on the German North Sea coast'; 'amphibious and airborne landings in the Athens-Piraeus area'; 
the 'possible seizure of Aegean islands'; 'amphibious and airborne assaults .. .in the 
Salonika ... and ... the Alexandroupolis area[s]'; the seizure of the 'Turkish straits ... by ground 
attacks .. .in conjunction with amphibious and airborne landings'; and finally, major 'amphibious 
and airborne landings ... against the northwestern Black Sea coast' .413 Although both the 'seizure' 
and 'invasion' types of endeavour were described here, the more notable in this case were the 
latter as they resembled the 'joint amphibious operations' (or expeditionary operations) that had 
been conducted by the Americans and the British in the ETO during World War II. 
As evidenced above, and by subsequent 'intermediate-range' war plans (for war 
beginning in 1954) such as Plan REAPER,414 both amphibious 'seizures' and expeditionary 
'invasions' were to playa vital role in any future war to retake Western Europe from the Red 
Army. As such, both the Naval Service, which had employed mostly 'seizure' -type operations 
during World War II in the Central Pacific, and the Army (as well as the Air Force), which had 
employed 'invasion' -type operations in the ETO, had legitimate arguments as to why their 
approaches, concepts and practices were required. Whilst the legitimacy ofthe former's approach 
was suspect from the latter's point of view as it was too narrowly focused on so-called 
'amphibious operations', the legitimacy of the latter's conceptualisation of what were referred to 
as 'joint amphibious operations' was initially based on technical (but significant) legal positions. 
412 Brown, DROPSHOT, 38, 156,230. 
413 Brown, DROPSHOT, 273-281. 
414 Ross, 142-145. 
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ORGANISATIONAL/INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the immediate post-war period was marked at the 
organisational level by a complete re-organisation of the American defence establishment. Whilst 
creating a centralised Department of Defense (DOD) with three Military Departments under a 
civilian Secretary of Defense (SecDef), it still allowed the Department of the Navy (DN) to 
consolidate its apparent primacy in amphibious warfare development. However, this trend did 
not continue between 1950 and 1957. Instead, although the Marine Corps-which continued to 
find it necessary to protect its continuing efficacy, if not existence, as a naval fighting force-
managed to secure a few small but significant legislative and regulatory advances, this period 
was still characterised by an overriding effort toward further centralisation from the highest 
levels. 
Public Law 412 (June, 1952) 
The newly-renamed Department of Defense was less than one year old when the Korean 
War diverted much of its attention and energies from re-organization to waging another (albeit 
limited) war. Still, a number of new laws and regulations were adopted between 1950 and 1957 
which, while minor relative to the National Security Act of 1947 and its 1949 amendments, still 
had a notable impact on inter-service relationships as well as on the services' respective 
functions and responsibilities, particularly with regard to the US Marine Corps. 
The first of these was Public Law 416, of 28 June 1952, which directly affected the US 
Marine Corps. First, it mandated that the USMC-within the DN-'shall be so organized as to 
include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, 
aviation, and other services as may be organic therein ... ' .415 Although this legislation did not 
ensure that these divisions and/or air wings would be fully manned in times of peace, it did 
provide a permanent organisational foundation upon which the Corps' based its integrated 
'combined arms' (air-ground) formations, a legal feature that was unique amongst all of the 
415 See 'The National Security Organization-1949-52', in Cole ... , 114. 
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American armed forces.416 These, in tum, were central to the development of the Marines' 
'concept of future amphibious operations' , as will be seen in more detail below. 
The second part of the legislation gave the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) 
more of a voice at the highest levels of defence organisation and planning by permitting him to 
attend meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J CS) when topics relevant to the USMC were on the 
agenda. On these occasions, the law stated that the CMC 'shall have co-equal status with the 
other members' of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.417 This was important because particularly when the 
JCS were discussing war plans that included amphibious/expeditionary operations. Soon after 
enactment of the law, the CMC found himself participating 'in discussions concerning 17% of 
the items considered by the Joint Chiefs' .418 
Through this legislation, the Marine Corps had become permanently ensconced in the 
American defence establishment. In addition, while setting a peacetime manpower ceiling, it also 
established a permanent minimum force structure. Nothing similar occurred in the United 
Kingdom with regard to the Corps of Royal Marines, which simply remained a part of the Royal 
Navy. Instead, in the UK, whatever permanent organisational standing that existed with regard to 
amphibious warfare was accorded to the Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ), which 
was soon to be renamed the Amphibious Warfare Headquarters (A WHQ). 
Changes to Navy Organisation 
Additional changes that boosted the standing of the Marine Corps were made within the 
organisational structure of the Department of the Navy. These largely occurred in mid-1953 and 
concerned the status of the CMC and the status of the Marine Corps as a fourth service. Before 
30 June, the CMC had been depicted organisationally 'on a level with the technical bureaus of 
the Department of the Navy, and .. .in the same category as the bureau chiefs'. By 1 August, 
however, after changes to Navy Regulations, 'the Commandant [was] elevated from the bureau 
416 See Millett, SEMPER FIDELlS, xv. 
417 'National Security Organization', in Cole ... , 114. 
418 _, 'Relationship of the Marine Corps with the Other Services', [1953/4] (RG 127: RRMOP&O, Box 28, File 15; 
NARA),1. 
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chief level to a position comparable to the Chief of Naval Operations, being designated "Marine 
Corps Command Assistant"', which was similar to the CNO's designation as "Navy Command 
Assistant".419 While the CMC and CNO now appeared to be on equal command footing, this was 
not quite the case when it came to command from a specific amphibious warfare perspective. 
This was due to the fact that FMF units were automatically under the operational command of 
the CNO while assigned to 'The Operating Forces of the Navy,.42o Indeed, this permanent 
command arrangement was what gave the 'amphibious operations' conducted by the Navy and 
Marine Corps much more of a specifically naval character than a 'joint amphibious operation' 
conducted by Army and Navy-and possibly Air Force-forces. 
Due to the confusion caused by some of these developments, certain aspects of Navy-
Marine Corps relationships were in need of clarification. This was perhaps even a result of the 
language used by the Secretary of the Navy himself when announcing the aforementioned 
agreement. 
The Marine Corps, while not a separate service in the sense of the Anny, Navy and Air 
Force, is a unique service and forms an integral part of the Department of the Navy. 
Because of its specialized mission and objectives, it is distinct from a board, bureau or 
office of the Department, and yet is an inseparable part of a composite whole comprising 
the Naval Establishment.421 
Not helping the situation was the fact that the NSA of 1947 had specifically not recognised the 
Marine Corps 'as a separate service', which was reinforced by the exclusion of the Commandant 
from the JCS, at least until the 1952 law (P.L. 412) changed this arrangement partially.422 
Furthermore, language in the DOD Directive that had officially replaced the 'Functions Paper' 
continued to refer to the Army, Navy and Air Force as the 'three major services', which implied 
that the Marine Corps was only a 'minor service', if a service at all.423 
From a developmental perspective, all of these latter factors served to undermine the 
legal and organisational changes that had taken place in 1952 and 1953 that were to be used by 
419 USMC, 'Relationship', 3, Charts 2 & 3. See also CMC, memo to All Commanding Officers, 9/21/53 (RG 127: 
RRMOP&O, Box 28, File 15, Tab 8; NARA), l. 
420 See Enclosures to CMC, memo to All Commanding Officers. 
421 SECNAV, Memorandum to CNO/CMC, 4/7/54 (RG 127: RRMOP&O, Box 28, File 3; NARA), 1. 
422 Keiser, Unification, 113. 
423 See 'DOD Directive No. 5100.1, 16 March 1954' in Cole ... , 293-306. 
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the Naval Service to dispel the longstanding (and ongoing) perception that the Marine Corps was 
not, in fact (and now legally), a fourth service. As will be seen in more detail below this in turn 
" , 
retarded the Naval Service's efforts (particularly those of the Marine Corps) to argue that there 
were no significant organisational differences between so-called 'amphibious operations' and 
'joint amphibious operations' (as there were actually two services already taking part in the 
latter, the Navy and the Marine Corps). The Army and the Air Force, however, not to mention 
others within the defence establishment, viewed the Navy and the Marine Corps as part of a 
singular Naval Service that therefore could only conduct (limited) 'amphibious operations' per 
se. To conduct large-scale amphibious/expeditionary warfare, 'joint amphibious operations' 
using the resources of all 'three major services' were still required. This appeared to be the case 
in Great Britain where the Royal Marines Commandos, because of their overall size and 
composition, had essentially been limited to performing amphibious raids and acting as a mobile 
Imperial police force, whilst A WHQ (fonnerly COHQ) remained responsible for developing all 
types of 'combined operations'. 
TACTICAL/OPERATIONAL ASPECTS 
By 1950 the Naval Service-led again by the Marine Corps-had established itself in a 
seemingly dominant-if not exclusive-position among the US anned forces with respect to the 
development of amphibious warfare concepts and doctrine as well as equipment. Although this 
situation was reinforced by the perfonnance of the Naval Service in the Korean War, particularly 
with the amphibious assault at Inchon and subsequently with the Marine Corps' continuous 
development of its 'vertical envelopment' concept-which was central to its 'concept of future 
amphibious operations' , the reality was quite different. Due to the new geo-strategic 
circumstances which focused on a future war against a continental (i.e., Eurasian) enemy and 
organizational/institutional changes that were pressuring the defence establishment to become 
increasingly centralized and unified (i.e., 'joint'), both the Army and the Air Force were able to 
challenge the apparent monopoly on amphibious warfare development held by the Naval Service. 
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This, coupled with the fact that the naval establishment's conceptualization of 'future 
amphibious operations' seemed to have outrun the technological capabilities of available 
equipment at the time (mainly with respect to helicopter lift), ultimately resulted in what 
appeared to be an impasse with regard to the development of amphibious warfare, particularly 
with regard to the larger-scale 'joint amphibious operations'. As will be seen in a later chapter, 
however, this situation did manage to set the stage for compromise between and among the 
services, which eventually resulted in the production of Goint) amphibious warfare doctrine in 
the 1960s. 
The Korean War and 'Amphibious/Expeditionary Warfare' 
The major offensive amphibious operations that were conducted during the Korean 
War-Pohang-Dong (July 1950), Inchon (September 1950), and Wonsan (October 1950)-have 
been thoroughly analysed.424 Several observations, particularly of the operation at Inchon, are 
significant because they provide evidence that parallel but different courses of amphibious 
warfare development were evolving in America between the naval establishment on the one hand 
and the Army (and Air Force) on the other. 
The first concerns the impact of atomic weapons (or lack thereof) on amphibious 
warfare. Despite specific assertions to the contrary,425 the assault at Inchon did not specifically 
refute the predictions made by General Omar Bradley that large-scale Goint) amphibious 
operations were facing obsolescence against enemies armed with atomic weapons. As the North 
Koreans did not have any atomic weapons to employ, there was never any such threat to take into 
account in the first place. This effectively precluded Bradley's forecast from even being tested 
although one contemporary article published in July 1950, for example, concluded that the 
amphibious assaults at Normandy, Leyte, and Okinawa, would most likely have been devastated 
424 See, for example, Boose, Chapters 3-7. See also Chisholm, Donald, 'Negotiated Joint Command Relationships -
Korean War Amphibious Operations, 1950', NWCR, 53:2 (Spring 2000),65-124. 
425 See, for example, Isenberg, Shield, 157; Heinl, Soldiers, 530; Heinl, Victory, 3; Krulak, First to Fight, 71; 
Simmons, Marines, 180; Love, Volume Two, 335; and AlexanderlBartlett, 1. 
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had two atomic bombs-similar to those used against Japan-been employed III these 
. 426 
scenanos. 
A second observation relates to the type (or conception) of amphibious landing that was 
actually employed at Inchon. According to the author of the official history of the naval war 
against Korea, 'the story of [the] Inchon landing is the story of the Pacific War repeated. It used 
no new tactics, developed no new doctrine, [and] introduced no new weapons. Inchon added 
little to the US Marines' art of amphibious assault. It did reaffirm the emphatic proof of the 
Pacific War-that a difficult beach could be seized' .427 However, from a broader, joint service 
and operational-level perspective, the attack at Inchon seemed more similar to certain World War 
II amphibious landings that had been conducted in the ETO (e.g., Salerno and Anzio, both of 
which were on an immense peninsula) and, even more so, in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) 
(e.g., during the New Guinea campaign or in the Philippine archipelago). This was revealed in 
two main areas: first, in the operational conception of the enterprise; and second, in the 
operational command and organizational structure. 
Concerning the operational concept of the Inchon attack, it was not a pure frontal assault 
against a highly-defended (but limited) objective such as an island or atoll. Instead, it was a 
'deep-envelopment,428 operation that-as part of a larger land campaign-was designed to create 
an 'anvil' of forces against which the 'hammer' of the attacking Eighth Army (after breaking out 
ofthe Pusan perimeter almost simultaneously) would crush the retreating North Korean forces. 429 
To use MacArthur's own words, it was an 'amphibious landing of a two division corps in [the] 
rear of enemy lines for [the] purpose of enveloping and destroying enemy forces in conjunction 
with [an] attack from [the] south by Eighth Army,.430 All of this indicated that the amphibious 
operation was an extension of the land campaign that was being conducted on the Korean 
peninsula, making it, in the words of a contemporary author, an 'envelopment by amphibious 
426 Allen, Chester F., (Lt-Col., USA), 'Dispersed - Yet Organized', MR, 30:4 (7/50), 24-30. 
427 Cagle, Malcolm W., (Cmdr., USN), 'Inchon - The Analysis of a Gamble', USNIP, 80: 1 (1154), 51. 
428 Baer, 324. 
429 Heinl, Soldiers, 547; Simmons, Marines, 188. 
430 Heinl, Victory, 24-44. 
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assault' .431 Again, to paraphrase the National Security Act of 1947 and the 'Functions Paper' , the 
Inchon endeavour was far less of a limited land operation essential to the prosecution of a naval 
campaign and much more of a naval operation essential to the prosecution of a land campaign.432 
This perspective was further supported by a second revealing detail: the establishment of 
a higher echelon joint command structure, Joint Task Force 7 (JTF 7), which functioned before, 
during, and after, the assault phase of the (joint) amphibious operation. Whilst tactical command 
over the 1st Marine Division (MarDiv)-the assault division-had been transferred ashore on 
D+ 1 (16 September), essentially after the assault, operational command over the Landing Force 
(consisting of the 1st MarDiv and the 7th Infantry Division-ill) was not passed ashore until the 
21 S\ after a phase of 'consolidation', which marked the end of the amphibious enterprise.433 
In sum, whilst the assault at Inchon has been celebrated as an example of the Naval 
Service's prowess in conducting 'amphibious operations' that resembled the 'seizure' -type 
enterprises of the Central Pacific during World War II, a number of observations tend to 
undermine such a final conclusion. As argued above, this is mainly because the amphibious 
landing at Inchon more closely resembled the larger-scale, 'joint amphibious operations' (or 
'invasions') that had been performed in the ETO-and particularly the SWP A-during the war. 
The Naval Development of 'Amphibious Operations' (or Amphibious Warfare) 
Amphibious warfare development by the Naval Service at the tactical/operational level 
was characterised by a number of parallel yet overlapping evolutions between 1950 and 1957. 
The first involved the ongoing refinement of doctrine, which resulted in the promulgation of a 
new or, at least, updated series of naval amphibious doctrine as well as an updated set of landing 
force publications. The second consisted of the development of the 'concept of future 
amphibious operations' which, while based on 'vertical envelopment' by helicopter, culminated 
431 Canzona, Nicholas A. 'Is Amphibious Warfare Dead?', USNIP, 81:9 (9/55), 991. Emphasis in original. See also 
Weigley, Russell F., The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New Yorlc, 
NY: MacMillan, 1973),386. 
432 Roe, Thomas G. Ernest H. Giusti and Benis M. Frank, 'A History of Marine Corps Roles and Missions: 1775-
1962', Marine Corps Historical Reference Series, Number 30 (Washington, DC: HQ, USMC, 5/31/62),19. 
433 See, for example, Heinl, Victory, 128, 157, 189. 
124 
in the publication of LFB-17, Concept of Future Amphibious Operations, in December of 1955. 
This 'future concepts' document included the concurrent development and evaluation of new 
equipment such as transport helicopters and helicopter assault carrier ships as well as the 
reorganisation of the Fleet Marine Force into an essentially air-transportable assault force to help 
implement the new concept. Although these developments have generally been hailed as 
revolutionary, a number of points bear remembering with regard to the overall courses of 
amphibious/expeditionary warfare development in both America and the United Kingdom. 
From a national perspective, for example, developments in doctrine did not help resolve, 
let alone dampen, the increasing debate(s) amongst the armed Services, as they evolved from 
'seizure' versus 'invasion' to 'amphibious operation' versus 'joint amphibious operation'. 
Second, despite the 'future concept', the amphibious attack was still ultimately dependent on 
conventional seaborne lift capabilities as capability limitations precluded heavier equipment from 
being transported by standard helicopters. This technological shortcoming was the source of a 
fundamental disagreement with the Army with regard to amphibious warfare versus 
expeditionary warfare concepts. Lastly, even though the US had far greater resources at her 
disposal, which allowed for a developmental advantage when it came to weapons procurement, 
particularly with regard to helicopters and amphibious shipping, this did not necessalily translate 
into any sort of advantage with regard to conceptual developments. 
Navy (Amphibious) Doctrine Development 
Despite the operational focus on the war in Korea, doctrinal development continued 
unabated during the conflict. ill mid-1951, the US Navy began outlining the revision of the USF 
series of manuals after concluding that a new series of publications was required which, while 'in 
consonance with Joint Action Armed Forces where applicable', was to be split into 'two broad 
divisions'-Naval Warfare Publications (NWPs) and Fleet Training Publications (FTPs)-in 
which the former was further separated into 'four categories'. Amphibious warfare was included 
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under Category III (,Conduct of Naval Operations'), and the new keystone amphibious warfare 
manual was to be titled NWP 22, Amphibious Operations.434 
First published in December of 1952,435 NWP 22 outlined a slightly broader range of 
amphibious warfare operations as compared to those offered in USF 6 in 1946. Two general 
'types' of amphibious operations were described: 'one involving the landing of forces on a 
hostile shore and the other involving withdrawal of troops from land,.436 This latter concept 
logically seemed to reflect the evolution of 'general war' planning since 1946, which recognised 
the possibility of the evacuation of allied forces from continental Europe in case of an 
overwhelming Soviet invasion, although the only evidence of planning for these types of 
enterprises stemmed from the Korean War.437 By comparison, such enterprises made up a 
considerable part of the British conception of 'combined operations' thinking at the time. 
Although NWP 22 also specifically referenced 'j oint amphibious operations', it did so only from 
a strict force structure perspective by simply recognising the difference between operations 
'conducted by forces of the naval establishment alone' (referred to as 'seizures' in the past) and 
those 'conducted by such forces in combination with significant elements of the other armed 
services' .438 
The manual listed the six phases of an amphibious operation: 'planning', 'embarkation', 
'rehearsal', 'movement to the objective area', 'assault', and 'consolidation', with the last being 
defined as 'the period during which the beachhead, advanced base area, or area to be denied to 
the enemy is made secure, and any necessary tactical and logistical buildup is begun'. 439 The 
'termination' of an amphibious operation was also discussed, with notable emphasis being made 
434 'Final Recommendations of the Conference on Revision of the USF Series of Publications, 4-8 June 1951', A2-
A4;' 'Planned Tactical Doctrine Publications', 6/8/51 (p1946CF: Box 545; OAB, NHHC), 1. See also DN, NWP 0, 
Presen~ation and Scope of the Naval Wmfare Publications, 4/52, VII, Section II; and OCNO, NWP 0, Guide and 
Master Index to the NWP's, 1954 (PI946CF: NWPPS, Box 415; OAB, NHHC). 
435 See CMC ltrto CNO, 7/30/52 (RG 127: RRDAWD, Box 1(3); NARA), 1-2. 
436 DON, NWP 22, Amphibious Operations, 12/52 (p1946CF: NWPPS, Box 415; OAB, NHHC), 1--4. 
437 See Boose, 232-244,251-256. 
438 DON, NWP 22, 1----4. 
439 DON, NWP 22,1----4-1-8. 
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on this occurring quickly, which seemed to reflect concern for the vulnerability of amphibious 
shipping that had characterized the island seizures of World War II.44o 
Termination of an amphibious operation is effected when the final objective of the 
amphibious task force has been captured and the beachhead area, advanced base area, or 
area to be denied to the enemy has been made secure. Operations subsequent to the 
consolidation phase are not considered part of the amphibious operation, though they 
may require the use of amphibious equipment and techniques for execution. The decision 
as to the time of termination is made by the immediate superior of the amphibious task 
force commander.441 
This limited conception of the 'consolidation phase', which only seemed to include the beginning 
of the 'tactical and logistical buildup', would tum out to be one of the central areas of contention 
between the Army and the Naval Service. The former simply believed that the latter's concept of 
'amphibious operations', which was based largely on the 'seizure' -type assaults in the Central 
Pacific, was far too narrow and limited. The Army argued that any termination of a large-scale 
amphibious operation against a continental land mass (i.e., 'invasion'), particularly against the 
Soviet Union, had to occur after the end of any 'tactical and logistical buildup' as had occurred in 
Europe. 
Marine Corps (Amphibious) Doctrine Development 
Even prior to the Navy's continuing effort to Improve its amphibious doctrine, the 
Marine Corps had embarked on a more all-encompassing yet focused course to concentrate on 
amphibious operations', specifically from the landing force perspective. This began on 1 
February 1950, when a Marine Corps Board issued a study that was considered 'the genesis for 
the ... system of coordination of amphibious developmental activities'. 442 Citing the legal 
responsibilities accorded the Corps through the NSA of 1947, the report analysed the current 
status of the Marine Corps' efforts and responsibilities with regard to the development of 
amphibious landing forces, and concluded that 
440 See Lorelli, John A., To Foreign Shores: US Amphibious Operations in World War 11 (Annapolis, MD: NIP, 1995), 
43-57,295-306. 
441 DON, NWP 22,1-8. Emphasis added. 
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[t]he field is now too large and complex to be left to itself. The Army and Navy are 
actively exploiting their adverse interests. There is a serious need for standardization' 
[and] there is a need for providing specifically for a means of Army and Air Forc~ 
participation and means must be provided for the Commandant to exercise an authority 
imposed by law,.443 
As such, it was recommended that both a 'Landing Force Center' and a 'Landing Force 
Development Agency' be established at Marine Corps Schools (MCS), Quantico.444 This led to 
the creation of the Marine Corps Education Center (MCEC) and the Landing Force Development 
Center (LFDC).445 To supervise and coordinate these new entities and their efforts, the 
Commandant, MCS, was assigned the 'additional duty as Coordinator of Landing Force 
Development Activities', later the CMCLFDA.446 
Whilst the MCS was being reorganized, the Marines had edited and expanded their 
groundbreaking 'PRIB' series pamphlets,447 first re-titling them Amphibious Manuals (AMs) 
and, later in 1952, Landing Force Manuals (LFMs).448 The LFMs were shortly thereafter 
supplemented by Landing Force Bulletins (LFBs), a doctrinal series designed for longevity in 
which the Marine Corps would present their most revolutionary ideas. 
After the promulgation of the new NWP series, however, which included 'advanced 
techniques and certain changes', the CMC initiated a complete review of the LFM series by the 
two FMF Commanding Generals in the Atlantic and Pacific (otherwise known as CG, FMFLant 
and CG, FMFPac). In apparent acknowledgement of the significant differences between the 
techniques used in the Pacific and Atlantic during World War II, the CMC divided the LFMs 
between the CG, FMFPac, and CG, FMFLant, according to the specific subject matter and 
techniques that had characterised the respective theatres. Although many titles were naturally 
applicable to both, those more closely associated with 'seizures'-such as LFM 4, Ship-to-Shore 
Movement, LFM 15, Reconnaissance, and LFM 17, The Employment of Amphibious Vehicles-
443 MCB, Memorandum for Executive Director, MCB, 2/1/50 (HAP 677, Box 38; AB, MCRC), 5. 
444 MCB Memorandum, 12. 
445 CMC ltr to CMCS, 10/16/50 (HAP 677, Box 38; AB, MCRC), 1-4. See also _, 'The Marine Corps Schools', n.d. 
(HAP 677, Box 38; AB, MCRC). 
446 CMC ltr to CMCS, 1-4. 
447 This series had 31 titles, 29 of which were promulgated, including the famous PHIB-31, Employment of Helicopters 
(Tentative), 1948. 
448 See MCS, AM-I, Training, 1951 (AM Publication Series; Library, MCRC). 
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were sent to the fonner; those more closely related to 'invasions'-such as LFM 9, Field 
Artillery, LFM 12, Shore Party, LFM 13, Engineers, and LFM 20, Logistic Support (Including 
Personnel)-were sent to the latter.449 
Naval Development of the 'Concept of Future Amphibious Operations' 
Initial Concepts and Exercises, 1950-1952 
The Marine Corps' 'concept of future amphibious operations' actually had its roots in a 
1950 Equipment Policy paper, the central tenets of which remained in place until the December 
1955 promulgation of LFB 17, Concept of Future Amphibious Operations, which was the 
official, CNO-approved, long-tenn objective of the Marine COrpS.450 The Equipment Policy 
paper's key components were as follows: 
1. Emphasis on tactical surprise, featuring a vertical envelopment by helicopter... 
2. Commencement of the assault proper with the launching of assault troops m 
helicopters and amphibian vehicles from ships underway ... 
3. Landing of helicopter forces in landing zones ... 
4. Landing of further troop components by amphibian vehicles ... [and] 
5. Early logistic support following the pattern of the assault itself, using helicopters ... and 
hObO hO 1 d 01 451 amp I Ian ve IC es an tral ers. 0 0 
After being tasked by the CMC, the MCS investigated the vanous developmental aspects 
required to implement the aforementioned concept, producing two interim reports in January and 
February 1951, respectively. The first focused on all aspects of helicopter assault forces, 
techniques, and ship types. The second concentrated on research and procurement of the 
helicopters and ship platfonns. As a result, an aggressive commissioning schedule was proposed 
to establish six helicopter squadrons by September of 1952 in order to test the new concept. In 
terms of platfonns, various shipping options were considered for use, including certain cargo 
ships (e.g., APAs and AKAs), the LSD, the LST, seaplane tenders, and aircraft carriers, the last 
of which was determined to be the most desirable, in modified fonn, along with possibly a 
specifically-designed helicopter and troop ship.452 
449 -' MC Memorandum Number 20-54, l. 
450 See HQ, USMC, LFB Number 17, Concept of Future Amphibious Operations, 12/13/55 (HAF 453, Box 21A; AB, 
MCRC) 0 
451 Rawlins/Sambito, 48-490 
452 Rawlins/Sambito, 49-510 
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A series of exercises was arranged for early 1952 based on the above reports to test the 
'vertical envelopment' concept. The first of these, HELEX I, was conducted in late January and 
comprised an amphibious 'field exercise' in which the escort carrier USS SIBONEY (CVE-II2), 
with 20 HRS-I helicopters and a Marine battalion of 700 men embarked, landed the latter 
element ashore plus its 'combat cargo' in six and one-half hours. A second, almost identical 
exercise, HELEX II, was conducted in late February, again with the SIBONEYand again landing 
the same troop element in about six hours.453 Whilst a number of conclusions were reached, the 
most significant was 'that the CVE 105 class carrier can adequately handle aircraft, personnel 
and logistic support to launch vertical envelopment from the sea' but the idea of employing a 
'Helicopter Transport' ship with a 'Helicopter Troop Transport' simultaneously was 'considered 
tactically unsound at the present time' .454 A separate study, conducted in March, concluded that 
the CVE-55 class escort carrier, with minimal modifications, was also 'suitable for helicopter 
operations using the present HRS helicopters' (which could transport 8-10 troops each).455 
A number of specific problems concerning cargo lift and ship platform suitability still 
required resolution,456 so additional exercises continued that were generally part of a broader 
amphibious and land warfare training regimen for Marine units. On the one hand were the annual 
joint CAMID exercises, which remained largely as conventional assault demonstrations and 
often included Army paratroop dropS.457 On the other hand were such exercises as TRAEX I and 
II held in June and November of 1952, respectively, in which helicopter assaults were conducted 
as part of larger conventional amphibious landings. The focus of these latter types of landings 
concerned the early link-ups between conventional and helicopter-landed forces as well as the 
453 MG Field Harris, USMC, Ser 00104 to CG, FMFLant, 4/7/52 (EF: Box 44; AB, MCRC), 1-3. See also MG Field 
Harris, USMC, Ser 0037, to CG, FMFLant, 2/15/52 (RG 127: RRO&E, Box 21; NARA), 1-4. 
454 MG Field Harris, USMC, Ser 00104,3-10. 
455 CG, FMFLant, Ser 0044 to CINC, US AltFlt, 2/21152 (RG 127: RRO&E, Box 21; NARA), 1-2. 
456 CG, FMFLant, Ser 00116 to CNO, 4/16/52 (EF: Box 44; AB, MCRC), 1-2. 
457 See CTF 106, 'Operation Order: ComPhibLant 14-50' [CAMID V], 5/9/50; TG 106.1 Training Group and 
ComPhibTraLant 'Operation Order: ComPhibTraLant No.2-50' [CAMID V], 7/31150; and CTF 42, Commander AF, 
'Operation Order; ComPhibLant 34-51' [CAMID VI], 5/10/51 (EF: Box 41; AB, MCRC). See also 116 Marines, 2nd 
MarDiv, FMF, 'Operation Order Number 1-52: MARLEX' [CAMID VII], 5/15/52 (EF: Box 44; AB, MCRC); and 
AF, US AtlFlt, TE 85.12 and ComNavPhibTraUnitLant, 'Operation Order: COMNAVPHIBTRAUNITLANT No. 9-
52' [CAMID VII], 5/8/52 (EF: Box 46; AB, MCRC). 
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testing of anti-mechanized defence tactics, techniques, doctrine and equipment for the latter 
elements since they were extremely vulnerable to enemy counter-attack once landed inland.458 
Ultimately, most exercises during this period tended to focus on testing the helicopter in 
the ship-to-shore movement, one notable example being PHIBEX 1-53, in which two squadrons 
of helicopters moved a full battalion of troops.459 A number of other exercises, however, were 
more specialised as they experimented with different times and climates. Examples included 
NILEX I, a night exercise conducted in July 1952; AIRLEX I and II, desert exercises conducted 
in September 1952 (in Nevada) and February 1953 (in California), respectively; and NORAMEX 
II, a December 1952 cold weather exercise in Labrador, Canada, which comprised a joint 
helicopter and conventional ship-to-shore raiding operation.460 
Still other exercises experimented with operating in an atomic environment, which was 
by far one of the most important factors in developing the 'concept of future amphibious 
operations'. PHIBEX I, a division-size landing operation that was conducted Camp Pendleton, 
California, in early October, 1952 included the transport by helicopter of a battalion after a 
simulated atomic bomb was dropped to clear the helicopter landing zone.461 This was followed 
by exercises DESERT ROCK V and VI, which were held in the Nevada desert in 1953 and 1955, 
respectively, and where small contingents of marines were flown into an actual atomic drop zone 
within hours of detonation.462 
At the same time that these various exercises were being conducted, the US Marine 
Corps continued to develop and refine helicopter assault doctrine, a process that had apparently 
lagged behind since the release of its groundbreaking PHIB-31 in 1948. The first significant 
publication came out almost immediately following DESERT ROCK V, in April 1953, and was 
458 Appendices 2 & 4 of Umpire Control Director, FMFLANT, Document No.1 to CG, FMFLant, 7/9/52 (RG 127: 
RRO&E, Box 27; NARA); HQ, FMFlant, 'Change No.5 to Operation Order Number 9-52: TRAEX II', 10/14/52; 
Commander AmphGp Four (CTG 42.2) Serial 0138 to Commander AF, US AtlFlt (CTF 42), 12/12/52; and 
Commander AF, US AtlFlt, Serial 073 to CINCLantFlt, 1126/53 (EF: Box 44; AB, MCRC). 
459 [AlCS, G-3], ['Evaluations of Exercises']' [3/54] (RG 127: GSF, Box 11; NARA), 8-9. 
460 ['Evaluations'], 7, 9-10, 12-13. See also various correspondence (EF: Boxes 28, 45; AB, MCRC). 
461 ['Evaluations'], 10-12; R. D. Taplet, Ser 0-39-52 to Director, MCEC, 12/2/52. See also HQ, FMFlant, 'Change No. 
5 to Operation Order Number 9-52: TRAEX II', 10/14/52 (EF: Boxes 45,44; AB, MCRC), C-2. 
462 CG, FMFPacTroops, Ser 0011 to BG Wilburt S. Brown, USMC, 2/27/53 (EF: Box 48; AB, MCRC); and 
['Evaluations'], 16-17. See also Clifford, Progress, 85. 
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titled LFB 4, Interim Doctrine for the Tactical Employment of Transport Helicopters.463 This 
document first described how the helicopter introduced a number of new characteristics that were 
going to be fundamental to future amphibious assaults. Most important were 'the rapid 
concentration of troops on shore from dispersed forces at sea, a greater element of surprise, 
increased depth of operation, and improved mobility and flexibility'. It also summed up the 
helicopter's key tactical advantages, most significantly 'its ability to circumvent enemy defences 
and to land in undefended or lightly defended areas'. Having outlined these advantages, however, 
the manual notably stipulated that helicopter landings were only a part of the amphibious assault, 
and not the main part at that: '[H]elicopter landings do not, and will not in the foreseeable future, 
entirely supplant conventional amphibious landings.... Helicopter assaults will normally be 
conducted in conjunction with conventional surface assault and link-up of the two forces should 
be effected within a period of72 hours' .464 
The Evolution of the 'Concept of Future Amphibious Operations' 
What was perhaps conflicting with the ultimate approval and promulgation of this 
helicopter assault doctrine was the parallel development of the 'concept of future amphibious 
operations' which, by the end 1955, was in the final stages of being finalised and approved by 
the CNO. Dissatisfied with these only gradual advances in concept development, the CMC, in 
January 1953, directed the CMCS to establish a 'special study group of highly experienced 
Marine officers to expand upon the 1951 concept' .465 
Plans and guidance for this so-called 'Advanced Research Group' (ARG) were initially 
drawn up by the Policy Analysis Division of HQMC, which outlined 'eight proposed projects' 
for the Group to undertake.466 Three projects were selected, including 'Project 1', which was 
presented as follows: 
463 HQ, USMC, LFB Number 4, Interim Doctrinefor the Tactical Employment of Transport Helicopters, 4/26/53 
(HAF 481, Box 24; AB, MCRC). 
464 LFB Number 4, 1-1. . 
465 Rawlins/Sambito, 62. See also CMC ltr to CMCS, 4/22/53 (RG 127: RRMOT&O, Box 10, FIle 4, Part 2; NARA), 
1. 
466 Head, Policy Analysis Division, Memorandum to CIS (G-3), 211153 (RG 127: File 4, Part 1; NARA), 4. 
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Develop a concept of future (within the next 10 years) amphibious operations that will 
require maximum utilization of the Fleet Marine Forces as a mobile force in readiness. 
Based on this concept determine the validity and adequacy of current tactical doctrines, 
organization, equipment development policies and training programs within the Marine 
COrpS.467 
The ARG submitted its final report to the CMC on 24 March 1954, the central tenets of 
which were subsequently 'approved' by the CMC 'as the long range objective of the Marine 
COrpS,468 and presented to general officers at a conference held at USMC Headquarters in July.469 
The core of the presentation (and the concept) revolved around an 'appraisal of new 
developments' in US capability that were expected in the near future, including: the mass 
availability of nuclear weapons, both 'air delivered' and 'organic to Ground Forces'; new long-
and medium-range 'heavy attack' and 'attack' aircraft with atomic weapon delivery capabilities; 
new helicopters with payloads and operating ranges of 12,500 pounds and 100 nautical miles, 
respectively; 'electronics' for an 'all-weather close air support' capability; and, finally, 'guided 
missiles ... for air defense ... for artillery augmentation ... [and] for other surface-to-surface use' .470 
The full effects of these developments, combined with the employment of 'high speed' 
Amphibious Task Forces as well as Fast Carrier Task Forces, would ultimately provide 'the 
Marine Corps the capability to lift and support, wholly by helicopter, all Landing Force elements 
required for the amphibious assault in an atomic war,.471 
The concept was tested first through the re-instatement of the PACKARD senes of 
command post exercises (CPXs) at Quantico and Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.472 PACKARD 
V and PACKARD VI, conducted in May of 1954 and 1955 respectively, simulated large-scale 
amphibious assaults of 'corps size' whilst using atomic weapons, with the former also 
introducing the Navy's 'Sea Echelon Concept', which aimed 'to achieve greater dispersion and 
467 CMC ltr to CMCS, 4/22/53. 
468 CMC ltrto CMCS, CG, FMFLant, and CG, FMFPac, 4/27/54 (HAF 689, Box 38; AB, MCRC), 1. 
469 [HQ, USMC], 'A Summary of the General Officers' Conference held at Headquarters US Marine Corps, 14-16 
July, 1954', [7/55] (RG 127: VHQMCD, Box 2, [File b]; NARA). 
470 'Summary', 32-36. 
471 'Summary', 35. 
472 See Chapter 1. 
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simplify mine sweeping problems' .473 At the same time, the Marine Corps' 'air-ground task 
force' organisational concept, which was seen as the primary method to enhance the marines' 
'force-in-readiness' mission, was also tested.474 This began with the activation of the '2d Marine 
Air-Ground Task Force' on 21 December 1953 by the CMC, and was soon followed at the 
conceptual level by 'Project III' of the 1953-54 ARG. As a result of these efforts, the CMC 
approved a new organisational objective, which was to provide 'a task force commander with an 
integrated headquarters' whenever combat air and ground elements were deployed together for 
'all foreseeable conditions of combat'. According to the Commandant, this concept was, in fact, 
'considered a significant factor in the ultimate realization of the Marine Corps concept of future 
amphibious operations' .475 
At the tactical level, this enhanced the integration of the 'combined arms' concept upon 
which FMF units were organised, deployed and employed. In comparison, the Royal Marine 
Commandos did not have such an organisational capability. Although they could veritably be 
considered as amphibious assault infantry, they had to rely not only on the Army for their 
'combined arms' ground support but also on RN and/or RAF aviation for air transport and 
support. 
With these various procedures underway, a second ARG was formed for the 1954-55 
academic year and assigned its research projects.476 Final reports were presented sequentially to 
various Marine Corps general officers in December, 1954, and in March, April, and June of 
1955, respectively.477 Even before the fmal presentation, however, the Marine Corps seemed to 
have made a significant breakthrough in its concept development when, at the Navy 
Department's annual Amphibious Warfare Conference in May, it was concluded that the 'Marine 
473 See various correspondence for these respective exercises (EF: Boxes 50, 51; AB, MCRC). 
474 CG, FMFPac Serial 00107 to CMCS, 11123/50; and HQ, FMFPac, Staff Study, 'The Establishment of a Balanced 
Fleet Marine Force Air-Ground Force in the Western Pacific', 10119/50 (HAF 742, Box 40; AB, MCRC). 
475 [MCS], 'Suggested Mailing List - Phib Series', n.d. (HAF 463, Box 21A; AB, MCRC), 1-2; and_, 'Extracts from: 
CMC ltr A-49/AT-1938 dtd 7 July, 1954, to CIS HqUSMC, Subj: ARG Project III "Air-Ground Relations'" (HAF 688, 
Box 38; AB, MCRC), 2. 
476 'Advanced Research Group', n.d. (RG 127: C&RR, Box 10, #1-58; NARA), 1. 
477 as, ltr to AC/S, 2/7/55; and CIS, Memorandum to Distr., 2/14/55 (RG 127: RRMOT&O, Box 10, File 6, Part 2; 
NARA). 
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Corps concept of all helicopter assault is now accepted by the amphibious people of the Navy as 
the goal to shoot for' .478 
Indeed, an LFB had already been in the course of preparation since January 1955, which 
was finally promulgated on 13 December. Titled Future Concept of Amphibious Operations, this 
document marked the culmination of a conceptual formulation process that had begun in the late 
1940s. The 'central features' of the concept did not differ appreciably from past articulations and 
only touched on the fact that it would apply 'under conditions of nuclear and non-nuclear 
warfare', which seemed notable considering the Marine Corps' overall identity as America's 
global 'force-in-readiness' .479 Instead, the most stress was placed on the futuristic aspect of the 
concept, which had 'as its ultimate goal an all-helicopter assault'. However, the LFB was quick 
to point out that, in fact, current progression had reached a stage where the amphibious assault 
involved 'a powerful two-pronged attack, one prong a vertical envelopment by helicopter, the 
other a surface assault across the beach by conventional means, with the latter constituting the 
• ,1'1', ,480 
mam eJJort. 
It was with regard to this last issue that the most controversy arose, particularly with the 
Army, which still saw the Marine Corps' concept as being too limited when facing a first-class, 
continental enemy like the Soviet Union with its mobile heavy armour and mechanised forces. It 
all seemed to come down to a difference in basic philosophies, which was exemplified by the 
geo-strategic competition between 'sea power' and 'land power', with the former-through this 
new concept-having apparently gained the upper hand. From the Navy's perspective, as the 
United States now generally enjoyed 'control of the seas'-in the same way as the British had 
during the Napoleonic Wars-the country therefore seemed to be on the verge of a new 'era', 
mostly due to changes in 'sea power'. As a result, '[t]he fleet which formerly based itself on land 
and projected its power on the sea is now capable of basing itself at sea and projecting its power 
478 AC/S (G-3), memo to C/S, 5/17/55 (RG 127: RRMOT&O, Box 10, File 6, Part 5; NARA), 1-3. 
479 See LFB Number 17, 3; and Utgroff, V., 'Seaplane Assault', USNIP, 79:8 (8/53), 881-885; and Benge, Howard, 
'Consider This Concept', MeG, 38:6 (6/54), 54-59. 
480 LFB Number 17, 3-4. Emphasis added. 
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beyond the seas to wrest from the Reds control of vital rimlands of the Eurasian continent. The 
balanced fleet can do this because it has amphibious forces,.481 
It was this last sentiment that the Army saw as being fundamentally flawed. Against a 
foe such as the Soviet Union, the Army argued, heavier weapons and equipment, which could not 
be transported by helicopter-let alone by air at all-were an absolute requirement in cases of 
large-scale, 'joint amphibious operations' (or 'invasions'). Although this was not quite true for 
limited interventions in which rapid reaction by a light force was most important, it was this 
underlying difference that had caused (and continued to cause) such a divergence in approach 
towards concept development. As will be seen below, this was most starkly evidenced by the 
failed attempt by the Services to promulgate joint amphibious operations doctrine during the 
early and mid-1950s. 
Equipment Development 
The culminating evolution of naval development of 'amphibious operations' that 
occurred during the period 1950-1957 involved the procurement of various transport (assault) 
helicopters as well as the introduction of the first helicopter (assault) carrier. With regard to the 
procurement of helicopters, by mid-1953, the nine squadrons of helicopters (mostly HRS-types) 
then in existence had a combined lift capability to transport 'an infantry regiment in an 
amphibious operation ... '. With the anticipated introduction of the much larger HR2S -1 model, 
this capability would increase to landing 'three Regimental Landing Teams', each of which with 
an 'additional battalion of 105mm howitzers with ~ ton 4x4 trucks (jeeps) as prime movers,.482 
At the time, the Marine Corps desired to have this capability in place by the end of 1957.483 
However, due to technical and financial reasons, the procurement numbers were reduced 'from a 
total of 158 aircraft in June 1955 to only 34 by November the same year,.484 mdeed, a 
481 CIS, HQ, USMC, 'Presentation of Marine Corps Concept of Amphibious Operations', 12/19/55 (RG 127: 
RRDAWD, Box 1, File 1; NARA). 
482 Director of Aviation, memorandum to CMC, 9/18/53 (RG 127: QSNCMCDNKl, Box 1, [File a], Part 1, Tab 2; 
NARA), Enclosure (1). 
483 Op-52, Memorandum to Op-50, 4/14/53 (RG 127: RRPPA&AO, Box 1, File 4, [Part A]; NARA). 
484 Rawlins/Sambito, 68-69. 
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comparison of 'desired' helicopter numbers and actual numbers 'on hand' for the period 1954-
56, reveals that the USMC suffered not only with regard to total numbers but also with respect to 
the particular types.485 
Although the procurement of amphibious shipping appeared not to fare much better, this 
only really applied to the particular requirement for transport helicopters. In fact, it was not until 
1956 that the USMC would receive their first helicopter carrier. In 1951, the original class of 
carrier chosen for conversion into a helicopter carrier, the Commencement Bay class (CVE-105), 
was found to be unavailable due to higher priority anti-submarine warfare requirements. Instead, 
the Casablanca class (CVE-55) was found suitable (with even more speed) and available (in the 
reserve fleet).486 It was just such a vessel, the USS Thetis Bay, that was chosen to be the first 
conversion. Re-designated as CVHA-l (Carrier, Fixed-Wing, Helicopter, Assault), the ship 
underwent a year-long conversion and was commissioned on 20 July 1956; she was re-
designated as LPH-6 (Landing Ship, Personnel, Helicopter) on 30 January 1959. Her 
modifications included berthing for 1,000 marines (plus a crew of 540), the removal of all 5-inch 
and 20mm guns but the retention of eight twin-40mm guns.487 The only other major amphibious 
shipping that was added to the Navy Lists in the 1950-57 timeframe comprised eight LSDs ofthe 
new Thomaston class, and a total of fifteen LSTs of the new Terrebonne Parish class.488 
In sum, although the Navy Department-mostly through the efforts of its Marine 
Corps-had successfully developed and adopted a new 'concept for future amphibious 
operations', limited resources (relative to other defence priorities) effectively precluded the 
concept from being realised. This was due specifically to the lack of enough transport helicopters 
not to mention also the lack of helicopter assault shipping, both of which were required. As will 
be seen in Chapter 5, this pattern initially seemed to be on the verge of repeating itself. Whilst 
485 See Op-52 Memorandum, Enclosure (2); and Rawlins/Sambito, Appendix E. 
486 Rawlins/Sambito, 51. 
487 McCarton, Matthew, 'The Evolution of the Helicopter Carrier', unpublished monograph Surface Ship Design and 
Engineering Directorate, Total Ship Concepts Division, NAVSEA, 3/98 (NL, NHHC), 24-25. 
488 McCarton, B-1, Appendix B. See also 'Dictionary of American Fighting Ships' at 
http://www.history.navy.milldanfslindcx.html. 
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the Marine Corps was able to reorganise its Fleet Marine Force by 1958 to comport to the new 
concept, delays in the procurement of both helicopters and (especially) helicopter assault carriers, 
still prevented any significant progress in the concept's implementation. It was not until the 
1960s, when both of these latter assets entered service in minimal numbers, that the concept 
could be fully tested and implemented. 
(Joint) Development of 'Joint Amphibious Operations' (or Expeditionary Warfare) 
As the Naval Service, particularly the Marine Corps, focused on adapting 'vertical 
envelopment' by helicopter to future 'amphibious operations', the Army and, to a lesser extent, 
the Air Force, continued to formulate and present their alternatives to the Naval Service's 
approach, arguing that their concept of 'joint amphibious operations' (or expeditionary warfare) 
was more appropriate-and ultimately more probable-against a Soviet-occupied Eurasian 
continent. The two services based their views on the significantly different wartime experiences 
in the European and Pacific theatres during World War II. This debate had evolved into one 
involving 'joint amphibious operations' on the one hand (representing 'invasion' -type 
operations) and 'amphibious operations' on the other (representing 'seizure' -type operations). 
The Joint Amphibious Board and 'Divergent Views' 
With the promulgation of the Joint Action Armed Forces in September 1951, which 
replaced Joint Action o/the Army and Navy of 1935 (with changes), a number of joint boards 
were established to address the intricacies of various types of joint operations. These included 
'joint amphibious operations', which were the purview of both a Joint Amphibious Board (JAB), 
responsible to the CNO (as agent of the JCS), and a Joint Landing Force Board (JLFB), 
responsible to the CMC (also as agent of the JCS).489 
Due to the fact that the JAB dealt with broader concepts involving amphibious warfare 
and the JLFB focused on more of the specific tactics, techniques, procedures and equipment 
requirements for landing forces, the former was ultimately the more significant with respect to 
the overall development of amphibious/expeditionary warfare in the US. By far its most 
489 See various correspondence (RG 127: RRPPA&AO, Box 3, File 16, Tabs 10, 11; and Box 8, File 11; NARA). 
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important endeavour was Formal Project No.1-52, 'Doctrines and Procedures Governing Joint 
Amphibious Operations', which was an inter-service attempt to formulate an agreed doctrine for 
joint amphibious warfare. After over a year of work the JAB failed to arrive at a consensus and, 
under final direction from the JCS, the CNO requested that 'a divergent views report' be 
produced 'setting forth all divergent Service views encountered which are delaying finalization 
of a joint acceptable solution', whilst also specifically isolating those differences involving 'the 
areas of concept, command, employment and control' .490 A final report was submitted quickly on 
15 January 1954.491 
The central difference between the Naval Service and the Army, which had been 
evolving since the late 1940s, centred on the actual conception of what an 'amphibious 
operation' or a 'joint amphibious operation' was. This, in tum, shaped almost every other aspect 
of the debate, including such vital areas as command and organisation as well as employment 
and control. Indeed, it is interesting to point out the basis of the Army's main variance with the 
Naval Service here, which not only stemmed directly from the position arrived at by 1950 but 
also almost exactly copied the stance taken by the so-called 'RAW Committee' in the United 
Kingdom when the latter rejected establishing a corps of amphibious specialists along the lines of 
the Marine Corps. As the document outlined, 
[t]he amphibious assault is not a special fonn of operation requiring a specialized assault 
force which is to be replaced after the assault objective has been achieved. To assure 
economy of means, assault forces must, therefore, be organized, trained and equipped on 
the basis of least possible deviation from the organization, tactics and equipment 
nonnally employed in land operations.492 
The Army simply believed that amphibious assaults sometimes fell within the realm of land 
warfare. More specifically, 'when the joint amphibious operation is a step in the development of 
large-scale land operations, it cannot be separated from the land campaign; the amphibious 
operation is an essential step in development of the land campaign'. Along these lines, the 
490 Enclosure A (12/23/53) to JAB, 'Doctrines and Procedures Governing Joint Amphibious Operations, with 
Divergent Service Views; report on Project No.1-52', 1115/54 (MHI Stacks: U261.U54; Library, AHEC). 
491 'Doctrines', 1115/54. . 
492 SAR [JAB], Memorandum, ['Joint Amphibious Operations'], 1127/52 (RG 127: VHQMCD, Box 2, Flle [e]; 
NARA),I. 
139 
document also noted that 'the Service having fundamental responsibility for the exploitation 
must have the dominant responsibility' in the amphibious phase itself.493 Not surprisingly, this 
basic position would remain effectively unchanged throughout the Board's existence. 
From a purely conceptual point of view, the Naval Service considered the 'joint 
amphibious operation' from a more narrowly tactical and strictly naval sense. In fact, it 
ultimately made no distinction between the 'amphibious operation' and the 'joint amphibious 
operation'. This was done by emphasising first, that '[ u ]nity of command on the tactical level 
over all forces .. .is essential', and second, that 'the exercise of command over the forces executing 
the landing .. .is a Navy function'. The Army, however, saw the 'joint amphibious operation' in a 
much broader context, arguing that although it 'may be an incident of a land, naval, or air 
campaign', it was 'essentially integral to the land campaign'. In addition, the 'distinguishing 
characteristic' of such enterprises was 'that of joint action by significant elements of the Army 
and Navy' which, while requiring '[ e ]xtensive air participation .. .including possible limited 
landings by airborne troops', could also involve the use of Air Force elements 'to provide some 
or all of the air effort' with Fleet Marine Forces perhaps 'required to supplement the landing 
force,.494 Ultimately, this viewpoint focused on the large-scale land campaign (or 'invasion'), 
which required the forces from at least two, if not all three, of the major services to initiate. 
The Naval Service's narrower conception of the 'joint amphibious operation' was more 
clearly revealed by its perception of the so-called 'Extent of the Operation' (or 'Phases of the 
Operation,).495 Whilst both the Naval Service and the Army generally agreed that there were 
three primary purposes of an amphibious attack, including the attainment of land areas 'to carry 
our further combat operations ashore', to '[0 ]btain ... [advanced] air or naval base area[ s]', or to 
'[d]eny the use of seized positions to the enemy', the Naval Service believed that the first type 
simply involved the seizure of a 'beachhead' just like in any other 'amphibious operation', unlike 
493 Memorandum, 2. 
494 'Doctrines', B-i, B-8, B-14, B-15. 
495 'Doctrines', B-8, B-17. 
140 
the Army, which required a 'lodgment area' .496 Although these two different terms were not 
defined in the report, the various phases of a 'joint amphibious operation', as outlined by the 
Naval Service and the Army, respectively, illustrated a fundamental variance. For the Naval 
Service, the phases of what amounted to a straightforward tactical (naval) operation included 
'Planning and Preparation" 'Embarkation', 'Rehearsal', Movement to the Objective', 'Pre-
assault Operations', 'Attack and Capture of the Objective', and 'Consolidation'. For the Army, 
the phases of what amounted to the initiation of a joint, large-scale (i.e., operational-level) land 
campaign generally consisted of a 'Preparatory Phase', an 'Amphibious Phase', and a 'Final 
Phase', although each of these phases had a number of 'sub' -phases. When all of the respective 
phases and sub-phases are listed side by side in comparison (see below), the fundamental 
difference in conception of a 'joint amphibious operation' becomes readily apparent.497 
Phases of a 'Joint AmDhibious ODeration' 
NavvlMarine CorDs Arm--.Y 
(1) Planninf! and Preparation (1) Preparatory Phase 
• joint planning • planning 
• ioint training • training 
• marshalling • concentration and marshalling of forces 
• preparation of the objective 
(2) Amphibious Phase 
(2) Embarkation • embarkation of troops 
• loading of equiQment and supplies 
(3) Rehearsal • rehearsals 
(4) Movement to the Objective • movement to the objective area 
(5) Pre-assualt Operations • preassault actions 
(6) Attack and Capture of the Objective • assault and capture of the objective 
(7) Consolidation* • initial consolidation operations 
(3) Final Phase 
• tactical organisation and consolidation 
of the objective 
• establishment of facilities and 
development of the area for the purpose of 
supporting projected operations 
* this includes when 'the force beachhead 
is made secure and the landing force is 
firmly established ashore' 
496 'Doctrines', B-1 -B-2. 
497 'Doctrines', B-8 -B-lO, B-17 -B-19. 
141 
As can be seen, the above display clearly accentuates the two main differences between the 
Naval Service's and Army's views: first, the predominantly naval versus militarylland character 
of the enterprise; and second, the narrower tactical versus operational scope. 
The variations between the Naval Service's and Army's conception naturally led to 
different approaches regarding organization and command although both entities agreed that the 
principle of 'unity of command' should be applied throughout and that a 'joint task force' type 
organization was required.498 However, as the Naval Service conceived of the 'joint amphibious 
operation' as a strictly tactical effort, it simply required the establishment of a 'Joint Amphibious 
Task Force' JATF (at the tactical level) to complete the enterprise 'in its entirety, ... from its 
inception to its termination'. In addition, because most of this procedure was naval in character, 
command 'over the forces executing the landing and conducting the operations connected 
therewith' was deemed to be 'a Naval function; accordingly the commander of the Joint 
Amphibious Task Force will be a Navy officer' .499 
The Army, on the other hand, required a Joint Task Force (JTF) to be established, 
complete with its own 'joint staff at the operational level. Significantly, the commander of this 
force was to be 'selected based upon the Service having dominant interest in the mission of the 
joint amphibious operation'. Presuming that the operation was being conducted to initiate a land 
campaign, would obviously be an Army officer. However, as the Army accepted that there was 
an 'Amphibious Phase' to the 'joint amphibious operation', it also provided for the establishment 
of 'an amphibious task force .... [with] command authority delegated to the amphibious task force 
commander' during that particular Phase. Whilst the landing force commander (and the 
'commander of Air Force forces ') generally functioned at the same level as the amphibious task 
force commander, the former was placed 'under the operational control delegated to the' latter 
498 'Doctrines', B-ii, B-25. 
499 'Doctrines', B-25 - B-31. 
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during the' Amphibious Phase' until 'the landing force commander can assume responsibility for 
all operations ashore'. 500 
In effect, the Army had inserted, due to the 'complexity of the operation, [and] the 
multiplicity of forces involved', an additional level of command, which treated the 'amphibious 
phase' (with its corresponding 'Amphibious Task Force') as merely one of many sequential 
stages involved in initiating and conducting a (large-scale) land campaign.50l This was in keeping 
with the definition of an amphibious operation that was still in the 'Functions Paper', which 
referred to 'the amphibious phase of a joint amphibious operation'. In addition, while the overall 
concept more closely resembled that of the British (as compared to the US Naval Service) the 
one big difference stemmed from the fact that, according to the Army's command relationships, 
the task force commander exercised unity of command at the operational level, unlike the British 
system where a purely joint (i.e., cooperative) system existed. 
Perhaps surprisingly, it was the US Air Force's (USAF's) approach that most closely 
resembled that of the British in many respects. The Air Force believed that 'joint amphibious 
operations' were not only operational but also tri-elemental (if not perhaps bi-elemental) in 
essence, almost to the point of exclusivity, an attitude that reflected its nascent independence 
after a bruising battle over defence unification. Partly as a result, its position was unequivocally 
that 'established doctrine for theater air operations has been tested in combat, and is applicable to 
all air operations conducted within a theater including air operations associated with an 
amphibious operation' .502 
On the one hand, the Air Force generally agreed with the Naval Service's naval 
characterisation of an amphibious operation being 'an attack launched from the sea by ground 
and naval surface forces'. At the same time, however, it also seemed to accept the Army's 
operational-level classification that the 'amphibious operation is normally part of a campaign or 
a series of operations having an objective of great magnitude than that of the amphibious 
500 'Doctrines', B-25 - B-26, B-29 - B-31. 
501 'Doctrines', B-35 - B-36. 
502 'Doctrines', B-i - B-iii. 
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operation'. By specifically emphasising different aspects of each definition, the Air Force 
formulated its own unique operational and tri-elemental conception of amphibious/expeditionary 
warfare, which ultimately stipulated that all 'Air Forces (Air Force, NavylMarine Corps, and 
Allied) participate in conjunction with an amphibious operation, similar to the manner in which 
air forces participate in conjunction with land operations' .503 
With regard to the naval characterisation, the Air Force's emphasis was on the fact that 
the 'amphibious operation' was specifically a 'surface operation' and that it was 'but one of 
many related surface operations conducted within a theater in furtherance of the theater mission' . 
More significantly, the Air Force also claimed that '[t]he amphibious operation, like all other 
surface operations is not self sufficient; it does not include the air operations which make the 
amphibious operation possible' .504 This directly contradicted the Naval Service's position, which 
simply stated that an amphibious operation 'always includes Navy and landing forces, including 
their air elements' (although this concept did not preclude 'extensive Air Force participation 
and .. .limited landings by airborne troopS,).505 Indeed, the Air Force reinforced its opposing 
position by categorising the forces required to execute a joint amphibious operation into two (not 
three) basic types. On the one hand was the 'Amphibious Task Force', which was made up of 
'Ground forces' and 'Naval forces' but specifically did 'not include any air forces in its 
organization'. On the other hand were 'Air forces', which comprised 'the full spectrum of air 
power in a theater', including the capability to perform such vital functions as 'interdiction', 
'close air support', 'air lift', and 'helicopter'. Finally, the Air Force also referred to 'Airborne 
operations', which were considered 'not a direct part of an amphibious operation' although they 
could be executed 'in conjunction with an amphibious assault'. 506 All of this served to separate 
all air forces (and their activities) from amphibious warfare operations so that they could be 
503 'Doctrines', B-1 - B-2. Emphasis added. 
504 'Doctrines', B-1 - B-6. Underlining in original. 
505 'D . , BIB 2 octnnes, - - - . 
506 'Doctrines', B-1 - B-3, B-6, B-14 - B-16. 
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classified as performing 'air operations' that, far from being integrated into amphibious warfare 
operations, nevertheless could (and were to) be employed in conjunction with the latter. 
The Air Force's views toward the phases of an amphibious endeavour were also 
revealing. While it appeared to agree with the seven main phases of 'an amphibious operation' as 
outlined by the Naval Service, the Air Force specifically noted that '[a]ir operations conducted in 
conjunction with the amphibious operation will not follow the pattern of the amphibious 
operation' as depicted by the Naval Service. Instead, it listed three loosely demarcated phases 
during which 'air operations' would be conducted, the first and second of which would begin 
with the 'planning' and 'movement' stages, respectively, and the third essentially beginning after 
the Naval Service's 'Consolidation' phase (or at the beginning of the Army's 'Final Phase,).507 
The fully independent (and inter-service) nature of the Air Force's overall position with 
regard to amphibious/expeditionary operations, which most closely resembled those of the 
British, was finally reflected in the command and organisation structure as well as the 
employment and control arrangements. Concerning the former, the Air Force simply maintained 
that the 'theater organization and command structure is sufficiently flexible to accommodate any 
and all joint or unilateral operations, including Goint) amphibious operations and the air 
operations associated therewith'. As such, a 'single theater commander', with his joint staff, 
would divide his forces under the control of ground, naval, and air force component 
commanders, by specifically assigning each of them 'operational control. .. [of] forces operating 
in one medium'. This, plus the fact that the component commanders were deemed 'co-equal and 
interdependent', meant that the 'theater air commander' had effective control over all air forces 
in a specific theatre, albeit 'in furtherance of missions and objectives of the theater', as opposed 
to the specific accomplishment of the amphibious mission.508 
The aforementioned structural arrangements were carried out through a parallel system 
of command relationships and organisation. Although the 'theater organisational structure' was 
507 'Doctrines', B-17 - B-19. 
508 'Doctrines', B-25 - B-27, B-42 - B-43. 
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re-emphasised, the possibility of creating a 'Joint Force' system did exist under the Air Force 
scheme. Ultimately, however, it had the same arrangement as that described above, 'that is, a 
single unified commander, a j oint staff, and component commanders', although the commander 
of the joint force could be from 'any Service'. Finally, although an 'Amphibious Task Force' 
was also listed, which had a naval officer in command of a combination of ground and naval 
forces, it did 'not include any air forces in its organization'. In these cases, the participating 'air 
commander', who was presumably in command of all air forces associated with the amphibious 
operation, 'is always co-equal with the amphibious task force commander'. 509 
Army and Air Force Development of 'Joint Amphibious Operations' 
The emergence of differing service views related to amphibious/expeditionary warfare as 
depicted in the 'divergent views' paper actually reflected a wider discrepancy amongst the 
Services as each tried pursue its own speciality of conducting modem warfare, whether at sea, on 
land or in air. As the Army was ultimately responsible for the conduct of land warfare, which had 
gained particular attention due to the destructive nature of (tactical) atomic weapons, it was 
perhaps not that surprising that it might also focus on those types of operations directly 'incident 
to land warfare' such as airborne and amphibious operations.510 The Army did so in two ways, 
the first through the unilateral promulgation of amphibious doctrine and the second through the 
continued development of 'joint amphibious operations' (or 'expeditionary warfare') concepts. 
As in the late 1940s, both of these trends of development were very similar to the overall 
development of 'combined operations' in the United Kingdom. 
Army Developments 
Amongst the US Army branches that were involved in Army amphibious/expeditionary 
warfare development, two of the most notable were the Corps of Engineers and the 
Transportation Corps, both because they were the only Army branches that possessed any 
509 'Doctrines', B-29 - B-34. 
510 See, for example Doughty, Robert A. (Major, USA), The Evolution of us Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76 (Ft. 
Leavenworth, KS: USA C&GSC, 1980) which, whilst covering airborne operations, does not mention amphibious 
warfare at all (although it does discuss 'strategic mobility'). 
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amphibious vehicles and 'watercraft'. However, the Army agency that was generally responsible 
for the development of amphibious/expeditionary warfare concepts, doctrine and training, was 
the Army Field Forces (AFF, formerly Army Ground Forces but after 1955, known as 
Continental Army Command, or CONARC).511 Indeed, it was through the promulgation of uni-
servIce amphibious-related doctrines that the Army's overall concept of 
amphibious/expeditionary warfare was best presented, particularly in comparison to that of the 
Naval Service and the Air Force, not to mention also the British. 
By the 1950s the Army had apparently resurrected its 60- series of doctrinal manuals 
from World War II that now addressed 'Amphibious Operations'. They also seemed to replace 
the FM 31- ('Special Operations') series manual that included the last edition (1944) ofFM 31-5, 
Landing Operations Against Hostile Shores. Two of these manuals, FM 60-5, Amphibious 
Operations, Battalion in Assault Landings, and FM 60-10, Amphibious Operations, Regiment in 
Assault Landings, promulgated in 1951 and 1952, respectively, were noteworthy because they 
were the first to collate the ideas and concepts that had evolved from Army thinking over the 
course of the late 1940s and also provide the foundation for the Army's positions that were 
articulated in the 'divergent views' paper of January 1954.512 These ideas and concepts were 
based primarily on the expeditionary experiences of the Army (and Air Force) in Europe during 
the Second World War in combination with the British, which had been mostly military (as 
opposed to naval) and operational-level (as opposed to almost purely tactical) in character. 
Another fundamental characteristic involved logistics, which was addressed specifically by two 
additional 60- series publication, FM 60-25, Employment of the Amphibious Support Brigade, 
published on 8 January 1952, and FM 60-30, Amphibious Operations, Embarkation and Ship 
Loading (Unit Loading Officer), released on 6 September 1952.513 
5!l For an overview, see Boose, 327-338. 
512 See DA, FM 60-5, Amphibious Operations, Battalion in Assault Landings, 2/21/51; DA, FM 60-10, Amphibious 
Operations: Regiment Assault Landings, 1/18/52. Another manual, FM 17-34, Amphibious Tank and Tractor 
Battalions, was released on 6/1/50 (AReO: Military Publications, AHEC). 
513 DA, FM 60-25, Employment of the Amphibious Support Brigade, 1/8/52 (AReO: Military Publications, AHEC). 
For a brief summary of the 60- series manuals, amongst others, see also Boose, 328-329. 
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As discussed above, the Army's conception of amphibious/expeditionary warfare as 
centring mostly on large-scale 'joint amphibious operations' was revealed in the aforementioned 
manuals in a number of ways. The most obvious involved the definition that was repeated almost 
identically in three of the four publications, which simply stated that the main purpose of an 
amphibious operation was 'to achieve an objective on land'. 514 In addition, two of the manuals 
differentiated between the larger-scale 'invasion' and the smaller-scale 'occupation' or 'seizure', 
whilst also including the 'raid' and 'demonstration' (plus a 'waterborne envelopment' in one 
case).515 Also revealing were almost identical descriptions of the distinctive 'Final phase' of 
amphibious operations, which specifically began with the 'end of the assault phase' and 
terminated 'when the normal logistical services of the Army and Air Force are established 
ashore' .516 As has already been discussed above, this phase would set the Army's scope of a 
'joint amphibious operation' apart from that of the Naval Service as the latter basically equated 
the ending of the assault phase with the termination of the whole amphibious operation. This 
particular variance, in fact, was better expressed by the Army's discussion of the 'pattern' of an 
amphibious operation, which included three distinct stages: 'Prelanding 
Operations'/'Preparation'; 'Landing'I'Assault'; and 'Consolidation', as illustrated previously.517 
Again, the Naval Service only seemed to be concerned with the first two whilst the Army 
focused on the last which, in tum, resembled the overall approach taken by the British. 
Along these lines, the second revealing issue revolved around concept of 'dominant 
interest' as applied by the Services during the various phases of an amphibious landing, which 
reflected the importance of logistics relative to each of the four phases. The 'Preparatory' phase 
was considered to be of equal interest to 'all three Services' because it logically involved all of 
the Services. Although the Naval Service had dominant interest during the 'Movement phase' for 
obvious reasons, the Army deemed itself to have dominant interest during both the' Assault' and 
514 FM 17-34,3; FM 60-5, 1; and FM 60-10, l. 
515 FM 60-5, 3-4; and FM 60-10, 4-5. 
516 FM 17-34,4-8; FM 60-5,8-11; and FM 60-10, 3-4. 
517 FM 60-5, 11-14; and FM 60-10,5-6. 
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'Final' phases. With regard to the' Assault Phase', the Anny's position was based on the fact that 
it was being supported by the Navy and Air Force in 'the establishment of the force beachhead'. 
And whilst all three Services were to exercise 'mutual tactical and logistical support' during the 
'Final Phase', the reason for the Anny having dominant interest again stemmed from the need to 
seize objectives located outside of the beachhead and to consolidate them with 'logistical 
operations,.518 
Other than FM 5-156, Engineer Shore Battalion, which was issued on 10 August 1954 
and dealt with one of the organic units to the Engineer's Amphibious Support Brigade (ASB),519 
the only other manual that covered amphibious operations in any great or important detail was 
the 1954 edition of FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations.520 The Anny's keystone 
operational manual, FM 100-5 outlined the degree to which the Anny had evolved its thinking, 
not only with regard to land warfare in relation to naval and air warfare (or, 'land power' in 
relation to 'sea power' and 'air power') but also with respect to land warfare in relation to 
amphibious operations. Also notable was that this edition was the first to make up for some of 
the previous manuals' major shortcomings, namely the lack of any discussion of the effects of 
atomic warfare on amphibious operations.521 
Whilst the subject of 'Amphibious operations' was included as a section in the 'Special 
Operations' chapter, as in previous editions of FM 100-5, some of the most significant language 
related to amphibious landings came in the 'Introduction' mainly because it was specifically 
aimed at securing the primacy of land warfare over sea and air warfare. In first setting out that 
'Army forces, as land forces, are the decisive component of the military structure', the manual 
then proclaimed that 'Army combat forces do not support the operations of any other 
component'. Instead, 'because of their decisive capabilities, [Anny forces] are supported from 
518 FM 60-5, 8-11; and FM 60-10, 3-4. 
519 DA, FM 5-156, Engineer Shore Battalion, 8/10/54 (AReO: Military Publications, AllEC). See also Boose, ????? 
520 DA, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, 9/27/54 (Library: FM Publication Series; MCRC). See also 
Boose, 329. 
521 FM 100-5, para. 173.b.l (Change 2,1956). 
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time to time by other military components as the nature of the situation may require ... toward 
insuring the success of the land force operation' .522 
This philosophy was applied to command relationships where it ultimately countered 
some fundamental positions of both the Naval Service and the Air Force. The basic issue 
involved the balance between unity of command and coordination of effort. On the one hand, 
while the Army seemed to agree with the Air Force on having unity of command at the theatre 
level, this was not the case at the tactical level-or even operational level, for that matter-where 
the Army required direct support. On the other hand, the Naval Service, whilst agreeing with the 
Army's assertion that unity of command was necessary at all levels, disagreed with the idea that 
it was in a supporting role to the Army in tactical situations.523 
These exact command issues were reiterated in the 'Amphibious Operations' section of 
the manual and comprised another distinguishing characteristic with specific regard to 
amphibious operations.524 As previously emphasised, one of the 'Fundamentals' of joint 
amphibious operations involved vesting '[c]ontol of Joint Forces .. .in one commander'. This 
commander, in tum, was to 'divide the operation into three successive phases', which ultimately 
stemmed from the phases that had been originally offered in the 'divergent views' paper and 
more closely followed the 'patterns' listed in the 60- series manuals discussed above. They 
included: 'Phase I-Planning and Preparation'; 'Phase II-Embarkation, Movement, and 
Assault'; and 'Phase III-Consolidation and Buildup,.525 
While the commander of the joint (task) force (i.e., the one with the 'dominant interest in 
the overall operation') was responsible for all three of these phases of a joint amphibious 
operation, a special 'amphibious task force' was to be formed specifically to accomplish 'Phase 
II'. This force, whose commander 'should always be a naval officer', was to consist of both 
naval (including naval air) and ground elements as well as possibly 'Air Force tactical air 
522 FM 100-5,4-5. Emphasis added. 
523 FM 100-5,6-7. 
524 FM 100-5, 150-210. 
525 FM 100-5, 179-181. 
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organizations'. Once Phase II ended, a number of changes were to take place, which included 
'the landing force commander [reverting] to the direct operational control of the joint task force 
commander; the naval components ... [assuming] the role of supporting the landing force; and the 
air components ... [coming] under the operational control of the landing force commander' .526 As 
was already starkly evident in the 'divergent views' paper, all of these options ran counter to the 
positions taken by the Naval Service and Air Force and would not be fully resolved until more 
than a decade later. 
Air Force Developments 
Due to the fact that it did not have any doctrine even remotely related to amphibious 
operations-the closest being the air-ground doctrine that evolved during World War II-the US 
Air Force (USAF) started the decade with a clean slate in this regard. According to one analysis, 
even by late-1951, the Air Force had simply just 'not given much thought to amphibious 
warfare,.527 This was primarily due to the prioritisation of strategic atomic bombing over other 
forms of air power, coupled with 'limited funds, lack of training with the Army, and the failure to 
prepare for limited war', specifically in the late 1940s.528 Although the USAF's tactical air forces 
regained some of their World War II prominence in the early- and mid-1950s, culminating in the 
Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) concept of 1955, this expeditionary concept and capability 
was almost exclusively advanced in conjunction with the Army, thus avoiding amphibious-
related operations altogether. 529 
However, the one exception with regard to amphibious-related development during the 
early and mid-1950s was in the field of doctrine. Indeed, by 1953, in a broad and comprehensive 
effort to produce a body of basic Air Force doctrine, a number of Air Force Manuals (AFMs) 
were promulgated, including AFM 1-5, Air Operations in Conjunction with Amphibious 
526 FM 100-5, 183. 
527 Futrell, Vol. I, 404. 
528 See, Caddell, Joseph W., 'Orphan of Unification: The Development of United States Air Force Tactical Air Power 
Doctrine 1945-50', Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1984, 328. 
529 See Martin Jerome V., 'Reforging the Sword: United States Tactical Air Forces, Air Power Doctrine, and National 
Security Polic~, 1946-1956', Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1988; and May, ~icha~l P., 'United ~tates Air 
Force Expeditionary Airpower Strategy, 1946-1964', Ph.D. dissertation, Kansas State UruvefSlty, 2005, SectIOns 
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Operations. By the end of 1954, a series of nine volumes had been finished, including a second 
edition of AFM 1-5, which was released on 1 April 1954, less than three months after the 
'divergent views' paper had been completed.530 
While AFM 1-2, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, was the Air Force's keystone 
manual, AFM 1-5 was based primarily on AFM 1-3, Theater Air Operations. This latter volume, 
while essentially focusing on the employment of air forces at the operational level of war, 
essentially served in the same role as the Army's FM 100-5 text. It did so by also offering a 
completely opposing stance to the one proclaimed by FM 100-5 by promoting the type of 
military forces that were now considered the most decisive in modem war: 'Air forces are more 
capable than any other theater force of producing decisive effects. Theater strategy, therefore, 
must be designed to create situations favorable to the exploitation of air force capabilities,.531 
This attitude was reflected in the 'Command and Control' arrangements that were prescribed for 
theatre forces in general and for theatre air forces in particular. First of all, unlike the Army, 
which claimed that its land forces did not support any other forces, the Air Force at least 
recognized that '[t]heater forces are organized and employed in accordance with the tenet of 
mutual support'. Second, and in an apparent slight against the Naval Service, the manual 
purported that, '[ n]o one theater component is self-contained or capable within itself of achieving 
the theater mission' .532 This appeared to question the Naval Service's fundamental ability (and 
perhaps even authority) to undertake purely tactical operations on its own. 
Having established these parameters, the manual set about defining the role of the theatre 
commander-along with his 'combined or joint staff-under the 'principle of unified 
command ... upon which the command system for theater operations is predicated'. Three 
component commanders operated under the theatre commander, one each for sea, land and air 
force, which were considered to be 'co-equal and interdependent'. Under this system, not only 
did the theatre air commander command all air forces assigned to the theatre but he also was 
530 Futrell, Vol. I, 384-396, especially 394-395. 
531 DAF, AFM 1-3, Theater Air Operations, 4/1/54 (Library; MeRC), 12. 
532 AFM 1-3,25. 
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'responsible for the conduct of all air operations essential to the theater mission'. Along these 
lines, the manual lastly stipulated that '[t]heatre air forces are employed as a single integrated 
unit, and elements thereof are not placed under the command of other theater forces' .533 
Most, if not all, of these principles were applied in various forms in AFM 1-5, 
particularly with respect to command and control arrangements. 534 Before assessing these, 
however, a number of features specific to amphibious operations were first discussed in the 
manual, some of which had been outlined in the 'divergent views' paper. One central tenet was 
that the Air Force considered that there was no significant difference between 'normal theater air 
operations and air operations conducted in conjunction with amphibious operations .. .'. Unlike 
the Naval Service, in which (naval and marine) air operations supported amphibious assaults 
directly, Air Force operations were specifically undertaken 'in conjunction with amphibious 
operations' .535 A second point was that the Air Force's definition of an amphibious operation did 
not seem to automatically include air operations of any sort as the only forces mentioned in the 
definition were 'naval and ground forces embarked in ships or craft'. This, again, flew in the face 
ofthe Naval Service's doctrine and past experience (not to mention also that of the Army). Third, 
while the usual purposes of amphibious operations were listed in the manual (i.e., '[t]o seize and 
secure' a 'beachhead', 'air and/or naval bases', or 'an area ... [to]. .. deny its use to the enemy'), as 
were 'Related Operations' (such as 'demonstrations, raids, and withdrawals'), there was only one 
'basic form' of amphibious operation presented: the 'invasion' .536 This seemed to be yet another 
slight against the Naval Service by not acknowledging the latter's primary form of amphibious 
endeavour-the 'seizure'. 
As mentioned above, the command and control arrangements that were discussed in 
AFM 1-3 were similarly applied in AFM 1-5 which, in effect, reinforced the overall 
independence of air forces in general and the Air Force in particular. As the manual itself stated: 
533 AFM 1-3,25-26. Emphasis added. 
534 DAF, AFM 1-5, Air Operations in Conjunction with Amphibious Operations, 4/1/54 (Library; MCRC). 
535 AFM 1-5, 1. Emphasis added. 
536 AFM 1-5, Chapter 1. 
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'The amphibious operation is conducted by utilizing the same command structure as that used for 
the conduct of any other theater operation; that is, unified control is vested in the theater 
commander, and centralized control of air, ground, and sea forces is vested in each of the 
respective component commanders ,.537 More specifically, the manual maintained that the 'theater 
air commander is responsible for all air actions including naval and marine air participation',538 
which flatly contradicted established Navy/Marine Corps doctrine and practice. This 
disagreement would plague inter-service relationships during the Vietnam conflict when the 
issue of control over air forces in amphibious operations returned and was never fully resolved. 
Finally, these aforementioned command and control arrangements were to remain in 
place even when a joint force or an amphibious task force was created. In the case of the former, 
'the principle of unified command ... [with] a single commander ... and component commanders' 
held fast. 539 In the latter case, only ground and naval forces were included in the amphibious task 
force while a separate air forces commander operated co-equally 'with the amphibious task force 
commander' .540 
CONCLUSION 
As these joint and non-naval service developments in the early and mid-1950s illustrate, 
the overall development of amphibious/expeditionary warfare in America was not completely 
predominated by the US Naval Service, as has generally been accepted (at least until very 
recently). Indeed, both the Army and the Air Force expanded on their own Second World War 
expeditionary experience that had been consolidated-at least initially-in the late 1940s, not 
only at the organisational/institutional level of analysis but particularly at the tactical/operational 
level. It was at the latter level, in fact, that all three major services diverged considerably in their 
thinking and conceptualisation of this form of warfare, so much so that the Army and Air Force 
promulgated their own doctrines that were in certain significant respects incompatible with that 
537 AFM 1-5, 11. 
538 AFM 1-5, 11. 
539 This was also stated in AFM 1-3,26. 
540 AFM 1-5,11-12. 
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of the Navy and Marine Corps. At the same time, however, these doctrines also highlighted the 
similarities between the former two services and the overall course of British (expeditionary) 
development, a trend that would culminate in the 1960s. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: UNITED KINGDOM, 1950-1956 
OVERVIEW 
Following on from the initial period of consolidation between 1945 and 1950, Britain's 
overall course of amphibious/expeditionary development continued to be characterised by 
various changes at all three levels of analysis. Whilst particular ones involving the role of the 
Royal Marines Commandos in amphibious operations seemed to indicate a general alteration in 
Britain's overall course of development and therefore a closer alignment with the American 
naval approach towards amphibious warfare,s41 other events seemed to demonstrate that it 
remained largely unchanged. 
From a strategic perspective, the United Kingdom's evolving situation continued to 
provide opportunities for all types of 'combined operations'-not just the traditional amphibious 
assault-which tended to involve all three Services out of necessity. All of them, in fact, were 
applicable in 'global war' scenarios, the requirements for which again ranged from 'raiding 
operations' (including amphibious ones) to the large-scale 'invasions' of the Normandy-type, 
although the increased threat of atomic weapons brought about a concomitant rise in the possible 
use of amphibious techniques for 'beach organisation' operations, which not only included 
'maintenance' and 'withdrawal' types but also an 'emergency re-supply' variation in case British 
ports and harbours were devastated by atomic attack. 
At the same time, and in the face of a mounting nuclear stalemate that appeared to reduce 
the chances of a third world war, there was an increasing cognizance of 'cold war' (and so-called 
'peace-time obligations') requirements which, whilst drawing on traditional amphibious landing 
techniques, emphasised strategic mobility and flexibility, as well as increasingly rapid, air-
transported forces. Possible contingencies ranged from 'internal security' and 'imperial policing' 
to 'limited war' operations which, whilst still far smaller than WWII endeavours, were 
nevertheless large enough to require the 'combined' (i.e., 'joint') efforts of the three Services. 
541 See Speller, Role, Chapter 3, especially 97-98, 100; and 'Role', 101-103, 1l0. See also Speller, 'Amphibious 
operations 1945-1998', especially 214, 238. 
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Whatever the case, it should be remembered that the defence establishment was continuously 
being limited by severe financial restrictions due to a weak economy, which drove successive 
governments to institute repeated defence reviews to economise whenever and wherever 
possible. 
Indeed, one of the targets of exactly such economising was the Combined Operations 
establishment, which had been renamed Amphibious Warfare Headquarters (A WHQ). Although 
this entity underwent a substantial downsizing in the mid-1950s, as well as a partial re-
organisation, which involved the move of the Amphibious Warfare Centre (AWC) to Poole 
under the administration of the Royal Marines within a new Joint Services Amphibious Warfare 
Centre (JSA WC), A WHQ continued to exist as an independent, inter-Service agency responsible 
directly to the Chiefs of Staff (and financed separately by the Ministry of Defence). As before, it 
also retained overall responsibility for the development of amphibious warfare policy, concept 
and doctrine development throughout the 1950s, as authorised by the Chief of Combined 
Operations Staff's (later Chief of Amphibious Warfare's) directive, which remained largely 
unaltered during this period. 
Finally, at the tactical level, although the Royal Marine Commandos had been earmarked 
throughout the 1950s for all seaborne raids, they nevertheless found themselves employed 
mostly in support of 'cold war' enterprises, for which they were ideally suited as essentially 
strategically mobile light infantry (with special 'commando' skills). However, as a purely light 
infantry formation, the Commandos had to be supplemented by Army units for various 
supporting arms-including artillery and armour-which effectively precluded them from being 
able to participate in any significant amphibious operations on a purely exclusive basis. As a 
result, the Commandos could not really be considered equal-or even very similar-to their US 
Marine FMF counterparts, who not only had organic supporting arms but also their own close air 
support assets integrated into their specially-organised landing force formations. 
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STRA TEGIC ASPECTS 
British Defence Strategy in the 1950s 
Collective Security and 'Global Strategy' 
Although Britain's geo-strategic situation in the early and mid-1950s was closely tied to 
the North Atlantic alliance, its defence policy, when combined with extensive imperial 
commitments, remained globally oriented. This was first summarised in a report produced by the 
Chiefs of Staff in June, 1950, entitled 'Defence Policy and Global Strategy', which outlined the 
two central aspects of Great Britain's geo-strategic position: first, that the country depended on a 
collective North Atlantic security arrangement to survive a 'hot' global nuclear war; and second, 
that an ongoing and continuous 'cold war' would be global in scope.542 
Almost exactly two years later, a revised and refined 'global strategy' paper was 
produced, which took into account the increasing impact (and costs) of atomic weapons as well 
as the impact of increased defence spending on the country's struggling economy. Published in 
June, 1952, the famous and similarly-titled 'global strategy' paper outlined the three main foci of 
British defence policy that would dominate the 1950s: nuclear war and deterrence; NATO; and 
'cold war obligations'. 543 The development of amphibious/expeditionary warfare in Britain was 
connected to all three. 
'Global', NATO and 'Cold War' Operations 
The outbreak of a 'hot' (or 'global') war, the document postulated, would likely 'open 
with an exceedingly intense but short phase of a few weeks' duration', one that would almost 
certainly involve the employment of atomic weapons by both sides. This 'opening phase' would 
'probably [be] followed by an intermittent struggle gradually spreading worldwide' .544 Termed 
542 See 'Defence Policy and Global Strategy, 1950' in Ovendale, 73-79. . 
543 Richard N. Rosecrance, Defence of the Realm: British Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch (New York, NY: ColumbIa 
University Press, 1968), 129-130. 
544 See 'Defence Policy and Global Strategy Paper' in Ovendale, 98-lO2. 
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'broken-backed' warfare, this was accepted by NATO as a central strategic concept for planning 
purposes for most of the 1950s.545 
The significance of this second phase of a global war, specifically from an amphibious 
warfare point of view, stemmed from the assumption that the Soviets-with their superior 
conventional ground and air strength-would initially overrun most, if not all, of Western 
Europe (as had been done by Nazi Germany at the start of World War II), not to mention also 
parts of the Middle East and East Asia. As a result, large-scale 'combined operations' would 
again be required, ranging from 'raiding' to 'invasions'. 
The perceived vulnerability of large-scale amphibious operations to atomic weapons, 
which was magnified by the introduction of hydrogen bombs,546 however, was part of the reason 
for Britain's support of NATO as the second main focus of its 'global strategy'. With regard to 
Western Europe, which would obviously bear the brunt of the Soviet conventional (and atomic) 
attack, if 'US and British forces were to be pushed off the continent in the opening stages of a 
ground war, they might never get back again. All the more reason for a strategy which prevented 
a successful Russian thrust in the first place'. 547 This strategy centred on the 'creation of an 
integrated force for the defence of Western Europe', which began with the activation of Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in April 1951, and included an American force 
commitment of 'six divisional-equivalents and seven [aircraft] wings' .548 Such a 'continental 
commitment' provided various opportunities for amphibious techniques to be applied towards 
broader expeditionary-type operations, such as 'withdrawals', 'maintenance' and so-called 're-
supply' operations, which received increasing attention in the 1950s when the probability of their 
use reached a zenith. 
545 Heuser, Beatrice, NATO, Britain, France and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000 
(London/Basingstoke: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1997),9-10. . 
546 Bartlett, C. J., The Long Retreat: A Short History of British Defence Policy, 1945-1970 (London/Basmgstoke: The 
MacMillan Press, 1972),58,84-85. 
547 Rosecrance, 128. 
548 Duffield, John S., Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO's Conventional Force Posture (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1995),49, 52-53. 
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The final area of concern in the British global strategy fell under 'cold war obligations'. 
These were unique in that they differed considerably from the closest American strategic 
conception-'limited war'-which still had the possibility of escalating into global (nuclear) 
war. 
But cold war obligations were of [a] different nature. They conduced to political stability 
in a given region; they bolstered trade and the sterling area; they assured access to vital 
raw materials, needed in peacetime. Singapore, Malaya, Kenya, and the Middle East were 
not simply instrumental to a hot-war objective; they were desiderata in themselves.549 
As such, when certain countries experienced threats from internal (or external) sources, such as 
communist insurgent forces in Malaya (from 1948 to 1957), Mau Mau 'terrorists' in Kenya 
(from 1952 to 1958), and nationalists in British-administered Cyprus after 1955,550 the British 
reacted by deploying military forces in essentially reinforcement-type actions that were more 
accurately labelled 'internal security' or 'imperial policing' operations instead of being classified 
under 'limited war' scenarios. Again, 
cold war conflicts were a British specialty. Limited [war] referred to concrete abstention 
from modes of warfare which, while efficacious locally, might provoke escalation and 
strategic retaliation. Korea was in this sense an example of limited war. Most of the 
British involvements overseas, however, were not limited war, but cold war 
commitments. In Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus there were no temptations to geographic 
escalation or the use of nuclear weapons. The forces actually used, classical though they 
were, were those most appropriate for the conflict at hand. 551 
These types of campaigns, amongst others that would emerge later, were not specific 
showcases for British amphibious development. However, they did represent a requirement that 
emphasised overall strategic mobility and flexibility over specific amphibious or airborne (i.e., 
tactical/operational) characteristics. Furthermore, from a purely 'amphibious' point of view, it 
did not help that the RN did not have any dedicated amphibious forces (like the USMC's FMF) 
available for most of the 1950s, which caused significant shortcomings in trying to plan for 
crises, such as Abadan (1951) and Egypt (1952).552 Some ofthese amphibious limitations would 
resurface during the Suez Crisis of 1956 but this was due to the fact that Great Britain generally 
549 Rosecrance, 175. 
550 Bartlett, Retreat, 87-91. 
551 Rosecrance, 204-5. Emphasis added. 
552 See, for example, Speller, Role, 119-128. 
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and the Royal Navy in particular had to allocate limited defence funds towards increasingly 
expensive, but ultimately more important, strategic priorities. 
War Plans 
Although British strategy for the 1950s appeared to be fully integrated with allied 
(NATO) strategy, war plans for the early 1950s were still primarily being devised in conjunction 
only with the United States. As discussed in the last chapter, this process first began in 1949, 
when the Americans drew up the first Emergency War Plan: OFFTACKLE. The plan's primary 
strategic objective, which responded to the new political (and therefore military) commitment to 
defend Western Europe, centred on the 'defense or more probably the reinvasion and liberation 
of the Continent'. Although subsequent war plans focused more on a plausible defence of the 
'Rhine River-Italian Alps line in Europe' /53 there remained a varying array of amphibious 
operations required to defeat a future Soviet offensive in Europe. Indeed, these endeavours 
ranged from 'raiding' operations, which would have been employed against an occupied 
European coastline, to large-scale Normandy-type 'invasions', however unlikely given Soviet 
nuclear capabilities. Other types of 'combined operations' (i.e., involving two or more Services) 
included those that involved the 'maintenance', 'withdrawal' or 're-supply' of forces (or even 
civilian populations, in the case of the latter) over beaches, particularly when ports were either 
damaged or destroyed. As will be seen below, all of these operations were at least studied, if not 
also trained for, by the British during the 1950-56 time period. 
ORGANISATIONAL/INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 
The 'Radical Review' and COHQ/A WHQ 
As a result of the new 'Global Strategy' being implemented in the early 1950s, a 
'Radical Review' process to examine corresponding defence expenditures throughout the 
defence establishment was also instituted. Part of this included a review of the amphibious 
553 Maloney, Sean M., Securing Command of the Sea: NATO Naval Planning, 1948-1954 (Annapolis, MD: NIP, 
1995),89. 
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warfare organisation, which was first initiated by the Chiefs of Staff (COS) in January, 1953.554 
A preliminary report was prepared by Lieutenant-General Sir Nevil Brownjohn, the Vice Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff (VCIGS), who summarised the conclusions of three previous 
investigative committees and consolidated them into three main 'principles': first, that 
'preparation for Amphibious Warfare must be regarded as a permanent commitment'; second, 
that 'responsibility for Amphibious Warfare policy, development and training, must be truly 
inter-Service' although 'the implementation of policy cannot satisfactorily be carried out by an 
inter-Service committee' which, in tum, meant that the 'retention of the Amphibious Warfare 
Headquarters is essential'; and, third, that 'CAW should be responsible directly to the Chiefs of 
Staff and not to any single Service Ministry' .555 In short, the Amphibious Warfare organisation 
had to be permanent,joint (i.e. , inter-Service), and independent. 
Brownsj ohn' s paper was considered at a Chiefs of Staff meeting on 10 February 1953.556 
The Chief of Amphibious Warfare (CAW), Major General V. D. Thomas, RM, opened the 
meeting by bluntly stating that the 'question to be faced up to was whether to retain the [A WHQ] 
organisation or to abolish it altogether - there was no half way house'. He then presented what 
seemed to amount to the strongest case for the retention of A WHQ, arguing that the 
atomic threat had recently been studied from the amphibious warfare point of view, and it 
had become evident that all landing ships and craft available would be required both to 
support the Army and also to supply the country over beaches if ports were knocked out. 
We should require greater flexibility in this respect than ever before. The atomic threat, in 
fact, necessitated that we should develop our amphibious technique as much as possible 
now. The effect of the abolition of the organisation at this stage would be as disastrous as 
the abolition of the ITSD in 1939.557 
This view was hardly unanimous, however. The First Sea Lord (Sir Rhoderick McGrigor), for 
example, proposed instead that the Amphibious Warfare organisation be turned over to the Royal 
Marines, who 'already had considerable amphibious warfare responsibilities in peace'. As he 
argued, it 'would be much more economical to make amphibious warfare the responsibility of 
554 COS (53) 69, 5.2.53 (DEFE 2/1845, folio 7; NA), 1. 
555 COS (53) 69, 1-2. Emphasis added. 
556 _, 'Confidential Annex to COS (53) 21 st Meeting Held on Tuesday, loth February, 1953', 10.2.53 (DEFE 2/1845, 
folio 10; NA). 
557 _, 'Confidential Annex', 1. 
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one Service in peace, instead of keeping in being a separate headquarters'. 558 This view was 
subsequently reiterated in a separate Admiralty report, which argued that an amalgamation of 
A WHQ within the Royal Marine Office (RMO) was possible and would save £160,000 
11 559 annua y. 
The Admiralty paper, as well as the revised report by Sir Brownjohn, were considered at 
a COS meeting on 28 July where the First Sea Lord presented the Admiralty's case.560 The Chief 
ofthe Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Sir John Harding, and CAW both opposed the Admiralty's 
proposition, not only by reiterating the need to maintain the organisation's inter-Service 
character but also for reasons of financial independence and overall efficiency. After 
inconclusive debate, in the name of defence economies, the Committee called for the 
establishment of a 'full-time Working Party ... to carry out a comprehensive examination of the 
present Amphibious Warfare Organisation, and of the Royal Marine establishments which had 
Amphibious Warfare aspects' .561 This Party was to be chaired by Harold Parker, an MOD civil 
servant. 
The 'Parker Committee' 
Within days, the Terms of Reference for this Working Party had been drafied,562 
reviewed563 and approved.564 These generally coincided with the 'principles' outlined in the 
Brownjohn papers. The first of these-permanence-was implied in the opening paragraph, 
which stated that the 'object' of the Working Party was 'to produce an Amphibious Warfare 
Organisation which can function effectively on a long-term basis at minimum cost'. The other 
'principles' were listed as follows: 
(a) The appointment of the Chief of Amphibious Warfare must be an inter-Service one, 
responsible direct to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. 
(b) The current directive for the Chief of Amphibious Warfare must remain 
fundamentally unaltered .... 
558 ,'Confidential Annex', 1. 
559 COS (53) 357, 22.7.53 (DEFE 2/1846, paper 2; DEFE 5/47). See also ADM 1124835. . 
560 _, 'Extract from COS (53) 93rd Meeting', [28.5.53] (DEFE 2/1845, Docket AW(O) 7/52/53, foho 25; NA). 
561 ,'Extract from COS (53) 93rd Meeting', 2-3. 
562 Secretary, COS, ltr to YCNS, YCIGS, and YCAS, 29.7.53 (DEFE 2/2060, folio 5; NA). 
563 'Extract of Minutes ofYCOS 94th Meeting on July 30th" n.d. (DEFE 2/1846, paper 3; NA). 
564 COS (53) 374, 1.8.53 (DEFE 2/1846, paper 4; NA). 
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(c) The Or~anisation must ?e .kept on an inter-Service basis and therefore in principle 
not subject to the vanatIOns of the financial policy of an individual Service 
Ministry. 565 
The first meeting of the 'Parker Committee' was held at the Ministry of Defence in 
September, 1953. Over the course of the next month, at least eleven more meetings were held 
and a final version of the Committee's report was released.566 Whilst the Committee did not 
recommend any changes to the A WHQ itself, it did propose that the School of Amphibious 
Warfare (SAW) and the Amphibious Warfare Signal School (AWSS) be combined and moved to 
Old Sarum, 'there to be integrated with the School of Land-Air Warfare [SLAW] as a further 
(Amphibious) Wing of that School...[to] be renamed the School of Land/Air and Amphibious 
Warfare' .567 
The Parker Committee made one revealing observation on the 'peacetime role' of the 
Royal Marine Commandos that is worth noting. Specifically, it considered 'the Commando 
Brigade [as] much more in the nature of a highly mobile and effective "Fire Brigade" than a true 
amphibious unit' .568 This issue had, in fact, been brought up during an early Committee meeting 
when Chairman Parker revealed that '[p]lanners regarded the Marine Commandos in peace as 
sort of [an] Imperial Fire Brigade' .569 Despite the fact that the Brigade was 'the only amphibious 
trained formation in the British Commonwealth' ,570 this contention, along with the fact that the 
Commandos had spent most of the past five years in an 'internal security' role in Malaya, added 
to the perception that the Commandos were not true amphibious infantry formations but rather 
light infantry or even special forces. 571 This aspect, along with the fact that the Commando units 
were not inherently 'combined arms' formations, differentiated them significantly from their US 
Marine Corps FMF counterparts. 
565 COS (53) 374,2. 
566 See IDAWC Nos. 8-19, 14.9.-12.10.53 (DEFE 211846, paper 9); See also COS (53) 527, 29.10.53 (DEFE 2/2060, 
folio 21; DEFE 5/49; NA). 
567 COS (53) 527, 4-9, Appendix E (page 20). 
568 COS (53) 527, 7, 10. 
569 IDA WC 18, n.d. (DEFE 2/1846, paper 9; NA), 2. 
570 COS (53) 527, 24 (Appendix 1). 
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When the Parker Committee report was addressed by the Chiefs of Staff on 1 December , 
1953, the COS agreed that further investigations were required before the report could be 
approved in its entirety.572 Follow-on studies by the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) and A WHQ 
ultimately concluded that the estimated savings from the proposed SAW/AWSS/SLAW 
amalgamation and move were less than originally anticipated.573 As a result, the COS rejected 
that proposal at their meeting of 12 April, 1954, but generally approved the rest of the report, 
which left the Amphibious Warfare Organisation-not to mention CAW's directive-almost 
completely intact.574 
The 'Davis Committee' 
As part of its 'follow-on' study on the proposed SA W I A WSS/SLA W amalgamation, the 
JPS report also provided a summary assessment of amphibious operational requirements, which 
suggested that a general retrenchment of capabilities be implemented to cut costs. 
The technique of large-scale assault operations should be kept alive by study at staff 
level only, and by collaboration with the US forces where appropriate. We should 
continue training in small-scale assault and raiding operations. For reasons of economy, 
training and trials should be confmed to the Commando Brigade, the Amphibious 
Squadron and the Beach Brigade. This should not exclude minor amphibious exercises 
by army units up to battalion strength. 575 
This new evaluation provided the background for the terms of reference of yet another working 
party which was approved by the Chiefs of Staff in June, 1954, with the Vice Chief of the Naval 
Staff (VCNS), Vice Admiral W. W. Davis, as Chairman. 576 Less than one month later, the so-
called 'Davis Committee' released its report, which generally confirmed the aforementioned 
retrenchment as presented by the JPS assessment. As a result, whilst the Committee maintained 
that the 'inter-service nature of the Organisation must be maintained', it also agreed that the 
572 See various correspondence (DEFE 2/2061, Docket No. AW(O) 17/1/53/54, folios 2, 4, 5, 14,26,40,46; DEFE 
2/2062, Docket No. AW(O) 17/54, folios 44, 47; NA). 
573 COS (54) 110, 6.4.54 (DEFE 2/2061, Docket No. AW(O) 17/1/53/54, folio 69; DEFE 2/2062, Docket No. AW(O) 
17/54, fo1io51; DEFE 5/52; NA). . 
574 -' 'Extract ofCOS(54)44th Meeting on 12/4/54', n.d. (DEFE 2/2062: Docket No. AW(O) 017/54, foho 54; NA). 
575 COS (54) 79, 12.3.54 (DEFE 5/51; NA). Emphasis added. 
576 Speller, 'Role', 100. 
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A WC at Fremington should be closed down, noting that '[a ]lthough the Organisation would 
remain inter-service in nature, the Royal Marines would play the predominate part'. 577 
The Davis Committee report was addressed by the Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on 14 
July. In first acknowledging the retrenchment of amphibious warfare operational requirements, 
the COS Committee seemed open to the proposed move ofthe Amphibious Warfare Centre from 
Fremington to Poole and the corresponding amalgamation of SAW with ASRM. 578 The 
'Controlling Authority for Amphibious Warfare' was discussed next. Whilst the possibility of 
establishing 'an Inter-Service Committee to formulate policy as directed ... by the Chiefs of Staff 
was considered, it was ultimately rejected in favour of an agreement 'that the Chief of 
Amphibious Warfare should be in London', albeit with a reduction in 'the present size of 
Amphibious Warfare Headquarters' .579 It was also agreed that CAW should 'examine the exact 
form of controlling authority for Amphibious Warfare and submit' recommendations back to the 
Chiefs of Staff. 580 
CAW's assessments were completed and subsequently presented as a single report to the 
Chiefs of Staff at the end of October. Although CAW first stated that the 'move of the 
Amphibious Warfare Centre to POOLE is an eminently practical proposition', he had to concede 
that 'complete integration [was] not, however, possible' between the SAW and the Amphibious 
School, Royal Marines (ASRM). This was because the 'latter is a single-service School dealing 
almost exclusively with the practical training of Royal Marines ... for specific aspects of 
amphibious raiding and clearance diving'. The SAW, on the other hand, instructed officers from 
all three Services on much broader aspects of amphibious warfare, including 'Raiding' (up to the 
strength of a 'Commando or Infantry Battalion with supporting arms'), 'Beach Maintenance' 
(both through 'damaged ports and over beaches' in atomic and non-atomic conditions), and 
'Assault Landings' (for forces up to a 'battalion or Commando with supporting arms' in cold war 
577 COS (54) 228, 9.7.54 (DEFE 5/53; NA). 
578 -' 'Minutes of Meeting ... 14th July, 1954 at 11:00 am', n.d. (DEFE 4171; NA), 8. 
579 'M' 14th J 1 ' 9 mutes... u y, . 
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and for forces up to a 'Brigade Group' in cold and hot war).581 In short, there were wide 
discrepancies in each entity's role and mission, which could be neither compromised nor 
reconciled. 
In discussing the final form of the 'controlling authority', CAW specifically argued 
against a single-service system (like the one that existed in the US). To wit, 
there are a number of disadvantages in identifying the Chief of Amphibious Warfare too 
closely with a particular Service establishment. I consider that "Joint Amphibious 
School" is a misleading term for the establishment at POOLE. The Amphibious Schools 
from Fremington can be correctly designated "Joint", in view of their inter-service nature. 
ASRM is not intended to be "Joint". It is a single Service School which, moreover, is 
very different in scope of instruction from the Fremington Schools in that its function is 
to train Royal Marines personnel to operate landing craft and raiding craft .... Moreover, 
the Chiefs of Staff noted that it is important from the point of view of the higher direction 
of amphibious warfare and the formulation of policy that CAW should be in London. 582 
Ultimately, this meant that A WHQ should remain intact, as should the CAW's directive. 583 
At its meeting on 25 November, the COS Committee endorsed CAW's proposals. In 
agreeing with the 'Controlling Authority' proposals, the COS also approved a revised directive 
for CAW.584 This remained almost completely unchanged from the last version (issued in 
1950),585 which preserved the status of AWHQ (i.e., CAW) as having the primary responsibility 
with regard to 'the higher direction of amphibious warfare and the formulation of policy' . 
T ACTICAL/QPERA TIONAL ASPECTS 
By 1950, British amphibious/expeditionary development, having been 'profoundly 
influenced by recent wartime experience', particularly the '[lJarge-scale amphibious operations 
on the Normandy model', had also diversified to include 'raiding' and so-called 'beach 
maintenance' -type operations, a situation that would continue well into the 1950s.586 As outlined 
by the Chief of Combined Operations Staffs (COCOS's) revised directive of April 1950/87 
Combined Operations Headquarters (COHQ) was responsible for a far wider range of 
581 COS (54) 339,28.10.54 (DEFE 5/55; NA), 1-2,5-6. 
582 COS (54) 339, 19. 
583 COS (54) 339, 21, Appendix D. 
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amphibious warfare operations than just the amphibious assault, which was the primary-if not 
exclusive-focus of the US Naval Service. At one end of the British spectrum were 'Raiding 
Operations', which had been specifically distinguished from 'Combined Operations' mainly 
because of the initial importance they would have in any future global war (just like in the first 
years of World War II). Whilst the Royal Marines were allotted the exclusive role of providing 
all seaborne raiding forces in war, which included both Commandos as well as Special Boat 
Sections (SBS), COHQ nevertheless retained the overall responsibility for studying 'the joint 
Service problems of raiding operations' from the sea, as well as 'the integration of sea, land and 
air forces for such operations' .588 
At the other end of the spectrum were 'Combined Operations', which were broadly 
defined as 'a landing or embarkation involving the integration of sea and land forces with, or 
without, associated air operations'. Whilst these included such areas as 'defence against an 
assault landing' and 'major river crossings', amongst the more significant to emerge during the 
1950-56 period were expeditionary-type operations that involved the so-called 'beach 
organisation', including 'the maintenance or withdrawal of a considerable force across beaches' 
as well as 'embarking and disembarking cargoes by improvised means'. Finally, 'Combined 
Operations' also still encompassed straightforward offensive-type operations of wide-ranging 
scope. Whilst COCOS was directed '[t]o study the technique of operations larger than a brigade 
group in conjunction with the Americans', he was also '[t]o preserve and develop the technique 
of landing and maintaining a force of up to a brigade group across beaches against light 
opposition,.589 These latter endeavours only gradually received attention in the early and mid-
1950s as requirements for so-called 'cold war obligations' or 'conflicts' expanded into the realm 
of 'limited war'. Indeed, shortcomings in British capabilities for executing both types of 
588 'D' 0 '2 rrectlve, 0 
589 'DO 0 '1 rrectlve, 0 
168 
endeavours were displayed to varying degrees during the Abadan crisis of 1951, the crisis with 
Egypt in 1952, and the Suez Crisis of 1956.590 
Operational Requirements for 'Hot/Global War' 
As mentioned above, the organisation (and content) of COCOS's 1950 directive revealed 
the growing importance that raiding operations played in British amphibious warfare 
development. This stemmed from the fact that, should the Soviet Union invade and occupy 
continental Europe (which they were expected to do if war broke out), the United Kingdom 
would find herself in a similar situation to that of 1940 when the country first raised special 
'commandos' to conduct raiding operations against a hostile coast. Far less evident, however, 
were the exact priorities of other types of amphibious warfare operations that were not only 
deemed possible upon the outbreak of war but also increasingly necessary during peacetime. 
Complicating this matter even further was the limited number of amphibious ships and craft 
readily available for training and operations (due to financial limitations and resulting manpower 
shortages i 91 against which all of the aforementioned priorities had to be balanced. 
This latter issue was raised as COCOS's new directive was being finalised in the spring 
of 1950, when the Chiefs of Staff requested that COCOS 'submit a paper on the Naval lift which 
should be maintained in peacetime,.592 A 'framework' document was drafted by COHQ in April 
that had the 'Amphibious Assault' ranked first amongst eight priorities.593 However, due to 
Admiralty opposition to the amphibious shipping that this ranking would have required, this 
category of amphibious enterprise was ultimately ranked last in a revised document, which was 
submitted on 3 March 1951 594 and subsequently endorsed (with a few amendments) in a Chiefs 
590 See, for example, Speller, Role, 119-128, Chapter 7; and 'Role', Chapter Five. See also Grove, Vanguard, 153, 
160-163, Chapter Five. 
591 Grove, Vanguard, 177-184. See also Speller, Role, Chapter 4. . 
592 _, 'Extract from COS (50) 47th Mtg of22 March 1950', n.d. (DEFE 211442, Docket No. CO(O) 7/50(A), foho 14; 
NA). 
593 COS (50) 295, [3.8.50] (DEFE 5/23; NA). 
594 COS (51) 117,5.3.51 (DEFE 1117, folio 716; DEFE 5/28; NA). 
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of Staff meeting on the 16th.595 The final revised list of 'purposes' (or 'requirements'), according 
to priority, was thus: 
(a) Raiding operations in WESTERN EUROPE and the MEDITERRANEAN. 
(b) Peacetime training; elementary training in war. ... 
(c) Strategic mobility of the Army including a heavy lift for the build up of forces 
overseas on mobilisation .... 
(d) Royal Naval RHINE Flotilla .... 
(e) Maintenance of a Force over beaches, when port facilities are not available .... 
(t) Withdrawal ofa force overseas .... 
(g) Emergency discharge of cargoes in the UNITED KINGDOM owing to damage to 
ports .... 
(h) Small scale amphibious assault operations ... which may include:-
(i) Seizure of small strategic objectives in the face oflight opposition. 
(ii) Operations on the seaward flank of the Army. 
(iii) Such operations in support of United Nations policy before the outbreak of 
general war. 596 
The report also included an analysis to determine which requirements could be met 
simultaneously, what numbers and types of ships and craft were required, and what deficiencies 
existed. As the Committee duly noted, requirements (a), (b), (c), (d), and (h) could be met 
simultaneously while (e) and (f) could be undertaken as alternatives. At the same time, it was 
also recognised that 'irrespective of assault operations every existing ship or craft capable of 
discharging a load over beaches may be required for the Emergency Discharge of cargoes in the 
UNITED KINGDOM' (i.e., option (g)).597 
Undermining all of these conclusions (and as the report itself was forced to 
acknowledge), however, was the continued lack of resolution with regard to maintaining the 
amphibious lift for a Brigade Group (assault loaded), which had plagued COHQ/AWHQ for 
years. Although the report had used this War Office benchmark as a basis for its calculations, it 
was forced to recognise the Admiralty's continuing inability to man the required number of ships 
and craft either 'in commission in peacetime' or 'in Category A reserve' (i.e., less than three 
.c h'b' l·ft598 months notice from mobilisation) due to manpower shortages lor amp 1 IOUS 1 . 
595 ,'Extract from COS (51) 49th Meeting held on 16 March 1950', n.d. (DEFE 1117, folio 719; NA). 
596 COS (51) 146, 19.3.51 (DEFE 1117, folio 720; DEFE 5/29; NA), 1, 4. Quoted in Speller, Role, 86; 'Role', 86. 
597 COS (51) 146,2,5. 
598 See COS (50) 374, 22.9.50 (DEFE 2/2067, folio 1; NA), 1. 
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Raiding and the Royal Marines 
Both COCOS's directive as well as the ships and craft requirements report demonstrated 
that raiding operations were evolving into a (if not the) priority for British amphibious warfare 
development at the start of the 1950s. What was most significant about this trend was twofold. 
On the one hand, raiding operations generally continued to be approached in a similar manner as 
'combined operations'; namely from a broad, inter-Service (or joint) perspective. On the other 
hand, whilst the current doctrine at the time-in the form of A WHB No. lOb, Amphibious 
Raids-was correspondingly applicable to 'military forces' in general for raids up to 'the 
landing of a complete brigade group', it also designated the Royal Marine Commandos as the 
main provider of the military forces for such endeavours. These enterprises were further 
addressed 'under two main headings': 'Medium scale raids', which involved 'military forces up 
to the strength of a commando or battalion'; and 'Small scale raids', which were 'conducted 
largely by stealth' by a 'total strength ... unlikely to be more than twenty' .599 
The Inter-Service Committee on Raiding Operations (ISCRO) 
Raiding operations had already garnered special attention in the United Kingdom in the 
late 1940s, as the strategic threat posed by the potential invasion and occupation of the European 
(or 'Eurasian') continent by the Soviet Union began to emerge in earnest. Studies had been 
performed by COHQ and an Inter-Service Raiding Committee (ISRC) had been established-
with COCOS as Chairman-which last met in 1949. In January, 1950, a paper produced by 
COHQ, which analysed the present position of the ISRC in light of COCOS's soon-to-be-
approved directive, ultimately concluded that a 'permanent committee on similar lines to the 
Inter-Service Raiding Committee [was] required to enable COCOS to carry out his co-ordinating 
599 See A WHQ (CAW), A WHB No. lOb, AmphibiOUS Raids, 1951 (DEFE 2/1771; NA), 1,3-4, 15, 3l. 
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functions,.600 As a result, after a new set of Terms of Reference had been drawn up in June,601 a 
'reconstituted' Inter-Service Committee on Raiding Operations (ISCRO) first met on 28 July.602 
At this meeting, the ISCRO first agreed on its tasks, which included providing 'policy 
directions', inter-Service 'co-ordination', and resolution of potential 'differences'. It also agreed 
that planning was to be 'the responsibility of the theatre commanders and not of the raiding 
authorities'. With regard to the 'primary responsibilities for study, training and development', the 
ISCRO declared that the Royal Marines were in charge when it came to '[rJaids by sea or in 
which the main force approaches by sea', although COCOS remained 'the responsible authority 
for co-ordination of training and not the Committee'. 603 
The Raiding Committee did not meet again until 1 February 1951,604 and then again not 
until 30 May.605 A number of areas were covered in the latter meeting that would be revisited 
frequently over the course of the next few years. The most pressing issue was that of command 
and control, which stemmed from the lessons learned from Wodd War II, particularly those 
involving so-called 'private armies'. 606 Following the production of a paper on the subject that 
was presented in late March,607 and eventually re-circulated in July after further deliberation,608 a 
new set of Terms of Reference was announced for yet another revision of the 'Raiding 
Operations' policy paper. It was into the final version of this document, which was released in 
December, that the 'command and control' paper was eventually incorporated.609 
600 G.3. Policy (COHQ), 'Future of the Inter-Service Raiding Committee', 24.1.50 (DEFE 212091, folio 3; NA), 1-2. 
601 COS (50) 205,17.6.50 (DEFE 2/2091, Docket No. COCO) 27/50, folio 25; NA). 
602 [COHQ], 'Minutes of the Third Meeting of the Inter Services Committee on Raiding Operations ... 28th July, 1950', 
28.7.50 (DEFE 2/2091, Docket No. COCO) 27/50); NA). 
603 'Minutes ... 28th July', 1-3. 
604 COCOS, ltr to the Secretary of the Admiralty (D ofP), CGRM, U-SS, WO (DMO), U-SS, Air Ministry (D ofOps), 
2.2.51 (DEFE 2/2078, Docket No. AW(O) 27/1/51, folio 17; NA). 
605 Secretary, ISCRO, 'Minutes of the Fifth Meeting [ISCRO]. .. on Wednesday, 30th May 1951 ',31.5.51 (DEFE 
2/2078, Docket No. AW(O) 27/1/51, folio 31; NA). 
606 G.2. RM (COHQ), Brieffor CCO, 27.1.51 (DEFE 2/2078, Docket No. AW(O) 27/1/51, folio 15; NA). 
607 Secretary, ISCRO, ltr to D ofP (ADM), CGRM, DMO (WO), D ofOps (Air Ministry), 27 .3.51 (DEFE 212078, 
Docket No. AW(O) 27/1/51, folio 20; NA). 
608 Secretary, ISCRO, ltr to the Secretary, JPS, 2.7.51; and Secretary, ISCRO, ltr to D ofP (ADM), CGRM, DMO 
(WO), D ofOps (Air Ministry), 2.7.51 (DEFE 2/2078, Docket No. AW(O) 27/3/51, folios 18, 19; NA). 
609 See JP (51) 157 (0) T ofR, 13.9.51 and JP (51) 157 (Final), 4.12.51 (DEFE 2/2077, Docket No. AW(O) 27/51, 
folios 15, 19; NA). 
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Policy for Raiding Operations and the Royal Marines 
The official policy for raiding operations had begun to evolve in the late 1940s. Efforts 
from that era culminated in June, 1950, when the Chiefs of Staff approved61 0 a (re-)revised report 
on 'Raiding Operations', which covered a number of areas, including 'definition', 'object', and 
'methods,.611 It should be noted that this report addressed raiding from an inter-Service point of 
view and therefore outlined responsibilities for various types of raiding, with (i) 'raids by sea' 
coming under the purview of COCOS, (ii) 'raids by land' under the War Office and (iii) 'raids by 
air' under the 'War Office in conjunction with Air Ministry'. For 'raids by land or air in which 
withdrawal is by sea', (i) and (ii) were to be followed 'in conjunction with the Chief of 
Combined Operations Staff. Finally, overall co-ordination responsibility was given to the 
ISCRO 'whose composition and Terms of Reference should be revised accordingly'. 612 The 
report also outlined inter-Service force requirements which, from the standpoint of the Royal 
Marines, included maintaining a Commando Brigade in the Middle East 'in peace' and raising 
two additional Brigades after the outbreak of war, one each at M + 3 and M + 6 months, 
respectively. In addition, the 'training establishments and units' such as the School for Combined 
Operations (SCO), the Commando School and the Amphibious School, Royal Marines (ASRM), 
'should be adapted for training raiding personnel in peacetime and for acting as a nucleus for the 
formation of new raiding units after the outbreak of war'. 613 
Although this report went through many revisions over the course of the next eighteen 
months or SO,614 it remained substantially unchanged when it was approved in final form on 31 
March 1952.615 Mention should be made, however, of an Admiralty memorandum that was 
submitted during this deliberative process as it specifically outlined the limited roles of the RM 
610 _, 'Extract from COS (50) 92nd Mtg dated 19 June 1950' (DEFE 2/2091: Docket No. COCO) 27/50, folio 26; NA), 
2-3. 
611 COS (50) 222, 29.6.50 (DEFE 2/2091, Docket No. COCO) 27/50, folio 32; NA). 
612 COS (50) 222, 1-4,9-10. 
613 COS (50) 222, 7,10-11. 
614 For previous (final) versions, see JP (51) 46 (Final), 29.8.51; and JP (51) 157 (Final), 4.12.51 (DEFE 2/2077, 
Docket No. AW(O) 27/51, folios 11,19; NA). . 
615 See, -' 'Extract from Minutes of COS Meeting (145th) on 31.3.52', for approval ?fCOS (52) 29 (0) (Fmal), 
18.3.52 (DEFE 2/2081, Docket No. A W(O) 27/52, folios 33, 31; and DEFE 1117, foho 771; NA). 
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Commandos at the time, which still resembled those from World War II, and had been in place 
since 1949. The roles comprised: (a) 'Raiding operations by units or sub units'; (b) 'Seizure of 
ports or other areas of strategic importance'; and (c) 'Assault tasks calling for special skill in 
amphibious operations' .616 As a matter of fact, these exact roles had been outlined in the 
available doctrinal publication at the time, A WHB No. lOa, The Organisation, Employment and 
Training o/Commandos, which had just been promulgated in 1951, except that roles (b) and (c), 
had been reversed.617 It is interesting to note that this Handbook, just like its affiliate, A WHB No. 
lOb, Amphibious Raids, already discussed above, made a point about de-emphasising any sort of 
exclusivity-implied or otherwise-with regard to raiding roles specifically, not to mention 
amphibious-type enterprises in general. 
Although commandos have distinctive roles and characteristics it is neither to be 
expected nor desirable that they should be employed in these roles exclusively. 
Furthermore, many borderline tasks such as beach landings or penetration on thinly 
manned fronts, will occur. Non-specialised troops could do these tasks, but commandos 
could probably do them better and more economically.618 
It was this last aspect that would have the most significance in times of increasing financial 
stringency, particularly with regard to defence expenditures. 
Operational Requirements for Training ... and 'Cold War' Operations 
Training Requirements and the 'Amphibious Warfare Training Squadron' 
The second priority listed in the March, 1951, 'combined operations ships and craft' 
assessment was for 'training' .619 As summarised by COCOS in his first semi-annual report to the 
Chiefs of Staff in September, 1950, the state of affairs in this regard remained poor to say the 
least. 
[T]he present Royal Navy and Royal Marine manpower figure of 1100 will not allow a 
sufficient number [of ships and craft] in commission for training purposes. Of the more 
important vessels, the present training squadron includes 1 LST, 1 LCT and 1 LCH, as 
616 COS (51) 735, 10.12.51 (DEFE 1117, folio 744; NA). 
617 AWHQ (CAW), AWHB No. lOa, The Organisation, Employment and Training oj Commandos, [1951] (DEFE 
2/1770; NA). 
618 A WHB No.1 Oa, 1. 
619 COS (51) 146, 1. 
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against 3 LST, 4 LCT, 1 LCH and an LSH(S) without which the assault technique cannot 
be efficiently preserved. 620 
This situation, for instance, 'made it impossible to meet fully the demands for amphibious 
training, in particular that of the 29th Infantry Brigade and of the Middle East' .621 This was not to 
say that there was no amphibious training conducted at all, although initially it was on a very 
small scale. This included, for example, a 'circus' (or tour) through the Mediterranean in the 
autumn of 1950 by HMS SUVLA (LST(3)), upon which a jointly-staffed training 'team' was 
embarked, complete with a number of LCAs, a DD tank, an LVT, and a DUKW.622 A number of 
ports were visited, including Trieste, where a relatively large exercise, AJAX ONE, took place 
involving the landing of two battalions (i.e., more than 1,500 men and 240 vehicles) of the 24th 
Infantry Brigade in two LSTs and eight LCAs 'in darkness' .623 It also included annual 
RUNAGROUND exercises, which were held to exhibit the British inter-Service approach 
towards amphibious/expeditionary operations, mostly to British (and allied) staff officers and 
students. First performed in 1949, these demonstration exercises were put on in the late spring 
and revolved around a model inter-Service 'combined operation', which included an amphibious 
assault by an army unit (usually of battalion size), a preceding 'amphibious reconnaissance', a 
brief display of the 'early stages of the build up' using both Army and Navy elements of the 
beach organisation', and, usually, a difficult 'cliff assault' conducted by the RM Commandos, 
specifically to demonstrate the 'Commando technique' .624 
The theme of not having enough amphibious lift available for training purposes 
continued to be repeated, by the (renamed) Chief of Amphibious Warfare (CAW). In his second 
progress report, which was released on 4 May 1951 , CAW noted that a planned 'exercise on a 
620 COS (50) 374, 4. 
621 COS (50) 374, 4. 
622 See COCOS, ltr to Secretary of the Admiralty, 19.1.50; and COCOS, ltr to CGRM, 20.1.50 (DEFE 2/1698, Docket 
No. CO 1482C/50, folios 10, 12; NA). 
623 See various correspondence (DEFE 2/1699; NA). . 
624 Royal Marines, Portsmouth Group, 'RUN AGROUND III', 5.52 (Arch 6/4/1; Archives, RMM). For demonstratIOns 
in 1954, 1955, and 1956, respectively, see COS (54) 372, 2.12.54, 7; COS (55) 316, 28.11.55, 11; and COS (56) 404, 
13.11.56, 15 (DEFE 2/2067, folios 35, 37, 38; NA). 
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brigade group scale proposed by MELF had to be abandoned' for this exact reason.625 In 
addition, CAW cited A WHQ's (fonnerly COHQ's) recently completed 'combined operations 
ships and craft' assessment which had concluded that peacetime training exercises had to be 
conducted 'on a brigade group scale with one infantry battalion and elements of the teeth anns 
assault loaded' in order to maintain the amphibious warfare technique at alL 626 CAW reiterated 
his view yet again at a COS meeting on 21 May, while also noting that' air lift was also a serious 
problem from the training point of view' .627 
By the time CAW presented his October 1951 progress report,628 certain events had 
helped bring the issue to the fore. The first was the so-called 'Abadan crisis' in which an 
amphibious assault capacity of approximately a brigade group was needed to seize an island oil 
refinery off the coast of Kuwait in the spring of 1951. 629 The second was exercise SILVER 
STRAND, which was held in June 1951. Considered to be 'the most ambitious amphibious 
exercise ... since 1945' , SILVER STRAND served as yet another confinnation 'that the technique 
of the amphibious assault can only be kept up to date by carrying out exercises on a brigade 
group scale with at least one battalion and its supporting anns assault loaded'. As a result of 
these events and to alleviate this longstanding predicament, CAW made two proposals to the 
Admiralty, one old and one new. The first involved increasing the existing amphibious lift by 1 
LST and 2 LCT so that 'one battalion with supporting anns may be assault loaded'. The second 
was to fonn an 'Amphibious Warfare Training Squadron under one commander', which 'should 
raise the morale of the crews and give them a more defmite aim'. This fonnation, 'if so 
organised, would be in better shape to undertake an operational role and there would be at least 
h I f h·b·.c. ". b' '" 630 t e nuc eus 0 an amp 1 lOUS lorce m emg . 
625 'MELF' stands for 'Middle East Land Forces'. 
626 COS (51) 268, 4.5.51 (DEFE 5/31; NA), 2. 
627 _, 'Extract from COS (51) 83rd Meeting held on 21 st May 1951', n.d. (DEFE 1117, folio 723; NA). 
628 COS (51) 601, 22.10.51 (DEFE 212067, Folio 6; NA), 4. . . 
629 See, especially, Speller, Ian, 'A Splutter of Musketry? The British Military Response to the Anglo-Iraman 011 
Dispute', CBH, 17:1 (Spring 2003),39-66. See also Role, 119-125; 'Role', 
630 COS (51) 601,4-5. 
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'Cold War' Requirements and the Amphibious Warfare Squadron (AWS) 
At the COS meeting of 21 May-where CAW had again lamented the shortage of 
amphibious lift-the War Office had also noted that the recent Abadan crisis 'had clearly 
emphasised ... that a suitable and sufficient lift was not only a training requirement but also one 
connected with cold war operations'. After some minor discussion on this point (and after having 
endorsed CAW's report), the Chiefs directed that the 'War Office ... prepare in consultation with 
the Admiralty, Air Ministry and the Chief of Amphibious Warfare, an appreciation of the 
amphibious warfare requirement in 1952 for the prosecution of the cold war'. 631 At the appeal of 
the War Office, however, this request was later redirected to the JPS, which finally began its 
investigation in January, 1952.632 
The JPS released its report on 14 March, 1952.633 Noting that the previous 'ships and 
craft' assessment had been 'solely concerned with training and the early stages of a global war' 
and that there was 'as yet no policy for the employment of such forces in the cold war', the JPS 
ultimately focused its new report on 'the requirements for amphibious forces in 1952 for cold 
war and training tasks'. Confirmed was the necessity 'to preserve and develop the technique' for 
a Brigade Group amphibious assault, which required the retention (in commission or immediate 
reserve) of an assault lift for a battalion with some supporting arms. This amounted to 1 LSH(S), 
1 LCH, 3 LST(3), 4 LCT(8), 1 LCN, and 12 LCA. The report also noted the recent crises in the 
Middle East-which illustrated the need for amphibious lift for a possible intervention in 
Egypt-that had 'demanded ships and craft to lift as much as a Brigade Group assault loaded'. 
This, in tum, had prompted the question of 'what formation is the smallest that can operate 
tactically in an assault and at the same time can be assault-loaded into such ships and craft as are 
within the capacity of the Admiralty to maintain in commission or immediate [reserve]'; the 
answer turned out to be 'a battalion with elements of supporting arms' .634 
631 ,'Extract from COS (51) 83 rd Meeting .. .', 1-2. 
632 =, 'Extract from COS (51) 88th Meeting held on May 28th 1951', n.d. (DEFE 1117, folio 726; NA). 
633 JP (52) 1 (Final), 14.3.52 (DEFE 6/20; NA). 
634 JP (52) 1 (Final), 5. 
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Having thus concluded that the lift requirements for both 'cold war and training tasks' 
were the same (as were their respective deficiencies), the JPS report went on to argue that a lack 
of preparedness had 'handicapped us considerably in planning' possible amphibious 
operations-up to a Brigade Group in scale-at Abadan in the spring of 1951 and against Egypt 
in the spring of 1952. Because such contingencies were considered possible in the future, 'an 
amphibious squadron to carry a battalion with some supporting arms assault-loaded' was 
ultimately deemed necessary, which 'would alternatively be adequate to land on beaches against 
no opposition a formation, with few vehicles, approximating to two battalions'. Furthermore, if 
located in the Mediterranean, such a squadron would be able to reach the 'Far East'-as well as 
'Home Waters' (if necessary)-for cold war purposes but also remain available for annual 
. . h 635 trammg purposes at orne. 
The COS reviewed the JPS report on 31 March.636 Whilst the Chiefs confirmed that the 
'long-term cold war requirement' was for a battalion group amphibious lift (assault loaded), they 
also 'noted that there appeared to be no prospect in the immediate future of meeting this 
requirement without altering existing naval priorities' . With regard to establishing an 
'Amphibious Squadron', however, the COS agreed that this formation should be held 'at the 
disposal of the Chiefs of Staff to meet cold war requirements'. The Chiefs therefore directed that 
the Squadron be sent to the Mediterranean 'for a period' after completing a previously-planned 
NATO exercise near home waters and that the Admiralty investigate the 'administrative 
implications of this move in light of the Squadron's cold war role. Its location would then be 
reviewed 'periodically'. 637 
Despite this agreement and the fact that the Admiralty had officially agreed to establish 
an 'Amphibious Warfare Squadron' (AWS) by April, 1952, CAW continued to report that said 
squadron was still short 1 LST and 2 LCT. Not only did this mean 'that training cannot be 
undertaken on a realistic basis', but also that 'amphibious warfare training cannot be effective for 
635 JP (52) 1 (Final), 5-6. 
636 'Extract from COS (52) 45th Meeting held on 31 st March 1952', n.d. (DEFE 1117, folio 773; NA). 
637 =: 'Extract from COS (52) 45th Meeting held on 31 st March 1952', n.d. (DEFE 1117, folio 773; NA), 3-4. 
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1953' .638 Six more months brought a bit of improvement to the situation, even if it was mainly 
forced by the ongoing crisis with Egypt. In the early autumn, the A WS had moved into the 
Mediterranean to augment existing amphibious lift. Although no operations were undertaken, 
some training in the landing Centurions from LSTs and LCTs did take place, which seemed to 
provide evidence 'that proficiency for cold war operations can only be acquired if an amphibious 
force is available in the theatre thus making Joint Training practicable'. As a result, CAW 
recommended that the Squadron remain in the Mediterranean, for three reasons: first, a 'Cold 
War situation or civil disturbance' might occur again; second, 'troops including 3 Commando 
Brigade are available for training in that Theatre'; and third, the Squadron could be directed to 
the Far East if necessary (not to mention also the UK if required for any reason).639 
Even with these apparently positive developments, however, the overall training 
situation still appeared to be quite dire, particularly on the home front. Not only did CAW 
concede that the only 'main feature of training in the UK was a maintenance exercise of the 264 
Beach Brigade', but he also noted that a planned 'Brigade Group Scale Amphibious Exercise in 
1952 ... had to be cancelled' .640 Ultimately, this forced him to re-issue a warning should 
amphibious warfare training goals not be met. 
I must again emphasise the importance of carrying out an exercise on a Brigade Group 
scale with one Battalion assault 10aded .... Unless we can mount an Exercise of this type 
the maintenance of the technique of Amphibious Warfare will be confmed solely to 
instruction in the classroom. As a result our own Commanders and Staff will tend to 
avoid an amphibious operation owing to lack of planning knowledge and practice. 
Furthermore no formations, units or individuals will get a sufficient practice in 
amphibious operations to enable them to be carried out efficiently should the need arise 
in Cold War conditions. 641 
Training and Exercises 
Despite CAW's warning, amphibious training did increase in 1953, both in scale and 
participation. By April, CAW was able to report that there had already been 'two exercises in 
which a Commando and the Amphibious Warfare Squadron have taken part' with more planned, 
638 COS (52) 234, 30.4.52 (DEFE 2/2067, Folio 9; NA). 
639 COS (52) 649, 29.11.52 (DEFE 2/2067, folio 16; NA), 7. Emphasis added. 
640 COS (52) 649, 12. 
64l COS (52) 649, 11. 
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including two exercises with NATO forces and individual training 'on the North African Coast'. 
Noting that this was 'the first time that amphibious training on this scale has been possible since 
the War', CAW predicted that 'there will exist a small, but efficient, amphibious force' if the 
training continued, just as had been claimed when arguments were made for the Amphibious 
Warfare Squadron's establishment. 642 
Indeed, amphibious training continued over the next six months, during which time each 
of the three Commandos in 3 Commando Brigade trained with the A WS.643 Of particular note 
was Exercise WELDF AST, which included the A WS, 45 RM Commando, and a detachment 
from No. 116 Company, RASC (Royal Anny Service Corps), the only Army unit other than 264 
Beach Brigade to operate DUKWs and LVTs.644 This was a NATO exercise that involved an 
assault landing on the coast of Eastern Macedonia by an allied amphibious and landing force, as 
displayed below: 
Exercise WELDFAST 
Countries Am]2hibious Force Landing Force 
US 1 LSH(L), 3 APA, 3 AKA,2 LSD, 2 APD 2 reinforced battalions 
UK 1 LSH(S), 1 LST(A), 1 LCT 45 RM Commando, 116 Company (RASC) 
Greece 2LCT 1 commando battalion 
Italy demolition teams 
Although all of the forces involved 'received comprehensive orders based on the US standard 
amphibious technique', the employment of 45 RM Commando was very reminiscent of the way 
in which Commandos had been employed for special (i.e., difficult or ancillary) assaults tasks 
during World War II instead of being employed as straightforward (naval) assault infantry. To 
wit, '45 Royal Marine Commando was landed by A W Squadron on a separate beach and joined 
up on the left flank of the US Marine Corps for the advance inland'. Indeed, while it was noted 
that this exercise 'proved that British and US Amphibious Forces can work efficiently together in 
spite of the fact that there may be some differences in technique', it qualified this a bit by 
reminding its readers that in 'deciding the technique used, due consideration must be given to 
642 COS (53) 169,2.4.53 (DEFE 2/2067, folio 19; NA), 1-2. . 
643 COS (53) 538, 30.10.53 (DEFE 5/49; NA); and Chief ofStaffltr to CGRM, 13.11.53 (DEFE 2/2067, foho 25; NA), 
8. 
644 COS (53) 538, 8. 
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local conditions and the disposition of enemy forces', which seemed to imply that amphibious 
infantry units were not automatically inter-changeable.645 
'Beach Organisation' Operations: The 264 (Scottish) Beach Brigade (TA) 
Aside from raiding and the emerging operational requirements for training and 'cold 
war' operations, the most significant priority with regard to British amphibious/expeditionary 
development during the 1950s involved the 'beach organisation'. 646 This, in fact, involved three 
of the priorities listed in the approved ships and craft requirements report of March, 1951, and 
included (in order of priority): the 'Maintenance of a Force over beaches', the 'Withdrawal of a 
force overseas ... ', and the 'Emergency discharge of cargoes in the UNITED KINGDOM owing 
to damage to ports ... ', 647 all of which were to be performed by the 264 Scottish Beach Brigade. 
Originally 'a normal Infantry Brigade' of the Army, the '264 (Beach) Brigade TA' was 
first tasked by the War Office with training 'in the functions of Beach Groups in Combined 
Operations' in October 1946.648 According to COHQ, the main task of these Beach Groups-two 
or more of which made up a Beach Brigade-during the war had been 'to function as the 
administrative spearhead in an assault on an enemy coastline'. More specifically, 
[t]he tasks of a Beach Brigade on landing may include breaking through underwater and 
beach obstacles, clearance oflocal resistance, landing of assault troops and maintain[ing] 
the assault formation and the build up ashore for an indefinite period, until a Base Port is 
d 'fi . I' d 649 capture or artl lCla port IS constructe . 
According to the Brigade's first training directive of July, 1947, its initial training 
programme was, up to 1950, 'designed to provide a suitable cadre on which the Brigade can be 
built up with its militia intake after that time'. This was done to a certain degree as limited 
exercises were held to train 'the Brigade .. .in an assault maintenance role', but the formation 
remained at a 'low mobilisation priority ... [as] part of the 2nd Contingent, TA, as a large scale 
amphibious assault was not foreseen within the first twelve months of a war'. 650 Indeed, the 
645 COS (53) 538, 11-12 (Appendix). 
646 See Speller, Role, 88, 113; 'Role', 88. 
647 COS (51) 146, 1,4. 
648 --.J 'Role of264 Beach Brigade', [1946] (DEFE 2/1634, Docket No. CO 838/49, folio 2; NA), 1. 
649 CO, 264 SBB, ltr to Distr., ?.2.47 (DEFE 2/1634, Docket No. CO 838/48, no folio; NA), 1. 
650 [AWHQ], 'A Short Review ... ', Pt. V, 4. 
181 
process of building up a 'cadre' was coming along rather slowly as the total strength of the 
formation by the end of July, 1950, for example, amounted to only 1,018 personnel (of an 
establishment of 6,316).651 
The 'Maintenance' and 'Withdrawal' of Forces Overseas 
Despite the successful completion in mid-1950 of Exercise BUILD UP, which employed 
264 Scottish Beach Brigade (SBB) in a scaled-down amphibious assault by an infantry brigade 
group involving the use of major landing craft and amphibians,652 it was not until 1951 that the 
serious study of beach maintenance seemed to take hold, which-not quite surprisingly 
considering the continuing Soviet threat of occupying the European continent-initially seemed 
to focus on 'withdrawal' operations. In January of that year COCOS directed that preparations be 
made for a 'Withdrawal Exercise', which was essentially a headquarters study. This was to 
revolve around a 'British field force of two Corps each of two Divisions with associated Tactical 
air forces' that would have to evacuate the beaches in the face of land, air and, to a lesser extent, 
naval opposition.653 By September, 1951, this initiative had morphed into a specific proposal 
from the Commandant of the AWC to 'study the principles of an amphibious withdrawal' .654 
According to a report finally released in August 1954, which was still based on the A WC 
study period of March 1952, the amphibious ships and craft that were being maintained for a 
Brigade Group lift would be able to evacuate 'all the personnel of two corps, each of two 
Divisions from North West Europe to the United Kingdom in about one week'. In addition, the 
same lift would need approximately 'six weeks to evacuate all associated AFBs, guns and 
vehicles without aid from other shipping'. All told, this amounted to approximately '130,000 
men and 30,000 vehicles' .655 Of particular note was that, instead of employing a joint command 
system as was custom in British amphibious warfare, an Army officer was to be placed in 
651 HQ 264, Scottish Beach Brigade, 'Strength Returns', 8.8.50 (DEFE 2/1614, folio 8; NA), 1. 
652 See various correspondence (DEFE 2/1614, Docket 1146/50, folios 8, 17,27,29; NA). 
653 AlQ, ltr to DCO(P), 12.1.51 (DEFE 2/1806, Docket No. AW 271/5/51, folio 2; NA). 
654 Cmdt., A WC, ltr to A WHQ, 25.9.51 (ARCH 2/18/23, Docket No. AW 1528/20/51, folio 6; Archives, RMM). . 
655 [A WHQ], 'Organisation and Control of a Withdrawal of Army Forces and Associated Air Forces Over Beaches III 
Western Europe', 16.8.54 (DEFE 2/2058, Docket 1112/54, folio 18; NA), 2. 
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command of the withdrawal, using an 'Embarkation Headquarters' (EHQ). This organisation had 
four main characteristics: it was to be 'Joint Service', established 'as early as possible', only in 
charge of the evacuation (not the defence of the bridgehead), and under command of the senior 
Army officer. 656 
Although the withdrawal study was comprehensive enough, by the time it was officially 
released (i.e., in mid-1954), its usefulness appeared to be in doubt because war plans were 
assuming increasingly stronger defences on the 'Central Front', which gradually reduced the 
likelihood of having to implement such a requirement. During the same time period, progress had 
also been made with regard to the development of the straightforward maintenance of 
expeditionary forces, which again revolved around the Beach Brigade. Indeed, this was 
illustrated by planned training exercises at Braunton near the AWC in North Devon in the 
summer of 1952 that involved 'Beach Group Exercises' rather than assault training.657 The 
central aim of Exercise FIRST RESERVE, in fact, was to 'exercise a composite Beach Group of 
264 Scottish Beach Brigade in Beach Maintenance technique' using available coasters, fast 
launches, an LCT, the LCA Flotilla (manned by RM reservists), and both DUKW and LVT type 
amphibians. Each 'camp' (e.g., FIRST RESERVE I and II) was divided into 'reconnaissance' 
phase, a 'discharge' phase and a reloading phase, with the middle phase involving training at 
night.658 
(Emergency) 'Maintenance' in the United Kingdom 
The War Office focused on this task for the Brigade when it represented to the Chiefs of 
Staff what it saw as the prioritised roles of the Brigade in November 1952: 
(a) The maintenance ofa brigade group over beaches. 
(b) The evacuation of a force over beaches. 
(c) The working of a damaged port either on the Continent or in the United Kingdom. 
(d) Assistance to the civil authorities in the United Kingdom in the organisation and 
h · f h' try 659 initial operation of "beach ports" to supplement t e major ports 0 t IS COUll . 
656 [AWHQ], 'Organisation', 3-4,10. 
657 HQ, 264 SBB (TA), ltr to A WHQ, 5.12.51 (DEFE 2/1828, folio 3; NA), 1. See also HQ, 264 SBB (TA), ltr to 
AWHQ, 30.4.52 (DEFE 2/1829, Docket No. CO 831/3/52, folio 19; NA). 
658 'Exercise "FIRST RESERVE"', 7.7.52 (DEFE 2/1829, Docket No. CO 83113/52, no folio; NA). 
659 COS (52) 645,25.11.52 (DEFE 2/1828, folio 18; NA), 1. 
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A WHQ was quick to comment, however, that the order of the above priorities should be re-
organised to (c), (d), (b), and (a).660 The most likely reason for the change stemmed from the fact 
that exercises to test the Brigade's ability to work a 'damaged port' had begun as early as 1951, 
one of the first being ATA PORT, which was held in October. 661 This administrative type 
exercise aimed to 'study the employment of 264 Scottish Beach Brigade in the operation and 
development of a small port and its adjacent beaches on the outbreak of war' using a tactical 
scenario in which the port of Glasgow had been damaged heavily by atomic bombs, thus 
necessitating the use of the smaller port of Troon. 662 
However, serious study of this particular problem did not really emerge until 1953 with 
1952 being dominated by the study of the maintenance of expeditionary forces. Having 
ascertained the main threats to the United Kingdom as being from 'sea mining' and 'atomic and 
heavy bomber attacks', A WHQ concluded 'that the alternative of loading onto boats, amphibians 
and lighters without port facilities, is unlikely to achieve the rate of discharge required .. .'. 663 By 
March 1954, whilst in the process of amending the Beach Brigade's original 1947 training 
directive, a number of decisions were 'reached on the tasks, command and organisation of 264 
(Scottish) Beach Brigade', specifically including the re-prioritised roles, the continued use of 
infantry as the core of the formation, and the need for new 'operational' and 'training' 
directives.664 While the roles were further refined over the next few months and then 
disseminated,665 headway was also made with regard to the latter aspects, although the training 
directive was delayed until after Exercise WINCH, held in July 1954.666 This was a maintenance 
exercise conducted by 'the whole of 264 (Scottish) Beach Brigade ... to test the means of supply 
through a small port'. It was held at Zeebrugge and involved not only reserve Royal Marine 
660 _, 'Amphibious Warfare - Note by the War Office', n.d. (DEFE 2/1828, folio 19; NA), 1. . 
661 HQ, 264 SBB (TA), ltr to G Branch, HQ Lowland District, 17.10.50 (DEFE 2/1614, Docket No. CO 786/50, folIo 
24; NA). 
662 Cmdr., 264 SBB, ltr to AWHQ, 9.10.51 (DEFE 211826, Docket No. CO 83111/51, folio 6; NA), 1-2. 
663 [A WHQ], 'Maintenance of Supplies to Great Britain (plan "Super Teak")', [2/3.53] (DEFE 2/2063, Docket No. 
A W (0) 380/52/53, folio 6; NA), i, 1. 
664 Secretary, COS, ltr to ISL, CIGS, CAS, 12.9.51 (DEFE 11110, folio 217; NA), 1-2. . 
665 _ (WO), ltr to GOC, Scottish Command, 14.4.54 (DEFE 2/1889, Docket No. AW 28/3/55, folIo 12; NA). . 
666 DGMT (WO), memorandum for HQ, Scottish Command, 23.7.54 (DEFE 211888, Docket No. AW 28/1/55, folIo 
16; NA). 
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landing craft crews but also LCMs from the Rhine Squadron, which unloaded 'stores destined for 
BAOR. .. from one Liberty Ship and four coasters' .667 
The Brigade's training directive was finally promulgated in December 1954, and offered 
a re-prioritised list of roles, as follows: 
(a) Assistance in the working of damaged ports either in the United Kingdom or on 
the Continent. 
(b) The replacement of damaged ports by beach ports either in the United Kingdom 
or on the Continent. 
(c) The maintenance of a brigade group in the assault over beaches. 
(d) The evacuation of a force over beaches. 668 
Soon after being disseminated, however, the list of roles came under investigation once again, 
this time in an A WHQ report on CAW's responsibilities with regard to 'Port and Beach 
Maintenance'. After first reviewing CAW's directive as it related to this particular field, the 
report scrutinised the specific roles of the Brigade, first by stating outright that 'the task at...(c) 
above is remote', due to the fact that the original task 'for which the Brigade was formed - the 
support of a corps of two divisions - no longer exist[ed]'; and second, by considering that (d), at 
least with regard to the 'evacuation of an assault force', was 'now improbable'. As a result, the 
War Office itself was already re-examining the roles of the Brigade and, with the agreement of 
AWHQ, would 'likely ... propose limiting them to two ... (a) and (b)'.669 
This, in fact, occurred in early 1955 as the Executive Committee of the Army Council 
reduced the roles of the Brigade to '(a) Assistance in the working of damaged ports, small ports, 
harbours, or 'hards', either in the UK or on the Continent; [and] (b) Emergency shipments over 
beaches either in the UK or on the Continent'. 670 As a result, the Brigade was 'no longer 
responsible for maintenance in the assault' which,671 as had been warned in the A WHQ analysis, 
meant that CAW's 'stake in the Brigade must inevitably diminish' .672 Indeed, by the time CAW 
667 COS (54) 372, 2, 7. 
668 VQMG (WO), ltr to CAW, 10.3.54 (DEFE 2/1888: Docket No. AW 28/1/55, folio 9; NA), 1. 
669 AAlQMG, 'Port and Beach Maintenance - Chief of Amphibious Warfare's Responsibilities', 20.12.54 (DEFE 
2/1888: Docket No. AW 28/1/55, folio 20; NA), 1-2. 
670 VQMG, memorandum for CAW, 23.2.55 (DEFE 2/1889: Docket No. AW 28/3/55, folio 35; NA), 1. 
671 d 1 VQMG, memoran um, . 
672 'Port and Beach Maintenance', 2. 
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had compiled his annual report in November, 1955, his responsibility with regard to the Brigade 
had, in fact, 'largely disappeared'. 673 
From 'Combined Operations' to 'Amphibious Warfare'? 
As outlined above, overall British amphibious/expeditionary development during the 
early and mid-1950s appeared to be dominated by such varying forms of amphibious technique 
as 'raiding' and 'beach organisation' operations. Traditional amphibious landing operations were 
not ignored, however, even though they had dropped from first to last priority in the 'operational 
requirements' assessment process of 1950-1. Progress had been made with the establishment of a 
permanent 'Amphibious Warfare Squadron' in early 1952 which, when coupled with the 
redeployment of 3 Commando Brigade to the Mediterranean from the Far East that summer (not 
to mention also the increased availability of Army battalions and their supporting arms), 
provided a relatively significant amount of amphibious training, if not also operational potential. 
Underlying this potential was continued study of larger-scale amphibious operations in 
conjunction with the Americans, as had been outlined in CAW's directive since 1950. Although 
there were many general similarities between American and British techniques, the traditional 
British approach had still evolved in a manner that had some fundamental differences with the 
American (naval) technique (but, simultaneously, similarities with the US Army and Air Force). 
A number of these differences were ultimately revealed by Operation MUSKETEER in 
November 1956, which involved a joint (and combined) seaborne/airborne assault to seize Port 
Said, Egypt. 
OperationalRequirementsfor 'Amphibious Warfare', 1954 
Following on from the early assessment process to determine the peacetime requirements 
for 'combined operations ships and craft', a new operational requirements assessment was 
requested from the JPS on 1 December 1953, the results of which were finally approved by the 
COS on 11 March 1954. It was divided into four parts, including 'cold war', 'hot war', 
'deployment and maintenance' , and 'the need for an Amphibious Warfare Organisation', which 
673 COS (55) 316, 3. 
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not only reflected a fundamental shift in strategic priorities (from 'hot war' to 'cold war') but 
also indicated that amphibious assault operations were now back to a high priority.674 
Concerning the 'cold war', the report generally concluded that 'large-scale assault 
operations' were not likely although 'occasions may arise when small-scale operations would 
have to be carried out'. As a result, amphibious forces were anticipated for the Middle East only, 
although at a scale far below that which had been previously required. To wit, 
[i]t is not possible to foresee exactly what form any of these operations might take or 
what size of minor amphibious lift might be required, but against light opposition, which 
is what we expect, a force of about a battalion group with appropriate lift should be 
adequate. The Amphibious Warfare Squadron ... and the Commando Brigade or Army 
units which are already in the Mediterranean could meet this requirement. 675 
In the case of the 'hot war', the report did not deviate much from previous assessments in that, 
'amphibious operations would of necessity be on a very small scale' (i.e., raiding operations) 
during the initial stages of any future (global) war. Finally, although the report concluded that 
enough LSTs existed to fulfil the requirements for 'deployment and maintenance' purposes and 
that the existing Beach Brigade would also suffice for the time being, it also addressed the issue 
of the need for an 'Amphibious Warfare Organisation,.676 According to the JPS, it was 'unwise 
to assume' that no such requirement would exist and that, consequently, such operations should 
not be forgotten. 
We should keep alive the technique of large-scale assault operations by study at staff 
level only, and by collaboration with the US forces where appropriate. We should 
continue training in small-scale assault and raiding operations. For reasons of economy, 
training and trials should be confmed to the Commando Brigade, the Amphibious 
Squadron and the Beach Brigade. This should not exclude minor amphibious exercises by 
. b 1· h 677 army umts up to atta IOn strengt . 
'Amphibious Warfare' Training, Exercises, and Doctrine Development 
Although the above assessment appeared to devolve a primary amphibious role to the 
Commandos, as even the JPS report noted, it was not to the point of exclusivity. This was 
demonstrated by the exercises that were undertaken over the course of the next few years, which 
674 COS (54) 79,12.3.54 (DEFE 5/51; NA). See also COS (53) 136th Meeting, 3; and JP (54) 8 (0) T ofR, n.d. (DEFE 
2/2060, folios 34, 35; NA). 
675 COS (54) 79, 2-5 
676 COS (54) 79, 3-6. 
677 COS (54) 79,5. Emphasis added. 
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involved both the Commandos and Army battalions, not to mention also Army supporting units. 
The year 1954, for example, witnessed all three Commandos receiving practical training, as did 
'one infantry battalion, with supporting arms ... both by day and by night'. This had occurred 
despite the fact that 'the command and military forces to be exercised were situated in the Canal 
Zone' .678 Exercise FLOODTIDE, which was held in August, 'was the first occasion since 1948 
in which an army battalion carried out a full scale amphibious exercise'. In addition to this unit, a 
number of supporting army elements were also employed, including one troop from the Field 
Artillery, RA, one troop from the 1 st Royal Tank Regiment (RTR), and one 'ad hoc' amphibious 
platoon from the 1st Armoured Divisional Column, RASC. Some of these same supporting units 
exercised with various Commandos in separate instances, including another troop from the 1 st 
RTR (plus a troop from 33 Airborne Field Battery, RA) in Exercise MEDCONVEX with 45 
Commando, and the aforementioned 'ad hoc' amphibious platoon in Exercise MEDFLEX 
BAKER with 42 Commando. Finally, RUNAGROUND V again employed an army battalion-
the 1 st Battalion, Rifle Brigade-to demonstrate the amphibious assault. 679 
1955 saw a further expansion of joint training, even though 'two of the major exercises 
were cancelled at short notice'. 40 and 45 Commandos took part in two significant exercises, the 
larger of which-BON MARCHE-consisted of an 'amphibious assault' with the latter 
Commando, one troop of the 14/20 Kings Hussars, one troop of the 3 rd Regiment, Royal Horse 
Artillery (RHA), and the 266 Amphibious Observation Battery, RA (AOBRA). The Hussars and 
RHA troops, in fact, were also slated for Exercise FULL SAIL in support of the 1 st Battalion, 
South Staffords-along with one troop, Royal Engineers (RE), and the Amphibious Platoon, 
RASC-although this was ultimately cancelled. Also cancelled was its smaller substitute, 
STORMSAIL, in which 42 Commando was to participate. Finally, the 1 st Battalion, Highland 
678 COS (54) 372,1-2. 
679 COS (54) 372, 4-7. 
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Light Infantry participated in the RUNAGROUND demonstration in May, which included a 
'Helicopter Phase' , along with 42 Commando, which performed the cliff assault. 680 
Finally, due to Commando commitments in 1956, the only significant amphibious 
training was allocated to Army units, even though a number of their exercises were ultimately 
cancelled. The most significant exercise of the year, for example, was carried out by the 1 st 
Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders, in Exercise FORTHRIGHT, which was designed 'to carry out 
progressive training, covering all aspects of the amphibious assault and re-embarkation ... '. Other 
exercises similar in scale included SHELLDRAKE, which was a night landing (and withdrawal), 
and MEDTACEX, which involved the 'landing ofa [Turkish] military force of battalion strength 
over two beaches in support of a larger operation (imaginary)'. Two additional exercises were 
notable even though they were cancelled as they were each more expansive than any previous 
exercises held to date. The first, BEAU SEJOUR, was to have involved the 'landing of two 
battalions (one British and one French) and supporting forces by night...[and] re-embarked 
tactically the following night'. The second of the cancelled exercises was SEASHELL which, as 
'the largest British amphibious exercise carried out in the Mediterranean for some time', was to 
have involved 'the landing of a battalion with supporting arms under cover of naval gunfire and 
air support'. Rounding out these endeavours was the annual RUNAGROUND demonstration, 
which again 'included a helicopter phase' during the battalion assault, provided by the newly-
formed Joint Experimental Helicopter Unit (1EHU).681 
What all of these exercises suggest, as initially mentioned, was that although the 
'operational requirements' assessment had called for a reduction in the scale of training and 
trials, this did not seem to alter previous policies concerning the inter-Service nature of British 
amphibious/expeditionary practice. Indeed, both the Royal Marine Commando Brigade as well 
as various Army battalions continued to be trained in--or earmarked for-amphibious 
680 COS (55) 316, 4-11. . 
681 COS (56) 404, 4-5,12-15; and A WHQ, AWHQ Information Letter No.7, 1956, 7.1.57 (LIbrary; RMM), 3-9. 
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operations, particularly the latter after the Commandos were deployed to Cyprus for 'internal 
security' duties in late 1955. 
This state of affairs was reinforced even further by the promulgation of various doctrinal 
publications by A WHQ, which continued to address amphibious/expeditionary operations 
specifically from a joint perspective. This included straightforward doctrine, which had been 
promulgated throughout the 1950s in the form of the so-called Amphibious Warfare Handbooks 
(AWHBs). For example, and as discussed above, the two books that covered Commandos and 
raiding operations, Nos. lOa and lOb, respectively, stated explicitly that they were not applicable 
to any single Service exclusively.682 Indeed, a quick glance at the organisational arrangement of 
COHBs/ A WHBs reveals a similar organisational methodology used to classify the World War II 
era COPs, which involved separating volumes according to role or Service. Correspondingly, the 
COHBs/AWHBs comprised a number of series, including 'Series 3' for 'Naval Units and 
Formations', 'Series 4' for' Army Formations', 'Series 7' for 'Units for Beach Maintenance', 
'Series 8' for 'Air Forces', and 'Series 10' for 'Commando and Raid Technique' .683 
One of the more notable of these manuals was No. 8a, Employment of Air Forces in 
Amphibious Warfare. Promulgated in 1952, it addressed both 'the Royal Air Force and Naval 
Aviation' as essentially inter-changeable, which would have been impossible in the US 
considering the current state of disagreement between the US Air Force and the other services.684 
Probably the most significant manual, however, was A WHB No. 4a, The Battalion with 
Supporting Arms in the Amphibious Assault, which was released in 1956, notably in the wake of 
the re-organisational downsizing and partial consolidation of the A WHQ establishment. In one of 
its introductory paragraphs, this Handbook effectively underscored the inherently joint nature of 
amphibious operations and, on the eve of one of the most famous 'combined operations' in 
682 See page 175 above. . . ' 
683 See Appendix X for a complete list of planned publications as outlined in The Manual of Combined OperatIOns, 
1950. 
684 A WHQ (CAW), A WHB No. 8a, The Employment of Air Forces in Amphibious Warfare, 1952 (DEFE 2/1768; NA). 
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British history, thus reinforced one of the mam differences between British and American 
amphibious/expeditionary courses of development. 685 
It sh?~ld be understood that there is no "black magic" in the various aspects of 
amphIbIOuS warfare. By virtue of the fact that two or more of the fighting services are 
always involved and that it depends upon a large degree of close co-operation, careful 
planning and exact timing, it is perhaps a little more complicated than some other forms 
of warfare. 686 
A similarly arranged set of publications, which also reflected the British joint approach 
toward amphibious/expeditionary operations, was the Amphibious Warfare Policy Statements 
(AWPS) series, whose 'function ... [was] to present the overall policy of Amphibious Warfare, as 
a basis for thought, planning and teaching within Amphibious Warfare Headquarters and the 
School of Amphibious Warfare,.687 Accordingly, the series was arranged according to subject, or 
'Item', as follows: 
I. General 
II. Amphibious Assault by Battalion/Commando ... 
III. Amphibious Raiding 
IV. Maintenance Over Beaches and Through Damaged Ports 
V. Withdrawal of a Large Force 
VI. Amphibious Assault in a Nuclear War 
VII. Defence Against an Assault Landing 
VIII. Training - SAW Curriculum688 
Each 'Item' area, in turn, comprised a number of subsidiary statements, which provided details 
about particular aspects of each subj ect. 
Whilst the above arrangement clearly reflected the joint-service organizational approach 
taken by the British, a few of the individual Statements reinforced the joint nature of system 
more specifically. One straightforward example was Number 102, which was simply a reprint of 
the existing 'Directive to Chief of Amphibious Warfare' who, as discussed previously, continued 
to be developmentally responsible for a broad range of joint amphibious enterprises.689 Probably 
the most significant Statement, however, was Number 202, 'Forces Available', which, whilst 
685 A WHQ (CAW), A WHB No. 4a, The Battalion with Supporting Anns in the Amphibious Assault, 1956 (DEFE 
2/1760; NA). 
686 AWHB No. 4a, 1. Emphasis added. 
687 CAW, [AWPS], 'Introduction', 1.2.56 (DEFE 2/1889, Docket No. AW 554/56, folio 3; NA). 
688 CAW, [AWPS], 'Index', n.d. (DEFE 2/1889, Docket No. AW 554/56, folio 3; NA), 1-2. 
689 CAW, A WPS VI02, 'Directive to Chief of Amphibious Warfare', 1.2.56 (DEFE 2/1889, Docket No. AW 554/56, 
folio 3; NA), 1-3. 
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specifically listing the three Commandos of '3 Commando Brigade RM' as an option, began by 
presenting the standard option: 'Any Infantry Battalion with appropriate sub units of supporting 
arms and Services provided they are at a satisfactory level of military training, and have had the 
necessary specialized amphibious training as a team' .690 Finally, two particularly interesting 
observations can be made about Number 601, 'Limited War', which, as noted above, fell under 
'Item' VI, 'Amphibious Assault in Nuclear War'. Somewhat ironically, considering the general 
lack of attention given to the offensive employment of nuclear weapons in limited war, the first 
addressed exactly this issue, noting that if 'there [was] a possibility of nuclear retaliation, the 
employment by us of atomic missiles in plentiful numbers would be imperative'. Less serious but 
much more prescient was the conclusion reached about the future role of amphibious landings 
within the wider purview of joint operations, which was simply that: 'Amphibious operations 
will become increasingly complementary airborne/seaborne operations' .691 Whilst an operational 
example of this would be witnessed by the end of the year and again in 1961, the evolution of a 
distinct 'joint warfare' concept and corresponding organisation would follow over the course of 
the next half dozen years. 
Operation MUSKETEER: Suez, 1956 
In early November 1956, British and French seaborne and airborne forces launched 
Operation MUSKETEER. This was, according to one source, an 'old style amphibious 
operation',692 which resembled the 'combined operations' that had characterised the ETO during 
World War--except on a smaller scale-and involved an integrated seaborne and airborne 
attack. Although sometimes referred to as a military failure, the consensus maintains that the 
military operations were mostly successful and that political interference precluded the military 
b· . fi b' h' d 693 o ~ectIves rom emg ac leve . 
690 CAW, A WPS II1202, 'Forces Available', 1.2.56 (DEFE 2/1889, Docket No. AW 554/56, folio 3; NA). 
691 CAW, A WPS VV601, ['Limited War'], [5.56] (DEFE 2/1889, Docket No. 554/56, folio 4; NA), 3-6. 
692 Speller, Role, 200; 'Role', 163. . . 
693 See, for example, Speller, Ian, 'The Suez Crisis: Operation MUSKETEER, November 1956' ill Lovenng, 397-412. 
See also Fullick, Roy, and Geoffrey Powell, SUEZ: The Double War (Bamsley: Pen & Sword Books, Ltd., 2006; fIrst 
published 1979); Jackson, Robert, SUEZ: The Forgotten Invasion (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing Lt.d., 1996; first 
published 1980 as Operation Musketeer); Fergusson, Chapter XVI; and Grove, Vanguard, Chapter Five; 
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Planning for this enterprise involved a number of sequential phases, beginning with the 
composition of an 'outline plan' by the JPS, which established the Task Force concept and forces 
required. This was followed by the first 'Musketeer' plan, which was based upon 'an initial air 
assault to neutralise the Egyptian Air Force, followed by a joint assault on Alexandria, with a 
build-up and break-out along the desert road towards Cairo and an advance across the Delta to 
the Canal'. "'Musketeer" Revise' replaced this original version and was divided into three 
phases, which culminated in a 'joint assault against Port Said, followed by a build-up and break-
out down the length of the Canal' .694 
Although this 'Revise' plan was ultimately adopted (and executed), mention should be 
made of two 'last minute revisions'-involving Operation OMLETTE695 and Operation 
TELESCOPE-the latter of which involved landing 'the parachute forces a day in advance of the 
main assault'. While the original reason for this was to pre-empt 'a possible order for a cease fire 
by the United Nations', it was also hoped that this show of force would be enough to force the 
Egyptians to capitulate and/or allow the main assault to land with little, if any, opposition.696 
Two things were noteworthy of these plans that helped distinguish Britain's approach 
towards amphibious/expeditionary operations as having inherently joint characteristics. At the 
operational level, they all included some sort of joint airborne/seaborne assault scheme which, as 
mentioned above, resembled the classic 'combined operations' enterprises employed during 
World War II, although on a much smaller scale. At the tactical level, the jointness of the purely 
amphibious part of the operation was distinguished by the fact that the Commandos had to be 
supplemented by Army supporting arms and support units, which was inherently different from 
the US Marine Corps' Fleet Marine Force that had all of its supporting elements organic to the 
formation. 
As a matter of fact, two parallel themes emerged from Operation MUSKETEER's after-
action analyses, both of which also related to Britain's joint approach to 
694 Air TF Commander (RAF), 'Report on Operation "Musketeer''', 27.11.56 (AIR 20/10746; NA), 2-3. 
695 _, 'Operations of Allied Forces Against Egypt - Operation Musketeer', 11.56 (ADM 205/150, no folio; NA), 6. 
696 'Report', 2-3. 
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amphibious/expeditionary warfare development. The first fell under the more general subject 
area of 'flexibility of forces', which took into account both 'air operations' and 'airborne 
operations' as being complementary to what appeared to be a scaled-down version of the classic 
'combined operation'. The second involved the more specific aspect of 'amphibious assault 
forces' where two related issues were addressed, one being the Commandos' lack of supporting 
arms and the other concerning the minimum size of the operational formation required to conduct 
a true amphibious assault against opposition. 
With regard to 'air operations', one of the primary factors involved in the success of 
MUSKETEER was the air support provided by the carriers in the Mediterranean, particularly 
with regard to the support given both the airborne and seaborne landings.697 More significant was 
the value placed on 'airborne' forces (and operations), which were 'clearly the ideal type of 
forces for such operations'. 698 Indeed, it appeared that airborne forces were valued even higher 
than seaborne forces, judging from the priorities recommended by the Commander-in-Chief, 
Allied Forces. First was the requirement for '[s]ufficient airborne forces complete with 
supporting weapons and transport and load carrying transport aircraft'; this was followed by 
, [ a] ssault forces complete with sufficient landing craft' .699 
This situation notwithstanding, praise for the Royal Marine Commandos in 
MUSKETEER was almost unanimously positive, except in one particular area. As the 
Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces, concluded in his post-operation recommendations, 'they do 
not possess supporting arms such as guns and therefore ... army formations must always include 
such operations in their training'. 700 Supporting the above critique was the generally accepted 
proposition, even by the Admiralty, that 'a Brigade Group [was] the smallest force capable of 
sustained operations against opposition. Anything smaller must be regarded as a raiding force or 
697 [Admiralty], 'Naval Report on Operation Musketeer', 15.2.57 (ADM 116/6209; NA), 1-2, 7. See also General Sir 
Charles F. Keightley, C-in-C Allied Forces, 'Certain Specific Recommendations (Operations in Egypt, November to 
December, 1956)', [1957] (DEFE 7/1081; NA), 12-13. 
698 'Recommendations', 18. 
699 'Recommendations', 19. 
700 'Recommendations', 14. 
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as subsidiary to the main operation'. 701 In arriving at this conclusion, a number of smaller 
formations were analysed, including a 'battalion group', a 'two battalion group' and a 'brigade 
group'. With regard to the first, it was determined that: 
[a] force of this size has insufficient strength on its own to do more than seize a very 
small bridgehead. It has no reserves and can only remain in close contact with the enemy 
for a limited period. It can, in fact, only be regarded as a raiding force with a limited 
objective and a limited period ashore before:- (a) Withdrawal is necessary. (b) Contact 
with friendly troops ashore is effected.702 
This was particularly significant because the previously discussed 'operational requirements' 
report of March 1954, had determined that 'a force of about the size of a battalion group with 
appropriate lift should be adequate' for possible assault landing operations 'against light 
opposition'. As a result of this discrepancy, there appeared to be a sizeable gap between possible 
requirements and current capabilities. 
As the 'two battalion group' was simply deemed 'too weak to be effective and lack[ed] 
balance', only the 'brigade group' was judged 'capable of independent sustained action', for 
three reasons. The first centred on its ability to attack 'on a reasonably wide front (two battalions 
up) ... to overcome opposition and secure a bridgehead'. Second, it had a reserve with which it 
could launch counter-attacks, initiate breakouts, or relieve/refit units, if necessary. Lastly, it 
could allow a follow-up force to pass through its bridgehead 'against reasonable opposition', 
provided it had 'a two battalion assault lift' (or helicopters).703 This latter lift requirement also 
seemed to conflict directly with the scale stipulated in the 1954 'operational requirements' 
assessment (as mentioned above), which meant that the Amphibious Warfare Squadron was 
woefully short of sufficient lift to launch a truly viable amphibious assault operation (i.e., at 
brigade group scale against opposition) at short notice. According to the MUSKETEER analysis, 
in fact, it appeared that the Amphibious Warfare Squadron and Commando Brigade were 
technically only capable of launching large-scale raids! 
701 'Naval Report', 7. 
702 'Naval Report', 95. 
703 'Naval Report', 95. 
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CONCLUSION 
From the various observations discussed above, it was evident that the course of British 
amphibious/expeditionary development generally continued on from the consolidation period of 
the late 1 940s, which remained joint (i. e. , inter-Service) in character. This was particularly 
demonstrated by the (joint) nature of the Suez operation, both with regard to the simultaneous 
employment of airborne and seaborne forces to mount an assault along the lines of the Normandy 
invasion (but obviously on a smaller scale) and with regard to the fact that the RM Commandos 
were supplemented by Army supporting arms, which not only included artillery and armour but 
also such items as anti-tank units and weapons. As a result, this left the British joint approach 
towards amphibious/expeditionary warfare development largely opposed to the American single-
service (i.e., naval) approach that was prevalent at the time, although by the tum of the decade, 
these trends seemed to soften in both countries. 
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PART THREE: 1957-1968 
AMERICAN AND BRITISH COMPROMISE ... OR DEBATE? 
Following on from the early and mid-1950s, the 1957-1968 period continued to witness a 
general trend of developmental convergence between (and within) the United States and the 
United Kingdom. This was perhaps most notably illustrated by the promulgation of newly-
approved, American joint amphibious doctrine by NATO in 1968. However, at the same time, it 
was also evident that certain significant differences continued to exist, not only internationally 
but also within each subject country. 
In the US, whilst the US Naval Service advanced its 'future concept' by gradually 
procuring helicopters and amphibious shipping as well as by conducting increasingly larger 
exercises, all of the services continued to work on formulating viable joint amphibious operations 
doctrine. This effort first bore fruit in 1962, with agreement having been reached between the 
Naval Service and the Army. The Air Force eventually concurred with a newly-revised edition in 
1967, a 'sanitized' version of which, as mentioned above, was adopted by NATO the next year. 
At the same time, both the Army and, to a lesser extent, the Air Force continued to develop what 
were ultimately expeditionary capabilities, which included such areas as doctrine promulgation 
and equipment procurement. From an operational standpoint, however, these joint developments 
appeared to be overshadowed by an expansion of the Naval Service's amphibious capabilities 
and by early amphibious operations conducted during the Vietnam War, which were performed 
almost exclusively by the Navy and Marine Corps. Not only did this seem to illustrate the 
Department of the Navy's domination of the amphibious warfare field in general, but it also 
revealed specific underlying differences amongst the services with regard to both concept and 
execution. 
In Britain, yet another review of the changing geo-strategic situation ultimately caused 
the Royal Navy to shift its own strategic priorities and, correspondingly, its force structure. This 
resulted in the initial conceptualisation of the 'commando carrier force' initiative which, by 
1962, had evolved to predominate almost the Royal Navy's entire raison d'etre (aside from 
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aircraft carriers). As this scheme was being implemented, mainly through the procurement of 
amphibious shipping and the expansion of the Royal Marine Commandos, it was overtaken by 
the formulation of the 'seaborne/airborne/land operations' concept by A WHQ which, after 
effectively being tested operationally in Kuwait in mid-1961, ultimately evolved into the 'joint 
warfare' concept. This, in tum, resulted in a complete institutional re-organisation that 
amalgamated AWHQ into a new 'Joint Warfare' structure that included not only a 'Committee', 
a 'Staff and an 'Establishment', but also a specific sub-committee for amphibious warfare. 
Whilst the Royal Marine Commandos found themselves playing an increasingly central role in 
this new arrangement by providing the core of the seaborne (light) infantry required for the 
amphibious side of 'joint warfare' operations, there were still a few fundamental differences that 
distinguished them from the USMC's FMF, particularly with regard to force structure. Although 
Commando units consisted of specially trained marines and were mostly employed as highly 
mobile, light rapid reaction forces, they lacked organic fire support elements such as armour and 
(light and heavy) artillery-not to mention also organic air elements-which had to be supplied 
by the Army, thus restricting the Commandos' exclusive use to so-called 'cold war' operations. 
This was opposed to the American FMF units which, whilst comprising 'air-ground' teams of 
fully-integrated 'combined arms' that included armour, (light) artillery, combat engineers, and 
even organic air support, were exclusively employable in 'cold war', 'limited war', and even 
certain 'general war' situations. In short, whilst the Commandos were essentially lighter, 
specially-trained and -organised forces that performed amphibious tasks (amongst others), like 
their proteges-the US Army Rangers-in World War II, FMF units were heavier, 
amphibiously-trained and -organised forces that sometimes performed special tasks, as their 
nation's 'force-in-readiness'. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE UNITED STATES, 1957-1968 
OVERVIEW 
As with the previous two chapters that discussed American amphibious/expeditionary 
warfare developments up to 1957, the subsequent period up to 1968 has also been generally 
portrayed as being pre-dominated by naval developments.704 The US Naval Service did, indeed, 
gain significant ground in this regard, due primarily to the gradual but deliberate procurement of 
helicopters and amphibious shipping. This enabled it to conduct division-size amphibious assault 
exercises over long distances in the mid-1960s, which was an indication that it was at least on the 
verge of attaining a true expeditionary capacity. However, a number of notable developments by 
the other services did take place, a fact that has been largely overlooked, at least until very 
recently.705 
On the one hand, the most evident example of joint development was the adoption of so-
called joint 'doctrine for amphibious operations'. This was achieved first by the Naval Service 
and the Army in 1962, and then also by the Air Force in 1967. Indeed, a 'sanitized version' of 
this exact doctrine was also adopted by NATO one year later. On the other hand, the Army and, 
to a lesser extent, the Air Force continued to forge ahead with their separate expeditionary 
efforts, although these generally declined over time during the 1960s. By far the most significant 
aspect of Army development was the continued promulgation of uni-service doctrine and 
concepts, which still tended to emphasise the characteristics of the large-scale 'joint amphibious 
operations' or 'invasions' that had taken place during World War II. 
Even with these joint and Army advances, by 1968 it appeared that the Naval Service 
had, in fact, been able to dominate, if not actually monopolise, most aspects of 
amphibious/expeditionary warfare development. Not only was this evidenced by the 
aforementioned expanded amphibious capabilities but it was also due to the fact that almost all of 
704 See Introduction, 15 -18. 
705 See Introduction, 21. 
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the amphibious operations during the first few years of Vietnam War were conducted solely by 
the US Navy and Marines, which had formed two special (floating) formations to do so. 
STRATEGIC ASPECTS 
The period 1957-1968 can generally be characterised as one of strategic transition from a 
reliance on 'massive retaliation', which was based on the employment of overwhelming strategic 
and tactical nuclear forces in cases of 'general war' with the Soviet Union, to the adoption of a 
strategy of 'flexible response', which emphasised (in addition to nuclear retaliation) the 
employment of strategic and tactical (nuclear-capable) conventional forces in 'cold', 'limited' 
and even some 'general' war scenarios, particularly in the most unstable regions of the world. 
This was significant from an amphibious/expeditionary warfare development standpoint mainly 
because this latter strategy vastly increased the demand for strategically (and tactically) mobile 
and ready conventional forces that needed to be deliverable by either seaborne or airborne means, 
or both. Although this category seemed to describe the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) of the Naval 
Service and even seemed to dovetail with the Marine Corps' helicopter-centric 'concept for 
future amphibious operations', so too did the airborne and air-transportable forces of the US 
Anny, which not only were based around the globe near certain regions of instability but also 
would soon exist as a ready, strategic reserve in the continental United States. Indeed, the 
complementariness of air-lifted and sea-lifted forces, which also characterised similar British 
forces and the operations in which they participated, was aptly demonstrated in all three of the 
most significant contingency operations that took place during this period; in Lebanon in 1958, 
during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and in the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 
1965. 
Defence Policy 
Most general accounts trace the evolution ofthe 'flexible response' strategy as beginning 
in 1961, the first year of the Kennedy administration.706 A few scholars have pointed out that this 
706 See Gaddis, Strategies, ix, Chapter 7. 
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process actually began as early as 1957, if not before. This is argued not only from the 
perspective of nuclear strategy but also from a conventional force posture standpoint. 707 Central 
to the strategic phase was the concept of 'limited war', which also emerged on the public stage in 
1957.708 Although the general notion had actually found its way into the Basic National Security 
Policy (BNSP) documentation prior to 1957,709 it was the introduction of a 'new strategic 
concept' in February of that year that proved seminal, indicating that a shift in emphasis from 
'general war' to 'limited war' was underway.7lO Simply put, this new concept now identified 'two 
military eventualities: (a) cold war or military conflict short of general war and (b) general war 
initiated with an atomic onslaught by the Soviets ... '. As a result, America's 'military posture' 
needed to be changed to provide: 
(1) A forward deployment of US ready military forces ... both to counter local aggression 
and to carry out the initial tasks of general war. 
(2) Mobile ready forces, principally based on US territory, which can be deployed 
rapidly to provide reinforcement to forward deployed forces ... or to fight unassisted .... 
(3) An atomic retaliatory capability .... 
(4) A defense system ... to protect the war-making capacity and resources of the Western 
Hemisphere. 
(5) Forces as necessary to provide the capability of maintaining essential land and sea 
and air communications. 711 
From the above classifications, it was quite evident that amphibious forces, which were 'forward 
deployed' almost by definition, fell into the first category and therefore were to receive primary 
focus in the future. A bit less evident, perhaps, were those (ground and air) forces already 
forward deployed and easily (and quickly) transportable (mainly by air), which also seemed to 
fall into the first category. These included, for example, Army and Air Force forces garrisoned in 
Europe, which could be quickly and relatively easily dispatched to the Mediterranean and Middle 
East if required (as they were for the Lebanon crisis in 1958). More significant in the future, 
707 Freedman, Lawrence, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2nd edn. (HoundmillslLondon: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 
1989), Chapters 7,8; and Heuser, Chapter 2. 
708 Lincoln, G. A (Col., USA), and A A Jordan (Lt. Col., USA), 'Limited War and the Scholars', MR, 37:10 (1/58), 
60. See also Kissinger, Henry A, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 
1958; first published June 1957); and Osgood, Robert E., Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago, 
ILlLondon: The University of Chicago Press, 1957). 
709 Annexes to NSC 5422, 6/14/54, in FRUS, 1952-54, Vol. II, National Security Affairs, Part 2 (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 1984),675, for the phrase 'limited military aggression'. 
710 SecDef, Memorandum to Executive Secretary, NSC, 2/25/57, inFRUS, 1955-57, Vol. XIX, National Security 
Policy (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993),419-424. 
711 SecDef, Memorandum, 424. 
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however, were Army (and later Air Force) forces, stationed in the US, that fell into the second 
category, which would also receive the bulk of attention (and therefore financial support) over 
the next decade even though the requirement for some form of 'strategic reserve' had been 
identified as early as mid_1954.712 
The dual nature of the new strategic concept was noted-albeit not in very much detail-
in subsequent BNSP documents in 1957 and 1958, although 'general war' still seemed to be the 
top priority in 1959.713 Yet another BNSP was drafted though, which outlined the future elements 
of US strategy that would essentially become ensconced as the central tenet of American defence 
policy for the next decade (and longer), where 
the United States and its allies in the aggregate will have to have, for an indefinite period, 
military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and mobility to enable them to deal 
swiftly and severely with Communist overt aggression in its various forms and to prevail 
in general war should one develop.714 
War Planning and Contingency Operations 
As strategic attention shifted from 'general' war to 'cold' and, more importantly, 
'limited' war scenarios, so too did the focus of war planning. This was not to say that planning 
for general war had stopped, or even slowed much for that matter. Each military service regularly 
produced a military 'Capabilities Plans' (MCP) that outlined the various force levels required for 
each potential war scenario, although details about forces' probable employment were largely 
missing. For example, the Marine Corps' 1960 'MCP-60' generally provided that, within twelve 
months of D-day, 'three Marine Divisions [and] three Marine Aircraft Wings ... [would] be 
deployed to the European-Mediterranean Area', whilst an additional 'Marine Division [and] one 
Marine Aircraft Wing ... [would]. .. remain deployed in the Pacific Western Area'.71S More specific 
requirements were laid out by each unified command war plan, such as those by USCINCEUR, 
which called for Marine Corps forces ranging from' 119 of a DivlWing Team initially' in the case 
712 NSC 5422,6/14/54, inFRUS, 1952-54, Vol. II, National Security Affairs, Part 2 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 
647-667. 
713 NSC 5707/8, 6/3/57, in FRUS, 1955-57, Vol. XIX, National Security Policy (Washington, DC: GPO, 1993),507-
524; and NSC 5810/1, 5/5/58, and NSC 5904/1, 3/17/59, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. III, National Security Policy; Arms 
Control and Disarmament (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996),98-116,207-210. 
714 NSC 590611,8/5/59, in FRUS, 1958-60, Vol. III, 292-316. 
715 CMC, 'Letter of Promulgation [MCP-60]', 6/19/59 (RG 127: VHQMCD, Box 2, [File f]; NARA), 1-16. 
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of USCINCEUR PLAN 200-12, which focused on the region of Italy during '[g]eneral war or 
just prior to its outbreak', to '2 DivlWing Teams' in the case ofUSCINCEUR PLANs 100-2 and 
100-3, the former of which was 'EUCOM's basic general war plan'.716 Neither plan, again, 
provided details about how these forces were to be used. 
As the number of 'limited' and 'cold' war scenarios increased, so too did the variations 
in force levels required for various contingency war plans. This was particularly relevant for the 
Marine Corps which, by the early 1960s, had essentially established three standing, forward-
deployed amphibious formations of battalion size to act as the nation's 'force-in-readiness', 
located in the Mediterranean (since the late 1940s), the Western Pacific (since the late 1950s), 
and the Caribbean (since 1959/60). Contingency plans for Latin America, for example, which 
were contained in CINCARIB's 6- series plans, generally required force levels of up to 
RLTIMAG size, for possible use in the 'Brazil'/'Uruguay-Argentina', 'Colombia-Ecuador', and 
'Peru-Chile' areas.717 European limited war plans called for a total of two BLT IMAG formations, 
one for Yugoslavia (USCINCEURPLAN 100-4) and 'another for general use in cold war 
situations anywhere in the EUCOM area' (CINCLANT PLAN 310-59; USCINCEUR PLAN 
100-1). For the Middle East and Mediterranean, CINCSPECOMME's 215- series plans, of which 
there were fourteen variations covering 1958 and 1959, required forces ranging from a single 
BLT (for Lebanon or Jordan), to a single BLTIMAG (for Iraq), to a full RLTIMAG plus an 
additional BLTIMAG (for Morocco). The most FMF units and supporting forces, however, were 
earmarked for the Far East with up to one division/wing team each for Indonesia and Vietnam 
and up to two divisions/wings each for Korea and Taiwan. 718 
Overall, it is interesting to note that the limited war force distribution for the Marine 
Corps was far larger in the Pacific (the Naval Service's historical launching point for amphibious 
warfare in 'total war') and represented the polar opposite of force distribution for general war 
716 Historical Branch (G-3), HQ, USMC, 'Historical Examination of Marine Corps Amphibious and Force in 
Readiness Commitments Since 1945', 1/7/60 (RG 127: VHQMCD, Box 2, [File c]; NARA), C-5. 
717 'Historical Examination', V-I, C-4. 
718 'Historical Examination', V-l- V-2, Tab 3 (C-l through C-5). 
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force requirements, which concentrated on Europe and the Mediterranean. At the same time, 
although it was evident that the number of limited and cold war contingency plans had 
proliferated considerably, it was the quality of these war plans that came into question. This was 
evidenced by the lack of overall coordination in all three of the major joint contingency 
operations that were conducted between 1958 and 1965/19 all of which demonstrated the loose 
characteristics of what the British would eventually embrace as so-called 'seaborne/airborne/land 
operations'. Indeed, even after the intervention in Lebanon in 1958 and the near-
intervention/invasion of Cuba in 1962, the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army 
General Maxwell Taylor, complained about this exact lack of quality as late as mid-1964. ' .. .1 
have been impressed by the incompleteness of our past contingency planning', he said, noting 
that 'our other contingency plans are little more than outlines which could not be expanded for 
implementation other than on a "crash" basis without months of additional staff work both in the 
field and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff .720 This assessment would prove true yet again in the last of 
the major joint contingency operations of the time period in the Dominican Republic in 1965.721 
ORGANISATIONAL/INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 
As a result of the combination of scientific advances in modem weaponry and delivery 
systems, most notably nuclear devices (and their means of delivery, including nuclear 
submarines and particularly ballistic missiles), and their concomitant rise in costs, the 
719 For Lebanon, for example, see various documents in FRUS, 1958-1960, Volume XI, Lebanon, 9-10,54,60, 150-
152,231; HQ (G-3), US Army, Europe, 'The US Army Task Force in Lebanon', 1959 (author's copy); Gray, David 
W., (MG, USA, Ret.), The US Intervention in Lebanon, 1958: A Commander's Reminiscence (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: 
CSI, USA C&GSC, 8/84); Schulimson, Jack, Marines in Lebanon, 1958, Marine Corps Historical Pamphlet 
(Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC, 1966); and Spiller, Roger J., "Not War But Like War": 
The American Intervention in Lebanon, Leavenworth Papers, No.3 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CSI, USA C&GSC, 1/81); 
Wade, Gary H. (LCOL, USA), Rapid Deployment LogistiCS: Lebanon, 1958, Research Survey No.3 (Ft. Leavenworth, 
KS: USA C&GSC, lO/84). For Cuba, see various documents in FRUS, 1961-1963, Volume X, Cuba, 1961-1962, 732-
733, 749-756, 886-892, 917-920, lO82-lO83, 1089-1090; and in Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, 
documents 13, 17, 150, and 186. See also CINCLANT, 'CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis -1963 (U)', 
4/29/63 (RG 127: RRPAUSMCR&HS, Box 11, File 8, Parts 1 & 2; NARA), especially 17-57. 
720 CJCS, ltr to SecDef, 7/1/64, in FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. X, National Security Policy (Washington, DC: GPO, 2002), 
97-101. 
721 See, for example, Palmer, Bruce, Jr., Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965 (Lexington, 
KY:P The University Press of Kansas, 1989); Schoonmaker, Herbert G., Military Crisis Management: US Intervention 
in the Dominican Republic, 1965, Contributions in Military Studies, Number 95 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1990); Yates, Lawrence A., Power Pack: US Intervention in the Dominican RepUblic, 1965-1966, Leavenworth 
Papers, Number 15 (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: CSI, USA C&GSC, 1988). See also -' 'CHRONOLOGY - US Marine 
Corps Operations in the Dominican Republic, April-June 1965'(1988); and -' 'US Marine Operations in the 
Dominican Republic, April-June 1965', n.d. (RG 127: RG&AU, Box 19, File 5; NARA). 
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Department of Defense came under another round of financial and organisational scrutiny.722 
This was magnified by President Eisenhower's specific concern 'that fierce inter-service rivalries 
had been re-kindled' .723 As a result, the President, in his State of Union message in January, 
prioritised another examination of the defence establishment and, on 3 April 1958, proposed yet 
another re-organisation effort to Congress.724 In announcing his intentions, the President listed 
the underlying principles behind his rationale for more changes. 
First, separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. If ever again we should be 
involved in war, we will fight it in all elements, with all services, as one single 
concentrated effort. Peacetime preparatory and organizational activity must conform to 
this fact. Strategic and tactical planning must be completely unified, combat forces 
organized into unified commands, each equipped with the most efficient weapons 
systems that science can develop, singly led and prepared to fight as one, regardless of 
• 725 
servIce. 
Parts of the speech seemed to echo the message of the British 'RAW Committee' of 1944 when 
it argued that the COHQ organisation needed to have a permanent establishment so that the 
knowledge gained and lessons learned could be retained and continued. However, the whole 
philosophy of increased integration of the armed forces was generally opposed by the 
Department ofthe Navy, as it had been since the late 1940s. 
1958 Defence Re-organisation Act 
Underlying this resistance was the fear that increased integration would weaken-if not 
separate-the already integrated surface, air and ground forces of the Naval Service which, in 
effect, would undermine the whole concept of 'sea power'. In addition, the Navy's senior 
leadership, notably the CNO, also feared that Army and Air Force officers continued to 
misunderstand the 'sea power' concept and would therefore misuse the country's otherwise 
invaluable naval (including amphibious) forces. 726 Finally, still others within the defence 
722 Organizational Development, 35-44. 
723 Schwartz, 90. 
724 'President Eisenhower's Message-3 April 1958' in Cole ... , 175-187. 
725 'President Eisenhower's Message', 175. 
726 Schwartz, 92. 
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establishment even 'feared that passage of the legislation would lead to the merger of the 
Services or the abolition ofthe Marine Corps' .727 
After lengthy negotiations and some (minor) compromise, Congress approved and the 
President signed into law, the 'Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958' .728 As with 
all previous legislation that increased centralisation over the defence establishment this law was , 
no different. The main thrust of these changes was to consolidate further the Secretary of 
Defense's control over the armed forces at the expense of the military departments and their 
Chiefs.729 From the Naval Service's point of view (and specifically that of the Marine Corps), 
this meant that the major services would be increasingly precluded from waging their own land, 
air and sea (or naval) campaigns; instead, there would be increasing pressure to mount joint 
operations using land, air and sea elements. In other words, the integrated 'amphibious 
operations' that were usually conducted by the Navy and Marine Corps (as a single Naval 
Service) were apparently having to give way to the employment of 'joint amphibious operations' 
by the Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force, which ultimately resembled the traditional 
British practice. This trend seemed applicable to the formulation of various doctrines, 
particularly those for amphibious/expeditionary warfare that frequently required the resolution of 
disputes at departmental (or even higher) levels. As a result, it appeared that 'the Marine Corps 
responsibility for landing force doctrine and development [had] become less secure' .730 
Changes to the 'Functions Paper' 
At the same time, there were some who thought that the changes did not go far 
enough.731 This sentiment became apparent even after a new DOD Directive covering the 
functions of the armed forces was issued on 31 December 1958 as a result of the aforementioned 
727 Organizational Development, 39. 
728 'Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958-6 August 1958 (72 Stat. 514)' in Cole ... , 188-230. 
729 -' 'Key Features of President's Plan for Reorganization of the Department of Defense' , n.d. (RG 127: 
RRMOT&O, Box 2, File 5, Part 2; NARA). . 
730 ,'Summary on the Effect of Defense Reorganization Act on Marine Corps and the Commandant of the Manne 
Corps', [1958/9] (RG 127: RRMOT&O, Box 2, File 5, Part 2; NARA), 5. See also Organizational Development, 39. 
731 Gilman, Seymour L, (Col. USA), 'A New Concept for Military Organization', MR, 38:1 (4/59),36-42. 
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Reorganl·zatl·on Act.732 Alth h th oug ere were no significant changes that affected 
amphibious/expeditionary warfare development directly, there were a few more subtle changes 
that bear mentioning as they had been topics of discussion related to this development. 
First, the Secretary was given the power to transfer, reassign, abolish or consolidate the 
functions of the armed forces providing the proper procedures were followed. This was 
something that the Naval Service had long feared and opposed considering past efforts by the 
Army to usurp the Marine Corps' responsibilities with regard to amphibious warfare 
development. Next, the JCS were no longer required to approve joint operations doctrine, such as 
for amphibious or airborne operations. This was to be done amongst the Services at the 
departmental level which, somewhat ironically considering the recent history of the Joint 
Amphibious Board, eventually met with success. 
Finally, there were two semantic items of note. First, the phrase 'three major services' 
was no longer used in the document, which seemed to indicate that the Marine Corps had 
officially become the co-equal of the other Services. However, the fact that the Commandant still 
only sat in with the JCS on matters pertaining directly to amphibious operations appeared to 
show otherwise. Second, although the term 'joint amphibious operations' was still employed 
throughout the document, the definition of 'amphibious operations' in the Glossary was 
removed; consequently, so was the controversial phrase 'the amphibious phase of a joint 
amphibious operation' .733 This latter action proved the most interesting as all of the Services, 
after the failure of the Joint Boards, would successfully draft, negotiate and approve doctrine for 
joint amphibious warfare over the course of the next decade. 
T ACTICAL/QPERA TIONAL ASPECTS 
Whilst the mid-1950s were marked by considerable-and apparently irreconcilable-
disagreement amongst the Services, the period between 1957 and 1968 was characterised by 
some significant convergence, specifically in the area of joint doctrine. On the one hand, naval 
732 'Department of Defense Directive No. 5100.1-31 December 1958' in Cole ... , 316-324. 
733 'Department of Defense Directive No. 5100.1 ... ' in Cole ... , 318-324. 
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efforts focused on implementing the 'future concept', which centred on three areas: the 
reorganisation of the FMF, helicopter procurement, and amphibious shipping procurement. This 
was paralleled by an expansion in the size of amphibious exercises, almost to the point of 
reaching a truly large-scale, expeditionary capability. On the other hand, 'joint' efforts 
concentrated on the promUlgation of joint amphibious doctrine, which was eventually achieved 
in two successive stages, ending in 1962 and 1967, respectively. At the same time, the Army 
(and, to a lesser extent, the Air Force) continued to develop its own unilateral 
amphibious/expeditionary doctrine. As this doctrine was specifically designed for substantially 
larger contingencies (and therefore corresponding landing forces) than those addressed by the 
Naval Service, it continued to illustrate the underlying differences in concept and practice. 
Naval Development of 'Amphibious Operations/Warfare' 
Naval Implementation of the 'Conceptfor Future Amphibious Operations' 
Re-organisation of the Fleet Marine Force 
Following the unveiling of LFB-17 in December 1955, the Marine Corps focused its 
immediate attention on implementing its new concept. To do so first required a complete 
reorganisation of 'the entire FMF, including aviation', as determined by a special board-known 
colloquially as the 'Hogaboom Board'-that was established by the CMC and which presented 
its final report in January 1957.734 The significance ofthis Board's conclusions stemmed from its 
emphasis on the true nature of the 'future concept', which ultimately involved using dual 
helicopter-borne and seaborne means to effect an amphibious assault, an aspect that had not been 
stressed in LFB 17. 
There appears to be a considerable body of opinion in the Marine Corps today which 
holds that in the foreseeable future all movement from ship-to-shore will be by 
helicopter. Thus the "all helicopter assault" concept has somehow become the "all 
helicopter concept." This idea the board believes is invalid and should be corrected 
immediately.... . . 
The board believes that this line of thinking has perhaps obscured the contmumg 
importance of crossing the beach operations in our modern concept. We believe that for 
the foreseeable future a substantial portion of the men and materiel required in effecting a 
lodgement on a hostile shore must still cross the beach in a "conventional" fashion. This 
734 Rawlins/Sambito, 73-74. See also Clifford, Progress, 85-88. 
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is n~t in our opinion i~co~sistent with the "all helicopter assault" concept, or with the 
reqUIrement for the prOjectIOn of sea power ashore without the necessity of direct assault 
on the shoreline.735 
Whilst perhaps ironic considering that the first tactical employment of helicopters had been 
successfully achieved by the British less than three months before, it is nevertheless interesting to 
note here how realistic and prescient this assessment was, mainly because the July 1958 
amphibious landings conducted by US naval forces during Operation BLUE BAT in Lebanon 
were almost exclusively carried out by 'conventional' seaborne means.736 
As a result of the renewed emphasis on the 'all helicopter assault', the Board ultimately 
determined that the 'optimum Marine division organisation and composition' entailed one in 
which the 'the assault elements of the division [were] helicopter transportable and the entire 
division ... air transportable'. This basically required a considerable lightening of the division's 
combat, fire support and service elements. With regard to the first element, the most significant 
reduction occurred with the replacement of the Tank Battalion by an 'Ontos' Battalion, which 
was accompanied by an overall decrease in division personnel of 10 percent.737 
Reductions in the fire support element centred on artillery, specifically by making 'the 
battery, rather than the battalion, ... the basic fire support unit' of the division. Corresponding 
decreases in equipment involved the replacement of 105mm howitzers with 105mm and l20mm 
mortars, and the replacement of l55mm howitzers by 105mm howitzers. Force Artillery, 
however, which could only be transported by seaborne means, still included various forms of 
heavy artillery as well as the atomic-capable rocket systems of the 'truck mounted' Honest John 
and the towed-and 'helicopter transportable'-Little John.738 
Finally, the division's service elements also underwent a series of cutbacks. This first 
involved the replacement of the Service Regiment and Shore Party Battalion by a single Service 
Battalion which, at first glance, appeared to be 'far too small for support of the division'. 
735 Quoted in Rawlins/Sambito, 74. Partially quoted in Clifford, Progress, 87. 
736 See works by Schulimson and Spiller as cited in footnote 719. . 
737 _, 'FMF Organization and Composition Board Report, The Division', MCG, 41:4 ~4/57), 2~-30. '~ntos' were arr-
transportable, tracked vehicles, similar to LVTs, that were armed with six 106mm recoIlless antI-tank nfles. 
738 ,'FMF Organization and Composition Board Report, Fire Support', MCG, 41:6 (6/57),8-12. 
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Although the Engineer Battalion was also whittled down (and re-designated the Pioneer 
Battalion), two new units were proposed. The first was a Mass Evacuation Company and the 
second a new Force Service Regiment, although it is notable that the latter only had an estimated 
strength of 3,860 men, which was about half of that of the Army's Amphibious Support 
Brigade.739 
Although this divisional re-organisation increased both the strategic and tactical mobility 
of the Marine division, all of these changes, which consisted largely of reductions in one form or 
another and which were fully implemented throughout the FMF by September 1958/40 seemed to 
reduce the overall fighting power of the Marine division. Indeed, by one account, the lighter 
Marine division was 'in this instance much closer to the Army's airborne division whose 
organization was also circumscribed by the need for air transportability,.741 It was this exact 
aspect of Marine Corps landing forces that the Army found most disconcerting in any possible 
future' general war' as it perceived the Marines as being unable to sustain land combat against a 
first-class enemy such as the Red Army. This meant that Marine landing forces, presuming that 
they could successfully get ashore in the first place, would have to be replaced by heavier (army) 
ground forces, which was ultimately a very inefficient use of limited resources. Such an 
argument against specialist amphibious assault forces had been generally accepted by the British 
since 1944, although the latter's attitude would shift during the mid- and late-1950s as changes in 
the geo-strategic situation induced a reassessment of force requirements (and therefore also 
structure), particularly by the Royal Navy. 
Helicopter Procurement 
The Hogaboom Board report also included an assessment of future aviation 
requirements,742 which had evolved over the course of the past year and had resulted in two 
major studies. The first was HQMC 'G-3 Study Number 3, a Memorandum for the 
739 _, 'FMF Organization and Composition Board Report, Service Elements', MCG, 41:7 (7/57), 20-24. 
740 Rawlins/Sambito, 78. 
741 Mataxis, Theodore C., (Col., USA), 'The Marines' New Look', MR, 38: 11 (2/59), 17. 
742 _, 'FMF Organization and Composition Board Report, Aviation', MCG, 41:5 (5/57), 10-12. 
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Commandant', which was specifically titled 'Employment of Helicopters Within the FMF 
During the Period of 1956 to 1960'. This was the first analysis to take into account newly 
imposed financial restraints by the overall Navy budget, which resulted in an estimated 
production plan that included three types of helicopters: the HRS, the HR2S, and the new HUS, 
with troop-carrying capacities of 10, 23, and 12-18, respectively.743 The procurement numbers 
for the next six years ranged from a total of 180 helicopters (all HRS type) in 1956, to 210 (180 
HRS/HUS; 30 HR2S) in 1958, to 285 (240 HRS/HUS; 45 HR2S) in 1960 and 1961. These 
numbers would permit each Marine division to lift one BLT in the assault simultaneously (i.e., in 
a single wave) with 'an eventual goal of lifting one and one-half divisions' (or one regiment of 
each Marine division simultaneously). The second analysis stemmed from an initial 'basic 
Marine aviation objective plan for pre-mobilization' for the 1956-1961 fiscal years that was 
based on the 'requirements for the support of three divisions in combat short of general war'. The 
helicopter totals ranged from 267 helicopters (180 HRS/HUS; 15 HR2S; 72 HOK) in fiscal year 
1957 to 344 (180 HRSIHUS; 90 HR2S; 54 HOK) in fiscal years 1960-1962.744 
With this background information, the Hogaboom Board recommended a three-phased, 
graduated procurement plan that also listed the requirements for a total of ten helicopter assault 
ships (by 1965) to implement the new concept. Whilst the total procurement numbers estimated 
under this plan were similar to those in the plan described above, by 1959, plans were also put in 
place to begin increasing the numbers of helicopters as required, at the same time extending the 
overall timeframe to cover through fiscal year 1964.745 Estimated totals for these revised fiscal 
years ranged from 211 helicopters in fiscal year 1959 (212 HRS/HUS; 35 HR2S; 48 HOK), to 
339 in fiscal year 1962 (272 HRSIHUS; 28 HR2S; 39 HOK), to 436 in fiscal year 1964 (375 
HRSIHUS; 22 HR2S; 39 HOK).746 By the end of fiscal year 1962, however, even though the 
total helicopter inventory of the Marine Corps amounted to 412 helicopters, the capability 
743 Rawlins/Sambito, 70; Polmar, Norman, and Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr., Military Helicopters of the World: Military 
Rotary-Wing Aircraft Since 1917 (Annapolis, MD: NIP, 1981),290-299. 
744 Rawlins/Sambito, 72-73. The 'HOK' was a light reconnaissance helicopter. 
745 Rawlins/Sambito, 80. 
746 CMC, ltr to CNO, 3/31/59 (RG 127: RRMOP&O, Box 13, File 19; NARA), Enclosure (3). 
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objective of lifting and supporting an RL T from each Marine division had not yet been achieved. 
This was not primarily due to the ongoing financial restrictions but instead to the overall lack of 
HR2S helicopters, which had not been procured in the required numbers for technical reasons.747 
The financial restrictions, however, would have a much more significant impact on the 
procurement of amphibious shipping, particularly helicopter assault carriers. 
Amphibious Shipping Procurement 
The last aspect concerning the naval implementation of the 'concept of future 
amphibious operations' involved the procurement of new amphibious shipping, especially the 
new and indispensable helicopter assault carriers. Within months of the December 1955 
promulgation of LFB 17, the Marine Corps had completed a number of studies to determine the 
amphibious shipping requirements for operations of various sizes. Preliminary data for four such 
studies were presented in April 1956, which involved total carrying capacities for the first three 
options ranging, respectively, from '59,000 personnel and 17 million cubic feet of cargo', to 
'40,000 personnel and 10.1 million cubic feet of cargo', to a force of 40,767 men, as outlined 
below.748 
Shipping Requirements and Capabilities of Subject Force' (1956) 
TYQe ofProQosed Force Numbers/TYQe ofShiQ* 
AGC APA AKA LSD LST APD LPH AP AK 
"Marine DivisionIWing TF" 2/- 18/6 33/39 15/1 43/6 3/-
"Austere DIW TF" 1/- 12/4 14/33 14/8 32112 2/-
- -
"Embarkation Plan"" lI- S/- 6/- 8/- 12/- 3/- 114 /38 
"New Concept" 1/- 4/- 3/- 5/- 12/-
A CGFMFLANT Embarkation * -/- configurations represent the numbers of ships required for 
Plan 220B-55 AssaultlFollow-up Echelons 
The 'New Concept' scenario involved a much smaller total number of ships. The number 
of new construction LPHs had been initially reached during a May 1955 Amphibious Warfare 
Conference, which 'included a long range program' covering fiscal years 1957-1962. By January 
747 Rawlins/Sambito, 81. For details on the HR2S, see 68-69, 78. 
748 See Enclosure to Cokin (Lt. Col., USMC), ltr to Buchanan (Col., USMC), 4/16/56 (RG 127: RRPPA&AO, Box 6, 
File 27; NARA). 
212 
1956, however, changes to the FY -57 and FY -58 programs had each resulted in 'the substitution 
of one CVE conversion for...two [new] LPH', not to mention also the elimination of a total two 
20-knot LSDs and one 20-knot LST. 749 
Despite CMC's repeated efforts to argue on behalf of the new construction program to 
t h ' h'b' f: 750 execu e t e new amp 1 lOUS war are concept' , he was forced to accept the planned conversion 
of CVE-105 aircraft carriers. This scheme did have some distinct advantages over the new 
construction LPHs, including far greater endurance (i.e., 35,000 miles at 18 knots versus 10,000 
miles at 20 knots) and a far shorter production time (i.e., 24 months versus 34 months).75! By 
March 1957, a new compromise program of new construction and conversion had been agreed 
upon by the Standing Committee, Shipbuilding and Conversion, for fiscal years 1960 through 
1964, as outlined be1ow.752 
Standing Committee, Shipbuilding and Conversion (March 1957) 
Shin T:yne FY60 FY61 FY62 FY63 FY64 
AGC(NC) - 1 - - 1 
LPD (NC) 1 2 1 2 2 
LPH (NC) 1 2 2 1 -
LPH(CONV) 1 1 - - -
LSD (NC) 2 2 - 2 2 
LST (NC) None until completion of feasibility study by BuShips. 
At the same time, the Committee arrived at some particularly noteworthy conclusions due to 
their potential effects on the overall development of amphibious warfare in the United States. 
Two significant trends appeared to be evident among the committee members and may 
develop further: a. There appears to be a growing recognition that naval warfare does not 
necessarily center around the fast carrier task force and the extensive use of high yield 
nuclear weapons. Situations short of general war and peripheral warfare were noted and 
related to the effective development of shipbuilding and conversion program. b. 
Stemming from the foregoing was a recognition of the fact that supporting and 
amphibious warfare type ships are essential and cannot be further delayed without 
. ~3 
senous consequences. 
749 Aide Memoire for the CMC Discussion with Admiral Burke, CNO, n.d. (RG 127: RRPPA&AO, Box 6, File 
~ 
27, Tab 23; NARA). 
750 CMC, Ser 004B1156 to CNO, 1124/56; and CMC, Ser 004A4956 to CNO, 1124/56 (RG 127: RRPPA&AO, Box 6, 
File 27, Tab 23; NARA). 
751 CNO, Ser 0023P03 to CMC, 4/14/56 (RG 127: RRPPA&AO, Box 6, File 27, Tab 23; NARA). 
752 DClS, Memorandum to CIS, 3/15/57 (RG 127: RRPPA&AO, Box 6, File 27, Tab 30; NARA). 'NC' stands for New 
Construction; 'CONY' stands for Conversion. 
753 DClS, Memorandum, 1. 
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Within a few months of this proclamation, a solution to the problem of repeatedly 
delayed new construction LPHs was proposed, 'utilizing Essex-class CVSs (ASW support 
aircraft carrier) as interim LPHs since some carriers of this type were scheduled for retirement'. 
Although no action was taken for a number of months, following the successful employment of 
two CVSs and one CVA in LANTPHIBEX 1-58 in early 1958 to land an entire RLT, the CMC 
finally accepted the idea. As a result, three CVSs were-after short conversions-re-designated 
as LPHs: the USS Boxer (CVS-21) as LPH-4 in January 1959; the USS Princeton (CVS-37) as 
LPH-5 in March 1959; and, finally, the USS Valley Forge (CVS-45) as LPH-8 in July 1961. As a 
result, the CVE-105 conversions were subsequently cancelled.754 
Finally, less than two months after the USS Valley Forge had been officially re-
designated, the first of seven new fwo Jima-class LPHs was commissioned on 26 August 1961.755 
The central advantage of the new LPH was that it had been 'designed particularly to combat 
load, transport, and land a Marine BLT of up to 2,000 personnel with an embarked Marine 
transport helicopter squadron,.756 Five additional LPHs were commissioned between 1962 and 
1968 (and the sixth in 1970).757 
Rounding out the amphibious shipping procurement was the newly-designed Raleigh-
class LPD as well as a number of smaller landing craft types. The former was the most 
complimentary to the aforementioned LPH and had an operating capacity for approximately 
1,000 troops, a number of landing craft and up to six helicopters. Five of these vessels were 
commissioned between August 1962 and June 1965.758 Of the largest landing craft, a total of36 
newer LCU-type vessels were delivered between 1960 and 1968, with a cargo capacity of up to 
180 tons. 271 copies of the 30-ton capacity LCM(6) Model 2 vessels were procured, beginning in 
1960 (9) and ending in 1967 (122). Similarly, 266 LCVPs were also produced by 1967, as were a 
relatively large number of support craft. The latter included two versions of the LCPL, the Mark-
754 Rawlins/Sambito, 87-89. 
755 'Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships' (DANFS) at http://www.history.navy.milldanfs/indcx.html. 
756 Rawlins/Sambito, 88. 
757 See http://hazegray.org/navhist/carriers/us assau.htm. 
758 DANFS at http;//www.history.navy.mil/danfs/index.html. 
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4 and the Mark-8, of which a total of 427 were constructed between 1957 and 1967, although 
only a few of these were actually fitted out with any significant armament. 759 
Naval Training and Exercises 
Naval Indoctrination and Training 
At the same time that the procurement of helicopters and amphibious shipping was 
underway, practical training efforts to refine and improve doctrine and techniques, not to 
mention also maintain a seaborne 'force-in-readiness', continued. This followed the evolution of 
defence policy and strategy away from 'global war' and toward 'limited' and 'peripheral' combat 
around the Eurasian littoral. Somewhat ironically, whilst the Naval Service essentially achieved a 
level of true amphibious capability by the early 1960s (by maintaining a number of standing 
amphibious forces afloat around the world), it would also continue striving towards reaching a 
true expeditionary capability in the mid-1960s. 
From a purely conceptual standpoint, this shift in training was first exemplified by a 
change in the types of 'Advanced Base Problems' that were offered at the Marine Corps Schools 
(MCS). For instance, in 1955 and 1956, Operation DRAGON, 'an operation against China', was 
delivered where particular emphasis was placed on the use of air support to maximise (strategic) 
surprise. Operation VIPER, an operation set for Cambodia in 1962, was then offered between 
1959 and 1961, whilst Advance Base Problem XV-also known as Amphibious Warfare Study 
XV-'depicted a hypothetical operation taking place in the Karachi-Tatta-Hyderabad, Pakistan 
area during 1963'. More than 100 demonstrations of this latter Problem, which included the use 
of helicopters for troop and supply transport, were made between 1959 and 1961. The last 
presentation prior to the Vietnam War was Operation CORMORANT, planning for which began 
in 1961. futerestingly, this consisted of an operation in the Da Nang area of Vietnam between 
759 Miller, Richard T., (Capt., USN), 'Fighting Boats of the United States' in Frank Uhlig, Jr., (ed.), Naval Review, 
1968 (Annapolis, MD: NIP, 1968; second printing March 1969),316-319. 
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1963 and 1965, the exact location where the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) would 
land in the latter year.760 
By the time that Operation CORMORANT had come into being, a similar shift away 
from 'global war' scenarios in Europe toward 'limited war' situations around the world was also 
demonstrated by the types of exercises being held. One of the highlights of 1957, for example, 
was Exercise DEEP WATER, which aimed 'to test the feasibility of employing forces from 
SACEUR's Strategic Reserve in the Southern Region of Europe under total war conditions'. The 
amphibious force was provided by a provisional Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) of 
RLTIMAG size (which was supposed to simulate a reinforced DivisionIWing size Task Force) 
that was to link up with 'II Turkish Corps, First Turkish Army' .761 
Although generally successful, two items of significance were raised with regard to 
amphibious/expeditionary deVelopment. The first concerned the fact that the employment of 
American amphibious doctrine had apparently proved so successful that it was recommended 
that it 'serve as a model for the development of NATO amphibious doctrine and that it be used 
for the conduct of NATO amphibious operations and incorporated into appropriate directives' .762 
This was quite an ambitious suggestion considering the high level of disagreement amongst the 
armed forces of the United States. The second point involved the provision for 'the immediate 
relief and withdrawal of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force after seizure of the Force 
Beachhead'. According to the Army, this was an inefficient use of valuable resources. It was 
much more efficient and effective to have regular formations-albeit specially trained-to land 
with their heavier equipment so that they could initiate and sustain the land campaign without 
interruption. Indeed, this same attitude had been taken by the British in the late 1940s although 
their approach had begun to shift somewhat by the mid-1950s, due to changes in the strategic 
environment. 
760 Francis J. Kelly (Maj., USMC), 'Advance Base Problems', MeG, 51:11 (11/67),47-49. 
761 CG, HQ, FMFLant, Ser AI6-7/3 to [CG, FMFLant], 4/22/57 (RG 127: RG&AU, Box 21, File 2; NARA). 
762 CG, HQ, 4thproV. MAGTF, Ser AI6-7/3 to Cmdr., Naval Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe, 10/26/57, 
6; and Cmdr., Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe, Ser 01357 to CINC, Allied Forces, Southern 
Europe, 11114/57 (RG 127: RG&AU, Box 21, File 2; NARA), 4-5. 
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Exercise DEEP WATER was one of the few exercises larger than a Battalion Landing 
Team (BLT) to have been completed by FMFLANT units in the 1950s.763 This was primarily due 
to the shortage in amphibious shipping, which was one of the main concerns resulting from 
consecutive LANTPHIBEXs conducted in 1960 and 1961 in the Caribbean.764 Although the 
latter of these did finally involve landing three BLTs of the 4th MEB, the 'shipping limitations' 
did not allow the full potential of the exercise to be realised.765 This complaint was repeated only 
a few months later following another 'Major Exercise' called AXLE GREASE, which was also 
held in the Caribbean. Indeed, in this case, it was even noted that 'casualty reports of various 
exercises show the need for an effective modernization or replacement program' .766 
By 1961, despite all of these apparent difficulties, a milestone of sorts had been reached. 
The United States Naval Service had, in fact, established three standing amphibious formations 
that were truly amphibious in nature, meaning that they were almost exclusively naval in 
character. This was opposed to expeditionary-type forces, which were ground (or air-ground) 
formations that were specifically formed to operate overseas but which required an intermediate 
seaborne ( or airborne) movement as well as a possible amphibious (or airborne) assault to get 
ashore. The first and oldest example entailed the so-called 'Mediterranean Battalions', which had 
been deployed in the Mediterranean since January 1948. Aside from two short gaps in 1950-1951 
and 1955-1956, this deployment continued unbroken and proved its worth during the 1958 
Lebanon crisis even without a vertical assault capability.767 The second was the relatively new 
FMF formation that had been established in the Caribbean in the wake of the 1959 Communist 
revolution in Cuba. While 'officially described as a routine amphibious training unit', this 
formation had 'a balanced air-ground structure capable of vertical assault' and was 'sometimes 
763 [ComAmphForLant], Ser N33/0412 to CINCLANT, 8/14/61 (RG 127: RG&AU, Box 18, File 4, Part 1; NARA), 
Enclosure 1 (page 7). 
764 CG, FMFLant, Ser 03D11461 to CMC, 5/61; and CG, 2d MarDiv, Ser 03C9661 to CMC, 4/3/61 (RG 127: 
RG&AU, Box 18, File 4, Part 1; NARA). 
765 CG, HQ, 4th MEB, Ser 03-61 to Commander, AmForLant, 3/31161 (RG 127: RG&AU, Box 18, File 4, Part 1; 
NARA). 
766 CG, HQ, 4th MEB, Ser 03A17361 to CMC, 6/22/61 (RG 127: RG&AU, Box 18, File 5, Part 1; NARA), 2. 
767 [HQMC], 'Mediterranean Battalions, 1948-1950; 1951-1955; 1956-Present', 114/61 (RG 127: VHQMCD, Box 2, 
[File d], [Enel. 0]; NARA). 
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ashore, sometimes afloat,.768 The last was a similarly-established unit in the western Pacific that 
had originated from a request by the Commander of Seventh Fleet 'that a Marine BL T be 
maintained afloat on a pennanent basis' due to various crises that had culminated in the Chinese 
Communist bombardment of the Chinese Nationalist islands of Quemoy and Matsu. As a result, 
'TO 76.5 (SPECLANFORWESPAC)' was activated on 4 August 1960.769 
Taken together, these fonnations represented the essence of a truly amphibious naval (or 
perhaps maritime) power, that is, the ability to launch rapid, if limited, attacks from the sea either 
to help seize, maintain or exploit 'command of the sea' or to assist in the outcome of events on 
land. Even so, these were not examples of true expeditionary power that were capable of 
extended sustainment ashore due to the inherent limitations of such a small standing/floating 
force even if it was a fully-integrated combined anns fonnation. 
This specifically amphibious potential was recognised at the time by none other than the 
famous British strategist Captain B. H. Liddell Hart although he did so by ultimately overstating 
the expeditionary potential of the US Marine Corps. Nevertheless, his comments proved 
extremely poignant when viewed as a model for both amphibious and expeditionary warfare 
development. 'The US Marine Corps is a three-in-one Service in embryo. It has gained so much 
experience in combining land, sea and air action that it fonns a nucleus and a pattern for further 
development. Logically it should be the basis for further progress in integration'. 770 
Later Exercises and 'Strategic Mobility , 
Although an amphibious milestone had been reached by the Naval Service by 1961, 
continued shortages of significant amphibious shipping effectively precluded this capability from 
expanding considerably during peacetime. The one exception came during the Cuban missile 
crisis in October 1962 when the Naval Service was able to amass the largest collection of 
768 [HQMC], 'Cuban Crisis, October 1959 - Present', 1/5/61 (RG 127: VHQMCD, Box 2, [File d], [Encl. 9]; NARA), 
1; and Buse, H. W., Jr., (BG, USMC), lecture presentation, 'A Force in Readiness', 12/4/61 (RG 127: RRMOP&O, 
Box 22, File 11; NARA), 21. 
769 [HQMC], 'Pacific Battalions, August 1960 - Present', 114/61 (RG 127: VHQMCD, Box 2, [File d], [Encl. 10]; 
NARA); and [L. C. Hudson, (BGEN, USMC)], 'Manuscript for Air War College Presentation on "Cap~bilities and 
Employment of the US Marine Corps -1 March 1961''', 3/1/61 (RG 127: QSNCMCDNKI, Box 1, [FIle b]; NARA), 
9. 
770 B. H. Liddell Hart (Capt., BA), 'Marines and Strategy', MeG, 44:7 (7/60), 17. 
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amphibious shipping since the Second World War, which included a total of 1 AGC, 3 APDs, 10 
LSTs, 11 APAs, 12 AKAs, 15 LSDs, and 4 LPHs. The corresponding naval landing forces 
amounted to about one and one-third reinforced divisions although this required the 5th MEB to 
transit through the Panama Canal from the Pacific. Even then, this amphibious force was 
overshadowed by the nearly four divisions of Army expeditionary forces-two airborne, one 
infantry and two-thirds of one armoured-which were prepared for employment. Although these 
landing forces were never employed offensively, an RL T -size landing exercise was conducted by 
the re-deploying amphibious forces, one of the largest in years, which involved three LPHs and 
the helicopter-lifting of two of the six BLTs.771 
With new, modem amphibious shipping slowly entering service in the early 1960s, it 
appeared that the Naval Service would be able to achieve some sort of true, if limited, 
expeditionary capability as demonstrated in two major exercises.772 The first of these, STEEL 
PIKE I, took place in late 1964 and was the third 'strategic mobility exercise' in a series 
sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This exercise was supposed to provide 'an exercise and 
test of the general war plan 201' (for Europe) as well as 'a test of the Marine Expeditionary 
Force portion of the 316 Plan by the conduct of a division landing in the Huelva area' of 
Spain.773 In the words of the senior staff members and commanding officers of II Marine 
Expeditionary Force (MEF), who had participated in the operation, because the past years had 
been overwhelmingly characterised by 'limited ... small scale operational deployments', it was 
finally time to break off the 'long love affair with single BL T operations'. 774 
From a specific expeditionary point of view, however, the results were mixed. The US 
Naval Service had, in fact, landed an MEF across the expanse of the Atlantic Ocean in an 
enterprise reminiscent of the World War II 'invasion' of North Africa-Operation TORCH. 
771 CINCLANT 'CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis -1963 (U)', 4/29/63 (RG 127: RRPAUSMCR&HS, , 
Box 11, File 8, Parts 1 & 2; NARA), 65-66, 141-151. 
772 See AlexanderlBartlett, 40-44. 
773 CG, FMFLANT, 'Strategic Mobility Exercise for Marine Division-Wing Team in Eastern Atlantic for fiscal year 
1965; recommendations for (S)" 1/9/64 (RG 127: U&OC, Box 135, File 2; NARA), Enclosure (1), 8-9. 
774 Hammond, 1. W., (Maj., USMC), ed., 'STEEL PIKE 1', MeG, 49:1 (1/65),48; CG, FMFLANT Ser 003A00864 to 
CINCLANT, 1/9/64 (RG 127: U&OC, Box 135, File 2; NARA). 
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However, there were still considerable doubts about this apparent expeditionary capability, 
particularly in two areas of previous concern. The first involved the 'logistics capability' of the 
entire force, which had already been deemed as deficient due to the need of having to employ a 
'reincarnated shore party battalion' that had initially been eliminated by the FMF reorganisation 
of 1957-58. Although questions also arose as to the 'engineer capability', the main concern once 
again returned to the 'adequacy of amphibious shipping'. As a matter of fact, '[s]hipping 
limitations dictated leaving behind some organic motor transport, engineer equipment, part of the 
Force Service Regiment, all major replacement end items, the ground equipment essential to the 
helicopter group for shore operations, and some L VTs' .775 
Finally, there were also a number of 'tactical questions' that revealed weaknesses in 
what were otherwise considered to be Marine Corps' strengths in amphibious warfare. By far the 
most significant was the overall lack of fire support, which was simply considered to have been 
'woefully small'. Particularly notable was the lack of carrier-based air support-again, a usual 
forte of the Marine Corps-although at least the landing of the administrative elements of a 
Marine Air Group was deemed 'a success'. Nevertheless, despite these shortcomings, the 
outstanding 'advantages of the multi-decks', which consisted of 'three LPH and two LPD decks', 
were ultimately confirmed, which appeared to validate the validity of the amphibious operation 
(and amphibious 'vertical envelopment') as a 'method of strategic mobility' .776 
The second of the large-scale strategic mobility exercises was SILVER LANCE 
(P ACFLEX 1-65) which took place in early 1965. According to public accounts, it was the 
largest 'war game staged by US armed forces since WWII', involving 60 ships as well as '20,000 
sailors and 25,000 Marines' .777 More specifically, it consisted of a 'short-of-war situation' and 
ended 'with the amphibious landing and maneuver ashore of an Expeditionary Corps'. Also 
significant was the considerable training in 'advisory and assistance roles', apparently in 
775 Hammond, 49-50; CAF, AtlFlt, SerNI2/0877 to CINCLANT, 12/23/64 (RG 127: U&OC, Box 135, File 3; . 
NARA); and CMC Observer Team, 'Exercise Steel Pike 1', n.d. (RG 127: U&OC, Box 22, File 19; NARA), SectIOn I. 
776 Hammond, 49, 51; 'Exercise Steel Pike 1', Section III. 
777 _, 'Silver Lance Ends; Mission Accomplished', MeG, 49:4 (4/65), 5. 
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preparation for Vietnam, as this had been almost completely lacking in Marine Corps training for 
many years.778 
Probably the most noteworthy observation to be made about SILVER LANCE was the 
decision to employ the FMF at a Corps level, as this represented the largest formation possible 
for the USMC, something the US Anny considered to be only medium-sized. However, although 
most of the training goals were deemed to have been met successfully, problems continued to 
afflict what seemed to be the weakest aspect of the Naval Service's apparent expeditionary 
capability-logistics. Whilst the lack of amphibious shipping was (again) noted immediately, 
more prominent this time was the apparent need for extra logistics training-in the form of a 
'logistics exercise (LOGEX),-to follow 'every MEF and MEC exercise in order to exercise 
properly the Force and Corps level service and support agencies,.779 
(Joint) Development of 'Joint Amphibious Operations' (or Expeditionary Warfare) 
The Evolution of (Joint) Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (DAO) 
Following the failed attempt to formulate joint amphibious doctrine through the Joint 
Amphibious Board (JAB), the Navy and Marine Corps convened a 'Navy-Marine Corps Ad Hoc 
Panel' in July 1957 to review a draft ofNWP 22, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (DAD), 
for use as future joint amphibious doctrine.78o After nearly a year of revisions, an updated draft, 
titled 'Advance Change 5 to NWP 22/LFM 00 (Tentative)', was approved by the CNO and 
CMC, which they regarded 'as suitable for use in any amphibious operation'. As such, copies 
were sent to the 'the other Services' for their consideration.781 
After nearly two years of inaction, progress in negotiations with the Chief of Staff of the 
Army was finally made and, in mid-June 1960, the Naval Service confirmed that it was 'in 
778 AC/S (G-3), Memorandum to CIS, 6/10/65 (RG 127: U&OC, Box 154, File 7, Part 1; NARA); CG, FMFPAC, ltr to 
CMC, 4/15/65 (RG 127: U&OC, Box 154, File 7, Part 1; NARA), i-ii; and Millett, Semper Fidelis, Chapter 17. 
779 CG, FMFPAC, 'SILVER LANCE', encl. (1),1-2,4,6,10-13. 
780 CMC, Memorandum (Ser 03C15459) for the CNO, 6/19159 (RG 127: RRPPA&AO, Box 6, File 27; NARA), 1. See 
also Boose, 332-335, for a brief assessment of this process. . ' 
781 [MCS], Advance Change 5 to NWP 22/LFM 00 (Tentative), Doctrinefor Amphibious OperatIOns (TentatIve Draft), 
1958,6/1/58 (author's copy). 
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complete or substantial agreement with approximately 80% of the Anny comments' on DAO.782 
Complete accord followed six months later,783 although disagreements with the Air Force 
persisted. Even after attempts were made to solve Air Force objections, which centred on issues 
of command organisation and the fact that DAO essentially stemmed from unilateral doctrine, the 
Air Force held firm by finally notifying the CNO and CMC in November 1961 that it could not 
'concur with publication of the manual in its present form', for two reasons. The first echoed the 
old concerns of the Army with regard to the desired establishment of a 'joint task force' in cases 
where 'significant elements of Army and Air Force forces' were involved. The second concerned 
the perception that the current doctrine was a mix of 'joint doctrinal principles and unilateral 
Service tactics, techniques and procedures', which therefore required clarification by subsuming 
DAO to the joint principles enshrined in Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), the replacement 
document for JAAF.784 
As a result, a joint Anny/Navy/Marine Corps manual, FM 31-111NWP 22(A)/LFM 01, 
Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (DAO), was promulgated on 1 July 1962.785 Ironically, and 
despite the Air Force's objections as outlined above, this manual appeared to address these exact 
problem areas, at least to the satisfaction of the Anny, which had objected to the same during the 
original process of formulating joint doctrine in the early 1950s. For example, although the issue 
of an interim 'joint task force' was not specifically mentioned, the manual's language appeared 
flexible enough to allow such an arrangement to take place, if required. As paragraph 005a 
stated: 
The amphibious task force is organized as a subordinate command within the area 
command structure. Establishment of an intervening command between the amphibious 
task force and the area command may be required when the amphibious operation is one 
782 CNO/CMC Joint Letter to CIS, USA, 6/13/60 (RG 127: RRDAWD, Box 6, File 20, Part 2, Tab 56; NARA), 1. 
783 CIS, USA, Memorandum for CNO/CMC, 12/19/60 (RG 127: RRDA WD, Box 6, File 20, Part 2, Tab 58; NARA). 
784 -' 'Chronological Resume of Air Force Objections to the Doctrine for Amphibious Operations C?AO) 
(NWP22(1), LFM-Ol and FM 31-11) with Attendant Rationale', n.d. (RG 127: RRDA WD, Box 5, FIle 17, Tab 6; 
NAR), 2-3; CIS, USAF, ltr to CNO/CMC, 11127/61 (RG 127: RRDA WD, Box 6, File 20, Part 2, Tab 6~; NARA), 1. 
785 USAlUSNJUSMC, FM 31-11INWP 22(A)/LFM 01, Doctrinefor Amphibious Operations, 7/1/62 (LIbrary; 
MCHC), III. 
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of several related operations and the area command structure is not suitable for direct 
control of all forces participating therein. 786 
Although this higher command arrangement would have applied to the Air Force as well, the 
latter still took issue with the lack of independent command over Air Force forces whilst these 
forces were a part of the 'amphibious task force'. Somewhat ironically, this particular aspect was 
not even mentioned in the rejection letter to the CNO/CMC, and it was apparently not raised five 
years later when the Air Force finally approved a new version ofthe joint manual. 
This officially occurred in 1967 when a revised Doctrine for Amphibious Operations 
(DAD) manual was officially promulgated by all of the military services on 1 August as FM 31-
lllNWP 22(B)/AFM 2-53/LFM 01.787 Interestingly, only minor alterations appear to have been 
made to the 1962 edition, the most significant of which involved the aforementioned issue of 
command over Air Force forces simply by introducing the term 'joint amphibious task force'. 
Although it appeared that DAD had thus been subsumed under the principles of UNAAF as the 
Air Force had wanted, it nevertheless placed the direction of Air Force forces, even when 'the 
preponderance of tactical aviation is provided by the Air Force ... under the joint amphibious task 
force commander' .788 Either way, according to one source, the main obstacle to final approval 
ultimately lay at the top echelon of the Air Force in the form of General Curtis E. LeMay, who 
first rejected the initial overtures in 1961; once he stepped down on 31 January 1965, the 
doctrine was approved and promulgated relatively quickly. 789 
Army Developments 
More than a year prior to the publication ofFM 31-11, the Army promulgated FM 31-12, 
Army Forces in Amphibious Operations (The Army Landing Force).79o Although this document 
seemed to have originated indirectly from the failed efforts of the JAB, it actually stemmed from 
786 FM 31-11INWP 22(A )/LFM 01, XIII. 
787 USAIUSN/uSAF /USMC, FM 31-11INWP 22(B)/ AFM 2-53/LFM 01, Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, 8/1/67 
(author's copy). 
788 FM 31-11INWP 22(B)/AFM 2-53/LFM 01, paragraph 226. Also cited by Boose, 335. . 
789 LtGen Snedeker (USMC), Memorandum to LtGen Greene (USMC), 3/29/62 (RG 127: RRMOT&O, Box 1, FIle 4, 
Part 2; NARA), 1. 
790 DA, FM 31-12, Army Forces in Amphibious Operations (Ihe Army Landing Force), 3/28/61 (LB, MCRC). See also 
Boose, 335-336. 
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related correspondence between the Departments of the Army and Navy that culminated in May 
1955 'tactical concept guidance paper', titled 'The Army Landing Force', written by AFF. 
According to this paper, the new 'concept ... was based on the strategical and tactical mobility 
requirements of the Army in consonance with the Army mission to seize, occupy and defend land 
areas',791 as outlined in the 1954 edition ofFM 100-5. Reiterating the Army's long-standing view 
that '[a]n amphibious operation may precede a large scale land operations, in which case it 
becomes the amphibious phase of a joint amphibious operation', the concept outlined various 
tactical principles as well as specific 'combat and logistical support' and 'organisational 
structure' requirements, all of which were to be 'based on a capability of supporting an Army 
corps consisting of three (3) infantry divisions and two (2) armored divisions',792 a force that was 
nearly twice the size of the entire Marine Corps. 
By June 1956, the Department of the Army (DA) had approved the establishment of a 
new 'Engineer Amphibious Support Command' as well as its corresponding doctrine 'in 
principle,793 which, whilst appearing in draft form as FM 5-156 in 1958, was never published, 
although a related manual, FM 5-144, Engineer Shore Assault Units, appeared in October 
1963.794 More significant was the instruction to 'rewrite FM 31-5', which still existed in its 1944 
edition, and issue it as a new 60- series manual, titled 'The Army Landing Force 
(Amphibious)'.795 
This was ultimately accomplished on 28 March 1961, although in the form of FM 31-
12.796 Of the various issues covered in this publication, the two most significant, due to the fact 
that they help distinguish between US Army and Naval Service expeditionary/amphibious 
thinking whilst also facilitating a comparison of the Army's conceptualisation with overall 
British thinking, were actually summarised in the 'FOREWORD'. The first concerned the 
791 HQ, CONARC, 'Chronology and Analysis of the Development of Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations', 
7/1/58 (MHI Stacks: U261.C49; Library, AHEC), 4, 7. 
792 Enclosure to HQ, CONARC, ltr to Distr., 5/31/55 (MHI Stacks: U261.D62; Library, AHEC). 
793 HQ, CONARC, ltr to Distr., 6/7/56 (MHI Stacks: U261.D62; Library, AHEC), 2. 
794 See Boose, 336. 
795 HQ, CONARC, 6/7/56, 2. . 
796 DA, FM 31-12, Army Forces in Amphibious Operations (The Army Landing Force) (Washmgton, DC: HQ, DA, 
3/28/61). Also cited by Boose, 335-336. 
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broader expeditionary nature of the Army view towards Goint) amphibious operations, which 
stemmed from its emphasis on the overall 'requirement for strategic and tactical mobility'. 
Along these lines, and similar to the British evolution from 'combined operations' to the 
'seaborne/airborne concept' and subsequently to the 'joint warfare' concept (as will be seen), the 
manual specifically recognised the potential of 'projecting Army assault forces ashore from a 
mobile sea base in conjunction with assault by airborne forces' .797 This idea, along with 
'Airmobility', was also pursued in this manual's sister text, FM 31-13, Battle Group Landing 
Team (Amphibious), which was published in September 1961798 and was predicated on the 
Army's newly organised 'pentomic' division that comprised a total of five 'battle groups', each 
between battalion and regiment size.799 
The second, and closely related, aspect involved the overall classification of the 
operation, which effectively stemmed from its scope, not only practically but also conceptually. 
As the manual stated outright that a 'typical amphibious attack' by the Army would involve 'a 
small field army or an independent corps of three to five assault divisions', it was almost self-
evident that a very broad approach towards amphibious landings had to be taken. As such, the 
manual reverted back to techniques used by the Army over the past 15 years in order to try to 
distinguish itself from the Naval Service. On the one hand was the manual's return to the use of 
certain terms and definitions, most notably including 'Invasion' and 'Seizure'. On the other was 
the continued stress on where amphibious landings stood in relation to land warfare. Although 
the manual admitted that the 'amphibious operation is a complete operation within itself, which 
seemed to reflect a significant concession to the Naval Service, it then asserted that it was still 
'usually one phase or part of a campaign of larger magnitude' which, again, possibly included 
'integrated, small scale airborne operations' .800 As a result, and as the Army had argued since the 
late 1940s, 'the timing, means, and plans used to accomplish the mission of the amphibious task 
797 DA, FM 31-12, i. Emphasis added. See also paragraphs 2c, 6b, 8b, 9. 
798 DA, FM 31-13, Battle Group Landing Team (Amphibious) (Washington, DC: HQ, DA, 9/29/61), para. 4b. Also 
referenced by Boose, 336. 
799 Doughty, 17. 
800 FM 31-12, paras. 9, 10. Also quoted by Boose, 336. 
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force must contribute to the further objective and permit a smooth transition to subsequent 
consolidation and buildup essential to support of further land force operations ashore' .801 
Aside from these primary publications, it is worth remarking not only how much the 
topic of amphibious operations had spread amongst other Army Field Manuals (FMs) in general, 
but also how this subject was addressed at ever higher levels of force structure, which reflected 
the Army's broader, expeditionary approach. Amongst the most significant were 100- series 
manuals, particularly the -5 volumes. Versions published in 1962 and 1968 continued to devote 
one chapter to 'Amphibious Operations' whilst also referring to these enterprises as being closely 
associated with 'airborne' operations, with the latter one also mentioning 'airmobile' 
operations.802 Somewhat ironically, the -15 volumes, which specifically covered 'Larger Units', 
did not specifically address 'amphibious operations' at all, even conceding that the 'Navy and 
Marine Corps have primary interest and responsibility in amphibious operations and land 
operations incident to the prosecution of a naval campaign' .803 
Most other FMs only devoted a single section to amphibious enterprises versus a whole 
chapter. Within the 7- ('Infantry') series, for example, whilst the -20 ('Battalion') volumes barely 
mentioned amphibious warfare, the -30 ('Regiment') ones did, which again seemed to 
demonstrate the Army's focus on larger-scale (expeditionary) endeavours.804 Similar attention to 
amphibious operations was also demonstrated, for example, in the 17- (' Armor') series, not only 
in the generic -1 volumes but also in the -30 ones, many of which also incorporated subsequent 
801 FM 31-12, para. 12c. Emphasis added. 
802 See DA, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations (Washington, DC: HQ, DA, 2/19/62), Chapter 8; DA, 
FM 100-5, Operations of Army Forces in the Field (Washington, DC: HQ, DA, 9/6/68), Chapter 9, especially para. 9-
2. 
803 DA, FM 100-15, Field Service Regulations, Larger Units (Washington, DC: HQ, DA, 12/12/63), para. 5-11; DA, 
FM 100-15, Larger Units, Theater Army-Corps (Washington, DC: HQ, DA, 12/27/68), para. 6-11. 
804 See DA, FM 7-20, Infantry, Airborne Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Battalions (Washington, DC: HQ, DA, 
1116/62); DA, FM 7-20, The Infantry Battalions (Washington, DC: HQ, DA, 12/8/69); DA, FM 7-30, Infantry, 
Airborne, and Mechanized Division Brigades (Washington, DC: HQ, DA, 1117/62), Chapter 10, Section IV; DA, FM 
7-30, Infantry, Airborne, and Mechanized Division Brigades (Washington, DC: HQ, DA, 5/19/65), ~apter 7, Section 
IV; and DA, FM 7-30, The Infantry Brigades (Washington, DC: HQ, DA, 3128/69), Chapter 8, SectIon IV. 
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sections on 'Shore-to-shore movements' .805 This held true for the final important 61- ('Division') 
series, at least until the 1968 edition, where the latter topic was removed. 806 
AmphihiouslExpeditionary Warfare in Vietnam 
Despite the apparent compromises reached to secure the promulgation of (joint) 
amphibious warfare doctrine, the actual practice of amphibious warfare in operational situations, 
particularly during the Vietnam War, seemed to return almost completely to a monopolistic, 
naval affair. With the presence of a 'permanent' (i.e., floating) Amphibious Ready Group/Special 
Landing Force (ARG/SLF) in the western Pacific as early as 1960, and the fact that it had already 
participated in a contingency-type operation in Thailand beginning in May 1962,807 the Naval 
Service was poised to take advantage of its amphibious 'force-in-readiness' role. Indeed, 
between March 1965 and the beginning of 1969, 'more than 50 amphibious operations' were 
conducted. 808 
Dominating 1965 was a series of five DAGGER THRUST raids which, ironically, had 
always been the specialty of the Royal Marine Commandos and not the US Marine Corps' FMFs. 
Nevertheless, the geography of Vietnam presented undeniable opportunities for exploitation. In 
addition, General Westmoreland, the head of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), 
was also interested in exploiting this truly amphibious force although a number of problems 
served to complicate their employment. The first was the fear within naval circles that once 
control over this force was relinquished, that it would never be regained. 809 More concrete was 
the concern that the ARG/SLF was the Pacific Fleet commander's only strategic reserve and 
therefore had to be ready to perform operations anywhere in the western Pacific at a moment's 
805 DA, FM 17-1, Armor Operations-Small Units (Washington, DC: HQ, DA, 8/23/57), Chapter 11, Section IX; DA, 
FM 17-1, Armor Operations (Washington, DC: HQ, DA, 6/20/63), Chapter 12, Section XI; DA, FM 17-1, Armor 
Operations (Washington, DC: HQ, DA, 10/14/66), Chapter 12, Section XI; DA, FM 17-30, The Armored Division 
Brigade (Washington, DC: HQ, DA, 11128/61), Chapter 6, Section II; DA, FM 17 -30, The Armored Brigade 
(Washington, DC: HQ, DA, 9/12/69), Chapter 10, Section II. 
806 DA, FM 61-100, The Division (Washington, DC: HQ, DA, 114/62), Chapter 9, Sections II, III; DA, FM 61-lO0, The 
Division (Washington, DC: HQ, DA, 6/25/65), Chapter 9, Sections II, III; DA, FM 61-100, The Division (Washington, 
DC: HQ, DA, 11115/68), Chapter 12, Section II. 
807 Whitlow, Robert H., (Capt., USMCR), US Marines in Vietnam: The Advisory and Combat Assistance Era, 1954-
1964 (Washington, DC: HQMC, 1977), Chapter 7. 
808 Hilgartner, P. L. (Lt. Col., USMC), 'AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE in VIE1NAM', MCG, 53:1 (1/69),29. 
809 Schulimson, Jack, and Charles M. Johnson (Maj., USMC), US Marine in Vietnam: The Landing and the Buildup, 
1965 (Washington, DC: HQMC, 1978), Chapter 13. 
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notice. A similarly command-related controversy erupted over whether and how long the 
amphibious forces should come under the senior land commander who was commanding the 
entire operation. This concern was raised by the unduly long control exerted over the force 
during Operation DOUBLE EAGLE in early 1966.810 
While some of these controversies continued, a number of operations were still 
conducted, and with success. Most notable in the rest of 1966 and early 1967 were 'the broader 
type of amphibious operation, codenamed Deckhouse'. These were specifically 'designed to 
complement allied operations against enemy units'. The first took place in June 1966 'in support 
of the US 1st Cavalry Division's operation Nathan Hale', which ultimately evolved into a 'nine-
battalion operation'. This seemed to be the biggest of the series as the other DECKHOUSE 
variations amounted to not much more than single BL T landings. 811 Indeed, this seemed to be 
characteristic of the overall amphibious contribution to the war in the first few years. 
With few exceptions, SLF operations, to that point, had little resemblance to classical 
amphibious warfare. For the most part, Marine amphibious operations in Vietnam were 
either administrative landings, exploitations of an already existing battle situations, or 
amphibious raids. Marine landing forces were not assaulting hostile shores; they were 
landing where large US and allied ground forces and air forces were already present. 812 
Despite this limited performance, two SLFs had been formed by 1968-Alpha and 
Bravo-each of which consisted of about 2,000 men built around an infantry battalion, a 
helicopter squadron and various supporting arms, all of which remained afloat in amphibious 
shipping. As a matter of fact, both SLFs would participate in the largest amphibious operation of 
the Vietnam War in 1969--called Operation Bold Mariner. However, this enterprise would 
essentially represent the highlight of amphibious warfare in this conflict. 'For 1969, there would 
be 14 SLF operations as compared to 13 in 1968, and 25 in 1967. By the end of 1969, the SLFs 
had become a moot question for operations in South Vietnam. With the reduction of forces in 
Vietnam, the SLF could only be committed with the specific permission of the JCS'. 813 
810 Schulimson, Jack, US Marines in Vietnam: An Expanding War, 1966 (Washington, DC: HQMC, 1982),297-298. 
811 Schulimson, Expanding, 304-305. 
812 Schulimson, Expanding, 306. 
813 Schulimson, Jack, and Leonard A. Blasiol (Lt. Col., USMC), Charles R. Smith, and David A. Dawson (Capt., 
USMC), US Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968 (Washington, DC: HQMC, 1997),631-642. 
228 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the fact that the US Naval Service was the almost exclusive practitioner of 
amphibious landings during the early years of the Vietnam conflict, there were a few notable 
indications that showed why naval predominance over American amphibious/expeditionary 
development was not as clear-cut as has generally been accepted. On the one hand was the US 
Army's continued production of unilateral amphibious doctrine throughout the 1960s, which 
reflected its broader expeditionary perspective. On the other hand was the official adoption of 
joint amphibious doctrine by all the services in 1967, which indicated that a convergence of the 
parallel courses of amphibious and expeditionary warfare development within the US had 
occurred. It was this latter Goint) course of development, in tum, that most closely mirrored the 
overall British direction of amphibious/expeditionary warfare development in the 1960s. Even 
though the Royal Navy would ultimately reorient its primary role towards conducting 
(amphibious) landing operations, thereby reflecting the amphibious thinking-and, to a far lesser 
extent, capacity-of the US Navy and Marine Corps, it would still do so within the broader (and 
traditional) framework of 'combined operations'-eventually known as 'joint warfare'-which 
involved all three Services. 
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CHAPTER SIX: UNITED KINGDOM, 1957-68 
OVERVIEW 
It was during the 1957-1968 period that the most significant changes in British 
amphibious/expeditionary development occurred, although they did not alter its overall course. 
Most influential was a pivotal shift in the geo-strategic situation that allowed-if not propelled-
the Royal Navy to change its own strategic priorities, as well as its corresponding force structure, 
to include (and eventually become predominated by) amphibious capabilities. Unlike in the late 
1940s and early 1950s, when (offensive) amphibious capabilities were generally seen as being of 
lower priority by all the services, particularly by the Navy, the mid-l950s witnessed a significant 
shift in the geo-strategic situation from 'general war' and (limited) 'cold war' operations to what 
would eventually be referred to as 'limited war' scenarios. Ultimately, this translated into a 
broader need for what were then termed as 'strategic mobility, 814--or expeditionary-
capabilities, not just specifically amphibious ones. 
Nevertheless, it was this particular alteration in strategic priorities that provided the 
Royal Navy with the initial (but primary) justification for increasingly supporting 
amphibious/expeditionary capabilities. Whilst this first involved the procurement of new 
specialised amphibious shipping for all types and elements of ground forces, it also featured the 
expansion of the Royal Marine Commandos, which effectively consolidated the ongoing shift 
away from their limited roles as (wartime) amphibious raiders and a (peacetime) mobile Imperial 
Police force (or 'Fire Brigade') to that of seaborne light infantry. As a result, even though the 
Commandos successfully consolidated their expanded roles, numbers and reputation, they still 
fell short of conforming very closely to the USMC Fleet Marine Force (FMF). 
By the time that the RN's strategic and organisational re-orientation had gained 
momentum in the early 1960s, its amphibious capabilities had been incorporated into a new 
'joint warfare' concept and matching organisational/institutional structure. This evolved from the 
814 See Brown, Strategic Mobility. 
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so-called 'seaborne/airborne/land operations' concept, which had been developed by A WHQ, 
and was based on the integrated employment of complementary seaborne and airborne strategic 
mobility capabilities to effect reinforcement- and intervention-type operations over great 
distances. Exactly just such an enterprise was conducted to reinforce Kuwait from a direct Iraqi 
threat in the summer of 1961. 
Although this 'joint warfare' concept has been described as being 'innovative', 
specifically because of 'the emphasis that it placed on joint operations', 815 it seems apparent that 
this notion was perhaps similar, at least conceptually, to the original concept of 'combined 
operations' that emerged during the inter-war years, albeit perhaps applicable to altogether 
different strategic scenarios and therefore in overall scope. 816 This was most evident in the area 
of doctrine as reflected by the new Manual of Joint Warfare of the 1960s (and 1970s) on the one 
hand, and the various editions of the Manual of Combined Operations of the 1920s and 1930s on 
the other. 
STRA TEGIC ASPECTS 
The evolution of British defence policy and strategy between 1957 and 1968 can 
generally be divided into two five-year phases, as marked by the respective 1957 and 1962 
defence statements. The first phase (1957 -1961) essentially consolidated the mid-1950s 
transition from the all-encompassing threat of 'global war' to the smaller-scale (but longer-term 
and more dispersed) dangers of the 'cold war'. This was propelled by reductions in military 
spending, which not only forced an increasing reliance on the nuclear (and thermo-nuclear) 
deterrent but also ushered in a return to all-regular forces. It was during this phase that, whilst 
calls for strategically mobile forces continued in general, the Royal Navy in particular-under 
the prescient leadership of Lord Louis Mountbatten as First Sea Lord (FSL)-underwent a 
fundamental strategic and organisational reorientation away from traditional 'sea control' toward 
conventional 'power projection' or 'amphibious' capabilities. 
815 See Speller, 'Seaborne/Airborne', 80. 
816 See, for example, Clifford, Amphibious, and Massam. 
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The second phase (1962-1968) was generally characterised by an ongoing attempt to 
balance increasingly limited defence resources (due to continued financial stringencies) with an 
undiminished spectrum of global commitments. As a result, a more concerted effort was made to 
provide for all types of strategically mobile conventional forces to deal with 'cold war' as well as 
'limited war' contingencies. Additionally, in order to maximise these (still limited) forces' 
effectiveness and efficiency, a parallel attempt was made to integrate them, not only 
operationally but also conceptually, from the 'bottom, up' as well as from the 'top, down'. 
Almost all of these endeavours generally benefitted the Royal Navy (and, by extension, the 
Royal Marines), which had made improving its amphibious capabilities its first (if not sole) 
priority by 1962, despite difficulties brought about by inter-service rivalries and institutional 
resistance to change. Ultimately, however, this overall balance could not be maintained and, as a 
result of another set of defence reviews that began in 1965, it was decided three years later that 
British defence commitments would have to be withdrawn from 'East of Suez' altogether. 
Defence Policy, 1957-1961 
Following the 'Suez Crisis', the so-called 'Sandys White Paper', which was published in 
April 1957 and titled DEFENCE: Outline of Future Policy, announced a seminal change in 
British defence policy that effectively represented the 'culmination of attempts since 1952 to 
reduce Britain's defence expenditure,.817 Indeed, due to yet another episode of economic 
hardship and various 'scientific advances', mainly the 'far more powerful hydrogen or megaton 
bomb ... [and] the evolution of rocket weapons of all kinds', the paper concluded that 'it is only 
now that the future picture is becoming sufficiently clear to enable a comprehensive reshaping of 
policy to be undertaken with any degree of confidence' .818 
817 Doclaill, Michael, British Defence Since 1945 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1988),65. 
818 MD, Cmnd. 124, Defence: Outline of Future Policy (London: HMSO, 4.57), l. 
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From a purely geo-strategic perspective, however, this white paper only consolidated a 
process that had evolved, at least publicly, since 1954.819 As a result, it summarily asserted that 
Britain's armed forces must be capable of performing two main tasks:-
to play their part with the forces of Allied countries in deterring and resisting 
aggression; [and] 
to defend British colonies and protected territories against local attack, and undertake 
limited operations in overseas emergencies. 820 
Whilst then referring to 'Collective Defence' and the 'Nuclear Deterrent' as the main sources of 
British security, the document also emphasised two areas of focus that would characterise the 
evolution of overall British defence policy and force structure through the mid-1960s. The first 
concerned a 'Central Reserve .. .in the British Isles', which was to be paired with 'the means of 
rapid mobility' provided by 'RAF Transport Command'. The other area centred on 'Sea Power' 
which, even though the document had previously noted that the 'role of naval forces in total war 
[was] somewhat uncertain', involved 'the Royal Navy, together with the Royal Marines, 
provid[ing] another effective means of bringing power rapidly to bear in peacetime emergencies 
and limited hostilities'. At the same time, it was also pointed out that 'the role of the aircraft 
carrier, which is in effect a mobile air station, becomes increasingly significant'. Finally, the 
report announced the Government's intention, due to the new defence plan's 'reduced demands 
on manpower and its emphasis on highly trained mobile forces', to put 'the Services on to an all-
regular basis' .821 
Emphasis on these two main areas of concentration was repeated in the 1958 REPORT 
ON DEFENCE, which also proclaimed that 'through the balancing fears of mutual annihilation' , 
there was no reason why this strategic situation could not continue 'almost indefinitely'. 822 As a 
result, the 1959 white paper basically provided only a 'progress' report of sorts, notably focusing 
on 'Modernisation of Fleet' first, 'Re-equipment of Army' second, and 'Air Support and 
819 See MD, Cmd. 9075, Statement on Defence, 1954 (London: HMSO, 2.54), 1-7; MD, Cmd. 9391, Statement on 
Defence, 1955 (London: HMSO, 2.55), 1-9; and MD, Cmd. 9691, Statement on Defence, 1956 (London: HMSO, 
2/56), 1-8. 
820 MD, Cmnd. 124,2. partially quoted in Dockrill, 67. 
821 Cmd. 124,5-6. Partially quoted in Grove, Vanguard,203. 




By the time that the 1960 statement was promulgated, there was still 'no major 
change' in the course of this new policy.824 However, it should be noted that, whilst 
modernisation efforts with regard to 'Land', 'Sea' and 'Air' forces were briefly summarised, 
separate emphasis was now being placed specifically on 'Mobility', 'so that reinforcements can 
be brought to trouble spots before the trouble has time to spread into a major conflict'. Included 
under this heading were, again, the evolving 'strategic' and 'tactical transport' assets of 'RAP 
Transport Command' as well as a new 'commando carrier', which 'will normally be deployed 
east of Suez' .825 
The Royal Navy and Strategic Mobility 
As mentioned above, it was during this first phase that the Royal Navy underwent a 
fundamental strategic and organisational reorientation that enabled it, in the face of being 
overshadowed-even completely-by the focus on 'global (nuclear) war' (and the RAF and 
strategic bombing),826 to become an increasingly central part of British defence policy from 1957 
onwards. The origins of this change stemmed from the initiation of yet another defence review in 
1955. As a result, the new First Sea Lord, Lord Louis Mountbatten (of World War II COHQ and 
SEAC fame), who believed that the Royal Navy had not yet reached the 'limits of administrative 
economy' due to its '''dangerously bloated condition" with its massive infrastructures of shore 
establishments', also initiated a review of the entire naval establishment. 827 The idea for doing so 
seemed to germinate as early as 1950,828 although the fact that the Navy had '''never streamlined 
, d d' ·,829 A itself after the war'" ultimately drove Mountbatten to pursue urgent an rastlc prumng . s 
Mountbatten noted at the time, the review's 'purpose was to examine the structure and 
supporting organisation of the Navy up to 1965 - to go into the teeth to tail relationship and to 
823 MD, Cmnd. 662, Progress of the Five-Year Defence Plan (London: HMSO, 2.59),1-3. 
824 MD, Cmnd. 952, REPORT ON DEFENCE, 1960 (London: HMSO, 2.60). 
825 C d mn . 952, 8-10. 
826 See, especially, Ziegler, Philip, Mountbatten, Perennial Library reprint (New York, NY: Harper & Row, 1986), 
522, 525-526. 
827 Grove, Vanguard, 174-175. 
828 Ziegler, 496. . 
829 Hough, Richard, Mountbatten (New York, NY: Random House, 1981),249-250. For support of thIS agenda see, for 
example, CINC, ME Station, ltr to FSL, 12.10.55 (MB1II370; BA). 
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recommend the necessary cuts where they were found to be justified and feasible,.830 What 
resulted, as announced in the 1956 Naval Estimates, was an ongoing process of streamlining 
based on a 'general emphasis ... on maintaining the frontline fleet as cheaply and efficiently as 
possible, at the price of mobilization potential', which was 'a significant shift from the priorities 
of the previous decade'. 831 
In having to defend this so-called 'frontline fleet' from continued pressures to cut 
defence costs, the Admiralty set about providing a number of justifications. The most significant 
of these, not only for its 'carrier force in particular' but also for 'the navy in general', was the 
role of the Royal Navy in scenarios ranging from "'peacekeeping" missions' to 'limitedlbrushfire 
war' operations, particularly east of Suez. 832 Whilst the Navy's positive performance in the latter 
variety during the Suez Crisis seemed to provide 'evidence' supporting the Admiralty'S 
argument, more fundamental was the appreciation within certain quarters of the Navy itself, even 
prior to Suez, of the continued value of the 'Senior Service' in all sorts of future situations. This 
was particularly with regard to a new 'carrier with a Commando embarked with its transport as 
well as troop-carrying helicopters', which could be employed as a 'fire extinguisher...before 
calling in the "Fire Brigade'" (as a Brigade of the divisional 'strategic reserve' in the UK was 
called).833 
Moreover, the effective 'creation of a Middle East "air barrier" against British flights' 
(due 'directly' to the debacle at Suez) appeared to provide an inherent limitation to the 
effectiveness of British air power east of Suez. This did not seem to be the case for long as the 
RAF had apparently crafted what would eventually be referred to as the 'Island Stance' strategy, 
'as a means of circumventing the Middle East air barrier, [although] it soon acquired wider 
overtones in self-conscious opposition to the navy's carrier plans'. Whilst an intense period of 
inter-Service rivalry erupted, the Navy seemed to maintain the upper hand, at least with regard to 
830 _, 'Statement Recorded by the First Sea Lord for the Way Ahead Presentation in Fairlead', [1957] (MBlII578; 
BA). For more on the origins of this review, see various correspondence (MB1/I370; BA). 
831 See Grove, Vanguard, 175.1956 Naval Estimates cited as 'Cmnd. 9697, paras. 23-27'. 
832 Grove, Vanguard, 199-200. 
833 See VCNS, ltr to [FSL], 12.2.55; and Director of Plans, ltr to VCNS, FSL, 10.9.56 (MB1/I370; MBIII260; BA). 
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procuring amphibious capabilities, although its newly-designed aircraft carrier, the CV A-O 1, was 
ultimately cancelled in 1966.834 
Whilst the 1957 defence statement, as discussed above, effectively pronounced the initial 
success of all of these aforementioned 'review' efforts, the Navy was forced into similar 
defensive action yet again, this time in preparation to promote the specific value and efficacy of 
amphibious capabilities, including the Royal Marine Commandos. This began with the so-called 
'Autumn Naval Rethink', which was 'endorsed' by the Chiefs of Staff, and ended with the 
introduction of a new 'converted carrier, equipped to accommodate a Marine Commando force 
and capable of operating helicopters for either the troop-carrying or anti-submarine role', as 
stated in the 1958 defence statement.835 This agreement was apparently secured through the 
personal effort of Lord Mountbatten, who convinced the Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys, of 
the value of this new concept during a visit to his personal estate at Broadlands. 836 
Ultimately, the extent to which amphibious (and related) capabilities had been 
accepted-and prioritised-by the Royal Navy in particular, and the British defence 
establishment in general, was specifically exemplified in the '1962 Naval Estimates'. This was 
simply because, as one authoritative analysis concluded, 'amphibious warfare was now the 
acknowledged role of the Royal Navy. There was no mention of other kinds of operations,.837 In 
the final analysis, however, it is worth noting that the traditional term 'combined operations' 
(instead of 'amphibious warfare') was used to describe the 'role of the Navy' in the same 1962 
Estimates, specifically at the beginning of an oft-cited paragraph (which was even quoted in the 
aforementioned 'authoritative analysis'). To wit: 
In peace-time the ships of the Royal Navy are stationed all over the world. But when 
danger threatens they can be quickly assembled to take their place with the Army and 
Royal Air Force in combined operations to meet the threat. 838 
834 Grove, Vanguard, 201, 256-257, 276-277. See also Speller, 'Role', 243-264; and 'The Royal Navy ... ' in Kennedy, 
178-198. 
835 Cmnd. 363, 8. 
836 Grove, Vanguard,210. 
837 Grove, Vanguard, 253. Emphasis in original. 
838 See First Lord of the Admiralty, Cmnd. No. 1629, Explanatory Statement on the Navy Estimates 1962-63, 
paragraph 2; reprinted in full in Thursfield, H. G. (RADM, RN), (ed.), BRASSEY'S ANNUAL: The Armed Forces 
236 
The use of such all-encompassing tenninology, despite the fact that the '1962 Estimates' was a 
Royal Navy document and that the tenn 'amphibious warfare' had been in official use since 
1951, indicated that British amphibious thinking was ultimately still focused on a broader, 
holistic capacity (and approach), whether described as 'strategic mobility', 'expeditionary 
operations', or 'joint warfare'. At the same time, although the Navy now viewed amphibious 
warfare as its predominant function-something of an evolution from the immediate post-war 
years-resource limitations meant that it was in no position to develop single service capabilities 
comparable to America's. 
Defence Policy, 1962-1968 
The second phase of British defence policy evolution, as mentioned above, attempted to 
balance increasingly limited defence resources with largely unaltered global commitments, 
whilst also building strategically mobile conventional forces and integrating them to maximise 
their effectiveness and efficiency. This policy was first described in the 1961 defence statement, 
which asserted 'that many of our most important responsibilities are not concerned with the 
direct deterrence of all out global war, but rather with the checking of small outbreaks which 
could grow into nuclear war by accident or design'. As a result, British defence policy 'must 
depend on its evident power of rapid and certain reaction against any fonn of attack' whilst 
protecting 'us, our allies and our friends against the whole spectrum of possible aggression and 
military threats ... '. Using conventional forces, this was to be accomplished primarily by 'the 
establishment of local stockpiles, ... the rapid air movement of troops and equipment, and by 
increased naval strength'. 839 
This sentiment was reiterated with more urgency in next year's statement which, as its 
title revealed, addressed The Next Five Years (and even beyond). As a situation had been reached 
where 'Governments can no longer choose to have either a full-scale conventional war or a 
Year-Book, 1962 (London: William Clowes & Sons, Ltd., 1962), 292-314. Also quoted in Grove, Vanguard, 252, and 
Crowe, 236. Emphasis added. 
839 MD, Cmnd. 1288, REPORT ON DEFENCE, 1961 (London: HMSO, 2.61), 3-5. 
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limited war without risking the use of nuclear weapons', the document basically reaffirmed the 
solution outlined the previous year. 
We must insur.e against the possible loss of fixed installations overseas by keeping men 
and heavy eqUipment afloat, and by increasing the air and sea portability of the Strategic 
Reserve .... Greater mobility by air and sea is the best way of fulfilling efficiently over the 
next five to ten years the requirements set out.. .. In short, we must maintain carefully 
balanced forces to deter every form of aggression and military threats [sic]. 840 
Although first outlined to the public in these two defence statements, the era of what 
would become known as 'British Strategy in the Sixties' had one of its major sources from a 
'Joint Study' that was produced by the JPS and promulgated by the COS on 5 July 1960.841 This 
comprehensive paper ultimately analysed British 'military strategy ... , ... the tasks of the Services, 
and ... the consequent force requirements during the coming decade'. In reaching the strategic 
conclusions that were outlined in the defence statements discussed above, the paper also outlined 
how Britain could fulfil is strategic obligations. 
Whilst we have not yet been able to study in detail the many practical problems involved, 
it seems that the only course which can offer the means of achieving our aim is to 
develop progressively towards a strategy based on the maintenance of small seaborne 
forces with floating stockpiles, and on the rapid movement by air over long distances of 
land and air forces. 842 
In addition to the general force requirements outlined above, the 'Joint Study' also described the 
'Need for an Assault Capability', in particular an 'airborne assault capability .. .in the 
MediterraneanlNear East area and a seaborne and airborne assault capability in the Persian Gulf 
area. No specific requirement [was] foreseen for either of these capabilities in the Far East'.843 
More details on the 'seaborne force' were provided in an Appendix, which revealed a myriad of 
insights with regard to inherent differences between American and British amphibious 
development. For example, of subtle-yet not insignificant-importance was the terminology. 
This involved the actual term 'amphibious warfare', which the British viewed as being simply 
'the transport by sea of land forces, who have had some special training, from a base to a foreign 
840 MD, Cmnd. 1639, STATEMENT ON DEFENCE, 1962: The Next Five Years (London: HMSO, 2.62), 4-5. 
841 COS (60) 200, 5.7.60 (DEFE 13/299; NA). 
842 COS (60) 200, paras. 6, 108. 
843 COS (60) 200, paras. 28, 191. 
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and possibly hostile shore, there to be landed across the beach ready to fight'. As a result, the 
British preferred to use the word 'seaborne' instead.844 
More significant was the description of 'Use of the Sea by Land Forces', which seemed 
to forecast the development of what would become known as the 'seaborne/airborne' concept 
that eventually evolved into the concept of 'j oint warfare'. 
In the future there is likely to be an even greater premium on rapidity of intervention and 
the distances between land force bases and possible operational areas will increase. The 
strategic lift of a force by sea from a shore base, even in fast ships, will then be too slow; 
land forces will depend increasingly on strategic air transport to reach their operational 
area within an acceptable time scale ... .In these circumstances, use of the sea can be 
complementary to strategic air movement in three ways: 
(a) By holding small self-contained forces poised well forward where they will be 
available for rapid intervention. 
(b) By holding forward heavy land and air force equipment and stores that will be 
required early in an intervention but are either very expensive in air transport or not 
air -transportable. 
( c) In the follow-up phase by establishing a sea L of C and by moving armour. 845 
While the central premise of this idea was that it was inherently joint (i.e., involving both 
'seaborne' and 'airborne' forces), it is important to note that the 'seaborne forces' themselves 
were also depicted as being joint too. This applied first to 'commando carrier operations' where 
there was 'no reason to suppose that the infantry unit embarked would necessarily always be 
Royal Marines, nor that the ship would not at times also carry RAF helicopters to augment those 
organic to the carrier. Inter-Service flexibility should be the keynote .. .'.846 Secondly, this applied 
to other specialised vessels by which 'armour and artillery could be included in the seaborne 
force with or without the personnel. In the latter case, the personnel concerned could join the 
ships by air...'. 847 This latter ship was referred to as the 'Seaborne Support Ship', two types of 
which were being considered at the time. The first, dubbed the' Assault Ship', was a '20-knot 
ship with a capacity for 700 men, 15 tanks, 6 guns and 50 x 3-ton equivalents'. The second, 
called the 'New LST', was a '15-knot ship with a capacity for 350 men and 16 tanks,.848 Both of 
these types of ships would eventually be built and deployed. Two of the former type emerged as 
844 COS (60) 200, Appendix C, paras. 3-4. 
845 COS (60) 200, Appendix C, paras. 3-4. 
846 COS (60) 200, Appendix C, para. II. 
847 COS (60) 200, Appendix C, para. 13. 
848 COS (60) 200, Appendix C, para. 17. 
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the assault ships HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid in 1965 and 1966, respectively, and a total of 
six larger versions of the latter type-called Landing Ships Logistic (LSL )~ntered service 
between 1966 and 1968, although these ships were at first operated by a commercial line like 
Army troop ships. Only later would they pass to the Royal Fleet Auxiliary, the organisation that 
operated Navy supply ships. 
ORGANISATIONAL/INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS 
From the AWHQ Establishment to a 'Joint Warfare' Organisation 
Following on from the Chief of Amphibious Warfare's (CAW's) annual report for 1956, 
which announced the required staff reductions as a result of the defence review process of 1953-
54,849 CAW was able to report by the end of 1957 that his 'Headquarters ... [was] working 
adequately, although it takes rather longer to get results' .850 This appeared to be evident after a 
request by the COS in early 1958 'to review the whole concept of Amphibious Operations,851 
took nearly two full years to complete. Nevertheless, this extensive effort culminated in a policy 
letter from CAW to the new Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), now Lord Mountbatten, on 19 
November 1959, which essentially introduced the concept of so-called 'seaborne/airborne 
operations' . 
In the present air age, amphibious warfare must be assessed as a means of strategic 
mobility in relation to air transport and air assault operations. In this comparison, the air 
offers the advantage of speed; the sea those of heavy load capacity, economy, 
b 'l' 852 independence of bases, and stand-off or hover capa Ilty. 
In parallel with this concept, which will be discussed in more detail below, CAW also noted that 
'[s]ome degree of overall co-ordination, earmarking of units, and the establishment of common 
doctrine for planning and training [was] necessary'. 853 
849 COS (56) 404, 2. 
850 COS (57) 265, 5.12.57 (DEFE 2/2067, folio 40; NA), 2. 
851 JP (58) 23 (D) Revised T ofR (A Section), 8.4.58, 1; and JP (58) 5 (Final), 13.2.58,2 (DEFE 6/49; NA). 
852 COS (59) 312, 7.12.59 (DEFE 5/98; NA), 2. Emphasis added. 
853 COS (59) 312,4. 
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The 'Joint Warfare Committee' (JWC) and 'Joint Warfare Staff' (JWS) 
An assessment to determine exactly what was required to implement such 'overall co-
ordination' was not accomplished by the JPS (and approved by the COS) until early June 
1961.854 In essence, this evaluation identified four maj or weaknesses in the 'present 
organisation'. Its first conclusion seemed to hearken back to one of the major concerns of the 
'RAW Committee' of 1944 with regard to 'combined operations', in that 'no single higher 
authority exists in Whitehall, below the Chiefs of Staff Committee, specifically responsible for 
formulating and directing joint Service policy for limited war to be implemented through all 
three Service Ministries'. Second, the existing 'Joint Organizations', which included the School 
of LandfAir Warfare (SLAW) and the Joint Services Amphibious Warfare Centre (JSAWC), 
effectively precluded the study of study seaborne/airborne/land operations as a joint concept 
because of the separate consideration of sealift and airlift. Third, the central weakness of the 
'Single Service Organizations and Training' was the lack of 'a world-wide inter-Service concept 
of seaborne/airborne/land warfare to which [the Services] can work'. In apparent contrast to the 
American (naval) approach, it was emphasised here that '[e]ven the experience of the Royal 
Navy with units active in all three elements ... cannot fully expose all the problems of operating a 
force drawn from all three Services. It is therefore no substitute for a fully integrated inter-
Service approach'. Finally, the report noted one last serious 'handicap': the 'lack of a common 
joint service concept [that] has resulted in the separate development of equipment for airborne 
d -C' b ., 855 an lor sea orne operatIOns . 
Subsequently, the JPS prepared another comprehensive analysis to recommend 
improvements, which was approved by the COS on 4 January 1962.856 This appraisal, which 
dealt primarily with the 'Proposed System for Higher Direction', first rejected 'the formation of a 
separate joint headquarters organisation' like A WHQ during peacetime, noting that it 'could not 
be justified' and that 'it was more appropriate for executive power to be exercised by Single 
854 COS (61) 180, 8.6.61 (DEFE 5/114; NA). 
855 COS (61) 180,2-7. 
856 COS (62) 12,4.1.62 (DEFE 5/123; NA). 
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Service Ministries .. .'. A more 'practical solution [lay] in the formation of a new j oint Service 
organisation in Whitehall consisting of a committee, composed of senior representatives of the 
Service Ministries and the Ministry of Defence but directly responsible to the Chiefs of Staff, 
served by a standing joint staff. This 'committee'-dubbed the 'Joint Warfare Committee' 
(JWC)-was to absorb the responsibilities of the Land/Air Warfare Committee and A WHQ, 
'both of which would cease to exist'. The 'staff, which was to be labelled the' Joint Warfare 
Staff (JWS), was to be headed by a 'Director', who was also to be a 'full member' of the 
JWc.857 Finally, it was suggested that a working party be established to make certain 
recommendations, the most urgent of which included 'the composition and establishment of sub-
committees' and the 'composition and organisation of the permanent staff .858 
As recommended, the newly-formed JWC addressed some of these issues at its first 
meeting, held on 17 January 1963, by appointing a 'Joint Warfare Working Party' (JWWP) to 
come up with specific 'recommendations,.859 A final version of this group's report,860 which was 
approved by the COS on 20 F ebruary, 861 recommended the establishment of three sub-
committees: an 'Offensive Support Sub-Committee' (OSSC), an 'Air Transport Support Sub-
Committee' (ATSSC), and an 'Amphibious Warfare Sub-Committee' (AWSC).862 It is 
interesting to note the elemental way in which responsibilities amongst these entities were 
allocated. This was particularly the case for AWSC which, for instance, was not given 
responsibility for 'naval gunfire support' (under OSSC) and 'all joint aspects of air transport 
support', including helicopters (under ATSSC),863 as would have almost certainly been expected 
from an American naval point of view as these areas were considered to be intrinsic 
characteristics of amphibious warfare. 
857 It is interesting to note that the frrst Director was the former CAW, Major General R. D. Houghton, RM. 
858 COS (62) 12,2-5. 
859 COS (JWC)(62) 1st Meeting, 17.1.62 (DEFE 111370: folio 1; NA). See also DCDS, ltr to ACNS, DMO, ACAS, 
12.1.62 (DEFE 111367: folio 1; NA). 
860 COS (JWC)(62) 1, 15.2.62; JWS/5/2/2/62, 2.2.62 (DEFE 111367, folios 5, 3; NA). nd. 
861 _, 'Extract from COS (62) 12th Meeting held on 20 Feb. 1962',20.2.62; see also COS (JWC)(62) 2 Meetmg, 
7.2.62 (DEFE 111367, folio 6; DEFE 111370, folio 3; NA). 
862 COS (62) 84, 28.2.62, (DEFE 5/124; DEFE 111367, folio 10; NA), 2. 
863 See COS (62) 84, Appendices A, B, C. 
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A number of items related to the composition of the JWS are also worth highlighting as 
many of them revealed apparently inherent similarities between the new JWC/JWS organisation 
and A WHQ. For example, not only did the required number of JWS staff match the existing staff 
level at A WHQ at the time, but it was also recommended to retain the 'present other ranks staff 
at A WHQ ... to serve the Joint Warfare Staff. Furthermore, it was also noted that A WHQ's 
existing 'accommodation ... [was] suitable for the Joint Warfare Staff. 864 All of these apparently 
coincidental similarities were reaffirmed, if only ceremoniously, by the subsequent approval by 
the JWS of the use of the 'original Combined Operations Badge, with modified wording' by 'all 
Joint Warfare Establishments' .865 
The 'Joint Warfare Establishment' (JWE) 
The JWWP next considered two other significant items that had been recommended by 
the JPS report of 4 January, namely 'the training and development organisation' and the 'best 
procedures for formulating doctrines and techniques' .866 After yet another extensive assessment 
was prepared by mid-July 1962,867 a revised version was ultimately approved by the COS on 30 
October, which authorised 'the formation of a Joint Warfare Establishment' by 1 April 1963. 
The report's central conclusion bears quoting in full. 
Defence strategy is founded on the unity of purpose of the three Services. For this to be 
translated into effective action demands common doctrines, standardised procedures, 
compatible equipments and a high degree of inter-Service understanding at all levels. For 
these reasons, we consider it to be important to reject the view that land/air warfare and 
amphibious warfare are distinct studies to be pursued more or less in isolation. We 
believe that the two subjects should be viewed as complementary parts of the concept of 
seaborne/airborne/land operations enunciated by the Chiefs of Staff; a concept which 
poses the problems of command, co-ordination, communications, and logistics in the 
most complicated form. This concept of Joint Warfare we defme as:-
"The employment of sea and/or air forces in concert with land forces.,,868 
'With the adoption of this concept', the report continued, 'it [was] no longer satisfactory to have 
separate schools for land/air warfare and amphibious warfare'. As a result, the 'ideal 
864 COS (62) 84, 3-5. See also JWS 2/29/3/62,29.3.62 (DEFE 11/367, no folio; NA). 
865 See PPO/P (62) 37, 4.7.62 (DEFE 111367, folio 22; NA). See also COS (JWC) 7th Meetingl63, 8.5.63; and COS 
(JWC) 9th Meetingl63, 10.7.63, for the decision to provide the 'Amphibious Warfare Badge' to 'all Joint Warfare 
Establishments' (DEFE 111370, folio 12, 14; NA). 
866 COS (JWC)(62) 3rd Meeting, 6.4.62 (DEFE 111370: folio 4; NA) 
867 JWS 5/17/7/62, 17.7.62 (DEFE 111367, folio 24; NA); and COS (JWC)(62) 5th Meeting, 27.8.62 (DEFE 111370, 
folio 10; NA). 
868 COS (62) 426,31.10.62 (DEFE 5/l31; NA), 1. Emphasis added. 
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solution ... [was] to create a single establishment, at one location, which would provide for both 
training and development in all Joint Warfare matters,.869 Although the move of SLAW to Poole 
(the location of JSA WC) was 'ruled out by the lack of accommodation', the 'move of the 
Amphibious Warfare School to Old S arum , (the location of SLAW) was considered to be 
'possible'. Consequently, the amalgamation of the two entities at Old Sarum to form 'a Joint 
Warfare Establishment' (JWE) was advocated 'with a target date of 1 st April, 1963,.870 
The JWE was to be organised into a 'Headquarters' and two 'Wings'. A 'Training Wing' 
was to consist of an 'Offensive Support Section', an 'Air Transport Support Section', and an 
'Amphibious Warfare Section'. This 'Wing' would generally be responsible for all training 
aspects, including 'academic training' that included the following subject areas, which bore a 
very strong resemblance to those topics accorded to the ISTDC back in 1938: 
(a) Offensive and transport support, both seas and air, of grounds forces established in 
the field .... 
(b) Airborne assault and associated air support. 
( c) Seaborne assault and associated air and surface support. 
(d) Air-landing operations and associated air support. 
( e) Landings from the sea, over beaches or through a port. 
(t) Logistic support, whether air-dropped, air-landed, over a beach or through a port. 871 
The 'Training Wing' would also be responsible for disseminating 'up-to-date Joint Warfare 
doctrine, procedures and techniques by means of...Study Periods, ... presentations and visits', 
teaching various courses-including a new 'Joint Warfare Course', and providing specialised 
training. A second 'Tactical Development Wing' was to have primary responsibility for 'the 
development of joint-Service tactical doctrines, procedures and equipment'. 872 Although it is 
unclear whether the original 'target date of 1 st April, 1963' was adhered to, the new JWE was 
reported to be up and running by May. 873 
869 COS (62) 426, 1. 
870 COS (62) 426, 1-2. 
871 COS (62) 426, 3. 
872 COS (62) 426, 3-4, 8. . 
873 See COS (JWC) 7th Meeting/63, 8.5.63; see also COS (JWC) 6th Meeting/63, 5.4.63 (DEFE 111370, fohos 12, 11; 
NA); COS 93/63 (issued 1 st March, 1963),4.4.63 (DEFE 5/136; DEFE 111367, folio 45; NA), 1-2,4; and COS (62) 
482 (issued 18.12.62), 11.1.63 (DEFE 5/132; NA). 
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Higher Level Defence Re-organisation 
Similar efforts to promote the 'unity of purpose of the three Services' also occurred at 
the highest levels of defence organisation; in effect, from the 'top, down'. This was evidenced by 
the creation of a truly unified Ministry of Defence in 1964. Whilst perhaps not having a direct 
impact on British amphibious/expeditionary development per se, it did ultimately reflect the 
conceptual and practical advances being made, not only at the organisational/institutional level 
(as discussed above) but also at the tactical/operational level (as will be discussed below). 
This higher level process was achieved in three areas. This first stemmed from the 1958 
promulgation of the Central Organisation for Defence which, amongst other things, officially 
confirmed the post of Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), similar to the US Chairman of the JCS, 
'designed to emphasise the importance of the closest inter-Service co-operation' .874 This was 
significant because its second occupant, Lord Louis Mountbatten, was to playa decisive role in 
this unification process. Mountbatten's rationale stemmed from his World War II experiences, 
not only as head of COHQ, where he became 'a firm believer in inter-Service co-operation', but 
also subsequently as the supreme commander of SEAC.875 Indeed, according to his official 
biographer, by the time Mountbatten became CDS (in 1959), he had apparently become known 
as 'a partisan of some degree of unification between [sic] the three Services for twenty years or 
more', even to the point of being a 'notorious ... partisan of centralisation' .876 
The second area, and one in which Mountbatten had a direct hand, concerned the 
'unification of the command of forces in the field [which] was, in terms both of tactics and 
organisation, an almost essential preliminary to any fundamental change in the Centre; .. .'. 877 
Although a 'Commander-in-Chief, British Forces Arabian Peninsula, had operated since April, 
1958' at a headquarters at Aden,878 it was first recognised publicly as a 'unified command' in 
874 PM, Cmnd. 476, Central Organisation for Defence (London: HMSO, 7.58), 3, 5. . . 
875 Terraine, John, The Life and Times of Lord Mountbatten (New York, NY: Hold, Rinehart and Wmston, 1980), 88. 
See also Hough, 259; and Ziegler, 180-181. 
876 Ziegler, 578, 532. 
877 Howard, Michael, The Central Organisation of Defence (London: RUSI, 1970), 14. 
878 Johnson, Franklyn A., Defence by Ministry: The British Ministry of Defence, 1944-1974 (New York, NY: Holmes 
& Meier Publishers, Inc., 1980), 76. 
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1959 and, along with the newly-formed 'Near East Command', was renamed 'Middle East 
Command' in 1961, with headquarters in Cyprus and Aden, respectively.879 In 1962, it was 
decided that a third unified command would be established in the 'Far East',880 notably where 
Mountbatten had tried (and failed) to create just such an organisation in 1946.881 
The third and last area involved the establishment of a unified Ministry of Defence. This 
essentially represented the culmination of a drive towards inter-Service co-operation that had 
blossomed with the 1962 announcement of both the organisational/institutional changes-in the 
form of a new 'Joint Service Staff-as discussed above, and the tactical/operational changes-
in the form of so-called 'joint Service task forces using the air and the sea to transport men and 
equipment and to support operations conducted ashore'-as will be discussed in more detail 
below.882 At the same time, the Statement also outlined the ongoing objectives of these efforts. 
Increasing stress will be laid on interchangeability of functions and mutual support and 
assistance between the three Services, so that we get the best value out of our Service 
manpower as a whole .... The purpose is not to revolutionise the organisation of the forces 
b h . d 883 ut rat er to secure greater co-operatIOn an economy. 
With the focus now turned toward fostering this 'outlook. .. at every level from the top to the 
bottom of our defence forces and organisation' ,884 as demonstrated by the official announcement 
of 'decisions ... to strengthen the central organisation for defence', 885 by 1964, the Government 
was able to boast, not completely without reason, 'that our three fighting Services have broken 
the conventional moulds and transformed themselves into a single swift-moving, flexible, almost 
infinitely adaptable instrument of defence policy'. 886 
One final by-product of this higher re-organisation process is worth noting, as it 
illustrated the degree to which the British defence establishment had effectively accepted that 
amphibious warfare was an inherent part of joint warfare. This involved a re-organisation within 
879 Cmnd. 662,4; and Cmnd. 1288,5. 
880 Cmnd. 1639, 15. 
881 Ziegler, 584; Howard, 14; Johnson, Ministry, 74. 
882 Cmnd. 1639, 10. 
883 Cmnd. 1639, 14. 
884 MD, Cmnd. 1936, STATEMENT ON DEFENCE, 1963, Including Memoranda to Accompany the Navy, Army and 
Air Estimates, 1963-64 (London: HMSO, 2.63), 5. 
885 MOD, Cmnd. 2097, Central Organisation for Defence (London: HMSO, 7.63), l. 
886 MD, Cmnd. 2270, STATEMENT ON DEFENCE, 1964 (London: HMSO, 2.64), 7. 
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the Naval Staff itself. Due to the 'changes in [the] central Committee structure', an internal 
Admiralty memorandum noted a year after the re-organisation had transpired, it had become 
evident that 'the division between the two Directorates' responsible for Joint and Amphibious 
Warfare was 'illogical and that Joint Warfare and Amphibious Warfare should be a unified 
responsibility,.887 As a result, it was agreed to consolidate these responsibilities into a 'unified 
Naval Staff responsibility'. This was based on the simple rationale that the 'dividing line 
between Joint and Amphibious Warfare can never be clearly defined, and in fact, the one 
included the other' .888 
T ACTICAL/OPERA TIONAL ASPECTS 
By 1956, it will be remembered, the joint amphibious operation began to re-emerge as a 
focal point of British amphibious/expeditionary development, although its scope remained 
relatively limited to 'a force of up to a brigade group', according to CAW's 1954 and 1958 
directives.889 At the same time, CAW continued to be responsible for examining such wide-
ranging fields as 'the technique of maintenance or withdrawaL.across beaches', 'embarking and 
disembarking cargoes by improvised means', and even 'maj or river crossings'. He was also 
responsible for 'the j oint Service problems of raiding operations', related to which was advising 
'on the development of technique and ... training policy for Commando Units, the Commando 
School, RM, [and] the Amphibious School, RM ... '. 890 
Nevertheless, the attention to purely offensive enterprises appeared to gain momentum in 
the late 1950s, mainly through the introduction and development of the 'Commando 
Carrier/Ship' concept. Although this initially supported the primacy of the Royal Navy and 
Royal Marines, at least with regard to amphibious capabilities,891 the re-evaluation of the 
amphibious assault and follow-up (or logistic) lift requirements, which resulted in the 
887 Director, NTWP, memorandum to DCNS, 29.7.65 (DEFE 69171; NA), 2. 
888 2nd PUS (RN), 'Joint and Amphibious Warfare - Responsibility Within the Navy Department', 26.11.65 (DEFE 
69171; NA), 1. 
889 COS (54) 365, 2; COS (58) 293, 24.12.58 (DEFE 5/87; NA), 2. 
890 COS (58) 293, 2-3. . . 
89J See, especially, Speller, Role, Epilogue; 'Role', Chapters 6-8; and his chapters in edited books, as dJscussed In the 
Introduction, 23. 
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procurement of these respective vessels in the 1960s, with the latter specifically for Army (and 
RAP) supporting arms and heavy equipment, actually reinforced the traditionally joint character 
of British concepts, approach and practice. Also significant was the permanent attachment of 
Royal Artillery (RA) batteries to RM Commandos whilst deployed (particularly afloat), making 
them inherently joint formations, not to mention finally the effort to study and implement the 
'interchangeability' of commandos and Army battalions when operating from commando 
ships.892 
Most important, however, was the introduction of the 'seaborne/airborne/land 
operations' concept in 1961. This subsequently evolved into the broader notion of 'joint warfare' 
into which 'amphibious warfare' was effectively subsumed, thus further reaffirming the 
traditional joint approach towards-and practice of-such endeavours by the British. In this 
particular regard, this development seemed to hearken back to the inter-war years (and even 
before) when so-called 'combined operations' (i.e., with 'combined' meaning joint) had first 
been conceptualised. 
The Evolution of (Joint) 'Amphibious Operations' (1956-59) 
The 'Commando Carrier Force' Concept 
The idea for a helicopter assault type ship actually preceded its first implementation at 
Suez in November 1956. This stemmed from an investigation into the future role, structure and 
organisation of the Royal Navy that was initiated in 1955 by the new First Sea Lord, Lord Louis 
Mountbatten, as discussed above. Approximately one year later, in July, a paper titled 'The 
Future Role of the Navy' was presented to the COS,893 which introduced a concept that would 
characterise--and eventually nearly dominate--the evolution of the Royal Navy for the next two 
decades.894 
The paper called for 'one Commando Carrier to carry a Royal Marine Commando with 
its transport and a squadron of troop-carrying helicopters'. This ship, in tum, was supposed to be 
892 See Introduction, 23, for Speller's 2006 and 2008 articles. 
893 COS (56) 280 (Revise), 25.7.56 (DEFE 5170; NA). 
894 See footnote 891. 
248 
part of a new 'Task Group, based on Singapore ... capable of ... bombardment and landing a self-
supporting Royal Marine Commando or an equivalent number of troops'. The general purpose of 
the Group, which consisted also of a Light Fleet Carrier, four destroyers, and a Cruiser, was to 
provide reinforcements to 'existing naval forces' in the East Indies and the Far East for 'Cold 
War policing' and 'Limited War' scenarios.895 
Although this paper accurately foreshadowed the evolution of British strategy and force 
structure in the late 1950s and even 1960s, and was visionary in scope, CAW only slowly moved 
forward on this concept. Whilst first noting the commissioning of the USS Thetis Bay 'into the 
first helicopter assault carrier. .. at the end of July, 1956', CAW concluded that, due to the 'recent 
emergency' (at Suez), there now existed an 'urgent need ... [t]o develop the helicopter 
technique' .896 He reiterated this emphasis to the COS less than a week later, whilst addressing 
certain 'amphibious warfare problems' that had occurred during MUSKETEER.897 However, it 
was not until September 1958 that concrete progress on the Commando Carrier force concept 
began, after the Admiralty promulgated an analysis outlining a proposed 'deployment' schedule, 
a corresponding 'redeployment' plan for the Commandos, and an articulation of the ship's 
strategic roles and capabilities. Interestingly, the Admiralty believed the primary role would only 
be for 'internal security and minor actions'. As a result, for 'Limited War' operations, the ship 
'would only be committed in conjunction with other naval, land and air forces', which meant that 
any such operation would have to be joint in character. 898 
This paper was considered by the COS on 14 October, 1958, where it was agreed that the 
'logistic and administrative implications' of the Admiralty'S proposals needed to be assessed.899 
The resulting examination, approved by the COS on 9 February, 1959, generally reiterated the 
Carrier's capabilities and strategic roles, albeit in a bit more detail. Specific topics included 
additional personnel, various 'means of supply, repair and replacement of unit equipment, 
895 COS (56) 280 (Revise), 3-4. 
896 COS (56) 404, 4; Appendix "C". 
897 COS (56) 412, 19.11.56 (DEFE 5/72; NA). 
898 COS (58) 219, 18.9.58 (DEFE 5/85; NA). Emphasis added. 
899 COS (59) 32, 9.2.59 (DEFE 5/88; NA), 2. 
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vehicles and spares', 'Accommodation', 'War Reserves', 'Other Facilities', and finally 'Training 
Facilities' in the 'United Kingdom', the 'Mediterranean', and 'East of Suez' .900 
Outstanding about this arrangement was that almost all of these requirements had be to 
provided from Army resources, which accentuated what increasingly appeared to be the joint 
nature of the Commando Carrier concept itself. This was reinforced even more by the 
requirement for 'logistical support' by the Army for 'any major scale, or independent operations' 
at the brigade level. Although no such support was necessary for operations conducted by the 
'Commando Carrier Force' on its own, it was estimated that up to '440 all ranks and 125 
vehicles' would be required from Army resources for larger enterprises, ranging from such units 
as an 'MT Company' to a 'Postal Unit,.901 However, as the War Office was not making any 
provision for such 'second line administrative units to support the Commando Brigade', it was 
ultimately concluded that the Commando Brigade could only be committed 'as part of a larger 
force for which logistic support, including administrative personnel, would have to be pre-
planned'. In other words, 'Commandos could be employed independently only in minor and 
special operations ... ' .902 This starkly differentiated the Royal Marine Commandos from their 
USMC FMF counterparts in America as the latter could provide all of the aforementioned 
logistic elements solely through the US Navy, thus enabling them to be employed quite broadly 
in an amphibious-and, arguably, even expeditionary-role. 
Although the Admiralty initially reported having difficulties implementing the 
aforementioned proposals,903 its efforts were complicated by calls for the movement of an 
armoured squadron, a Royal Marine Commando and the Amphibious Warfare Squadron south of 
the Suez Canal 'barrier,.904 The Admiralty responded with a paper on a proposed 'Joint Services 
Seaborne Force'. In the short term, such a force could be created (and based at Aden) by moving 
'the operational element of the AW Squadron (i.e. 1 LSH(S), 2 LST(A)s and 2 LCT(8)s) South 
900 COS (59) 32, 1-6. 
901 COS (59) 32, 7; Appendix "C", Part II. 
902 COS (59) 32, 7-8. 
903 COS (59) 71, 24.3.59 (DEFE 5/90; NA). 
904 COS (59) 137, 12.6.59 (DEFE 111219, folio 185A; NA), l. 
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of the Barrier' and adding to it a troopship, an MT ship, and two War Department (WD) LSTs. 
This force could either maintain a 'Battalion Group poised for a period of up to six weeks within 
4 days' steaming of Kuwait' or transport two Battalions directly from Aden to Kuwait within '8 
days', although the LCTs had to be located within the Persian Gulfin either case.90S 
By the end of 1959, it was evident that the approval and implementation ofthese actions, 
along with the scheduled commissioning of HMS Bulwark in January, 1960, would largely 
implement the 'Joint Services Seaborne Force' concept. However, this was ultimately only a 
temporary solution to a deeper and long-term problem that threatened to limit, if not paralyse, 
amphibious development in the United Kingdom for the foreseeable future. As summarised by 
the Chief of Amphibious Warfare in his annual progress report, dated 1 January, 1960, this 
'small joint force ... should, with the Commando Carrier, be a valuable asset, although nothing 
can make up for the slow speed and obsolescence of its ships' .906 
Operational Requirements for Amphibious Lift 
The 'obsolescence' of Great Britain's amphibious lift had been a concern of A WHQ 
since the Suez crisis.907 This anxiety gradually mounted until CAW finally declared in the first 
sentence of his 1958 annual report that the 'dominant problem of British amphibious 
warfare ... during 1958 ... [was] and still is the future of our assault and logistic amphibious 
shipping,.908 Consequently, efforts in 1959 focused on determining the operational requirements 
for future amphibious lift with examinations being launched by A WHQ and other entities.909 By 
the end of that year, a plan had emerged that consisted ofthe following two elements: 
(a) An assault lift of two Commando Carriers and two Amphibious Assault Ships to be 
built by the Admiralty [and] 
(b) A follow-up lift of LST to be built under the supervision of the Ministry of 
910 Transport for the War Office. 
905 COS (59) 137, 1-3. . 
906 COS (60) 1, 1.1.60 (DEFE 5/99; DEFE 2/2067, folio 44; NA), 2. EmphasIS added. 
907 COS (56) 412, 19.11.56 (DEFE 5/72; NA), 2. th 
908 COS (58) 282, 12.12.58 (DEFE 5/87; DEFE 2/2067, folio 42; NA), 1; and _, 'Extract from COS (59) 10 
Meeting held on 5 Feb 1959', n.d. (DEFE 111219, folio 160; NA), 4. 
909 COS (57) 182, 7.8.57 (DEFE 5/77; NA). 
910 COS (60) 1, 1. 
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This plan, in fact, was already underway as HMS Bulwark was scheduled for commissioning as a 
Commando Carrier in January, 1960, and another light fleet carrier, HMS Albion, was identified 
for conversion into a second Commando carrier that 'summer,.911 In addition, some advances had 
been made with regard to developing staff requirements and designs for the new Assault Ships 
and new (logistic) LSTs. Taken together, these measured accomplishments permitted CAW to 
state that 'the present obsolescent ships [could] be replaced by 1965 provided that appropriate 
Budget action is taken ... ' .912 
Development of the two Amphibious Assault Ships had first emerged from an October, 
1958, technical study conducted by the Admiralty (in consultation with AWHQ). This study 
looked at a number of different types of ships, including a new 'LCT', a 'Bow loading LST', a 
'Stem loading LST', an 'Amphibious Transport Dock', as well as 'Current and projected US 
amphibious ships and craft'. Although the two best options were deemed to be either the 'Bow 
loading LST' or a small version of the 'Amphibious Transport Dock', the fact that the latter had 
a maximum ocean-going speed of 23 knots seemed to be make it a more attractive option since it 
could keep up with both the Commando Carrier as well as with the American LPHs.913 At a COS 
meeting two weeks later, the Chiefs agreed that '[d]etailed design studies should be started 
forthwith on an Amphibious Transport Dock. .. ' .914 
Reflecting the increasing strategic emphasis on strategic mobility, the Board of the 
Admiralty finally approved the ship's design in March 1961,915 and awarded a contract for the 
so-called 'Landing Ship Assault' [LSA] in December.916 Although the two assault ships, HMS 
Fearless and HMS Intrepid, were not expected to come into service until 1966, their ultimate 
value revolved around providing fast and versatile vessels with a maximum carrying capacity for 
a myriad of items such as troops, tanks, and vehicles, as well as its own landing craft and 
911 Wettem, 182. 
912 COS (62) 47,5.2.62 (DEFE 5/124; NA), 1. 
913 COS (58) 254, 13.11.58 (DEFE 5/86; NA), 8-9, Appendix "B". . 
914 -.--J 'Extract from COS (59) 32 Meeting held on 26 May 1959', n.d. (DEFE 111219, folIo 183A; NA), 7. 
915 Speller, 'Role', 191. 
916 COS (62) 81,21.2.62 (DEFE 5/124; DEFE 2/2067, folio 66; NA), 2, 9. 
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amphibians. Finally, each ship had command facilities available for a 'Naval/Amphibious 
GrouplBrigade HQ' and included a 'joint Amphibious Beach Unit, consisting of Army and Royal 
Marine personnel' as part of its company.917 
There was also an emphasis on these ships providing a joint capability, which was 
reflected in the ships' roles and expected deployment. Indeed, four types of operational roles 
were outlined, consisting of: ' ( a) Seaborne Assault Role.... (b) J oint Seaborne/Airborne 
Landing.... (c) In support of an air transported force.... [and] (d) Logistic Role ... '. To execute 
these various roles, Anny and Royal Marine units and personnel had to be earmarked for training 
with new units being trained by the Amphibious Training Unit, Royal Marines, POOLE, before 
departure from the United Kingdom' .918 
With regard to deployment, it was expected that an 'Amphibious Group' would be 
formed east of Suez in 1966 which, in tum, would be 'normally ... supported by an aircraft carrier, 
the necessary escorts, a replenishment group and the Army's logistic ShipS,.919 These so-called 
'logistic ships', in fact, evolved from a 1958 examination of 'the problem of replacing existing 
WD LST and LCT' that was related to the aforementioned 'technical study' .920 Different versions 
ofthese vessels were also addressed in CAW's March 1959 report as well as a follow-up analysis 
of May 1960.921 
Finally, in September 1962, a formal 'programme for the construction of logistic ships to 
replace the present WD LST Fleet' was approved by the Chiefs of Staff.922 Indeed, due to their 
vastly 'improved characteristics' (relative to the old WD LSTs), the introduction of these new 
Landing Ship Logistic (LSL) into the Far East, Middle East and Near East, respectively, was 
therefore considered to be 'highly desirable', 'urgent', and 'desirable, though not essential'. In 
addition, it was considered that 'the early introduction of these craft generally, particularly east 
917 COS 109/64,2.4.64 (DEFE 5/150; NA), 1. 
918 COS 109/64,2. 
919 COS (62) 373, 12.9.62 (DEFE 5/130; NA), 2. 
920 JP (58) 24 (Final), 7. 
921 COS (60) 151,31.5.60 (DEFE 5/103; NA). 
922 COS (62) 373, i. 
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of Suez, is an important element in providing the flexibility and mobility required by our 
Strategy for the Sixties'. As a result of all of these factors, the COS ultimately concluded that the 
second and third ships should 'be ordered at latest by April 1963' and that '[i]t would be most 
economical to complete replacement of the existing fleet of WD LSTs by LSLs by 1966,.923 In 
the end, after the construction programme was accelerated,924 a total of six LSLs were launched, 
the first one, Sir Lancelot, in June 1963.925 
From (Joint) 'Amphibious Operations' to 'Joint Warfare', 1959-1968 
As discussed previously, the defence re-organisation of 1962-63 that resulted in the 
creation of the Joint Warfare Committee (JWC), Joint Warfare Staff (JWS), and Joint Warfare 
Establishment (JWE)-while also propelled by strategic factors-was mainly driven by 
developments at the tactical level. This revolved around the development of the idea of 
'seaborne/airborne/land operations', which subsequently evolved into the broader concept of 
'joint warfare'-into which amphibious warfare was subsumed. Far from being 'innovative' or 
'new', this development could arguably be seen as a return to the past in that it resembled the 
evolution of 'combined operations' during the inter-war years (not to mention also similar-but 
far more limited--organisational developments). As such, this fundamentally differed from the 
American development of amphibious warfare, which was generally maintained distinctly as a 
form of 'naval warfare' and 'sea power', both after and before World War II. 
The 'SeabornelAirbornelLand Operations' Concept, 1959-61 
Whilst many of the analyses concerning the Commando Carrier concept and amphibious 
lift replacement requirements referred to the employment of both seaborne and airborne forces, it 
was not until the end of 1959 that consideration was given to their mutual co-ordination, 
planning and training. As cited above, CAW first outlined the operational rationale behind what 
would eventually evolve into the over-arching concept of 'joint warfare' in a letter to the new 
CDS, Lord Mountbatten, on 19 November. To recap: 'In the present air age, amphibious warfare 
923 COS (62) 373, 3-4, 7. 
924 COS 88/63, 5.3.63 (DEFE 5/136; NA). 
925 Wettem, 227-228. 
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must be assessed as a means of strategic mobility in relation to air transport and air assault 
t · , 926 U d h h d· , opera IOns . n er t e ea mg of Smaller Operations' , CAW noted that a Commando Carrier 
and an Assault Ship, both based east of Suez, would be no more than 8 days away 'from any 
objective' in that area; in that same time period, 'the Strategic Airlift would be able to deliver 
two lightly equipped battalion groups'. Both of these capabilities employed together could 
therefore 'produce a brigade group with a proportion of armour and vehicles, in addition to the 
great tactical mobility given by the helicopters [of the Commando Carrier]' .927 
Although CAW repeated his call for 'the co-ordination for sea and air lifts' in his 1959 
annual report,928 it was not until a full year later that he was able to report any significant 
progress.929 By that time, the theoretical aspects of the concept had been examined by both 
A WHQ and JSAWC with presentations having been made 'at the Staff Colleges, Senior 
Officers' Courses and appropriate operational Commands'. In addition, while the concept was 
deemed 'most effective in the post-l965 form using future equipment, it [was] equally applicable 
to the existing lift'. As such, and at the request of the Chiefs, CAW began to undertake extensive 
efforts to study the 'co-operation between RAF operations and amphibious operations' .930 
By mid-1961, the parameters of the 'seaborne/airborne/land operations' concept had 
been accepted by the Chiefs of Stafe3 ! These types of enterprises were generally considered to 
be 'limited war operations', which were a step up in scale and character from the 'cold war' 
operations that had exemplified the early and mid-l950s. More specifically, they involved 'the 
rapid concentration of land forces, with naval and air offensive and transport support' at long 
distances 'from main bases'. They also 'could vary from an unopposed entry to a combined air 
and seaborne assault', although attacks against heavy opposition were 'not contemplated'. 
926 COS (59) 312, 2. 
927 COS (59) 312, 2-3. 
928 COS (60) 1,2-3. 
929 COS (61) 12, 13.1.61 (DEFE 2/2067, folio 49; NA). 
930 COS (61) 12,2, Annexes A and B. 
931 COS (61) 180,8.6.61 (DEFE 5/114; NA). 
255 
Finally, due to the fact that the available forces could be drawn from a myriad of sources and 
locations, a 'high degree of flexibility and inter-Service training' was required.932 
JointSeabornelAirborne 'Reinforcement' of Kuwait, 1961- Operation VANTAGE 
Somewhat fortuitously, at least from a conceptual point of view, 'Reinforced Theatre 
Plan (Arabian Peninsula) No. 7 - Operation V ANT AGE' 933 had to be implemented in the 
summer of 1961 to assist in the defence of Kuwait against what appeared to be an imminent 
attack by Iraq. Although this enterprise was initially dominated by the amphibious (helicopter) 
landings of 42 Commando from the new commando carrier, HMS Bulwark, the overall 
endeavour turned out to be a veritable test case of the 'seabome/airbomelland operations' 
concept.934 
As a matter of fact, Operation V ANT AGE-previously code-named ALECTO, 
CABRILLA, ALDERDALE and RIGAMAROLE-was based primarily upon the rapid 
movement of infantry formations and (light) supporting arms by air, not by sea. This operational 
scheme had been established as early as October, 1959, when the land forces deemed available 
were: 
( a) The parachute battalion from Cyprus. 
(b) An infantry battalion/Commando from Aden. 
(c) The Theatre Reserve in Kenya, i.e. Bde HQ and two infantry battalions. 
S . 935 (d) upportmg arms. 
These forces could be either 'air-landed within 48 hours of the decision to mount the operation' 
when there was 'no opposition ... expected' or employed in 'an initial air drop ... to secure an 
airfield ... [which] would take 4 days to prepare'. In the meantime, measures were being 
undertaken to strengthen the amount of available (heavy) supporting arms, which would be 
transported primarily by sea, mainly through the proposed move of a tank squadron to Aden 
932 COS (61) 180,2. 
933 CDS, ltr to MD, 28.2.61 (DEFE 13/89, folio 17; NA), 1. See also MOD (NHB), BR 1736(55), MIDDLE EAST 
OPERATIONS: Jordan/Lebanon -1958, Kuwait-1961, 9.68 (ADM 234/1068; NA), 41. 
934 See, for example, Speller, 'Role', Chapter 7; 'NAVAL DIPLOMACY: Ope:ation Vantag~, 1961' ~ Speller, Ian, 
(ed.), The Royal Navy and Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century, Cass Senes: Naval Pohcy and Hlst?~, 31 . 
(AbingdonlNew York, NY: Frank Cass, 2005), 164-180; and 'Kuwait: Operation V ANTAGE,. Jul~ 1961 ~n Lovenng 
(ed.), Chapter XXXII. See also Alani, Mustafa, Operation Vantage: British Military InterventIOn In Kuwazt, 1961 
(Surbiton; LAAM, 1990); and Brown, StrategiC Mobility, Chapter 4, Section IV. 
935 ~ 'Plans for Intervention in Kuwait', 6.10.59 (DEFE 13/89, folio E1; NA), 1. 
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which was planned to occur in April, 1960 (subject to Treasury approval). In addition, to move 
this heavy equipment 'and generally to improve our military posture in the area', it had also been 
proposed to move the Amphibious Warfare Squadron south of the Suez Canal 'barrier,.936 
By the end of 1959, the original plan-ALECTO-had been replaced by CABRILLA, 
h· h . f~ 937 W IC was to come mto elect on 1 January, 1960. Three variations of the plan were now 
offered, although all of them involved transporting 'one brigade group and one parachute 
battalion' by air by using 'virtually ... the whole of Transport Command as well as the theatre 
transport forces of MEAF, BF AP and FEAF' .938 It was estimated that such an infantry force 
could be built up within 6 to 11 days with the latter time preming 'an airborne operation to secure 
Kuwait airfield' .939 
Whether VANTAGE was the result of any new planning is unclear but, by February of 
1961, a revised plan had been finalised yet again. This took into account a number of force 
redeployments in the region, which had improved the overall military situation in the Middle 
East, particularly south of the 'barrier'. They included more transport aircraft in Transport 
Command, a 'squadron of tanks' (half ashore, half afloat in LSTs), additional Kuwaiti tanks 
'being stockpiled' ashore, '[a]rtillery being stockpiled at Bahrein', and 'the Amphibious Warfare 
Squadron south of the barrier' .940 Most of these changes were the cause of the overall increase in 
the plan's amphibious character,941 which was expanded even further less than two months later 
when the Commando Carrier (and embarked Commando) was added to the list of 'Naval Forces' 
(and 'Land Forces') available for this contingency.942 
As it turned out, what ultimately gave Operation V ANT AGE its predominantly 
amphibious character was twofold: first, the fact that 42 Commando RM had landed by 
936 'Plans', 1-2. 
937 CDS, ltr to MD, 14.12.59 (DEFE 13/89, folio 1; NA). MOD (London), message to HQ, BFAP, 11.12.59 (DEFE 
13/89, folio 2; NA). 
938 'MEAF' 'BF AP' and 'FEAF' stand for 'Middle East Air Forces' 'British Forces Arabian Peninsula' and 'Far East 
, , ' 
Air Forces', respectively. . , 
939 CDS, ltr to MD, 11.12.59, 1-2. See also _, 'Comparison in Build Up in Kuwait Between Cabnlla and Alecto , n.d. 
(DEFE 13/89, folio 3; NA), 1-2. 
940 CDS, ltr to MD, 28.2.61, 1. 
941 COS (62) 58, 15.2.62 (DEFE 5/124; NA), 2. 
942 DCDS, ltr to MD, 26.4.61 (DEFE 13/89, folio 19; NA). 
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helicopter from HMS Bulwark; and second the fact that 42 and 45 Commandos RM were the 
only infantry units ashore until early on the third day of the operation (3 July), which appeared to 
have deterred an Iraqi attack that 'seemed possible on I st and 2nd July,.943 While this 
circumstance 'reflected the value of the Commando Carrier in this operation', it was nevertheless 
pointed out that the Carrier 'must continue to remain only a bonus in any future plans' because 
this 'value' essentially depended on the Carrier's location in relation to any given crisis. 
Fortunately, and despite claims that the presence of HMS Bulwark was 'fortuitous' ,944 it was later 
demonstrated that this was only 'somewhat' so, due to the fact that there had been a general 
warning in advance and some perceptive preparations on the part of the Bulwark's captain.945 
A few vital points must still be kept in mind, however, to assess this operation from a 
broader operational perspective, or perhaps from the viewpoint of overall 'strategic mobility'. 
First, the reason why the planned airborne (or air-landed) forces were not employed immediately 
was not due to any inherent fault or limitation nor was it driven by any inherent advantages of the 
'amphibious forces' (other than they were at the right place at the right time). Instead, over-
flying rights were denied to the airborne forces by Turkey and Sudan on the first night of 
VANTAGE's implementation (30 June/1 July).946 Second, although another 'amphibious' unit, 
45 Commando, was the second British infantry formation to arrive in Kuwait, the formation was 
air-landed (not landed amphibiously) from Aden (on 2 July). Third, a half squadron of 3 Dragoon 
Guards (i.e., tanks) was landed on I July as were two companies of 2 Coldstream Guards, 
followed by the Para Light Battery, elements of 24 Brigade HQ & JAHQ, and the tanks of the 
other half squadron 3 Dragoon Guards on 2 July, all of which were Army units. Whilst the 
addition of Nos. 8 and 208 Squadrons (RAF) by 3 July made the initial part of the landing force 
essentially joint, the overall landing force was soon to be dominated by Army forces. Indeed, by 
943 COS (61) 378, 18.10.61 (DEFE 5/118; NA), 3. 
944 See COS (61) 378, 6-7; and BR 1736(55), 52. 
945 Grove, Vanguard,246-247. 
946 COS (61) 378, lO-12, 14-15. 
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the time that the 'Build up' was considered complete on 9 July, Army personnel outnumbered 
Navy (i.e., almost exclusively RM) personnel by a ratio of more than four to one.947 
A JPS/COS review of the after-action report of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, 
reinforced many of the points made above. First, it specifically noted the joint nature of the plans 
for the operation, which 'provided for the rapid deployment of a reinforced brigade group, with 
air and naval support, into Kuwait in various circumstances'. Second, it also recognised the 
emphasis on airborne (versus amphibious) forces, noting that the 'major part of the planned 
movement was by air from Cyprus, Aden and East Africa to Kuwait, with some reinforcements 
from the United Kingdom and Far East' .948 Finally, the JPS noted that due to the fact that 
artillery was not landed until the third day (because it was supposed to arrive by air, which was 
delayed), artillery should be embarked on Commando ships, something which had already been 
studied.949 In sum, the JPS was able to conclude that 
[t]he success of this operation supports our current seaborne/airborne concept of limited 
war operations, in which full advantage is taken of the flexibility provided by both sea 
and air transport. One the one hand, a substantial land force ... was speedily concentrated 
and supplied from distant bases by air at very short notice. On the other hand, not only 
were tanks, communications facilities, and eventually much needed air defence 
reinforcements, provided by sea, but in addition the early landing of a complete infantry 
unit from the Commando ship filled the dangerous gap caused by the temporary checks 
to the airlift in the initial stages of the operation.950 
The Emergence and Development of 'Joint Warfare', 1962-64 
Following the initial formulation of the 'seaborne/airbornelland operations' concept in 
1960, its successful operational testing during Operation VANTAGE in 1961, and the formation 
of the 'Joint Service Staff organisation in early 1962, efforts were made to further codify and 
refine the concept through the promulgation of doctrine. At the time, naval doctrine only devoted 
part of one chapter to 'Amphibious Operations' which, whilst identifying the 'two types' to be 
'RAIDS' and 'INvASIONS', was generally preoccupied with a 'future Global War' scenario, not 
947 COS (61) 378,15-16. 
948 COS (62) 58,15.2.62 (DEFE 51124; NA), 2-3. 
949 COS (62) 58, 4-5, 8. 
950 COS (62) 58, 8-9. 
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surprisingly considering it was promulgated III December 1958.951 This situation 
notwithstanding, the first step in this process was marked by the July 1962 release of a doctrinal 
manuscript by the newly-formed JWS, titled Notes on Amphibious Warfare, which was supposed 
to 'form the basis of a new 'Manual' that would address 'the present problems of limited war 
within the seaborne/airborne concept,.952 It is worth quoting at length here, if only because it 
accurately summarised the concept's evolution amidst contemporary strategic and operational 
limitations. 
In the present concept of limited war our forces must be ready to counter sudden enemy 
intervention in a country that is neutral or friendly to us .... The requirement is for a force 
that can act quickly and is ready to fight immediately in an area that may be far from its 
base; and that has the hitting power and mobility to take offensive action and get quick 
results, to prevent the war from extending or from escalating to global war.... Both sea 
and air transport have their advantages as methods of carrying such a force. When the 
area of operations is within striking distance of the sea, air-transported and amphibious 
forces can act together to land a powerful and balanced military force. With present force 
levels, it is unlikely that adequate balance and force can be obtained unless airtransported 
and amphibious forces join together in a concerted operation. This concept of joint 
operations is known as the seaborne/airborne concept.... In this concept of joint 
seaborne/airborne operations, the amphibious and airtransported forces are part of a 
single team, sea and air each providing those elements of the force best suited to their 
characteristics and to the kind of operations expected.953 
Although the employment of a 'single team' of seaborne and airborne elements was envisaged, 
each element still needed to be able to intervene independently (at least initially), which therefore 
required 'each element to be balanced as far as possible'. This was especially true in cases where 
some opposition was expected, thus requiring a 'deliberate assault' and the ability of each 
element to be able 'to fight their way in' .954 
Whilst the Notes publication was divided into the usual chapters covering such issues as 
'Command', 'General Planning', 'Mounting', and 'Communications', of particular interest with 
regard to identifying differences between British and American amphibious enterprises was 
Annex 1B, 'US Concept of Amphibious Operations'. According to this, the US 'National 
Approach' was based on the following premise: 'An amphibious operation is considered a naval 
951 Admiralty, BR 1806, The Naval War Manual, 1958 (London: HMSO, 10.12.58),95-98. ., 
952 JWS, Notes on Amphibious Waifare, 31.7.62 (Library; RMM), 'Preface'. See also, Speller, 'Seaborne/Airborne, 
66-67; 'Corbett, Liddell Hart', 236. 
953 Notes, 111. Emphasis added. 
954 Notes, 1/2. Various parts also quoted by Speller, 'Seaborne/Airborne', 69. 
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campaign'. This simply indicated that amphibious enterprises were the responsibility of the 
Naval Service and not an independent, joint agency responsibility as in the UK. This single 
service approach was made possible, for the most part, by the size and organisation of the Marine 
Corps (specifically through its FMF), which provided 'infantry ... tanks, artillery, engineers and 
the supporting services necessary for sustained operations ashore', not to mention also 'its own 
aviation, including ... fighters and close support aircraft, helicopters and fixed-wing transport'. 
From these resources, most of the emphasis was placed on three types of special equipment: 
'helicopters for troop-carrying'; 'the LVT'; and aircraft for 'close air support'. One final unique 
difference was that American amphibious forces conceptualised these endeavours in atomic-use 
environments, as they were also armed with 'nuclear artillery' .955 
It was not until the early spring of 1963 that urgent attention was turned towards 
accelerating the production of the new Manual of Joint Warfare.956 This document was 
ultimately supposed to 'incorporate into one series of publications all the information at present 
contained in various documents and manuals such as Land! Air Warfare Policy Statements, [and] 
Joint Warfare Instructions' .957 The latter of these were being issued to promulgate 'urgently 
needed tactical doctrines and joint procedures' with four coming into effect on 15 June and one 
on 1 August 1963.958 By 30 September, all of the relevant data had been collated into a total of 
six Volumes, which were already under review by the JWS.959 
With this final evolution of the 'seaborne/airborne/land operations' concept into official 
'joint warfare' doctrine, British amphibious/expeditionary development seemed to have come 
'full circle' in that it essentially reflected the inherently joint character of the original 'combined 
operations' concept of the inter-war period. Indeed, from a purely conceptual standpoint, one 
only has to compare the definitions of 'joint warfare' and 'combined operations' as outlined in 
955 Notes, Annex IB. 
956 See Speller, 'Seaborne/Airborne', 70-71; 'Corbett, Liddell Hart', 236-237. 
957 COS 93/63 (issued 1 st March, 1963), paras. 9, 11, 20(e); Appendices II, III. 
958 See [JWS], JWI Nos. 1-4, [15.6.63]; and [JWS], JWI No.5, [1.8.63] (DEFE 212086; NA). See also JWS (62) 2 
(Second Revised Final), 2.6.62, (DEFE 111367, folio 21; NA), 1. 
959 See JWS 'State of Work' summaries (DEFE 111368, folios 90,105,107; NA). 
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the doctrine of each era to make this connection. On the one hand was the definition of 'j oint 
warfare' which, as cited above, was simply classified as: 'The employment of sea and/or air 
forces in concert with land forces'. On the other hand were the definitions in the 1925 and 1931 
editions of the Manual of Combined Operations, which were almost exactly the same. 
'Combined operations' were described as those 'forms of operations where naval, military or air 
forces in any combination are co-operating with each other, working independently under their 
respective commanders, but with a common strategical object' .960 A slightly narrower definition 
was offered in the 1938 edition, which focused on 'one of the principal forms of combined 
operation [that] may be undertaken by British arms': a 'sea-borne expedition of military and air 
forces, assisted by the navy and relying on naval and air force protection' .961 
This was also the case from an organisational point of view as the new Manual of Joint 
Warfare effectively mirrored the contents of the inter-war 'combined operations' manuals, albeit 
in a multi-volume format, which was arranged as follows:962 
Volume I - Concepts, Planning and Control of Limited War Operations 
Volume II - Joint Tactical Communications 
Volume III - Air Transport Operations 
Volume IV - Amphibious Operations 
Volume V - Offensive Support Operations 
Volume VI - Tactical Air Defence Operations 
Volume I (the capstone manual, with short title 'JSPl'), for example, basically summarised those 
principles that were applicable to all forms of 'joint warfare' --defined as 'any operation in 
which sea and/or air forces act in concert with ground forces' .963 Indeed, the subject areas 
covered resembled those addressed in Chapters I through VIII of the 1925 and 1931 Combined 
Operations manuals and Parts I and II of the 1938 edition.964 Similarly, the topics included in 
Volume V, Offensive Support Operations, resembled those covered in Chapters 9 and 10 of the 
1925 edition, Chapters 14 and 15 of the 1931 edition, and (loosely) Part IX of the 1938 version. 
960 ADMlWO/AM, Manual of Combined Naval, Military and Air Operations, 1925 (AIR 10/1206), 11. 
961 [ADMlWO/AM], Manual of Combined Operations, 1931 (DEFE 21708; NA); and [ADMIWO/AM], Manual of 
Combined Operations, 1938 (DEFE 21709; NA), 17. . rd 
962 [JWS], Manual of Joint Warfare, Volume I, Concept, Planning and Control of Limited War Operatzons, 1.3.70 (3 
edn.) (DEFE 73/1; NA). Short title: 'JSP 1'. 
963 JSP 1, 1-1. 
964 Other chapters from the 1925 edition would probably have included XXI and XXII. 
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This held true for Volume VI, Tactical Air Defence, specifically with regard to Chapters 11 and 
19, Chapter 16, and Part VIII of the three editions, respectively. All the rest would have been 
applicable to Volume IV, Amphibious Operations, except for isolated sections and paragraphs in 
the 1938 manual, which could have been included in Volume III, Air Transport Operations, had 
enough advances been made in that field to warrant such coverage.965 
In describing the general 'Characteristics of UK Forces', JSP 1 categorised them as three 
types: 'Forces Assigned to NATO', 'Air Transport' and 'Shipping', the latter two of which 
reflected developments that had emerged in earnest since the mid-1950s.966 'Air Transport', in 
turn, was separated into 'Strategic' and 'Tactical' classifications with the latter including three 
kinds of 'Airborne operations. (a) Parachute assault. (b) Helicopterborne tactical support. [and] 
(c) Air landing', all of which were detailed further in Volume III, Air Transport Operations.967 
The aforementioned 'Shipping' category, in turn, was separated into 'three broad groups', 
including 'Warships', 'Amphibious Ships', and 'Merchant Shipping'. While there were far fewer 
details provided for each, most were listed under ' Amphibious Ships', although specific 
reference was made to 'Volume IV of this Manual' for more information. 968 
V olume I then outlined the 'Types of Operations' that British armed forces were 
expected to undertake in various geo-strategic scenarios that had evolved since the 1950s. Of 
these, 'Limited War' and 'Minor Operations' ( during peacetime) emerged as the two in which 
'UK amphibious forces' would be most likely employed, especially outside NATO.969 These two 
types of enterprises, in fact, placed 'the greatest call on joint warfare techniques as they 
frequently bring together elements of all three Services, at short notice, for immediate action'. It 
was also necessary that such 'forces ... retain an assault capability and be self-supporting 
initially' .970 Along these lines, whilst 'minor operations' could be mounted 'entirely by air or 
965 Manual, 1925; Manual, 1931; and Manual, 1938. 
966 JSPl, 1-5-1-7. 
967 JSPl, 1-1-1-3 .. 
968 JSPl, 1-3-1-4. 
969 JSPl, 1-5-1-6. 
970 JSPl, 4-1. 
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entirely by sea' three 'Methods of Effecting Entry' were offered in which 'both methods of 
transport' could be employed. These included the 'Air Landed Operation', the 'Parachute 
Operation' and the 'Amphibious Operation'. Although the latter endeavour seemed to be the 
most likely to occur 'in conjunction with' either of the two above options, the maximum force 
size employable in each of the three scenarios now amounted up to 'brigade strength ... together 
with logistic support including reserve stocks' .971 
Detailed information about the 'Amphibious Operation' was supplied by the fourth 
Volume of the Manual, which was brought into force on 18 May, 1964, thereby superseding the 
1962 Notes.972 Whilst very similar in content, the new publication (JSP4) focused a bit more 
narrowly on the naval aspects of amphibious warfare rather than the joint characteristics of the 
'seaborne/airborne/land operations' concept. At the same time, JSP4 also pointed out the 
inherently joint nature of the amphibious operation itself. 
An amphibious operation brings together many types of ships, aircraft, weapons and 
landing forces in a coordinated effort to land a balanced military force form the sea .... It 
is essentially a joint enterprise and makes use of the principles of concentration, 
flexibility and surprise - by concentrating balanced forces and striking the enemy at his 
weakest point at the most opportune time. 973 
Indeed, this seemed to be reinforced, for instance, by the generic categorisation of the various 
types of ground forces made available to the Landing Force Commander for tasking, including 
'Infantry' (instead of just 'Commandos'), 'Airborne Troops', and 'Helicopter-borne Troops' .974 
Nevertheless, JSP4 specifically established the 'amphibious operation' within the 
broader, 'present concept of intervention operations'. This tended to magnify the joint nature of 
the British approach to limited war operations, as this particular (seaborne/airborne) 
methodology was ultimately found necessary to compensate for the limitations in military 
resources posed by financial restrictions. As a result, and as was similarly cited in the 1962 Notes 
above, (joint) amphibious operations were effectively considered to be an integral-if not 
integrated-part of (joint) limited operations. Indeed, because of the 'complementary' nature of 
971 JSP 1 4-3-4--4 
972 [JWS], Manual of Joint Warfare, Volume IV, Amphibious Operations, 18.5.64 (Library; RMM). Short title: 'JSP4'. 
973 JSP4, para. 4101. Emphasis added. 
974 JSP4, 8-2-8-3. 
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these 'two means of transport', JSP4 specifically noted that 'it is convenient to consider them 
separately in this Manual of Joint Warfare'. As such, topics related to air transport-including 
details on helicopter landings-were covered in Volume III, Air Transport Operations.975 
Finally, it should be noted that another Annex covering the 'US Concept' was included, which 
confirmed that the Americans still considered 'an amphibious operation ... a naval campaign' .976 
Force Structure Developments 
By 1965, the 'basic principle' of British force deployment had evolved 'to retain in 
overseas theatres the minimum of forces consistent with our commitments and to hold ready in 
the United Kingdom a Strategic Reserve, together with the air transport necessary to reinforce at 
maximum speed to any part of the world' .977 As a matter of fact, this 'principle' had been 
exploited in early 1964, when indigenous forces in East Africa mutinied, specifically in Kenya, 
Uganda and Tanganyika, causing British forces to be dispatched using both sea and air 
transport.978 
A big force structure change-albeit primarily affecting the 1970s, as decisions had 
already been made for shipping through the 1960s-involved new aircraft carriers. Indeed, this 
change resulted from the decision involved not building new aircraft carriers (i.e. the already 
designed CVA 01), mainly because the 'one type of operation ... for which carriers and carrier-
borne aircraft would be indispensable' was considered to be the type that Britain would not 
undertake without allies. This was 'the landing, or withdrawal, of troops against sophisticated 
opposition outside the range of land-based air cover'. Other tasks for which aircraft carriers 
could be used were deemed able to be performed by land-based aircraft 'more cheaply'; these 
included 'strike-reconnaissance and air defence functions' as well as 'airborne-early-warning'. 
Despite this longer-term decision, the current fleet of carriers was still going to be employed 'as 
975 JSP4, 8-4. See also Volume V, Offensive Support Operations, 8-8-8-10. 
976 JSP4, Annex B to Chapter 1(1-5). 
977 SSD, Cmnd. 2592, STATEMENT ON THE DEFENCE ESTIMATES, 1965 (London: HMSO, 2.65), 15. 
978 Cmnd. 2592, 19. 
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far as possible into the 1970s' so that there was enough transitional time to 'reprovide the 
necessary parts of the carriers' capability' .979 
At the same time, British strategy seemed to continue to rely increasingly on 'air 
transport', which included 'a substantial improvement in ... helicopter lift' .980 In fact, 'Air 
Mobility Forces' were given equal weight (at least on paper) as other main combat forces. 981 
Consisting of the 'strategic transport force; the tactical transport force ... ; the tanker force and 
communications aircraft, the role of the first two were of the most significance as they competed 
with and/or complemented the 'seaborne force' most directly with regard to their primary role of 
rapid mobility and support of men and equipment in most theatres 'within 72 hours' .982 
CONCLUSION 
By 1968, amphibious forces-in fact as well as doctrine-appeared as the highest 
priority amongst 'Royal Navy General Combat Forces', even ahead of 'Aircraft carriers and 
squadrons'. With two commando ships, the HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark; two new assault 
ships, the HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid, and the Royal Marine Commandos,983 these 
'amphibious forces' resembled 'joint amphibious forces' in that they functioned to 'land troops 
of any infantry battalion or Royal Marine Commandos with supporting arms and transport'. 
More significantly, they were also supposed to 'unload tanks, vehicles, equipment and stores 
across open beaches' and most of these (heavier) equipment were from the Army (and Air 
Force).984 This was unlike the US Naval Service, which could land almost every heavy item that 
it had in its own inventory, although perhaps not in as large numbers as the Army (and Air 
Force), not quite as heavy (at least with regard to such units as heavy engineers and artillery). 
979 SSD, Cmnd. 2901, STATEMENT ON THE DEFENCE ESTIMATES, 1966: PART I-THE DEFENCE REVIEW 
(London: HMSO, 2.66),9-10. 
980 C mnd. 2901, 12. 
981 SSD, Cmnd. 2902, STATEMENT ON THE DEFENCE ESTIMATES, 1966: PART II - DEFENCE ESTIMATES, 
1966-67 (London: HMSO, 2.66),23-38; and SSD, Cmnd. 3203, STATEMENT ON THE DEFENCE ESTIMATES, 
1967 (London: HMSO, 2.67), 32-41. 
982 Cmnd. 2902, 36-7. 
983 Cmnd. 2902, 26. See also Cmnd. 3203, 34. 
984 Cmnd. 2902, 27. 
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CONCLUSION 
It has generally been accepted that modem amphibious/expeditionary warfare 
development in the US and the UK evolved along similar 'parallel courses' in the first few 
decades of the Cold War. In effect, this international progression culminated with NATO's 1968 
promulgation of a 'sanitized version' of Doctrine for Amphibious Operations (DAD), which had 
been approved by all the American services the year before.985 However, a comparative study of 
American and British amphibious/expeditionary warfare development between 1945 and 1968, 
which is best undertaken by a re-examination of the respective intra-national developments-
particularly from a wider Goint) expeditionary perspective, indicates that this era was 
characterised instead by the (continued) evolution of two parallel but different courses of 
development. Although these courses converged considerably over more than two decades, they 
nevertheless continued to be marked by some underlying differences. 
This evolution went through three successive phases, the first of which was between 
1945 and 1950 and revolved around the respective consolidation of national approaches or 
systems that had evolved from differences at the strategic, organisational/institutional, and 
tactical/operational levels of analysis. On the one hand was the American system that emerged 
primarily from the US Naval Service's amphibious experience in the Central Pacific which, due 
to the Navy's own extensive aviation and ground forces, was based almost exclusively on a naval 
strategy, a single-service organisational methodology, and combined arms concepts and doctrine. 
On the other hand was the British system that stemmed from the three Services' expeditionary 
experience in North Africa and Europe, which was based on a maritime strategy, an inter-service 
organisations, and 'combined operations' (i.e., joint operations) concepts, doctrine and practice. 
Whilst activities against these consolidation efforts in these immediate post-war years were 
relatively benign in the UK, debates surfaced in the US at the organisational/institutional and 
tacticalloperationallevels of analysis. 
985 ,ATP-8, Doctrinefor Amphibious Operations, 11/7/68 (p1946CF: Box 407; OAB, NHHC). 
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The second phase of international development-from 1950 to 1957-was generally 
characterised by significant divergences within both subject countries. In the US, whilst slight 
shifts could be identified at all levels of analysis, they seemed to culminate at the 
tactical/operational level where an attempt to formulate joint amphibious doctrine resulted in a 
set of 'divergent views' being promUlgated by the services. These 'views' represented the 
underlying differences between so-called 'amphibious operations' or 'seizures' championed by 
the US Naval Service (i.e., US Navy and Marine Corps) on the one hand, and so-called 'joint 
amphibious operations' or 'invasions' advocated by the US Army and Air Force on the other. 
In the UK, the traditional 'combined operations' or expeditionary approach appeared to 
undergo a more fundamental change, mainly at the organisational/institutional level. It was 
during this period that the Royal Marine Commandos were elevated from their exclusive wartime 
role as amphibious raiders to a more central peacetime role, principally as seaborne light 
infantry, for cold war (i.e., 'internal security' and 'Imperial policing') and even limited war 
(amphibious) operations. This shift was not quite as comprehensive as apparent, not only at the 
organisational/institutional level but also at the tactical/operational level. With regard to the 
former, although the underlying efficacy of the COHQI A WHQ establishment was challenged yet 
again, its value as a permanent, independent, jointly-staffed agency that would keep the 
traditional 'art' of all types of 'combined operations' alive, was ultimately re-affirmed by the 
decision to retain it. This was due primarily to the fear that abolishing such an entity would result 
in a return to a situation reminiscent of the inter-war years, when the lack of exactly such an 
organisation did not fill the gap created when the Services would (or, perhaps, could) not devote 
scarce resources to this field because of more important strategic priorities. Although the A WHQ 
establishment did have to undergo a significant downsizing due to continued calls for reduced 
defence expenditures, the fact that CAW's directive remained almost completely unchanged 
(even into the early 1960s), specifically with regard to overall responsibility for amphibious 
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concept and doctrine development, confirmed this agency's effective endorsement by the British 
defence establishment. 
At the tactical level, although the Commandos were elevated to the role of seaborne light 
infantry, they still required supporting arms and logistical elements to effect even the most 
rudimentary conventional amphibious landings against opposition, except in more traditional 
cases where they were employed against flanking or especially difficult objectives. This was not 
of great significance in 'internal security' or 'Imperial policing' type of endeavours, for which 
the Commandos appeared to be used most frequently (due to imperial overstretch and limited 
resources). Nevertheless, this situation effectively precluded a direct comparison with the US 
Marine Corps' FMF units, which were specifically organised as self-contained, self-sufficient, 
and fully-integrated combined arms formations, consisting of such elements as artillery, armour, 
engineers, and even air support. 
The final phase between 1957 and 1968 experienced a gradual trend of developmental 
convergence between (and within) the two subject countries, although at different levels and to 
varying degrees. In the US, the armed services finally reached a number of (conceptual) 
compromises with regard to their 'divergent views', which was demonstrated by the official 
approval and promUlgation of joint amphibious doctrine: first between the Naval Service and the 
Army in 1962 and subsequently amongst all services in 1967. Although the Army continued to 
Issue unilateral doctrinal publications that promoted its broader concept of 
amphibious/expeditionary operations, the US Naval Service nevertheless re-emerged as 
America's predominant practitioner in this field. This was demonstrated not only by the 
expansion of the Navy's overall amphibious capabilities-almost to the point of reaching a true 
expeditionary capacity-but also by early amphibious operations conducted during the Vietnam 
War, which were almost exclusively by naval amphibious forces. 
In the UK as a result of a fundamental shift in the Royal Navy's strategic and , 
organisational orientation that embraced cold and limited war operations, amphibious 
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capabilities-particularly specialised amphibious shipping and the Royal Marine Commandos-
were increasingly emphasised until they effectively became the Navy's overwhelming priority in 
the early 1960s. By this time, due to continued strains on defence resources efforts at the , 
conceptual level eventually resulted in the formulation of a broader 'joint warfare' concept that 
effectively incorporated the complementary seaborne and airborne means of strategic mobility to 
produce the most effective and efficient intervention (or reinforcement) capacity possible, 
particularly east of Suez. Organisational changes quickly followed, which effectively subsumed 
the entire A WHQ establishment within a new Joint Warfare committee infrastructure. 
Whilst connections have been made between the evolution of this 'innovative' concept in 
the 1960s and the resurgence of British 'expeditionary' capabilities in recent years, based on the 
analysis presented, one could posit that the 'joint warfare' concept itself had roots in the inter-
war era at both the tacticalloperational and organisational/institutional levels of analysis. On the 
one hand were certain fundamental similarities with the original 'combined operations' concept 
that first materialised in 1925 (and even earlier), primarily the emphasis on close co-operation 
and co-ordination (if not integration) amongst the Services. On the other hand was the 
resemblance with the establishment of a DCOS Inter-Service Training sub-committee as well as 
the Inter-Service Training and Development Centre (ISTDC) in the 1937-1938 timeframe, at 
least from an infrastructural perspective. 
From the above, American amphibious and British expeditionary warfare development 
ultimately continued to evolve along parallel but different courses between 1945 and 1968. 
Despite various changes at the strategic, organisationallinstitutional, and tacticalloperational 
levels of analysis that resulted in some significant convergence between these two country's 
developmental courses, certain underlying differences appeared to remain firmly entrenched, and 
have continued to do so to this day. 
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APPENDIX A: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS 
This Appendix consists of an alphabetical list of acronyms used throughout the dissertation. 
(Data within the parentheses indicate the nationality of each one.) Please note that there is 







































First Sea Lord (UK) 
Army Air Forces (US, pre-1947) 
Assistant Chief of Staff (UK/US) 
Advisor on Combined Operations (UK) 
Admiralty (UK) 
Admiral (UKlUS) 
Airborne Early Warning (UKlUS) 
Amphibious Force (US) 
Air Force Manual (USAF) 
Armed Forces Staff College (US) 
Amphibious Group (US) 
Air Ministry (UK) 
Amphibious Manual (US) 
Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (US) 
Amphibious Operations Training Centre (UK) 
Advanced Research Group (US) 
Amphibious Ready Group (UK/US) 
Amphibious School, Royal Marines (UK) 
Amphibious Training Command (US) 
Amphibious Task Force (US) 
Atlantic Fleet (US) 
Amphibious Warfare (UK) 
Amphibious Warfare Centre (UK) 
Army War College (US) 
Amphibious Warfare/Combined Operations Handbook (UK) 
Amphibious Warfare Headquarters (UK) 
Amphibious Warfare Squadron (UK) 
Amphibious Warfare Signal School (UK) 
Amphibious Warfare Experimental Establishment (UK) 
British Army on the Rhine (UK) 
Base Defense [Manual] (US) 
Brigade (UK/US) 
British Joint Services Mission (UK) 
Battalion Landing Team (US) 
Basic National Security Policy (US) 
Command and General Staff College (US) 
Chief of Staff (UKlUS) 
Chief of the Air Staff (UK) 
Close Air Support (US) 
Commander, Amphibious Task Force (US) 
Chief of Amphibious Warfare (UK) 
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• CCO Chief of Combined Operations (UK: from Mar 1942) 
Commodore, Combined Operations (UK: Dec 1941 to Mar 
1942) 
• CCOR (at BJSM) Chief of Combined Operations Representative (UK) 
• Cdo Commando (UK) 
• CDS Chief of Defence Staff (UK) 
• CG Commanding General (USIUK) 
• CGRM Commandant General, Royal Marines (UK) 
• CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff (UK) 
• CINCLANTFLT Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet (US) 
• CINCPACFLT Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (US) 
• CJATF Commander, Joint Amphibious Task Force (US) 
• CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (US) 
• CLF Commander, Landing Force (US) 
• CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps (US) 
• CMCS Commandant, Marine Corps Schools (US) 
• CNO Chief of Naval Operations (US) 
• CNS Chief of the Naval Staff (UK) 
• COC Combined Operations Centre (UK) 
• COCOS Chief of Combined Operations Staff (UK) 
• COHQ Combined Operations Headquarters (UK) 
• CONARC Continental Army Command (US) 
• COP Combined Operations Pamphlet (UK) 
• COPP Combined Operations Pilotage Party (UK) 
• COS Chiefs of Staff [Committee] (UK) 
• COSSAC Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander (UK/US) 
• COXE Combined Operations Experimental Establishment (UK) 
• CSA Chief Scientific Advisor (UK) 
• CTC Combined Training Centre (UK) 
• DA Department of the Army (US) 
• DAF Department of the Air Force (US) 
• DC/S Deputy Chief of Staff (US) 
• DCAS Deputy Chief of the Air Staff (UK) 
• DCIGS Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff (UK) 
• DCNO Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (US) 
• DCO Director of Combined Operations (UK) 
• DCOS(IT) Deputy Chiefs of Staff [Committee], Inter-Services Training 
Sub-Committee 
• DNIDON Department of the Navy (US) 
• DOD Department of Defense (US) 
• DOS Department of State (US) 
• FM Field Manual (US) 
• FMF Fleet Marine Force (US) 
• FMFM Fleet Marine Force Manual (US) 
• FSL/ISL First Sea Lord (UK) 
• GOC General Officer Commanding (UK) 
• HMS HerlHis Majesty's Ship (UK) 
• HQMC Headquarters, USMC (US) 
• ID/InfDiv Infantry Division (US) 
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• ISTDC Inter-Services Training and Development Centre (UK) 
• JAAF Joint Action Armed Forces (US) 
• JAAN Joint Action ofthe Army and Navy (US) 
• JAB Joint Amphibious Board (US) 
• JADB Joint Air Defense Board (US) 
• JAirbTB Joint Airborne Troop Board (US) 
• JASCO Joint Assault Signal Company (US) 
• JATB Joint Air Transport Board (US) 
• JATF Joint Amphibious Task Force (US) 
• JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff (US) 
• JFSC Joint Fire Support Centre (UK) 
• JLFB Joint Landing Force Board (US) 
• JOC J oint Operations Centre (UK) 
• JPS J oint Planning Staff (UKlUS) 
• JSAWC Joint Services Amphibious Warfare Centre (UK) 
• JTF Joint Task Force (US) 
• JTSB Joint Tactical Support Board (US) 
• JWC Joint Warfare Committee (UK) 
• JWE Joint Warfare Establishment (UK) 
• JWS Joint Warfare Staff (UK) 
• LCOCU Landing Craft Obstruction Clearance Unit (UK) 
• LF Landing Force (US) 
• LFB Landing Force Bulletin (US) 
• LFM Landing Force Manual (US) 
• MAG Marine Air Group (US) 
• MAGTF Marine Air-Ground Task Force (US) 
• MarDiv Marine Division (US) 
• MAW Marine Air Wing (US) 
• MC Maneuver Commander (US) 
• MCB Marine Corps Board (US) 
• MCDC Marine Corps Development Center (US) 
• MCS Marine Corps Schools (US) 
• MD Minister of Defence (UK) 
• MELF Middle East Land Forces (UK) 
• MOD Ministry of Defence (UK) 
• MT Ministry of Transport (UK) 
• NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
• NAVSEA Naval Sea Systems Command (US) 
• ND Navy Department (US; pre-1947) 
• NDU National Defense University (US) 
• NME National Military Establishment (US) 
• NWC Naval War College (US) 
• NWIP Naval Warfare Information Publication (USN) 
• NWP Naval Warfare Publication (USN) 
• OCNO 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (US) 
• OSD 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (US) 
• PacFlt Pacific Fleet (US) 
• PAO Principle Administrative Officer (UK) Pacific Area of Operations (US) 
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• PRIB Amphibious [Manual] (USMC) 
• POA Pacific Ocean Area (US) 
• PM Prime Minister (UK) 
• OCNO Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (US) 
• OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense (US) 
• RAC Royal Armoured Corps (UK) 
• RAF Royal Air Force (UK) 
• RAMC Royal Army Medical Corps (UK) 
• RAOC Royal Army Ordnance Corps (UK) 
• RASC Royal Army Service Corps (UK) 
• RAW Responsibility for Amphibious Warfare [Committee] (UK) 
• RE Royal Engineers (UK) 
• REME Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (UK) 
• RLT Regimental Landing Team (US) 
• RM Royal Marines (UK) 
• RN Royal Navy (UK) 
• RTR Royal Tank Regiment (UK) 
• SAFMlSAFR Senior Air Force MemberlRepresentative (US) 
• SAMISAR Senior Army Member/Representative (US) 
• SAW School of Amphibious Warfare (UK) 
• SB Special Board (US) 
• SBB Scottish Beach Brigade (UK) 
• SCO School of Combined Operations (UK) 
• SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation 
• SECDEF /SecDef Secretary of Defense (US) 
• SECNA V /SecNav Secretary of the Navy (US) 
• SLAW School of Land/Air Warfare (UK) 
• SNM/SNR Senior Navy MemberlRepresentative (US) 
• SMCM/SMCR Senior Marine Corps MemberlRepresentative (US) 
• SRC Shipping Resources Committee (UK) 
• SSD Secretary of State for Defence (UK) 
• STOL Short Take-Off and Landing 
• TEC Troop Exercise Coordinator (US) 
• TF Task Force 
• TTU Troop Training Unit (US) 
• DDT Underwater Demolition Team (US) 
• UG Umpire Group (US) 
• UNAAF Unified Action Armed Forces (US) 
• USA United States Army (US) 
• USAF United States Air Force (US) 
• USCG United States Coast Guard (US) 
• USF United States Fleet [Publication] (US) 
• USMC United States Marine Corps (US) 
• USN United States Navy (US) 
• U-SS Under-Secretary of State (UK) 
• USS United States Ship (US) 
• V/STOL Vertical/Short Take-Off and Landing 
• VC/S Vice Chief of Staff (US) 
• VCAS Vice Chief of the Air Staff (UK) 
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• VCIGS Vice Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff (UK) 
• VCNS Vice Chief ofthe Naval Staff (UK) 
• VTOL Vertical Take-Off and Landing 
• WD War Department (UK) 
War Department (US; pre-1947) 
• WO War Office (UK) 
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APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY OF AMPHIBIOUS EQUIPMENT986 
The descriptions that accompany the letter designations below use the most original (technical) 
terminology whenever possible. In certain cases, more practical (and officially accepted) 





























Auxiliary, Cargo (US: known as 'cargo ship'; assault variant 
re-designated 'AKA' in 1943) 
Auxiliary, Cargo, Attack (US: known as 'attack cargo ship'; 
1943-1969 designation) 
Auxiliary, Personnel (US: known as 'transport' or 'transport 
ship'; assault variant re-designated 'APA' in 1943) 
Auxiliary, Personnel, Attack (US: known as 'attack transport'; 
1943-1969 designation) 
Auxiliary, Personnel, Destroyer (US: known as 'transport 
destroyer' or 'auxiliary transport destroyer') 
Amphibious Transport, Dock (UK) 
Carrier, Fixed-wing (US) 
Carrier, Fixed-wing, Attack (US) 
Carrier, Fixed-wing, Escort (US) 
Carrier, Fixed-wing, Helicopter, Attack (US) 
Carrier, Fixed-wing, Support (US) 
Landing [Ship], Personnel, Dock (US) 
Landing [Ship], Personnel, Helicopter (US) 
Landing Ship, Assault (UK) 
Landing Ship, Dock (UKlUS) 
Landing Ship, Headquarters (UK) 
Landing Ship, Infantry (UK) 
Landing Ship Logistic (UK) 
Landing Ship, Medium (US) 
Landing Ship, Medium, Rocket (US) 
Landing Ship, Stem-chute (UK) 
Landing Ship, Tank (UKlUS: number in parentheses 
indicates type, e.g., LST(I), LST(2), etc.) 
Landing Ship, Tank (Assault) (UK) 
Landing Ship, Tank (Command) (UK) 
Landing Ship, Utility (US: ex-LCT; later LCU) 
Landing Ship, Vehicle (US) 
986 The information for Amphibious Ships, Craft and Vehicles has been c?mpiled primarily from Friedman, Norman, 
US Amphibious Ships and Craft: An Illustrated Design History (AnnapolIs, MD: NIP, 20~~c~eetISol~~; J. DOll as 
Assault from the Sea 1939-1945: The Craft, The Landings, The Men (Newton Abbot: DaVI d ar eSh 0b 0 as we HQ, US Army Materiel Command, AMCP 706-350, Engineering I?e~ign Handbook: WheeZe Amp I zans 
(Washington, DC: USAMC, 1111/71), for details of wheeled amphIbIans o 0 0 0, 

















Landing Craft, Assault (UK: number in parentheses indicates 
type, e.g., LCA(1), LCA(2), etc.) 
Landing Craft, Control (US) 
Landing Craft, Flak (UK) 
Landing Craft, Gun (UKfUS) 
Landing Craft, Infantry (UKlUS) 
Landing Craft, Mechanised (UKlUS: number in parentheses 
indicates type, e.g., LCM(1), LCM(2), etc.) 
Landing Craft, Navigation 
Landing Craft, Personnel (UKlUS) 
Landing Craft, Rubber (UKfUS) 
Landing Craft, Support (US) 
Landing Craft, Tank (UKfUS: number in parentheses 
indicates type, e.g., LCT(1), LCT(2), etc.) 
Landing Craft, Utility (US: ex-LCT and -LSU) 
Landing Craft, Vehicle 
Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel 
AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLES (AMPHIBIANS) 
• BARC Barge, Amphibious Resupply, Cargo (US) 
• DD Tank Duplex Drive Tank (UKfUS) 
• DUKW 1942, Amphibious, Front-, [and] Rear-Wheel Drive (US) 
• LARC Lighter, Amphibious Resupply, Cargo (US) 





















indicates type, e.g., L VT(1), L VT(2), etc.) 
Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Armoured) (US: number in 
parentheses indicates type, e.g., LVT(A)(1), LVT(A)(4), etc.) 
Landing Vehicle, Tracked, [Combat] Engineer (US) 
Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Howitzer (US) 
Landing Vehicle, Tracked, Personnel (US) 
Landing Vehicle, Wheeled (US) 
US: Sikorski-built (S-51; R-5!H-5 'Dragonfly') 
UK: Westland-built ('Dragonfly') 
US: Sikorski-built (S-55; H-19 'Chickasaw') 
UK: Westland-built ('Whirlwind') 
US: Sikorski-built (S-52; H-18 ) 
US: Kaman-built (K-600; H-43 'Huskie') 
US: Sikorski-built (S-56; H-37 'Mojave') 
US: Boeing-Vertol-built (H-46) 
US: Piasecki-built (H-21 'Workhorse'/'Shawnee') 
(see H04S above) 
US: Sikorski-built (S-58; H-34 'Choctaw') 
988 See Polmar, Nonnan, and Floyd D. Kennedy, Jr., Military Helicopters of the World: Military Rotary-Wing Aircraft 
Since 1917 (Annapolis, MD: NIP, 1981), Appendix B. 
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UK: Westland-built ('Wessex') 
• H-1 Bell-built ('Iroquois') 
• H-46 US: Boeing-Vertol-built ('Sea Knight') 
• H-47 US: Boeing-built ('Chinook') 
• H-53 US: Sikorski-built (S-65; 'Sea Stallion') 
• H-54 US: Sikorski-built ('Tarhe') 
Helicopter Letter Designations 
• 1948-1962 
o B: Boeing 
o H: Helicopter 
o K: Kaman (manufacturer) 
o 0: Observation 
o P: Piasecki (manufacturer) 
o R: Transport 
o S: Sikorski (manufacturer) 
o U: Utility 
• 1962- (Prefixes) 
o A: Attack 
o C: Cargo 
o H: Search and Rescue 
o 0: Observation 
o U: Utility 
o V: VIP 
o X: Experimental 




. A number of research facilities were visited to glean the most relevant primary sources. In the 
Umted States, the most valuable repositories were the National Archives and Records Administration in 
College Park, Maryland (NARA) and the Marine Corps Research Centre (MCRC) at the Marine Corps 
University in Quantico, Virginia. Also important were the Marine Corps Historical Center (MCHC) and 
the Naval Historical Center (NHC), both of which were located at the Washington Navy Yard in 
Washington, DC. While the latter facility was recently rechristened as the Navy Historical & Heritage 
Command (NHHC), the former was transferred in its entirety to Quantico and renamed as the Marine 
Corps Historical Division (MCHD). 
NARA houses the official records of the US armed forces and was the best source of diverse 
materials on such matters as concepts and doctrine. The most helpful sources were found in Records Group 
127 (Records of the United States Marine Corps). The MCRC, which houses the Archives Branch (AB), 
retains the famous Historical Amphibious File (HAF) consisting of the most significant documents in the 
evolution of American (naval) amphibious warfare development. The NHHC's Operational Archives 
Branch (OAB) contained the 'Post World War II Command File', in which most amphibious warfare 
doctrinal manuals were located. Finally, the former MCHC's library also housed a considerable number of 
older doctrinal manuals as well as a considerable amount of general historical information on early 
concepts. 
The main source of primary documentation in Britain was the National Archives (NA; formerly 
the Public Record Office-PRO) located in Kew Gardens, London. Of central value were the Combined 
Operations Headquarters and Ministry of Defence file (DEFE 2), the Chiefs of Staff Committee 
memoranda file (DEFE 5). Also valuable were various sources located in the Admiralty (ADM) and War 
Office (WO) files. 
Two other locations in the UK deserve mention. One is the Royal Marines Museum (RMM) in 
Portsmouth, which houses a small but valuable archival research facility. This contained a variety of 
miscellaneous files that included analyses ranging from differences in World War II amphibious technique 
to various examples of amphibious and joint warfare doctrine. The other is the Broadlands Archives (BA) 
located at the University of Southampton, which holds the private papers of Lord Louis Mountbatten. As 
this man served, at one point or another during his extensive career, as Chief of Combined Operations 
(1941-1943), First Sea Lord (1955-1959) and Chief of Defence Staff (1959-1965), some of his attitudes 
and actions had a considerable influence on British developments, both directly and indirectly. 
NOTE: Abbreviations listed below are those that are used throughout the thesis. 
I. PRIMARY MATERIAL 
A. Unpublished 
(i) United Kingdom 
British Library (BL): London, UK 
• Reading Room 
• Manuscripts Reading Room 
Broadlands Archives (BA): Southampton, UK 
Mountbatten Papers (MB 1) 
• MBllB: Fifth Destroyer Flotilla and Combined Operations, 1939-43 
• MBI/C: South East Asia Command, 1943-46 
• MBIII: First Sea Lord, 1955-9 
• MB lIJ: Chief of the Defence Staff, 1959-65 
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National Archives iliA): London, UK 
ADM: Records of Admiralty, Naval Forces, Royal Marines Coastguard and related bodies 







ADM 1: Admiralty, and Ministry of Defence, Navy Department: Correspondence and 
Papers 1660-1976 
ADM 116: Admiralty: Record Office: Cases 1852-1965 
ADM 201: Admiralty and Ministry of Defence: Royal Marine Office: Correspondence 
and Papers 1761-1983 
ADM 202: Admiralty and Ministry of Defence: Royal Marines: War Diaries, Unit 
Diaries, Detachment Reports and Orders 1939-1980 
ADM 205: Admiralty: Office ofthe First Sea Lord, later First Sea Lord and Chief of the 
Naval Staff: Correspondence and Papers 1937-1968 
ADM 219: Admiralty: Directorate of Operational Research and predecessors: Reports 
1917-1980 
• ADM 234: Admiralty, and Ministry of Defence, Navy Department: Reference Books 
(BR Series) 1856-1984 
• ADM 239: Admiralty, and Ministry of Defence, Navy Department: Confidential 
Reference Books (CB Series) 19lO-1985 
AIR: Air records created or inherited by the Air Ministry, the Royal Air Force, and related bodies 
1862-1992 
• AIR 8: Air Ministry and Ministry of Defence: Department of the Chief ofthe Air Staff: 
Registered Files 1916-1982 
• AIR 20: Air Ministry, and Ministry of Defence: Papers accumulated by the Air 
Historical Branch 1874-1983 
CAB: Records of the Ministry of Defence 1808-2010 
• CAB 80: War Cabinet and Cabinet: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Minutes [1939-46] 
DEFE: Records of the Ministry of Defence 1808-2010 
• DEFE 2: Combined Operations Headquarters later Amphibious Warfare Headquarters: 
Records 1937-1963 
• DEFE 4: Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Minutes 1947-1978 
• DEFE 5: Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Memoranda 
• DEFE 6: Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Reports of the Joint Planning 
Staff and successors 1947-1968 
• DEFE 7: Ministry of Defence prior to 1964: Registered Files (General Series) 1942-1976 
• DEFE 11: Ministry of Defence: Chiefs of Staff Committee: Registered Files 1946-1983 
• DEFE l3: Private Office: Registered Files (all Ministers') 1950-2007 
• DEFE 25: Ministry of Defence: Chief of Defence Staff: Registered Files (CDS, SCDS 
and ACDS (OPS) Series) 1957-1981 
• DEFE 69: Ministry of Defence (Navy): Registered Files and Branch Folders 1897-1987 
• DEFE 73: Ministry of Defence: Ministry of Defence Headquarters and Joint Service 
Command: Publications 1962-2000 
WO: Records created or inherited by the War Office, Armed Forces, Judge Advocate General, 
and related bodies 1568-2007 
• WO 32: War Office and successors: Registered Files (General Series) 
• WO 116: Royal Hospital, Chelsea: Disability and Royal Artillery Out-Pensions, 
Admission Books 
• WO 163: War Office and Ministry of Defence and predecessors: War Office Council, 
later War Office Consultative Council, Army Council, Army Board and their various 
committees: Minutes and Papers 1806-1973. 
• WO 216: War Office: Office of the Chief ofthe Imperial General Staff Papers 1935-
1964 
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• WO 276: War Office: East Africa Command: Papers 1902-1964 
• WO 288: War Office: Suez Campaign Headquarters: Papers and War Diaries 1956-1958 
Royal Marines Museum (RMM): Portsmouth, UK 
Archives (Arch) 
• ARCH - Archives Files 
Library (Lib) 
(ii) United States 
Army Historical Center (ARC): Ft. Myers, Washington, DC 
Army Heritage and Educational Center (AHEC): Carlisle Barracks, P A 
Army Heritage Collection Online (ACHO) 
• [ see below] 
Library 
• MHI (Military History Institute) Stacks 
Marine Corps Research Center (MCRC): Quantico, VA 
Archives Branch (AB) 
• EF - Exercise File 
• HAF - Historical Amphibious File 
Library Branch (LB) 
National Archives and Records Administration II (NARA ID: College Park, MD 
RG 127: Records of the United States Marine Corps 
• Administrative Division - Historical Branch (AD-HB) 
o C&RR - Correspondence and Related Records, 1916-66 
o FMFP ACR - FMFP AC Records, 1948-78 
o QSNCMCDIVKI - Quantico Schools, 1947-70 IVarious CMC Documents, 1952-
70N arious Korea Information, 1950-59 
o VHQMCD - Various HQMC Documents, 1951-63 
• Division of Operations and Training (DO&T) 
o RTE&M - Records of Training Exercises and Maneuvers, 1941-50 
• History and Museums Division (H&MD) 
o DP&PMR - Division of Plans and Policies Miscellaneous Records, 1946-81 
o GSF - General Subject File, 1940-53 
o MSF - Miscellaneous Subject File, 1943-80 
o R&ORRKWMO - Reports and Other Records Relating to Korean War Military 
Operations 
o RCRO&P - Reference Compilations Related to Organization and Policy ("Reference 
Notebooks"), 1964-75 
o RG&AU - Records of Ground and Amphibious Units, 1960-86 
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